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Dovzhenko, Stalin, and the (Re)creation of *Shchors*

GEORGE O. LIBER

In his 1939 autobiography, the Soviet Ukrainian filmmaker Oleksander Dovzhenko claimed that the just-released film *Shchors* (on Mykola Shchors, a Red Army commander during the Bolshevik Revolution) was his best. He wrote:

> Working on the script for *Shchors* and shooting the film was the most satisfying experience of my life. It took eleven months to write the script and twenty months to film it. That was a whole lifetime. I put to full use in *Shchors* all the knowledge and experience acquired in twelve years of hard labor. I made it with all my love and strength as a memorial to the people, a token of my love and deep respect for the hero of the great Ukrainian October. I felt that my creative urges were being expressed not in flimsy celluloid, but in durable stone or metal fated to survive the centuries. I wanted to be worthy of the people and of the trust placed in me by the great man [Stalin]. When I fell ill during the work I could not bear the thought that I might not be able to finish it.[1]

But Dovzhenko's filming of *Shchors* had been more complex and more frustrating than this account intimates. In a letter to a close friend written on 8 December 1939, only several days after writing his autobiography, he admitted: "I completed *Shchors*. It was a very difficult film to make and took a good five years of health from me. And I still have not gotten over it."[2]

Dovzhenko did not leave a complete summary of his experiences filming *Shchors*.[3] What descriptions do exist are fragmentary, if not hagiographic, accounts written by others. It becomes obvious when reading between the lines of these narratives that the creation of *Shchors* presented Dovzhenko with his greatest challenge. Stalin's personal involvement in the film's production restricted the full expression of Dovzhenko's creativity. In response, the filmmaker became very frustrated, very angry, depressed, and ill, and even contemplated suicide. Despite official delays and emotional outbursts which paralyzed his work, Dovzhenko completed his project and created a socialist realist film with double meanings.

The film portrays Ukrainian Bolshevik resistance to the intervention forces of the Central Powers in 1918 and to the army of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) commanded by Symon Petliura during the Civil War. Young Mykola Shchors leads the Bohun Brigade and the salty old peasant, Vasyl' Bozhenko, heads the Tarashchansk regiment. Both forces amalgamate under Shchors' command.

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After Kaiser William II's abdication in November 1918, the hopes of German soldiers stationed in Ukraine of returning home are raised, but their officers oppose any such moves. Shchors initiates a policy of fraternization between the Ukrainian and the German enlisted men, which undermines the authority of the German officers; subsequently, the way is cleared for the Germans to leave Ukraine.

The film then centers on Shchor's defeat of Petliura at Chernihiv. The Bolshevik hero soon follows this victory up by capturing Kyiv. A UNR counteroffensive forces Shchors to retreat; he is injured in a battle at Berdychiv. Recuperating with other wounded partisans, Shchors discusses his dreams of the future. The scene then shifts to a distraught Bozhenko who has learned that counterrevolutionary agents murdered his wife; Shchors consoles him. The two leaders regroup and rout an invading Polish army. This victory, however, becomes short-lived. In the summer of 1919, Petliura's troops sweep across Ukraine. Mortally wounded during one of Petliura's attacks, Bozhenko dies. His men carry him to his grave, where Shchors delivers the eulogy. The film ends with Shchors reviewing the troops at his newly established school for Red Army officers.[4]

Although it comprised an unevenly developed plot, *Shchors* conformed to the guidelines set by the official Soviet policy of socialist realism. The film depicts a dedicated, selfless, and zealous revolutionary hero who overcame great odds by his faith in Lenin and by the force of his will. As a politically and militarily infallible protagonist, Shchors dominates the film. When *Shchors* appeared in 1939, it joined a group of films, such as the Vasiliev Brothers' *Chapaev* (1934) and Sergei Eisenstein's *Alexander Nevsky* (1938), that dealt with, as one scholar put it, "powerful individuals from Russian and Soviet history, all of which were designed to provide precedent and legitimation for Stalin's authority."[5]

Dovzhenko completed *Shchors*, his first reinterpretation of the Revolution and Civil War since *Arsenal* in 1929, during the peak of Stalin's power. In creating this film, he skillfully negotiated between the conflicting demands of his own creative muse and Stalin's interpretation of the Revolution and Civil War. In doing so, he took great risks and managed to square the circle, but at great emotional cost to himself.

Stalin's Initiative

As he edited *Aerograd* at the end of 1934, Dovzhenko hoped to start shooting two new films in 1935: *Tsar* (described as "a social satire based on the Imperialist War of 1914–1918") and *Paradise Lost and Found* ("about a new ice age").[6] But Stalin had other plans for the filmmaker.

During the fifteenth-anniversary celebrations of Soviet cinematography in early 1935, the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) of the Supreme Soviet honored Dovzhenko, together with the film director Vsevolod Pudovkin and

Boris Shumiatskii, the head of the Main Administration of the Soviet Cinema Industry. As M. I. Kalinin, TsIK's chairman and the nominal president of the USSR, awarded Dovzhenko the Order of Lenin on 27 February 1935, Stalin, who stood close to the podium, allegedly remarked of the filmmaker, "he has an obligation—to create a Ukrainian Chapaev."[7]

Chapaev appeared in 1934 and became extremely popular, selling over 50 million tickets in five years.[8] The film celebrates a newly resurrected hero of the Civil War, V. I. Chapaev, who commands a rifle division against various anti-Bolshevik armies. Chapaev, an uneducated peasant who fights courageously, possesses good political instincts and understands that the Bolsheviks represent the future. But without the guidance of their representative, the commissar, Chapaev would have been defeated. Under the commissar's watchful eye, Chapaev's class consciousness grows and he wins on the battlefield. Although he ultimately dies a heroic death in battle at the end of the film, his Red Army division triumphs. Thus, the hero might die, but the cause is invincible.[9] In suggesting that Dovzhenko make a film about a Ukrainian Chapaev, Stalin was, in effect, proposing that Dovzhenko cinematographically flesh out a highly sensitive topic—the Revolution and Civil War—which the Communist Party had begun to reinterpret along revisionist (Stalinist) lines by the early 1930s.

Following the presentation of the awards, Stalin asked Dovzhenko if he knew of Mykola Oleksandrovych Shchors and his significance. When Dovzhenko affirmed that he did, the Soviet ruler then advised him to "think about him."[10]

Dovzhenko had little choice but to agree to Stalin's proposal of producing a film on the Bolshevik military leader. On 12 March 1935, Dovzhenko publicly revealed for the first time that his next film would deal with Shchors, who hitherto had not been among the best known of Bolshevik figures in Ukraine.[11] Indeed, before 27 February 1935, most Soviet journalists and scholars could not identify Shchors. But after *Pravda* published (on 5 March) Stalin's remarks from the aforementioned fifteenth-anniversary conclave, which raised Shchors to cult hero status, they instantly "discovered" Shchors and reevaluated his contributions to the Bolshevik cause. Shchors now became "one of the organizers and commanders of the first units of the Red Army in Ukraine." Together with the help of the "fraternal Russian people and the heroic units of the Red Army," this Ukrainian Bolshevik liberated Ukraine "from counterrevolution."[12]

These hyperbolic declarations, however, contradicted historical reality. Shchors was born on 25 May 1895 in the village of Snovs'ke (now Shchors) in the Horodnia county of the province of Chernihiv. The son of a railway mechanic, he completed his education at a school run by the Russian railway administration. He then received training as a military medic, serving in this capacity at the beginning of the First World War. After completing officer training school in 1915, he became a junior officer in the tsarist army.[13]

It is unclear when Shchors developed his Bolshevik sympathies, but he certainly identified with the Communist cause by September 1918, when he formed the pro-Soviet Bohun Brigade. In February 1919 his unit helped to capture Kyiv, and in March 1919 he became the commander of the First Soviet Ukrainian Division.[14]

Although Shchors clearly did participate in the Revolution and the Civil War, he did not play the central role the Party claimed of him after February 1935. Shchors was, in fact, a rather problematic hero. In August 1919, one month short of his death, Red Army military inspectors complained that Shchors, who had earlier objected to former tsarist officers giving him orders, had an inflated ego and was not qualified to be a division commander.[15] These same inspectors further argued that Shchors should be held responsible for his unit's defeat and face trial before a revolutionary court.[16]

Despite such evidence against him, Stalin's Party machine insisted on representing Shchors as a selfless Bolshevik revolutionary hero. Reviving a secondary figure from the Civil War's memory hole, Stalin exaggerated Shchors' accomplishments, not unlike the way the Party leader magnified his own feats. Now Dovzhenko had to apply Stalin's interpretation to film.

In order to coherently portray this myth, Dovzhenko had to gather details about the new Bolshevik hero. His research became extensive. Already in mid-March 1935, Dovzhenko met with several groups of veterans from Shchors' division then living in Moscow and listened "attentively" to their stories. He also heard the reminiscences of Mykola Shchors' brother, Hryhorii. In addition, Dovzhenko received over 13,000 letters and brief memoirs from all across the USSR from veterans who had served under Shchors.[17]

On 28 April 1935, Dovzhenko traveled to Kyiv in order to examine the materials that the Ukrainfilm's Historico-Literary Bureau had gathered on Shchors after Stalin proclaimed him the "Ukrainian Chapaev."[18] Dovzhenko's trip of April 1935, his first to Ukraine since his departure from there in late 1932, went well. He arrived triumphantly, having become Stalin's client in the spring of 1933 and having his mission to produce a film about Shchors publicized extensively in the spring of 1935.[19] For nearly a year, until March 1936, Dovzhenko traveled back and forth between Moscow and Kyiv in order to work on *Shchors*. As he proceeded to research Shchors, Dovzhenko continued to edit *Aerograd* (until November 1935).[20] Working on these two projects simultaneously, Dovzhenko likely pushed himself to the brink of exhaustion.

The combination of meetings, letters, and research trips generated an enormous volume of "facts" concerning Shchors. According to one newspaper correspondent who observed him, Dovzhenko often selected only a phrase or an allusion from these mountains of paper in order to create the Bolshevik commander's personal and professional characteristics.[21] After receiving 38 thick files on Shchors from Ukrainfilm's Historico-Literary Bureau, the film-maker claimed that they described "the same things six, eight, and ten times, but in different ways . . . I am beginning slowly to become aware that those

who remember, 'remember' for a certain reason . . . I must admit that there is not one exact episode. I created everything."[22]

Written shortly after Stalin constructed the cult of Shchors, the reminiscences and memoirs appeared inconsistent to Dovzhenko. In light of the public campaign, the memoirs most likely delivered positive versions of the past, providing "facts" and vignettes which Shchors' former comrades-in-arms anticipated would please those collecting the memoirs. But the "facts" were insufficient: Dovzhenko needed to establish a coherent vision.

Building on the memoirs' fictions, Dovzhenko established a framework for Shchors' revolutionary activities. In doing so, he created an even greater fiction than Stalin's. For personal and professional reasons, he hoped that Stalin would be pleased.

Dovzhenko had good reason to be concerned. Between 27 February 1935, when Stalin first presented his idea to Dovzhenko, and March 1939, when the film finally appeared, the Soviet leader met with Dovzhenko several times. The first meeting took place in Stalin's Kremlin office on 22 May 1935. Initially, the Soviet leader asked the filmmaker questions about *Aerograd.* He then focused on *Shchors.*[23] Stalin, according to Dovzhenko's account, repeated that he only suggested that the filmmaker consider making a film about Shchors. Dovzhenko was not obliged to do so, Stalin claimed. If he had other plans, then he should work on them.

Dovzhenko thanked Stalin for his concern, but replied that the idea of making a film about Shchors excited him. At this meeting Stalin spoke much about Shchors, about the differences between Shchors and Chapaev, and about the challenges in creating a film about this Civil War hero.[24]

Stalin proposed that the film portray the struggle of the Ukrainian people with the "Ukrainian counterrevolution and with the German and Polish occupiers for their social and national liberation." At the same time, it was necessary "to show the Ukrainian people, especially their national character, their humor, their beautiful songs and dances."[25] The Soviet leader wanted to remind the director that *Shchors*, Dovzhenko's first film dealing with a Ukrainian topic in three years, should reflect the new Soviet interpretations of the Ukrainian past. Ukrainian songs and dances would provide the national form; the message, however, had to possess a socialist content.

Most importantly, the film would present a revisionist message: that the Ukrainians were an integral part of the Bolshevik Revolution and that they, assisted by the "fraternal Russian people" and the "heroic units of the Red Army," won the struggle against Ukrainian, Polish, and German counterrevolutionaries. *Shchors* would commemorate a Ukrainian Bolshevik leader and suggest that the efforts of the Ukrainians themselves, not a reliance on Bolshevik intervention from Russia, constituted the primary source of the Communist victory in Ukraine.

At the end of the meeting, Stalin mentioned a recently released record of Ukrainian folk songs. "Have you heard this record?" he asked the filmmaker.

"No, I haven't," Dovzhenko replied. "I don't have a record player."

An hour after Dovzhenko returned home from the Kremlin, the filmmaker received a record player, a gift from the Soviet leader. In an interview published shortly after this meeting, Dovzhenko claimed that he would keep the record player to the end of his life. "In what other country would workers and artists, scholars and authors," he asked rhetorically, "feel such a direct intimacy with their beloved leader and feel our glorious Party's and Comrade Stalin's daily concerns?"[26]

But in the company of his closest friends, Dovzhenko asserted that Stalin gave him the record player and the Ukrainian record to remind the filmmaker of his nationalist past.[27] Stalin most likely knew of Dovzhenko's service in Petliura's army and of his arrest and conviction in 1919.[28] His gift represented a warning shot: if Dovzhenko did not produce a film that conformed to the Party leader's standards (according to the filmmaker's interpretation of Stalin's motivations behind the gift), then trouble would follow.

Searching for an Interpretation

Not surprisingly, the filmmaker experienced problems in the making of *Shchors*. During the course of its production, Dovzhenko's loyalty and political reliability came into serious question. His emotional stability deteriorated; fears, anxieties, and feelings of insecurity weakened him.

He often became ill for long periods. On 22 April 1937, Dovzhenko wrote a letter to his friend, Vsevolod Vyshnevskii, in which he mentioned his poor health: "I have a sclerosis of my blood vessels, especially in my head and aorta. I do not feel well. I quickly get tired and do not always think clearly."[29] In order to take advantage of the winter weather necessary for critical scenes in the film, Dovzhenko had begun to film *Shchors* before the authorities had completely approved his screenplay. He hoped to save an entire year; the winter scenes were close to completion when Shumiatskii ordered Dovzhenko to stop.[30]

After a four-month illness (from September 1937 until January 1938), Dovzhenko started to film the now officially approved scenes.[31] Coronary disease then confined Dovzhenko to bed for three months in 1938.[32] Following the production of *Shchors* in March 1939, he again became sick and did not recover until September 1939.[33] The conflict between Dovzhenko's wish to conform and his desire to preserve his own creative integrity may have caused his illnesses.

In seeking to implement Stalin's suggestion, Dovzhenko feared that the actors he had selected, especially those in the primary roles, might not please the Soviet leader. After completing half the film with one actor in the title role, Dovzhenko started anew with another.[34] Finally, in the fall of 1937, the filmmaker chose a third actor, Ievgenii Samoilov, to play Shchors.[35] A Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del (NKVD) intelligence officer provided a

very perceptive report of the director's inability to find a good actor to play the main hero: "I think that Dovzhenko's dissatisfaction with the actors who played Shchors has a more complex reason than the incompatibility of this or that actor. Dovzhenko's creative dissatisfaction with the image of Shchors caused this hypercriticism."[36]

Perhaps. But Dovzhenko experienced a much greater frustration in the late 1930s. The historical context behind Shchors' image constantly changed. Between 1935 and 1939 Soviet historians rewrote the official history of the Revolution and Civil War, erasing the contributions of recent purge victims and replacing them with the newly expanded roles played by Lenin and Stalin. Dovzhenko's project became an integral part of this revisionist process. Censors, for example, arbitrarily altered sequences to conform to the latest changes in the official record.[37] Most importantly, Dovzhenko had to second-guess the contours of what was politically acceptable.

This had been Dovzhenko's problem with *Earth* (1930) and *Ivan* (1932). Over the course of their long-term production the Party changed course and left Dovzhenko, who could not transform his films as quickly as the Politburo could issue decrees, open to attack.

The Stalinist regime in the 1930s forced the filmmaker to submit every decision and every episode to groups of people "who knew what Stalin wanted." These critics, for example, asserted that Stalin wished Dovzhenko to show that Shchors' staff was better than Chapaev's; averred that the Soviet leader wanted Dovzhenko to depict a peasant insurrection in the film; expressed the hope that Dovzhenko would use Stalin's remarks concerning the national question; and strongly suggested that Dovzhenko make Shchors the leading political representative of the Leninist-Stalinist nationalities policy in Ukraine.[38]

D. V. Petrovs'kyi, a writer and a veteran of the First Soviet Ukrainian Division who knew Shchors personally, reviewed the screenplay and excerpts from scenes Dovzhenko had shot. He claimed that Dovzhenko fleshed out Bozhenko more than he did Shchors. Petrovs'kyi asserted that Arkadii Kisliakov, the second of the three actors who portrayed Shchors, did not fit the role and needed to be replaced. Most importantly, Petrovs'kyi professed that the portrayal of Shchors dying in the arms of Ivan Dubovyi—his second-in-command—the climactic moment in one of the earlier versions of the film, proved highly unsatisfactory. It "does not uplift the viewer." In order to arouse the viewer's enthusiasm, Petrovs'kyi suggested that Dovzhenko add a revolutionary call to arms, such as "Let's recapture Kyiv!" to this scene. In the film's final frames, according to Petrovs'kyi, the First Soviet Ukrainian Division, inspired by Shchors' death, should retake Kyiv. This, Petrovs'kyi concluded, would be the proper cinematic response.[39]

In addition to these critics, Dovzhenko experienced more late-night meetings with Stalin, some of which were not as pleasant as the first few. The filmmaker later told friends about one frightening incident in Stalin's office,

when the Soviet leader refused to speak to Dovzhenko and when Beria accused him of joining a nationalist conspiracy.[40]

It is unclear why Stalin and Beria were angry with the filmmaker. But perhaps it had to do with the portrayal—or lack thereof—of Stalin's role. At the height of Stalin's "cult of personality," it was difficult to portray a hero of the Ukrainian people who did not mention Stalin.[41] Or perhaps Dovzhenko received orders to include Stalin in his film, but did not comply.[42] Most likely, however, the cultural commissars imagined Stalin's inclusion to be an unspoken assumption and realized that the filmmaker did not understand this new political custom. Whatever the reason for the official displeasure, the expectation of subscription to Stalin's personality cult remained as ever before; Dovzhenko, however, did not conform.

In his own defense, the filmmaker claimed that he could not introduce a scene of Stalin or characters discussing him without violating the historical or artistic truth of the film's material.[43] During the Civil War Shchors did not report to Stalin. Few rank and file soldiers even knew of Stalin at the time. In the scenes portraying Shchors' talks with his own troops (who would not have been able to identify Stalin, a member of the Party's inner circle since 1912), Dovzhenko could not show his hero equating Stalin with Lenin.

The filmmaker also did not include a scene where Shchors allegedly met Lenin. If he had captured this scene on film, he would have had to conform to the custom established by Soviet filmmakers in the 1930s of assigning Stalin to Lenin's side. Instead, according to one of Dovzhenko's colleagues, the filmmaker chose to do otherwise. "I did not want to show this," Dovzhenko told this colleague. "I therefore only limited myself to Shchors' mentioning his conversation with Lenin."[44] Stalin's absence from *Shchors* raised the issue of Dovzhenko's true feelings for the Party leader.

Dovzhenko's situation became more precarious after the arrest of Ivan Dubovyi, Shchors' former deputy, in early 1938 and his subsequent execution on 29 July 1938. An important Red Army officer, Dubovyi commanded the First Soviet Ukrainian Division, which he handed over to Shchors in the spring of 1919. After Shchors' death, he again commanded this division. From 1924 he commanded the Kyiv Rifle Corps, then in 1929 became deputy commander of the Ukrainian Military District (under Iona Iakir) and, after a reorganization in 1935, the commander of the Kharkiv Military District.[45] Dubovyi befriended Dovzhenko and became a military consultant for *Shchors* and also a character in the film.

Dubovyi's relationship with Iakir marked him. After the arrest, trial, and hasty execution of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (the deputy commissar of defense), of Iakir, and other important military commanders on 11 June 1937, Stalin called for the extermination of "enemies of the people" in the army.[46] Stalin's subordinates suspected that Dubovyi had made unauthorized contacts with Germans and Ukrainian nationalists abroad.[47] Arrested in early 1938,

Dubovyi confessed that he killed Shchors in battle "in order to take his place as commander of the division."[48]

We can only imagine Dovzhenko's vulnerability following Dubovyi's arrest, confession, and execution, especially since the arrest took place in Dovzhenko's presence at the Kyiv Film Studios.[49] In essence, the NKVD arrested Dovzhenko's own military advisor in the middle of production and "unmasked" him as the murderer of the film's title character.

This Kafkaesque turn of events not only complicated the conclusion of the film, but also put Dovzhenko in grave danger. Before Dubovyi's arrest, the director envisioned Shchors to be dying on the battlefield and passing his command over to Dubovyi. Now, in order to save his own skin, Dovzhenko had to rewrite and to refilm *Shchors*.[50]

Dubovyi now became Dovzhenko's central problem. Shchors' deputy could not appear in the film, unless Dovzhenko presented him as "an enemy of the people"; Dovzhenko, however, felt that Dubovyi had been unjustly treated and executed.[51]

Dovzhenko did not want to portray Dubovyi killing Shchors in his film. But if the filmmaker did not want to follow the official interpretation, he had to edit Dubovyi out of the film. Once he excluded Dubovyi, then the cinematic Shchors could live beyond 30 August 1919, the date Shchors died. In a paradoxical manner, the only way that Dovzhenko could deal honestly with Shchors' death was to deny that it happened.

Although the filmmaker did not have much room to maneuver, he sought to deal honestly with other issues beyond Stalin's representation on the screen and Dubovyi's relationship with Shchors. Despite the fiction of the film's overall interpretation, that nationally conscious Ukrainians constituted the core supporters of the Bolshevik victory in Ukraine, Dovzhenko's use of Ukrainian folklore ukrainianized the film. Although the film met the guidelines, "national in form, socialist in content," the Ukrainian songs and dances overshadowed the revolutionary content in this "revolutionary film."

At the end of the screenplay and the film, Dovzhenko had Shchors observe a parade of future Red Army officers at the military academy he headed. In the screenplay, Shchors asserted before a group of visiting inspector-generals who wanted to send his students into a hopeless battle: "I will not send my school of Red commanders into battle. I will lose a division, but will save my commanders, and I'll have a division! A corps! An army!"[52] In one of the versions of the film, a narrator's voice concluded: "If Red commanders exist, then there is a Red Army." In and of itself, the statement reflected reality. But in the late 1930s, when the security organs arrested and executed tens of thousands of Soviet military leaders, might not this statement be an attack against Stalin?[53] Two years after Dovzhenko released *Shchors*, when German armies swept across the Soviet Union, it was obvious that a Red Army capable of effectively defending the USSR did not exist.

Although Dovzhenko did not have much creative flexibility under Stalin's shadow, his art, personal charisma, and his stubborn persistence allowed him to present his own covert interpretation of Soviet history on the screen. He adhered to the overall Stalinist interpretation, but undermined it by including scenes with double meanings. Dovzhenko succeeded in completing the film, but at the cost of his own physical health and of his own emotional equilibrium.

Emotional Breakdown

By the summer of 1938 Dovzhenko, especially when inebriated, could not disguise his rage against the restrictions Stalin had imposed on him. In a conversation recorded by the Kharkiv Oblast NKVD and relayed to Beria, Dovzhenko expressed his fury against the Soviet authorities, Ukrainians, and the Party. In light of the purges, he claimed that he could not distinguish between the legitimate Soviet authorities and the "enemies of the people," who hid everywhere. He cursed Dubovyi, whose arrest had caused Dovzhenko to reshoot his nearly completed film. He damned Ukrainians, whom he claimed were all "traitors." Further, he asserted that Ukrainians did not possess a native culture because the authorities feared the emergence of an independent Ukrainian culture. The authorities stereotyped the creators of an indigenous Ukrainian culture as "potential enemies." As a result of these prejudices, Ukrainian cultural workers became "martyrs at Golgotha."

Dovzhenko then condemned the Party: "What kind of party is this? Why does it contain so many traitors? All of its leaders are traitors." Dovzhenko then maintained that it was easier for Shchors to get rid of the Germans in 1918 than it was for him to make a film about the Bolshevik hero. "Let them allow me to work!" he cried out.[54] During a meeting of Party members at the Kyiv Film Studio on 19 October 1938, Dovzhenko's colleagues criticized the filmmaker for his lack of self-criticism, his slow pace, his waste of film, and his cost overruns. Dovzhenko snapped and retorted that it was better "to die than to listen to such criticism."[55] Responding hysterically to his critics, he yelled, "I hate you!"[56] Inasmuch as a director no longer had the right to change the screenplay during the actual shooting of the film, Dovzhenko complained that this restricted his "creative possibilities." Upset by these constraints, Dovzhenko threatened to change careers. After regaining his composure, he admitted that directors needed to follow this rule, but he did not have the strength to do so. He then said that he would finish the picture when he could. No one had the right to rush him, he protested. He then abruptly walked out of the meeting.[57]

Not surprisingly, Dovzhenko remarked that life was "very difficult" for him during this period. He often declared that he did not want to live[58] and often threatened suicide, before and after Dubovyi's arrest.[59]

In the course of creating *Shchors*, Dovzhenko had many discussions with leading Party and government officials other than Stalin. They included Panas

Liubchenko (who committed suicide in 1937, after being accused of heading a counterrevolutionary nationalist organization in Ukraine), Stanislav Kosior (executed in 1938), Pavel Postyshev (executed in 1938), Boris Shumiatskii (purged in 1938), Nikolai Yezhov (arrested in 1939 and shot in 1940), Hryhorii Petrovs'kyi, and Nikita Khrushchev, who served as the first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine from 1938 until March 1947.

These meetings at the height of the purges must have heightened Dovzhenko's sense of insecurity and fears for his future. As he read the morning newspapers with their denunciations of those purged, he may have been pleased with the demise of his tormentors. But he also must have come to the realization that if the security organs arrested, tried, and executed his supervisors, then he could not be far behind on the blacklist. Once on a list, always on a list.

Success

Dovzhenko terminated the filming of *Shchors* in the fall of 1938 and immediately started editing the raw footage. On 4 March 1939, he brought his final version to the Committee of Cinematography in Moscow for approval.[60] When the first official viewing of the film took place, he lay on the sofa in an adjoining room and cried.[61] Semen Dukel'skii, the man who replaced Shumiatskii, saw the film with his assistant, but abruptly left the screening room when it ended, not sparing a moment to discuss the film with Dovzhenko. He immediately took the film "to the higher-ups"; only after they praised Dovzhenko's final version did Dukel'skii admit that he enjoyed the picture.[62]

Two weeks later, on 19 March 1939, delegates to the Eighteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party in Moscow saw *Shchors* for the first time.[63] The film officially premiered on 2–3 April 1939 at the Cinema Building in Moscow. The audience, which included Sergei Eisenstein and other famous Soviet directors, responded enthusiastically.[64] On 1 May 1939, *Shchors* premiered in Kyiv and became a popular film throughout the USSR, selling 31 million tickets.[65] Dovzhenko took great pride in his accomplishment and considered it his best film.[66] Stalin agreed.

Dovzhenko's completion of *Shchors* resuscitated Stalin's faith in the filmmaker and brought him many rewards: in the spring of 1939 Dovzhenko became a member of the Union of Soviet Writers; in November he received the title of Honored Artist of the Arts of the Ukrainian SSR; in December he won election to the Kyiv City Council; in the fall of 1940 the All-Union Committee on Cinematography appointed him the artistic director of the Kyiv Film Studios; and, finally, in March 1941 he received the Stalin Prize, First Class category, for his film.[67] But most importantly, the authorities allowed the filmmaker to live and work in Ukraine. Only one prize eluded Dovzhenko—reinstatement in the Communist Party.[68]

Shchors became Dovzhenko's political triumph, but at a heavy psychological cost to the great artist.

NOTES

N.B. The Ukrainian archival citations of *fond/opys/sprava/*pages and the Russian equivalents of *fond/opis'/delo/*pages are rendered in the form 00/00/00/00.

1. Marco Carynnyk, trans. and annotator, "Alexander Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 19(1) Summer 1994: 25–26.
2. Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv-muzei literatury i mystetstva Ukraïny (hereafter TsDA-MLMU), 690/3/7/16–17; Oleksander Dovzhenko, *Tvory v p'iaty tomakh*, vol. 5 (Kyiv, 1966), p. 343.
3. If one is to believe Dovzhenko's diary entry of 10 April 1944, this film was very difficult to produce: "Write down the story of how *Shchors* was filmed from beginning to end: the parts played by Shumiatsky, Panas, and Koshara; the talk with Budyonny at Panas' summer cottage; reading the script at the Ukrainian Politburo; shooting the film; Dubovyi's arrest; X's phone call about the new version of Shchors' death; the trip to Moscow to see Stalin; how I conceived the ending of the film, etc., while filming *Shchors* I came down with a chest ailment; the film in Moscow; the "reception" at Dukelsky's; the reception at Stalin's." Alexander Dovzhenko, *The Poet as Filmmaker: Selected Writings*, ed., trans., and with an introduction by Marco Carynnyk (Cambridge, MA, 1973), p. 106. Dovzhenko, unfortunately, never described all of his experiences in filming *Shchors*.
4. This summary of the film's content is based on the excellent overview provided in Vance Kepley, Jr., *In the Service of the State: The Cinema of Alexander Dovzhenko* (Madison, WI, 1986), p. 122. Kepley devotes chap. 9 of his book (pp. 121–34) to *Shchors*. Dovzhenko's screenplays of *Shchors* appeared in A. Dovzhenko, *Izbrannoe* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 94–160; Oleksander Dovzhenko, *Tvory v tr'okh tomakh*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1958), pp. 129–214; Oleksander Dovzhenko, *Tvory v p'iaty tomakh*, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 1964), pp. 101–79; Aleksandr Dovzhenko, *Sobranie sochinenii v chetyrekh tomakh*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1966), pp. 180–252; Oleksander Dovzhenko, *Tvory v p'iaty tomakh*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1983), pp. 161–233; and Oleksander Dovzhenko, *Kinopovisti, opovidannia* (Kyiv, 1986), pp. 83–159.
5. Kepley, *In the Service of the State*, p. 122.
6. *Kino* [Moscow] 1934 (59); cited in M. V. Kutsenko, *Storinky zhyttia i tvorchosti O. P. Dovzhenka* (Kyiv, 1975), p. 100.
7. "Ukrainskii Chapaev," *Pravda* 5 March 1935: 6.

8. John David Rimberg, *The Motion Picture in the Soviet Union: 1918–1952, A Sociological Analysis* (New York, 1973), p. 202; cited in Peter Kenez, *Cinema and Soviet Society, 1917–1953* (Cambridge, England and New York, 1992), p. 172.

9. Kenez, *Cinema and Soviet Society*, pp. 172–76.

10. "Ukrainskii Chapaev," p. 6.

11. Kutsenko, *Storinky zhyttia*, p. 104.

12. I. L. Hoshuliak, "90-richchia z dnia narodzhennia M. O. Shchorsa," *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 1985 (6): 115–19; cited in Oleksander Fesenko, "Iak tvoryvsia mif pro 'ukraïns'koho Chapaieva,'" *Literaturna Ukraïna* 17 August 1989: 8. The most popular interpretation of Shchors appeared in *Bol'shaia sovetskaia èntsiklopediia* (cited hereafter as *BSE*), 2nd ed., vol. 48 (Moscow, 1957), p. 277.

13. *BSE*, 2nd ed., p. 277.

14. Ibid.

15. See the quote in Fesenko, "Iak tvoryvsia mif pro 'ukraïns'koho Chapaieva,'" p. 8.

16. "Nikolai Shchors — legenda i real'nost'," *Iskusstvo kino* 1990 (9): 116.

17. Kutsenko, *Storinky zhyttia i tvorchosti O. P. Dovzhenka*, p. 104; and "Narodzhennia fil'mu pro Shchorsa," *Proletars'ka pravda* 17 April 1936; cited in Kutsenko, *Storinky zhyttia*, p. 119.

18. Kutsenko, *Storinky zhyttia*, p. 106; Fesenko, "Iak tvoryvsia mif," p. 8.

19. Aleksandr Rutkovskii, "Grad nebesnyi Aleksandra Dovzhenko," *Zerkalo nedeli* (Kyiv) 9 December 1995: 15.

20. Kutsenko, *Storinky zhyttia*, p. 118.

21. "Narodzhennia fil'mu pro Shchorsa"; cited in Kutsenko, *Storinky zhyttia* p. 119.

22. Fesenko, "Iak tvoryvsia mif," p. 8. A group of four surviving veterans from the 44th Soviet Ukrainian Division (later renamed the First Soviet Ukrainian Division) in 1918–1920 confirmed that the memoirs collected in the 1930s were "full of lies" and "historically unfounded." See "Nikolai Shchors—legenda i real'nost'," pp. 109–117. These veterans provided a point-by-point refutation of many of the myths surrounding Shchors, including the "fact" that Shchors met Lenin (p. 110), that he received telegrams from the Soviet leader (p. 112), and that he joined the Bolsheviks in the fall of 1918 (p. 111).

23. The only accounts of this meeting are Dovzhenko's: "Na prieme u tov. Stalina. Beseda s rezhisserom A. Dovzhenko," *Vecherniaia Moskva* 26 May 1935; and A. P. Dovzhenko, "Uchitel' i drug khudozhnika,"

Iskusstvo kino 1937 (10): 15–16. Stalin's Kremlin office appointment book confirms this meeting: "Posetiteli kremlevskogo kabineta I. V. Stalina," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 1995 (3): 167.

24. Dovzhenko, "Uchitel'," p. 15.
25. Ibid., p. 16.
26. Ibid.
27. This passage appeared in the unpublished memoirs of F. Soluianova, cited in Rutkovskii, "Grad nebesnyi," p. 15.
28. The documents compiled by the Cheka and the NKVD on Dovzhenko were published only recently (unfortunately, not in whole) in Ukraine: "Zakliuchenie po delu No. 112 na Dovzhenko Aleksandra Petrovicha, 25 let" and "Sovershenno sekretno. Spravka," in V'iacheslav Popyk, ed., "Pid sofitamy sekretnykh sluzhb," *Z arkhiviv VUChK-HPU-NKVD-KHD* 1995 (1/2): 237–39, 241–42; and V. Popyk, "Pid sofitamy VChK-DPU-NKVS-NKDB-KDB," *Dnipro* 1995 (9/10): 21–60.
29. Dovzhenko, *Tvory v p'iaty tomakh*, vol. 5 (Kyiv, 1966), p. 337.
30. Ibid.
31. *Za bil'shovyts'kyi fil'm* 1938 (7); cited in Kutsenko, *Storinky zhyttia,* p.130. Also see Aleksandr Dovzhenko, "Ia poterpel bol'shoi uron v zhizni," *Iskusstvo kino* 1990 (9): 124n.
32. "Alexander Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," p. 26n.
33. Ivan Koshelivets', *Oleksander Dovzhenko: Sproba tvorchoï biohrafiï* (Munich, 1980), p. 220.
34. "Alexander Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," p. 26n.
35. The Kyiv theater actor, Mykola Makarenko (February–March 1937), the Moscow theater actor, Arkadii Kisliakov (May–summer 1937), and, finally, the Moscow actor, Ievgenii Samoilov (in the fall of 1937–1938), played Shchors. Lazar Bodyk, *Dzherela velykoho kino: Spohady pro O. P. Dovzhenka* (Kyiv, 1965), pp. 95–124; Aleksei Mishurin, "Na s'emkakh Shchorsa," in *Dovzhenko v vospominaniiakh sovremennikov* (Moscow, 1982), pp. 103, 107–108; and O. Mishurin, "Polum'iane sertse," in M. Kovalenko and O. Mishurin, *Syn zacharovanoï Desny* (Kyiv, 1984), pp. 148, 170, 196–98.
36. Popyk, "Pid sofitamy sekretnykh sluzhb," p. 260.
37. Kepley, *In the Service of the State,* p. 122.
38. Rossiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstva (hereafter RGALI), Moscow, 2081/ 1/ 941/ 2, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16.
39. RGALI, 2081/1/ 941/2, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16.

40. Jay Leyda, *Kino: A History of the Russian and Soviet Film*, 3rd ed. (Princeton, NJ, 1983), p. 354.
41. I. Rachuk, "Èsteticheskie vzgliady Aleksandra Dovzhenko," *Baikal* 1962 (1): 115–16.
42. Ibid., p. 116.
43. Ibid.
44. Oleksander Hryshchenko, *Z berehiv zacharovanoï Desny* (Kyiv, 1964), p. 193.
45. For an outline of Dubovyi's career, see *The Stalinist Terror in the Thirties: Documentation from the Soviet Press,* Borys Lewytzkyj, comp. (Stanford, CA, 1974), pp. 117–18; and Koshelivets', *Oleksander Dovzhenko,* p. 209. For a standard Soviet biography, see N. S. Kheryshev, *Komandarm Dubovoi* (Kyiv, 1986). Kheryshev's biography does not mention Dubovyi's arrest or execution.
46. Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*, revised and expanded edition (New York, 1989), pp. 420–21.
47. Pavel Sudaplatov and Anatoli Sudaplatov, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster* (Boston and New York, 1994), pp. 21–22.
48. N. S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, with an introduction, commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw (Boston, 1970), p. 88.
49. Tat'iana Derevianko, the head of the Museum at the Kyiv Film Studios, related this to me during the summer of 1996.
50. Koshelivets', *Oleksander Dovzhenko,* pp. 209–10.
51. Bodyk, *Dzherela velykoho kino,* p. 107. Shortly before his own death in November 1956, Dovzhenko expressed his pleasure that the Party had restored Dubovyi's honor.
52. Dovzhenko, *Tvory v p'iaty tomakh*, vol. 2, p. 178; and Dovzhenko, *Kinopovisti, opovidannia,* p. 149.
53. Leonid Cherevatenko and Anatolii Lemysh, "Dovzhenko v pritsele VChK-OGPU-NKVD-KGB: K stoletiiu so dnia rozhdeniia A. P. Dovzhenko," *Kievskie vedomosti* 3 September 1994: 3. The quote from the narrator comes from this source.
54. TsDA-MLMU, 1196/2/7/1–6; also cited in Popyk, "Pid sofitamy sekretnykh sluzhb," pp. 261–63.
55. TsDA-MLMU, 1196/2/8/1 and 1196/2/4/1–6; also cited in Popyk, "Pid sofitamy sekretnykh sluzhb," pp. 261–63.

56. TsDA-MLMU, 1196/2/4/4; Popyk, "Pid sofitamy sekretnykh sluzhb," pp. 261–63.
57. TsDA-MLMU, 1196/2/4/4–5; Popyk, "Pid sofitamy sekretnykh sluzhb," pp. 261–63.
58. TsDA-MLMU, 1196/2/4/3.
59. Koshelivets', *Oleksander Dovzhenko*, pp. 207–208. See Dovzhenko's April 1937 letter to Vsevolod Vishnevskii, in Dovzhenko's *Tvory v p'iaty tomakh*, vol. 5 , pp. 336–39.
60. *Moskovskii bol'shevik* 5 March 1939; cited in Kutsenko, p. 134.
61. Rachuk, "Ėsteticheskie vzgliady Aleksandra Dovzhenko," p. 116.
62. Bodyk, *Dzherela velykoho kino,* p. 151.
63. *Kino* 1939 (14); cited in Kutsenko, *Storinky zhyttia,* p. 135.
64. Kutsenko, *Storinky zhyttia,* p. 135.
65. RGALI, 2409/1/56; cited in Kutsenko, *Storinky zhyttia,* p. 137.
66. "Alexander Dovzhenko's 1939 Autobiography," p. 25.
67. Kutsenko, *Storinky zhyttia,* pp. 133–53.
68. Dovzhenko became a member of the Communist Party of Ukraine in early 1920 under mysterious circumstances. In the summer of 1923, when he studied in Germany, the Party did not renew his membership. I deal with this matter in my manuscript, *Triple Exposure: Alexander Dovzhenko's Ukrainian Visions, Soviet Illusions, and Stalinist Realities*, chaps. 2–3.

Ukraine and Germany: Toward a New Partnership?

ANGELA STENT

The results of Ukraine's second postcommunist presidential election in November 1999 may be interpreted as a popular vote of endorsement for continuing a policy of integration with the West.[1] President Leonid Kuchma, serving his second term, described the election as "a second referendum on Ukrainian independence" and stressed the importance of Ukraine's European choice. He pledged to seek membership in the European Union (EU) while strengthening Ukraine's relationship with both Russia and the United States. "The European future of Ukraine," he explained, "is inseparable from its strategic partnership with Russia."[2] As the West endeavors to ensure that the new Ukrainian government abides by promises to pursue reform, Germany will play a pivotal role in nurturing Ukraine's relations with Europe. The Schroeder-Fischer government has said it would conduct a more active policy toward Ukraine than previously. The decade ahead may see the realization of improved Ukrainian-German relations, closer to the initial vision of the early 1990s. Earlier aspirations have so far been unfulfilled because of domestic pressures both in Germany and in Ukraine, and because of Europe's difficulties in dealing with problems that followed the collapse of communism.

Since independence in 1991, Ukraine has sought to forge a viable role for itself in European security and economic structures. That process has been complicated both by Ukraine's domestic challenges and by the fragmentation of Europe since the end of the Cold War. Conflicts in the former Yugoslav states, varying rates of progress in the postcommunist transitions of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states, and uncertainty in the West over how far and how fast to integrate the new states into Western security structures, have all delayed the process of creating a new European security order after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. With the exception of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which are North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, all other European postcommunist states have developed a variety of links both with NATO and the EU that fall short of full membership in these organizations. The anticipated enlargement of the EU will only include a limited number of postcommunist states. Thus, Ukraine's prospects for fuller integration into European and transatlantic structures remain uncertain.

As Europe's principal central power and the one most concerned with developments to its east, Germany has played a key role in engaging Ukraine

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and in seeking its integration into European structures. This is partly because of historical ties, but also because a united Germany became acutely aware that, after the collapse of the USSR, instability to its east could have major detrimental effects on its own stability as it integrated the German Democratic Republic (GDR) into the German Federal Republic. Germany was concerned not only about the potential repercussions of mass migration or ethnic conflict close to its borders, but, with respect to Ukraine, also was worried about the potential environmental disasters that could engulf the continent in the event of another Chornobyl-like accident. Although its focus for much of the 1990s was Poland, Germany became increasingly committed to forging a partnership with Ukraine. Germany realized that it must construct a workable relationship with Ukraine, a country strategically positioned between Russia and Germany and vitally important in terms of the issues that most concerned Bonn.

Ukraine's geopolitical position on the border of what Bonn considered a new zone of insecurity, coupled with its complicated ties with Germany, ensured that a bilateral relationship would develop. The country's economic potential, its nuclear power status, and its population, which includes ethnic Germans, were factors that reinforced Germany's inclination to build ties with Kyiv. Ukraine, for its part, stressed from the beginning that it is a European state and, in seeking ties with the West, began to cultivate a relationship with Germany.

The Ukrainian-German relationship has, in this past decade, been hostage to domestic exigencies in both countries. Germany has been preoccupied with the enormous material and psychological costs of unification and with its transfer of the seat of government from Bonn to Berlin. Ukraine has faced the unprecedented challenge of simultaneously becoming a viable postcolonial nation-state and moving toward a democratic market society. Despite Germany's domestic preoccupations, it has realized that Ukraine will be a significant player in Europe in the twenty-first century. Germany has therefore considered it essential to build a strong bilateral relationship with Kyiv and to strengthen Ukraine's role in multilateral organizations.

Both Germany and Ukraine face foreign policy challenges. For Germany, the issue is to define a role for a united Germany in Europe, one that reflects the reality of Germany's resources and power, but that does not evoke too many ghosts from the twentieth-century past in Central and Eastern Europe. For Ukraine, the issue is of a different order of magnitude: how to articulate an independent foreign policy reflecting Ukrainian national interests—a foreign policy that balances the need for continuing ties with Russia against the desire to become a full participant in European structures while integrating both the economic and military aspects of security.

Given the complexities of these challenges, it is not surprising that the German-Ukrainian partnership is, thus far, an incomplete one, and that its future evolution will, in part, depend on domestic developments in both coun-

tries but also on their relationship with their respective neighbors. Nevertheless, the German-Ukrainian relationship has matured over this past decade and the elements of a partnership have begun to crystallize.

This article analyzes the Ukrainian-German relationship from the perspectives of mutual historical ties, the more recent bilateral relations over the last decade, and the multilateral dimensions of contemporary German-Ukrainian interaction.

Ukrainian-German Historical Ties

The history of Ukrainian-German relations is a long one. German merchants and travelers began to visit Ukrainian lands in the tenth century, but settlement did not begin until Catherine II's manifesto that invited German colonists to the Russian Empire. In 1764 Catherine II issued a decree aimed at attracting Germans to colonize parts of Southern Russia. The decree offered extensive privileges—including free transportation to the Russian Empire, freedom to practice any trade, interest-free loans, and exemption from military service. After the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich in 1775, German settlers arrived in the former Cossack territory of southern Ukraine. They subsequently came in larger numbers during the first half of the nineteenth century, settling across the Ukrainian steppe and in the Crimea. Almost all of the colonists, who came to be known as Black Sea Germans (*Schwarzmeerdeutsche*), settled in rural communities with distinct and separate religious affiliations: Lutheran, Catholic, or Mennonite. By 1897, the Black Sea Germans numbered some 345,000 individuals. There were another 200,000 more Germans in Volhynia, where they had purchased land from the Polish nobility.[3] The Germans lived in closed settlements where they received tax exemptions and other benefits while contributing to the local economy. In their compact communities they could practice beliefs (especially true of the Mennonites) which in their countries of origin were persecuted. Thus, for more than two centuries, Germans and Ukrainians lived alongside each other.

The First World War brought Germany and Ukraine together in their first major encounter of the twentieth century. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 3 March 1918 between the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers led to the division of Ukraine into German and Austrian spheres of occupation. By that time, there were 700,000 Germans living in southern Ukraine who together had represented the second largest concentration of German colonists in the tsarist empire; Germany had plans to supplement that number with more colonists after the war was over.[4] The main goal, however, was to collect food from Ukraine to feed the Central Powers' starving populations. Attempts to requisition food supplies were resisted by the peasants, and the Germans responded by disbanding the Ukrainian government of the Central Rada and ruling through the more cooperative regime of Hetman Pavlo Skoropads'kyi. As attacks on

Ukrainian peasants persisted, the Bolsheviks were able to present themselves as defenders of Ukrainians against the Germans. Conflict between Germans and Ukrainians continued until the German capitulation of November 1918.[5]

Whatever negative memories of German subjection of Ukrainians remained after 1918 were rapidly eclipsed during the 1920s and 1930s by the atrocities committed against Ukrainians under Stalin. Ukraine, the granary of the USSR, suffered disproportionately during collectivization and during the famine of 1932–1933. Thus, by the time of the Nazi attack on the USSR, there was little support for (russification-oriented) Soviet communism.

The next major encounter between Ukrainians and the German state came after 1939. As a result of the terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, most of western Ukraine was occupied by Soviet troops. In June 1940, the USSR forced Romania to cede Bessarabia and Bukovyna. Thus, a total of seven million inhabitants formerly in Poland and Romania were added to the Ukrainian SSR, giving Ukrainians from these regions their first taste of Stalinism. Another half-million Ukrainians lived in those parts of Poland that were occupied by the Nazis after September 1939. The most dramatic change, however, came with the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, after which most Ukrainians came under German rule.

The history of German-Ukrainian relations during the Second World War is mixed. Some Ukrainians, for whom Stalin was a greater evil than Hitler and who were thus eager to fight the Russians, welcomed the German invaders as liberators from communist oppression. Inasmuch as there were Ukrainians who equated Soviet communists with Jews, Hitler's antisemitic propaganda fell on fertile soil. There is no consensus on the degree to which Ukrainians participated in the atrocities against Jews, the worst committed in Ukraine being the massacre of 33,000 Jews at Babyn Yar on the outskirts of Kyiv in September 1941.[6]

Of course, Nazi ideology blinded the Germans to the pragmatic advantages of treating Ukrainians in a more civilized fashion. The Nazi ruler of Ukraine, Erich Koch, was notorious for his personal contempt for Slavs: "Gentlemen," he announced on his arrival in Reichkommissariat Ukraine in September 1941, "I am known as a brutal dog. Because of this reason I was appointed *Reichskommissar* of Ukraine. Our task is to suck from Ukraine all the goods we can get hold of, without consideration of the feelings or the property of the Ukrainians." And on another occasion he asserted: "If I find a Ukrainian who is worthy of sitting at the same table with me, I must have him shot."[7] During the course of the war, over 2.3 million Ukrainians were deported to work as slave laborers in different parts of the Reich. Nazi rule in Ukraine was brutal, and a Ukrainian resistance movement arose in response. Recruits for anti-German partisan warfare came from a variety of groups: disillusioned nationalists, communists, Jews, and escapees from forced labor camps. The partisan recruits who fought the Germans were partly autonomous and partly controlled by the

Soviets. As late as July 1941, Hitler had declared that "only Germans should carry weapons, not Slavs, Czechs, Cossacks, or Ukrainians." However, after the German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943, Nazi Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels began to adopt a more pragmatic attitude toward Slavs. Some Ukrainians were already fighting with the Germans, and now Ukrainians were encouraged to join the retreating German armies. The SS offered Ukrainians something of unique value—military training—and some Ukrainian units, in the vain hope that the Russian communists could still be defeated, fought with the Nazis until the end of the war.[8]

The history of German-Ukrainian relations during World War II is, therefore, a rather mixed one, particularly when compared with Ukrainian experiences under Soviet rule. During the postwar Soviet era, the Nazi occupation of Ukraine was never fully discussed out of fear that Ukrainians might consider it more favorably than the Soviet occupation. Although the USSR could always invoke the image of Nazi atrocities as a means of rallying its population behind Soviet policies, in Ukraine the image of Germans was more ambivalent because the Germans have historically been viewed as a nation that could liberate Ukrainians from Russian domination.

During the postwar Soviet period, the most significant contacts between Germans and Ukrainians came via GDR-Ukrainian relations, which were quite extensive. The Ukrainian SSR had a myriad of economic, cultural and political ties with East Germany. Moreover, when West Germany began to pursue its new *Ostpolitik* in 1969, East German and Ukrainian opponents of détente made common cause. The opposition of the first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Petro Shelest, to Brezhnev's rapprochement with Willy Brandt's West Germany gave a boost to GDR leader Walter Ulbricht's attempts to fight *Ostpolitik*. Ultimately, however, both Ulbricht and Shelest lost their positions.[9] West Germany also developed economic, cultural, and political ties with the Ukrainian SSR, but always within the context of its central relationship with Moscow. Nevertheless, contacts between elites and the population of Ukraine and the two German states grew as the Communist era ended. By 1991, therefore, the Ukrainian SSR had established a pattern of contacts with both East and West Germany.

The Evolution of German-Ukrainian Relations, 1992–1999

Ukrainian Expectations

When Ukraine achieved independence at the end of 1991, its initial expectations of German economic and political support were considerable, which were, as it soon transpired, unrealistic. Ukrainians approached Germany in 1992 with inordinately more enthusiasm than vice versa. Prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, Germany, like other Western countries, had done little to

recognize Ukraine's declaration of sovereignty of July 1990, although it had opened a consulate in Kyiv earlier in 1989. Chancellor Helmut Kohl's July 1991 summit with Mikhail Gorbachev in Kyiv, ostensibly to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Nazi invasion of the USSR, was a last-minute attempt to shore up the Soviet leader's weak internal position.[10] Only after the Belovezhsk agreement founding the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in December 1991 did Ukraine's foreign minister, Anatolii Zlenko, visit Bonn to discuss bilateral relations. He returned to Ukraine with promises of future German diplomatic recognition and for the establishment of a German-Ukrainian Economic Cooperation Council, and with an invitation for President Leonid Kravchuk to visit Bonn. In this early stage of official Ukrainian-German relations, the Ukrainian press highlighted the ignorance of most Germans about Ukraine.[11]

Before his February 1992 visit to Bonn, President Leonid Kravchuk gave an optimistic assessment of the prospects for German-Ukrainian ties. The new Ukrainian leadership hoped that Germany would be more forthcoming with assistance and contacts than the other Western states, partly because of history and geography, but partly because the GDR had been closely tied to Ukraine economically. The importance of economic links with Germany and of Ukraine's willingness to resettle deported ethnic Germans were stressed. At the time, both Russia and Ukraine felt that they were competing against each other for German largesse. The Russian daily *Izvestiia* reported, for example, that "[i]n the rivalry between Moscow and Kyiv in seeking Germany's favor, Kyiv is currently in the lead: [the Germans] paid Kravchuk the compliment of holding him up as an example to other CIS heads on how to tackle the problems of national minorities."[12]

A few months later, however, Kravchuk and his colleagues would deny any such suggestion that they were winning the battle for German attention and money. Ukrainian officials complained about "Bonn's fixation on Moscow."[13] As the economic situation in Ukraine deteriorated, Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma made a renewed appeal for German and EU assistance. Just before Kohl's visit to Kyiv, an opinion poll of Ukrainian politicians and officials found that the majority of them believed that Germany was the only G-7 state that was pursuing a supportive policy toward Ukraine and the only country that could save Ukraine from its unhealthy dependence on Russia. They also assumed that Germany had an interest in the outcome of Russo-Ukrainian tensions: Germany would be more directly affected by a Russo-Ukrainian conflict, after all, than would the United States.[14]

The German government, however, remained cautious. It continued to view its relationship with Ukraine largely through a Russian lens and was moreover concerned about the large number of unresolved issues in Russo-Ukrainian relations. In the fall of 1993, Germany reiterated that it would only become more involved in Ukraine once Kyiv committed itself to renouncing nuclear

weapons, thereby making explicit the link between economic assistance and political concessions. Although it welcomed the January 1994 Trilateral Agreement in which Ukraine renounced its nuclear arsenal, it was wary of Ukraine's economic difficulties. Germany had not yet defined its interests in Ukraine.

After Leonid Kuchma was elected president in the summer of 1994, he realized that in order to change German attitudes, Ukraine would have to convince Germany that it had modified its policies on two major issues: economic reform and relations with Russia. Kyiv would also have to persuade Bonn that Germany had vital interests in Ukraine. About a month after the elections, President Kuchma granted an interview to a reporter of *Der Spiegel* in which he recalled the German occupation of Ukraine, his prior experience with West Germany in his capacity as general director of Yuzhmash/Pivdenmash (the world's largest rocket construction firm, based in Dnipropetrovsk), and as a participant in a four-week management course in Germany. He stressed that he favored "a partnership with Russia, just as Germany wants it," and reiterated his commitment to economic reform, particularly privatization, and greater partnership with Germany.[15] Since the early years of independence, Ukraine has gradually become more realistic about what it needs to do in order to attract more German attention and investment.

German Expectations

Germany's initial attitude toward Ukraine was ambivalent. Like its allies, Germany greeted the breakup of the Soviet Union with a great deal of apprehension. In place of the predictable Gorbachev came fifteen new states with largely unknown leaders—former *apparatchiki* presiding over multiethnic states, the borders of which were delineated by Stalin for his own purposes, and whose major raison d'être was nationalism. These developments made Germans uncomfortable in view of their own twentieth-century experiences, and because their ongoing challenge of unification could be undermined by potential disruptions from the east. Since the West was accustomed to interacting with Russia, it continued to deal with Russia, aware that it was still a major nuclear power.

Germany's main interests in Ukraine centered on the resettlement of Soviet soldiers in their homelands and the containment of tensions between Kyiv and Moscow. The most pressing problem to September 1994 involved the withdrawal of the 380,000 Soviet troops and their dependents from the former East Germany. One-third of the former Soviet officers, along with many of the enlisted men, were Ukrainian. These soldiers needed housing and employment; therefore much of the initial German aid to the Newly Independent States after 1992 was earmarked for the construction of dwellings and for job retraining. Ukraine was a significant recipient of the aid that was apportioned for realization of these projects. Beyond these immediate issues—and given the burden of

history and the uncertainties about Ukraine's future—Bonn was wary of embarking on too assertive a relationship with Ukraine. Yet, if one contrasts its active and extensive ties with postcommunist Poland, another country with which it shares a heavy historical burden, it is clear that concern about Russia's reactions also influenced Germany's policy.

German policies were also influenced by the unexpected problems of adjusting to a new role in Europe. For forty years West Germany's sovereignty had been limited and it had deliberately eschewed a major international role. Indeed, the German Federal Republic had settled comfortably into its constrained position. Now, however, Germany came under increasing pressure from its allies and neighbors to assume a much larger role in Europe and to take the lead in rebuilding the economies of Central and Eastern Europe. It was particularly difficult for Germany to balance the demands of fostering stability and the development of viable market economies in Central Europe, on the one hand, and in Russia, Ukraine, and other successor states, on the other. Given Germany's uneasiness about summoning ghosts from the past, it sought to diversify these ties as much as possible and to shift the burden of assisting the postcommunist states to the EU and other multilateral bodies.[16] The imperatives for involvement in Ukraine were both positive and negative—the desire to help construct a viable market society and the fear of the consequences of instability and crisis in Ukraine for German stability and security.

It should not be overlooked, however, that Germany is a federal country, and that its constituent Länder (states) have their own identities. Perhaps none more so than the "Free State of Bavaria," traditionally the home of a good portion of Germany's Ukrainian émigré community. From the outset, Bavaria took a proactive policy toward Ukraine. As early as 1990, for example, the prime minister of Bavaria, Max Streibl, signed a partnership agreement with Ukraine. Also significantly, the following year in May 1991 Leonid Kravchuk, who was then chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, led a delegation to Bavaria, before being received in Bonn. During a meeting with the president of the Bavarian Landtag (legislature), both sides talked about their respective sovereignties and pledged closer economic and political ties.[17] Then in 1992, German Interior Minister Edmund Stoiber (a Bavarian) led a Bavarian delegation to Ukraine, and spoke of a *Südschiene* ("southern link"). Ukraine, he said, greatly admired both Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and Franz-Josef Strauss, the longtime prime minister of Bavaria, for transforming Bavaria from a primarily agrarian to a modern industrial state. It also admired, he continued, Bavaria's long struggle to assert its federal rights and achieve autonomy from Bonn.[18] In fact, Bonn continued to use Bavaria as an intermediary as it formulated its policy toward Ukraine. By mid-1993, the 1990 Bavarian-Ukrainian partnership agreement had expanded to include sister-city projects, cultural exchanges, and greater bilateral trade. Bavaria utilized its relationship with Ukraine to assert its own independence from Bonn and to raise its international profile. However,

Ukraine also profited from this burgeoning relationship, although Munich could not provide the recognition that Kyiv sought from Bonn.[19]

Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of debt repayments also came to the fore. Germany had been the USSR's largest creditor and, after 1991, it became concerned that Ukraine might not be willing to assume its part of the Soviet debt. Already before the breakup of the USSR, a German delegation had gone to Kyiv to persuade its future leaders to accept their full share of the Soviet debt.[20] By the time Foreign Minister Zlenko visited Bonn in December 1991, Germany was willing to talk about a German-Ukrainian treaty based on Kyiv's commitment not only to debt repayment, but to the renunciation of nuclear weapons as well. Ukraine then became the first post-Soviet state to be recognized by Germany, and the German consul general, Count Hennecke von Bassewitz (whose ancestor had been a diplomat at Peter I's court), was appointed ambassador. At this stage, Germany's concern, apart from nuclear questions, also extended to the issue of Ukraine's future adherence to conventional arms limitation treaties that had already been signed by the Soviet Union.

Despite these early German attempts to support Ukraine, Bonn soon became disenchanted because of the lack of progress on what it defined as priority issues: debt repayment, the situation of ethnic Germans, nuclear weapons, and economic reform. But because of Ukraine's geostrategic importance, by February 1993 Germany's foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, decided that it was time to reinvigorate the relationship.[21] He discovered during his visit to Kyiv, however, that the reception from his hosts was less than cordial. The Ukrainians complained that Bonn was making demands without offering them much in return. Bonn, for its part, began to view Ukraine as a "spoiler" in the NIS region, with its government unwilling to make good on its promises on nuclear weapons to the international community or on economic reform to its own people.

Chancellor Kohl went to Ukraine in June 1993 (the first visit by a major West European leader) still hoping to persuade Kravchuk to fulfill his promises, precisely because Germany realized how important Ukraine's potential European role might be. He emphasized that Germany "needs Moscow and Kyiv" and offered economic incentives for increased Ukrainian cooperation on political and strategic matters.[22] Ukraine and Germany also signed a joint statement on the basis of relations between the two states. This included an agreement to endorse the principles of sovereignty and the inviolability of borders, to renounce force, and to respect human rights. The two parties also committed themselves "to democracy as the only legitimate form of government." But Germany remained skeptical about Ukraine's domestic and international intentions until Kuchma's election. Although the German private sector was more forthcoming than Western counterparts, its government seemed wary. After Kuchma's election of 1994, however, the bilateral relationship acquired more dynamism.

Bilateral Issues Since 1992: Ethnic Germans

Before German unification, the West German government offered the USSR material incentives to encourage local ethnic Germans to emigrate to Germany. After 1990, however, the situation changed dramatically. The costs of unification, East German resentment of immigrants, and the economic burdens of absorbing 16 million people of the former GDR, all combined to change the German government's attitude. Policy shifted to enticing ethnic Germans to remain in the successor states to the USSR—mainly Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Although Stalin had deported most of Ukraine's ethnic Germans in 1941, by 1989 nearly 38,000 of the original 400,000 deportees had returned to Ukraine.[23] On the eve of his first presidential visit to Bonn, Kravchuk pledged to resettle 400,000 ethnic Germans in Ukraine and to offer them the best farmland in the southern regions of Ukraine and in the Crimea.[24] In Bonn Kravchuk secured a guarantee from Kohl that State Secretary Horst Waffenschmidt would discuss in Kyiv the matter of material support for resettling Germans in Ukraine.[25] The first German delegation, optimistic about Kravchuk's commitments, arrived a few weeks later. Local authorities in the Odesa region told a subsequent delegation that they would resettle up to 6,000 families in the next two years.[26] Grounds for optimism were also provided by Ukraine's liberal law on national minorities, which promised Germans, like other minorities, full rights, including citizenship.[27] However, the law did not explain how it could be proved that a person was indeed a deportee. In retrospect, it appears that Kravchuk and his colleagues had not fully considered all dimensions of the issue.

By June 1992 Kravchuk had gone back on his original promise and now asserted that Ukraine would only accept Germans (and their direct descendants) who had actually been deported from Ukraine. It would not take ethnic Germans who had not lived in Ukraine prior to 1941. Nevertheless, the German government continued to push ahead with its resettlement program. In September 1992, Wiedergeburt (Rebirth), the organization of ethnic Germans that originated in Russia, founded a chapter in Kyiv and sought to link ethnic Germans in Ukraine with those in Russia. A Ukrainian-German Fund was established with money from both countries, and Waffenschmidt, as Germany's official responsible for German resettlement, announced that DM52 million would be made available for relocation to the Odesa, Mykolaïv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk regions of southern Ukraine.[28] But by 15 March 1993 Kravchuk had declared the plans to resettle Germans in Ukraine a failure because, in his opinion, "most Germans are still hoping to go directly to Germany."[29]

The issue of ethnic Germans returning to Ukraine has been raised in every high-level bilateral meeting and continues even now to be a delicate matter. Since 1992 the German government has disbursed DM55 million to assist ethnic Germans, the bulk of those funds directed to housing, social, and cul-

tural programs. For its part, Weidergeburt became more active in Ukraine, but, in the process, also came into conflict with the Ukrainian authorities.

The program failed for several reasons: the costs were too high for the Ukrainian government and German assistance came mainly in the form of grants-in-aid, which the Ukrainians did not want. Moreover, while much of the funds were for cultural centers, economic assistance would have been far more important in persuading Germans to remain and not to emigrate. But there were also political reasons for the lack of success of the program. Up to 8 million Ukrainians lived outside Ukraine in the CIS,[30] and it was not popular domestically to invite German immigrants to settle in Ukraine when ethnic Ukrainians themselves found it difficult to return. Since it took at least two years for ethnic Germans in Ukraine to obtain visas for Germany, the German embassy in Kyiv endeavored to assist emigrants while they were waiting to leave. But many of the emigrants spent their time in difficult conditions in makeshift camps. So far, it has been extremely difficult for Germany to realize its goal of persuading ethnic Germans that they are better off in Ukraine or Russia than in Germany.

Economic Ties

The Public Sector

For the first few years of its existence, Ukraine received its largest amount of foreign aid from Germany. Germany's first—and largest—tranche of aid to Ukraine came while the USSR still existed, when, as noted, it provided funds for the construction of housing for soldiers returning from East Germany. After independence, the first stumbling block to new aid was the debt situation. Germany, as mentioned above, had been the USSR's largest creditor. Initially, Ukraine and Germany sparred over how much of the Soviet debt was Kyiv's responsibility. Eventually, Ukraine agreed to accept joint responsibility for the Soviet debt and consolidated its relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). After eight months of negotiations, Russia and Ukraine were able to agree on how to divide the German money intended for housing construction for returning soldiers. Germany was then more forthcoming with aid after these Ukrainian moves. It guaranteed, for example, a total of DM1.5 billion in export credits in 1992–1993 and also gave assistance for additional housing construction and for the retooling of returning soldiers.

Despite this aid and various humanitarian and technical assistance projects, the German government remained cautious about giving money to Kyiv because of the lack of economic reform. Bonn realized, however, that withholding assistance could become self-defeating and so it began to revise its policies after Ukraine signed the Trilateral Agreement of January 1994. A high-level Ukrainian delegation visited Bonn early in 1994, seeking not only more economic support, but also German assistance in persuading the EU to sign a

partnership agreement with Ukraine. Germany came to be instrumental in the development of the ensuing EU-Ukrainian relationship.

After Kuchma's election, the German government was more forthcoming, particularly in regard to Ukraine's integration into international economic structures. Kinkel and other delegates argued Ukraine's case at the 1994 Naples G-7 meeting and Ukraine was promised more assistance, especially after reassurances by Kuchma that financial stabilization and privatization policies would now be vigorously pursued. The IMF's first loan to Ukraine was $730 million, which came in two $365 million installments. A second loan for the sum of $2.2 billion was approved in 1998. By 2000, Ukraine owed a total of $3.1 billion in debt payments, half of which was owed to the IMF.

Political developments were, of course, closely tied to the changing German attitude. Immediately after Kuchma urged the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) to endorse the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Kohl offered increased German aid and support and closer Ukrainian ties with the World Bank and IMF.[31] Germany wanted to ensure multilateral cooperation for Ukraine's development. As Ukraine's largest aid donor, Germany's assistance came to total $1.7 billion in export credits, technical assistance and in other forms,[32] and was increasingly targeted at environmental projects which focused particularly on the Chornobyl nuclear power station. Germany's experience of radiation fallout from the nuclear explosion in 1986 had a major bearing on German-Ukrainian relations and provided a theme of continuity between the Kohl and Schroeder governments. In 1997 Germany allocated over $52 million for the reconstruction of the fourth nuclear reactor in Chornobyl.

When Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder visited Ukraine in July 1999, there was considerable controversy surrounding the question of the future of nuclear power. The Green Party, whose Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was instrumental in committing Germany to phase out nuclear power both domestically and in Europe, was initially encouraging Ukraine to renounce nuclear power altogether. Moreover, given the struggle within the Green Party between the more radical advocates of a total ban on nuclear power and those willing to compromise, the Ukrainian case was introduced as part of domestic politics. Given Ukraine's difficult economic situation and its dependence on imported Russian energy, Kuchma made it clear that Ukraine could not commit itself to phasing out nuclear power. Schroeder offered an alternative—construction of two nonnuclear generators, fired by coal or gas. It was a proposal that was supported by the majority of the Ukrainian population, but Kuchma rejected it. He instead secured a German agreement to consider financing the construction of alternative nuclear power plants in Rivne and Khmelnytskyi, and Ukraine eventually agreed to shut down the last Chornobyl reactor.[33] The Schroeder-Fischer government, like that of its predecessor, stressed the need for continuing economic reforms and the construction of a viable civil society in Ukraine. But it also emphasized that it will be less willing and able to give money to the NIS than was the Kohl Government.

The Private Sector

German-Ukrainian economic relations have experienced a number of cycles since 1991 and have been greatly affected by the difficult progress of economic reform in Ukraine and by the growth of corruption in the economy. The German private sector was, from the beginning, of two minds about Ukraine. On the one hand, there were those who were enthusiastic about promoting business in Ukraine. This group did not want to lose a potentially valuable foothold and be outbid by other Western firms. On the other hand, there was the voice of caution, expressed by the *Ostausschuß der deutschen Wirtschaft,* the major lobbying group for trade with the east, which argued that Ukraine had not taken the necessary economic, political, or legal steps to assure the German private sector that its efforts would be rewarded in any predictable way. Prior to the breakup of the USSR, the private sector tried to build on the close economic links between Ukraine and the former GDR, if only in part because of united Germany's obligations to take over the GDR economic ties with the former Soviet states that were part of the agreements on German unification.[34]

Despite the overall reticence of private firms, entrepreneurs found some areas of the economy to be promising. Telecommunications was one such sector, German firms being prominent in a deal to construct a modern telecommunications system for Ukraine. Some Länder, primarily from the east, entered into cooperation agreements, such as the one between Brandenburg and the Dnipropetrovsk region. Germany emerged to become Ukraine's second largest trading partner (after Russia) with a turnover in 1998 of $2.8 billion, although total private German investment in Ukraine was only $185 million;[35] there were also joint agricultural projects and joint mining projects. One feature of the Ukrainian market was that it was attractive for medium-sized German firms, which, for instance, found it difficult to operate in the Russian market which favored larger firms.

However, major disincentives to German private economic activity in Ukraine remained. There was, for instance, no enforceable legal system ensuring commercial rights and protection for investors. In 1997 a group of 600 German investors in Ukraine drew up a list of complaints, which included arbitrariness on the part of revenue officers and customs authorities; interference by authorizing bodies in investment projects; laws that were constantly changing; regulations that made any medium-term planning impossible; and demands for bribes. In addition, it was stated that German government funds designed to compensate Ukrainian victims of Nazism and slave laborers had disappeared into the pockets of corrupt officials.

President Kuchma had his own source of dissatisfaction with the economic relationship between Germany and Ukraine: "We are not satisfied with the development of relations," he said. "Our trade balance is negative. We buy more than we sell. There is hardly any German investment in Ukraine. For

Germany, Russia is a priority. I consider this a mistake."[36] Nevertheless, the German message throughout the 1990s was consistent: the private sector wanted to increase its activities in Ukraine, but the lack of an enforceable legal code, the slow pace of economic reform, and the prevalence of corruption were major obstacles to greater German-Ukrainian economic ties.

Military Cooperation

Initial German-Ukrainian military contacts were largely a product of German involvement in the resettlement of ex-Soviet troops from the GDR. Since Germany oversaw the construction of housing for soldiers in Ukraine and also supervised officers' retraining, it was constantly engaged in resolving disputes and trying to ensure adherence to the withdrawal schedule. Bonn realized that it had to become more involved militarily with Ukraine because of its potential strategic importance. In August 1993, German Defense Minister Volker Rühe visited Ukraine and inaugurated a program of bilateral military cooperation. He and his counterpart, Kostiantyn Morozov, signed an Agreement on Cooperation in the military sphere that provided for twenty-four official and working visits between delegations of both parties' armed forces over the duration of the next two years. This was Ukraine's second military agreement with a Western country, the first having been signed with the United States in July 1993. Since 1994, 74 Ukrainian soldiers have trained in Germany. There is currently a provision for 20 more to go to Germany annually.[37] Rühe also promised German financial assistance for dismantling nuclear weapons located in Ukraine, provided that Ukraine ratified START I and acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The German side had more than one motivation for this offer to Ukraine. On the one hand, Germany, like the United States, wanted to encourage Ukraine to fulfill its commitments to become a nonnuclear state and, realizing that arms reductions entailed large expenses, was thus willing to assist. On the other hand, Germany wanted to reward Kyiv's active contribution to the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslavia, which had resulted in Ukrainian casualties.[38] The Rühe-Morozov agreement inaugurated a series of bilateral military meetings, which have continued under the Schroeder government and is a key aspect of Germany's attempts to integrate Ukraine into European structures.

The bilateral German-Ukrainian relationship is, therefore, multifaceted, and entails a variety of political, economic, military, cultural and societal contacts. However, it has been limited by domestic political and economic pressures in both countries and by Germany's concerns about the pace of change in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the combined factors of history, geography, and common environmental concerns will ensure a continuing relationship. Both Ukraine and Germany realize that the multilateral dimensions of their relations are equally important, and will become more so in this new century as Ukraine

seeks to be more fully integrated into Europe and Germany is wary of being perceived to act unilaterally in Central and Eastern Europe.

Multilateral Ties

Ukraine and NATO

After gaining independence, Ukraine announced that it would pursue a policy of nonalignment, and its 1996 Constitution reaffirmed this. However, according to former Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk (1998–2000): "Our Constitution does not rule out the accession of our country to one bloc or another."[39] Given its central and somewhat precarious geographical position, Ukraine's general commitment to nonalignment was a correct one; nevertheless, it remains strategically vulnerable and has sought to enhance its security by establishing ties with Europe's major security organization, NATO. Germany has supported Ukraine in these endeavors. But as the issue of further NATO enlargement develops, Germany's views of Ukraine's ultimate place in NATO may differ from those of the United States.

In 1992, Ukraine joined the first postcommunist NATO group—the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. It was the first post-Soviet state to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP), in 1994. This program focuses on defense and military cooperation and on the democratization of postcommunist armed forces. Unlike Russia, Ukraine was, from the outset, an enthusiastic and cooperative member of PfP. It has participated in a variety of multinational military and naval exercises both on Ukrainian territory and outside it, including one in Romania in 1996, another in Central Asia in 1997, and various exercises in the Crimea. PfP provided Ukraine with additional security guarantees to those obtained in the January 1994 Trilateral Agreement. It has enabled Ukraine to diversify its security policies to work with the United States and Europe in a variety of ways. Ukrainian infantry, helicopter forces, and law enforcement officials, have been an essential element of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. Indeed, Ukrainian soldiers' participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia has reinforced Ukraine's role as a factor guaranteeing a peaceful outcome in the Balkans.[40]

Nevertheless, when the debate about enlarging NATO began, Ukraine found itself in a difficult position. On the one hand, having Poland as a NATO member brings to Ukraine the benefit of having NATO structures closer to its border. On the other hand, as many Ukrainian officials and politicians realized, NATO enlargement could also mean the redivision of Europe with the fault line now on the Polish-Ukrainian border.[41] Together with the United States, Germany was a prime mover urging NATO enlargement, primarily because of the historical obligations it felt toward Poland.[42] Although the United States said from the beginning that any European state was in principle eligible for

NATO membership, Germany was much more cautious—no German official has so far been willing to discuss the possible candidacy of Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials and politicians have also disagreed on NATO enlargement. Former Foreign Ministers Hennadii Udovenko and Tarasyuk both stressed that Ukraine had no objections to the admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO while noting that Ukraine had no plans in the foreseeable future to join it.[43] Kravchuk, Ukraine's former president, urged that Ukraine apply for admission to NATO,[44] to the chagrin of local communists, who have sharply criticized NATO expansion. Ukraine, like Russia, signed its own agreement with NATO in 1997—the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership—through which NATO intended to demonstrate that it wants to enhance Ukraine's role in the organization, even though it was not a candidate for membership. When the Charter was signed in July, Chancellor Kohl heralded it as representing a "new era for European security."[45] The Charter names several spheres of Ukrainian-NATO cooperation: arms trade and research; civilian planning for emergencies; joint efforts against the proliferation of nuclear technologies; terrorism; organized crime and drug trafficking; and also collaborative work on standardization, computer technologies, environmental protection, air traffic controlling and the uses of space.[46] In other words, the Ukrainian-NATO Charter covers security in a very broadly defined manner. Ukraine now has a permanent representative at NATO, and NATO has opened an information center in Kyiv. Both sides, thus, continue to work toward a more viable partnership.

Ukraine has been an active and constructive participant in the NATO-Ukraine Council. In January 2000, NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson visited Kyiv and praised Ukraine for its progress. He assured that NATO would assist Ukraine in modernizing its armed forces, although he admitted that the reform would be painful. Robertson and Tarasyuk discussed the evolving NATO-Ukraine partnership, which included the retraining of servicemen and cooperation in science and environmental protection. Robertson also commended Ukraine for its participation in the multinational, NATO-led Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR).[47]

Indeed, the war in Kosovo presented both Ukraine and Germany with difficult choices. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who had opposed NATO policies before he came into office, was confronted with the problem of how to deal with the process of ethnic cleansing. To the surprise of both the Green Party he led and to the larger public, he became a strong advocate of NATO's intervention to stop President Slobodan Milošević's widely condemned campaign in Kosovo. Germany played a prominent role in the war and in bringing about a ceasefire. To Ukraine, the war presented a different set of issues. The war exposed, for example, its delicate position of being sandwiched between Russia and NATO. While the Ukrainian communists, echoing the Russians, denounced NATO's bombing of Serbia, President Kuchma tried at the outset to serve the role of mediator, neither criticizing NATO's bombing

nor endorsing it. In mid-April 1999, the German, Finnish, and Austrian foreign ministers traveled to Kyiv to discuss Kuchma's proposals. Meanwhile, Tarasyuk journeyed to Belgrade to try to persuade President Milošević to compromise. Kuchma emphasized the need for UN approval of the bombing campaign and the need for all sides to negotiate in good faith.[48] At the height of the airstrikes, Kuchma attended the Washington NATO summit in which the three Central European countries were admitted as full members. This was an important gesture at a time when the majority of Ukrainians did not support NATO airstrikes against Serbia.

Ultimately, the Ukrainian efforts were unsuccessful, and Ukraine suffered significant financial losses from the war because of the interruption of Ukrainian-Yugoslav trade and disruptions to Ukrainian Danube ship transport. After the conflict was over, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping lauded Ukraine's efforts and stressed its role in Balkan peacekeeping.[49] Ukraine is an active participant in KFOR, but is handicapped by the question of financing: while Ukraine pays the salaries of its soldiers, the United States assumes much of the running costs. Such problems as these form part of wider Ukrainian dilemmas in reforming the military. Thus, the potential for greater Ukrainian integration into NATO, with the support of Germany, certainly exists. Both NATO and Ukraine, however, realize that the question of eventual membership is still premature. Russia's negative attitude toward Ukrainian NATO membership has also influenced this debate. NATO will make decisions on the next group of potential members in 2002, but Ukraine will not be among those considered. For the time being, Ukraine is focusing on close partnership with NATO and has instead set its sights on accelerating the timetable for eventually joining the European Union.

Ukraine and the European Union

Whereas Ukraine's attitude toward NATO membership has of necessity been very cautious, the Ukrainian leadership's views on eventual EU membership are not ambivalent: Ukraine has for some time argued that it wants to join the European Union and would like to move quickly toward this goal. As Tarasyuk has said, "The desire to restore to Ukraine its identity as a full-fledged European state has preordained European integration as the only acceptable development path for Ukraine. This is exactly why one of Ukraine's foreign policy priorities is integration with the EU."[50] Thus far, Russia has paid little attention to the implications of EU enlargement, focusing most of its ire on NATO expansion. Inferring from this, the Ukrainian government has calculated that it would encounter little opposition from Russia to any efforts to gain EU membership. The EU, on the other hand, has made it clear that any timetable for Ukrainian membership will be quite protracted. Instead, largely under German pressure, the EU has focused on Ukraine's environmental and nuclear power problems.

As a result of EU concerns, in June 1994 the EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed after Germany intervened on Ukraine's behalf. This represented the first international agreement in which Ukraine felt that it had been recognized as a sovereign European state.[51] Kravchuk hailed it as a "breakthrough," proving that Ukraine was oriented toward the West. As then Foreign Minister Zlenko stressed, "In one fell swoop Ukraine has ceased to be a subject of international relations in spite of its own will. This is why the joining of European economic and political structures is a logical and necessary direction in Ukraine's foreign policy at the current stage."[52] France and Germany, speaking for the rest of the EU, stressed that a major item on their agenda was the overhaul of Ukraine's energy sector and the earliest possible shutdown of the Chornobyl reactor. Safety and environmental concerns were at the heart of German espousal of the EU-Ukraine accord. As Kinkel put it, saving the environment on the territory of the former Soviet Union was a key concern in German foreign policy.[53]

It took almost four years for the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to come into effect. Even before it was officially ratified in Ukraine, some officials were asking the EU to consider an Association Agreement for Ukraine, similar to those signed with countries such as Poland and Hungary, which are candidates for EU membership in the first round of enlargement. The EU has stressed, however, that any upgrading of Ukraine's relationship with the fifteen-member organization will take time, although it has not ruled out eventual Ukrainian membership. German officials have reiterated that full membership in the EU is open to Ukraine when it has met the necessary conditions for association and, then, membership. Meanwhile, in order to comply with the Schengen Agreements of March 1995—in which EU countries agreed to abolish border controls along their joint frontiers but restrict freedom of movement from non-EU members—those of Ukraine's neighbors that are candidates for the first round of EU membership, such as Poland and Hungary, have placed restrictions on the freedom of movement of their citizens and those of Ukraine in traveling across their common boundaries, much to the consternation of the Ukrainian government. The EU continues to focus on nuclear power issues and has given Ukraine assistance for a number of projects, including nuclear safety and research and the decommissioning of nuclear devices. EU countries were the major donors in the July 2000 Chornobyl pledging conference hosted by Germany.

From Ukraine's point of view, the EU has moved too slowly in offering Kyiv the chance for greater integration. For the EU, relations with Ukraine remain constrained by the same factors that have restricted German-Ukrainian relations, namely, the slow pace of economic reform, domestic corruption, and the opaqueness of the political situation. But the framework for closer ties is in place and that framework could become more active if the Ukrainian economy improves its performance. In the fall of 1999, the EU published its Common Strategy on Ukraine, in which it committed itself to accelerate the pace of

interaction with the new Ukrainian government, and to do more to promote economic reform. However, the timetable for Ukrainian EU membership is still quite distant in the future.

The Future of German-Ukrainian Relations

As Germany reoriented its *Ostpolitik* in postcommunist Europe, Ukraine became part of the new equation, yet its place in Europe and in German foreign policy was unclear. Germany regarded the Visegrád countries, the transitions of which were proceeding more successfully than those of the countries to their east, as worthy of special assistance and membership in European institutions. Russia deserved special attention because of Germany's recognition of its potential to disrupt European security and because of its economic and nuclear assets. But where did Ukraine fit into German calculations? Its development was not sufficiently advanced to qualify as a Central European state, but it was also not to be feared or rewarded to the same degree as Russia.

Initially, Ukraine was in a "no-man's land" in the new European configuration. Germany's initial reluctance to get too involved made it more difficult for Ukraine to secure assistance from other countries. Germany largely set the agenda in their mutual relationship, which was initially, in many ways, determined by the Soviet legacy of debts, nuclear weapons, and environmental pollution. There were few "usable" historical ties from the pre-Soviet or Soviet period that could place the bilateral relationship in a familiar context. But Russia was also an important determinant of German-Ukrainian ties, and when the political situation in Russia became more uncertain, Kyiv benefited. Ukraine was potentially a major partner of Germany, but it would have to move further along in nationbuilding and state-building and in economic reform in order to realize that potential.

German policy toward Ukraine has remained consistent since Kuchma's 1999 election and since the Social Democratic Party–Green victory in 1998. Germany recognized Ukraine's strategic importance in Europe and its potential to become a significant European player, but a more active German engagement awaits greater economic and political change in Ukraine. The continuing uncertainties in Russia have intensified German attempts to promote Ukrainian stability; they have also reinforced Germany's desire to ensure that the "border of instability" in Europe, as Chancellor Kohl put it, remains on the Polish-Ukrainian boundary for the time being.

Ukraine's continuing desire for further integration into Europe will increase, particularly if its relationship with Russia—which has improved since the signing of the 1997 treaty of mutual recognition—becomes normalized under President Vladimir Putin. It is playing an increasingly important role in regional blocs—the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Group and the GUUAM complex (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova), for example—and as a mediator in the Moldova-Transdnistria dispute. Kyiv is showing by its

actions that it can pursue a constructive relationship with its neighbors. Newly-appointed Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko has reiterated this commitment. Unless there is a major domestic upheaval in Ukraine, the drive westwards will remain and will be a significant factor motivating reform. Indeed, if Ukraine were able to surmount its present economic and political difficulties, it would be poised to become more closely integrated into both Central European and broader European structures. Germany remains interested in promoting these developments, realizing that in the best of all scenarios, Kyiv could once again become a center of European commerce and culture.

NOTES

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1. See Jack F. Matlock, "The Nowhere Nation," *New York Review of Books* 67(3) 24 February 2000: 41–45.
2. "Kuchma Hopes Reforms to Take Ukraine into EU," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter, FBIS) FBIS-SOV-2000-0118, 18 January 2000.
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The Christianization and Ecclesiastical Structure of Kyivan Rus' to 1300

ANDRZEJ POPPE

The Christianization of Rus'—the state of the East Slavs created with the participation of Scandinavian war bands in the course of the ninth century—was a pivotal event in the history of Eastern Europe. The reception of Eastern Christianity and the articulation of the faith in the Slavic language set the course for much of the religious, intellectual, and cultural development of the three East Slavic peoples—Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Russians—over the succeeding millennium.

Despite the obvious significance of the act of conversion itself, one should not confuse the conversion of Rus' with its Christianization. Rather, the year 988, as the most important turning point in the process, marked but the opening of the Christian era for Rus', providing new dimensions and a new quality to its contacts with the world of Christian culture. Christianization itself lasted for several centuries, with the most important portion, in terms of events and results, falling in the second half of the tenth and the first half of the eleventh centuries: that hundred-year period opened with the crucial, though individual act of baptism of the *hēgemōn* and *archontissa Rhōsias*, Princess Ol'ga, at Constantinople in the 950s. It closed with a major development: the first formulation of a theosophical vision of the converted land of Rus', which placed its baptism into the context of a human history guided by the hand of Providence—the history of universal Salvation. That vision was pronounced by the monk-presbyter Hilarion (Ilarion), who was preparing in 1050 to assume the throne of the metropolitan of Kyiv.

Despite the visible progress of Christianity, it is clear from the events of the eleventh century that the common people were not as accommodating and quick in their reception of the new religion. Indeed, the tenth century merely demonstrated the possibility of, and the eleventh century created the conditions for, the extension of the Christian faith to the broader ranks of society, providing but a beginning to the Church's efforts to overcome the traditional mentality and ways of thinking of the common people. While the upper strata of society and the inhabitants of the chief urban centers can be considered completely Christianized in the eleventh century, the conversion of the majority of fortress-town centers in peripheral or recently colonized regions, particularly in the north and northeast, would continue throughout the twelfth century. The

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penetration of Christianity into rural areas, along with the rise of a parish network, comes only with the thirteenth century. Indeed, the disasters that befell Rus′ in that latter century expedited the conversion of its entire territory and deepened the religious allegiance of its inhabitants. Consequently, by the end of the thirteenth century, despite many survivals of the old beliefs and the existence of syncretistic tendencies, not only the state, with its elite and towns, but the whole populace of the lands of Rus′ had become a substantially Christian society.

Foredawn of Christianity on the Dnipro

The centuries-long influence of the Byzantine possessions of the northern Black Sea coast on the peoples of the southern tier of the East European plain began, in the ninth century, to extend as well to the East Slavic tribes, who now formed, together with bands of Scandinavian warriors and merchants, a new sociopolitical entity—Rus′. The cumulative effects of raids on the cities of the Black Sea coast and of the establishment of commercial contacts and diplomatic missions, had helped to acquaint the Rus′ people with Christianity. For its part, Byzantium was made quite aware of the danger posed by Rus′ in July 860, when the *Rhōs* (as they were recorded in Greek) laid siege to Constantinople. The empire reacted quickly, outlining two objectives to be achieved with the help of Christianization. In 861 a mission was sent to Khazaria, headed by Constantine, future apostle to the Slavs. His *Vita* allows us to conclude that the best means of preventing further Rus′ raids on Byzantine possessions was considered to be the winning over of the Khazar ruler to Christianity and, as a result, the baptism of the peoples under his rule, who included some of the Slavs on the Dnipro. A second Byzantine undertaking was aimed specifically at Rus′: negotiations were begun, the successful outcome of which, according to Byzantine accounts, was crowned by the arrival in Constantinople (ca. 865) of a Rus′ embassy requesting baptism. In connection with this event, Patriarch Photius reported in an 867 encyclical to the patriarchs of the East that "the wild people known as *Rhōs*, who not long ago dared to attack the empire of the Romans, have received the pure and uncorrupted Christian faith" and have "found a place among those obedient and friendly to us," and "been given a bishop and shepherd."[1] That bishopric, if in fact it was actually established, had an extremely short life, for it does not figure on any of the lists of dioceses from the period. This first attempt at Christianization, which was assumed on Byzantine initiative, was unsuccessful because Rus′ itself was not yet ready for conversion.

The absence of a bishop in Kyiv during Princess Ol′ga's period of rule is indicated by her efforts to obtain one from Otto I in 959. Nonetheless, Christianity continued to gain adherents on the Dnipro. We must consider credible, for example, the testimony of the Arab writer, Ibn Khurdādhbeh (d. 912),

which dates to around 885 and concerns the *ar-Rūs* merchants of the *aṣ-Ṣaqāliba* people who represented themselves as Christians to the Byzantine customs authorities.[2] To be sure, they would have had good reason to do so, as Christians paid only half of the customs duty, but even if we assume, to be on the safe side, that these merchants merely wanted to be seen as Christians, this in itself indicates that Christianity was well known in Kyiv at the end of the ninth century. A few merchants no doubt really were Christians, for the international character of Kyiv, quite apparent in the tenth century, allowed for the existence of a Christian community. Still, there were no Christians in the Rus′ embassy that concluded the Rus′-Byzantine treaty of 911. The turning point must have come sometime after that year, for in 944 Christians do figure among the Rus′ envoys, who represented the social elite. There was already at least one church in Kyiv by 944, as indicated by the text of a treaty from that year and by an accompanying Primary Chronicle commentary, written at the beginning of the twelfth century. As the chronicler relates: "the Christian Rus′ took oath in the church of St. Elijah, which is by the stream . . . [and] since it was a parish church, for many of the Varangians were Christians."[3] Likewise, the fact that visitors from Kyiv to Constantinople prior to 944 regularly resided in the suburbs near the Monastery of St. Mammas suggests that part of the Rus′ were already Christianized. This is also indicated by the Christian names of a number of Dnipro islands (St. Gregory [Khortytsia] and St. Aitherios [Berezan]) on the road "from the Varangians to the Greeks" (attested by Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos in the mid-tenth century), as well as by the presence of "baptized Rus′" in the imperial guard.

The disappearance of the practice of cremation of the dead and its replacement by inhumation in the Kyiv region prior to the actual Christianization of Rus′ may possibly be linked with the influence of Christian traditions of burial. Archaeological data do not permit a definitive conclusion, since the chronology of cremation and burial practices among the Eastern Slavs is too heterogeneous. Nonetheless, it is indisputable that the transition along the middle Dnipro, from a prevalence of cremation in the sixth to tenth centuries to a predominance of skeletal burials in the second half of the tenth century, coincides chronologically with the opening up of Rus′ to Christianity.[4] Elsewhere among the Eastern Slavs, cremation continues to be in evidence throughout the eleventh century. The absence of cult objects (such as crosses or icons) of stone or metal among the items found in the graves of this period is as characteristic, with a few exceptions, as it was for the eleventh to thirteenth centuries as well. We do not know whether the wearing of crosses was widely practiced at that time. Nor is it clear whether those crosses, undoubtedly treated at first as phylacteries, would have accompanied the deceased to the grave. Still, such a syncretic treatment of this Christian symbol is suggested by bronze and silver crosses of the eleventh century used as female jewelry or amulets and found among cremated remains as well.[5]

Baptism of Ol'ga—Regent of Rus'

After the death of the Kyivan prince Igor′ (c. 945), the regency of his widow Princess Ol′ga (until ca. 960) supported the further Christianization of Rus′. The most salient expression of this policy was the baptism of Ol′ga herself. According to eleventh-century tradition, that ceremony took place in Constantinople. The fact that Ol′ga's baptismal name, Helena, matched that of the wife of Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos implies the participation of the imperial couple as godparents. The Primary Chronicle's account of these events has been embellished with many folkloristic elements clearly originating in an already Christian society. Nonetheless, the Primary Chronicle's date for the baptism—6463 (according to the Byzantine *anno mundi*; i.e., between 1 September 954 and 31 August 955 A.D.)—finds support in the eulogy of Princess Ol′ga included in the triptych *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodimer*. That work, compiled at the end of the thirteenth century, contains annalistic notes dating back to the eleventh century, and a few of them display an independence from the chronology of these events presented in the chronicle. The work's alternative, indirect way of indicating the date of Ol′ga's baptism, for example, suggests it is using a different source: "after holy baptism, Ol′ga lived fifteen years . . . she died on 11 July 6477 [969]."[6] However, it is the completely independent account in the *Synopsis historiarum* of John Skylitzes that really demonstrates the likely accuracy of the Primary Chronicle's date of 6463. Writing in the middle of the eleventh century, Skylitzes makes use of tenth-century sources. He notes that Ol′ga, after the death of her husband, came to Constantinople and returned home a baptized Christian. All the events preceding and following this note relate to the period of Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos' reign between the dethronement of Romanos I Lekapenos in December 944 and the death of Patriarch Theophylaktos on 27 February 956. Skylitzes precedes his reference to the baptism of Ol′ga with information about relations with Hungary between 948 and 955, and follows it with a discussion of the marriage of Constantine's son Romanos II to Theophanō, which probably took place in 955 and certainly no later than 956. The chronological order of these events permits us to conclude that Ol′ga was baptized in Constantinople in 954 or 955.[7] The agreement between the Skylitzes data and the two accounts from Rus′ makes this dating of Ol′ga's baptism most likely.

The description of the visit to the imperial palace of Ol′ga, *archontissa* and *hēgemōn* of Rus′, in *De Ceremoniis,* does not explicitly indicate whether the Rus′ princess was already a Christian. Thus, the current debate concerning the date of that autumn visit—whether it occurred in 946 or in 957—is not of essential significance for determining the place and time of her baptism.[8] Certain inferences are possible, however. The fact that Ol′ga appears here under her previous name (Elga) rather than her Christian one (Helena) proves nothing, for many Christian South Slavic rulers and rulers of Rus′ (including

Volodimer, for that matter) are likewise known to Byzantine authors only by their princely names. The presence of a priest in the suite of Princess Ol'ga is likewise not of special significance: he could have been present to assist a baptized or catechumen princess, but he could also have been there simply because some of those accompanying Ol'ga were Christians (just as some of the emissaries concluding the treaty of 944 had been).

More significant, on the other hand, is the indication of *De Ceremoniis* that, during the ceremonial banquet, Ol'ga sat, in accordance with her dignity, among the *zōstai* at the imperial table.[9] She was thus treated as the equal of a "girded" *patrikia,* the highest female rank at the imperial court. The title of *zōstē* was used in that period by the first ladies of the court, who would accompany both empresses, the wives of the two emperors and Constantine and his son, Romanos. In addition, the ninth and tenth centuries saw the use of the term as an honorary title bestowed upon wives of neighboring rulers, including those of Bulgaria.[10] Only the *zōstai* had the right to sit at the table of the imperial family. The "appropriate honor" that according to Skylitzes was shown to Ol'ga after her baptism would have been nothing unusual, if it is understood to have been an award of the title of *zōstē patrikia* ("Girdled Lady"), particularly since the Hungarian princes had received the title of *patrikios* following their baptism. The Byzantine custom of granting court titles to foreign rulers who were baptized with the participation of the emperor was continued in the tenth century, and the omission of this award in Ol'ga's case is unlikely and would be difficult to explain. It should also be noted that there are no known instances in which the title of *zōstē* was bestowed upon a non-Christian.

Thus, on the basis of *De Ceremoniis* and the *Synopsis* of Skylitzes, we can basically conclude that the *archontissa* of Rus' received the title of *zōstē patrikia* after her baptism, as a result of the participation of the imperial pair as godparents. Likewise, the seating of the princess in the midst of the imperial family for dessert and informal conversation on various subjects with the emperor indicates an exceptional degree of intimacy for the imperial court, with its concern for strict ceremonial decorum. The bestowing of such honor to a *zōstē* and goddaughter of the emperor would have been natural enough, but it would have been completely unheard of for a pagan ruler to be accorded similar treatment. Since spiritual kinship with the imperial family can now be taken as a given here, the visit of the Christian Ol'ga must be dated to the autumn of 957, and her baptism to an earlier visit to Constantinople in 954 or 955.

The Ottonian Mission

This date appears to be contradicted by the *Continuation of the Chronicle of the Abbot Regino of Prüm* (*Reginonis abbatis Prumiensis chronicon, cum continuatione Treverensi*), probably written by Adalbert, monk of Trier and

then missionary bishop to Rus', who later, in 968, went on to become the first archbishop of Magdeburg. We read there, under the year 959, that "ambassadors of Helena, queen of the Rus', who was baptized in Constantinople under Romanos, emperor of Constantinople, came to King Otto I asking—insincerely, it later turned out—for the appointment of a bishop and priests for that people."[11] A literal reading of this account would suggest that the baptism of Ol'ga must to be dated to the reign of Romanos II, that is, between 9 November 959 and 15 March 963, but such a conclusion merely serves to deepen the impression that the account itself is unreliable: were it true, then it would have been a pagan Ol'ga, and not a Christian Helena, who would have sent an embassy to Otto I in 959.[12] Given the later provenance of this note (written after 962, but no later than 967), we should probably see this as a typical error resulting from faulty memory (naming Romanos instead of Constantine). Other inaccuracies and inexactitudes in the *Continuation* would tend to support such a view.

The very fact of the appearance of a Rus' embassy in 959 does not seem open to doubt, for already in Christmas 959 in Frankfurt, the monk Libutius was consecrated bishop *genti Rusorum* in the presence of Otto I. In light of this, the arrival of the Rus' embassy should be dated to the autumn of 959, when Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos was still alive. The news of his death on 9 November and of the assumption of power by Romanos could barely have reached the royal court by Christmas.

There would be no question about the reliability of the account if, instead of *"sub Romano imperatore Constantinopolitano,"* we were to find *"sub Constantino et Romano imperatoribus Constantinopolitanis."* There are, however, circumstances permitting us to understand the appearance of such imprecision at the time of the writing of the work. Romanos II became *basileus autokrator* only after the death of his father Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos on 9 November 959, but he had been emperor in name from the moment of his coronation on 6 April 945. At the courts of Europe it was well known who the real ruler was, but this did not free one from the obligation to observe established procedure. It is well known that "years of rule" were numbered from the date of coronation (and hence, for Romanos, from 945) and that the titulature in correspondence issued by the Byzantine imperial chancellery included the names of both emperors, Constantine as well as Romanos. The co-emperor was likewise named on a par with the real emperor in the address of letters sent to them.[13]

The author of the *Continuation,* Adalbert, served in the chancellery of Otto I from 953 to 956 and again, after his return from Kyiv, from 962 to 966, and was thus perfectly acquainted with the formulae of Byzantine correspondence. Since 945, Romanos had been named alongside Constantine in the address of letters originating from the royal chancellery. When, after his stay in Kyiv, Adalbert returned to his duties in the Ottonian chancellery, Romanos then

figured first in the address as the emperor *autokrator.* Hence, Adalbert could easily have named him alone when he wrote the further installment of his chronicle.[14]

We thus have the right to consider Adalbert's information reliable, though inexact (since it was incomplete), for, according to the chancellery's view of the surrounding world, Ol'ga-Helena did receive her baptism under the reign of Constantine as well as that of Romanos.

We owe the information about the Rus' princess included in the *Continuation* solely to the need felt by Adalbert to comment on the Rus' episode of his biography and to justify its unsuccessful outcome. Fate had it that the dispatch of bishop Libutius was delayed, and his death on 15 February 961 suggests that the delay must have been due to illness. The ordination of Adalbert in his place must have been carried out quickly, although not earlier than Easter (7 April) 961, so that in the summer of that year Adalbert could already have been in Kyiv, only to return home after less than twelve months.

Emphasizing the difficulties and dangers of his journey, Adalbert reproached the man responsible for his promotion, Archbishop Wilhelm of Mainz, "from whom better treatment should have been expected, since I had never done him any wrong."[15] From this comment alone it is clear that Adalbert belonged to that category of ecclesiastical dignitaries who had neither desire for nor understanding of the apostolicity *ad maiorem gloriam* of Christianity. He was the polar opposite of a zealous man, a pillar of the church like Bruno of Querfurt, who considered the mission to the pagans, even if it meant a martyr's crown, to be of the highest honor. The failure of the mission to Rus' thus had its internal reasons: the appointment of Adalbert as helmsman was not the happiest of choices. Undertaking his task without enthusiasm, the missionary bishop did not, however, simply dream up all the difficulties he encountered along the Dnipro. Two full years had passed since Ol'ga's invitation. Her son Sviatoslav, who had reached adulthood and assumed power in the meantime, was, at best, indifferent to the goals of the mission. For him, the opinion of his soldiers, with their scorn for Christianity, mattered more.

Under these new conditions, the pro-Christian Ol'ga was unable to offer effective support to the missionary efforts. The authorities were not quick *compellere intrare* (Luke 14:23), and so the missionaries, disappointed by such double-dealing, did not delay in returning to their homelands. The generally held view that the failure of the mission was a result of rivalries between Rome and Constantinople lacks any real foundation. Regardless of certain differences in rite, which could not have mattered to Ol'ga in any case, there was still one Church at this time, and the activity of Greek or Latin missionaries, therefore, did not have to be mutually exclusive, even though a signal success by one or other mission would have placed the matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the order of the day. Ol'ga clearly understood that the conversion of the realm would be difficult to carry out without dynastic, political and ecclesiastical

contacts and sufficient aid from outside, and could have felt justified in turning to any Christian ruler for this purpose. Her appeal, moreover, did meet with a moderately favorable but short-lived response from the Ottonian court. Otto I ultimately viewed the missionary action from the perspective of his own political interests, and these did not extend much farther east than the river Elbe.[16]

Likewise, the practical recommendations on foreign policy toward northern neighbors offered by Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos in *De administrando imperio* indicate that, in the mid-tenth century, the political horizon of the empire in that region was dominated by the Khazars and Pechenegs. To be sure, political and commercial contacts with Rus′ were valued, as was the supply of mercenaries from that country, but the opportunity of opening Rus′ up to Christianity through the conversion of its ruler had not yet been recognized. No doubt, influenced by earlier failures, Byzantine politics lacked a genuine missionary impulse in this period. Indeed, in both Constantinople and Rome in the tenth century, there was an absence of the imagination that had earlier fuelled their competition over Bulgaria. The limitless East European plain was only faintly outlined on the horizon of the Christian world in that period.

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Why, though, would a princess-regent of Rus′ have appealed to the Western Emperor Otto I in 959, given the traditional ties between Kyiv and the Eastern Empire?

It is quite likely that Ol′ga, on her visit to Constantinople in 954–955, sought, in addition to her own baptism, the dispatch to Rus′ of a mission led by a bishop.[17] The fulfillment of this wish would have depended upon the emperor and the patriarch. Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos, a scholar and literatus with an engaging lifestyle, was no statesman, living more in the past than the present. Generous in his promises, he was parsimonious in his deeds. The patriarch in that period, Theophylaktos, for his part, was a man found "more often in the stables than in the church." When Emperor Romanos I Lekapenos had forced the elevation of his sixteen-year-old son to the patriarchal throne in 933, the opposition of the local bishops was so great that the consecration of the young man had to be performed by papal legates. This lamentable situation continued until the death of Theophylaktos on 27 February 956. Moreover, as a result of a fall from his horse, he was in poor health during the last two years of his life, and was thus at the very least limited in his activities, which would have included the consecration of bishops. Finally, finding a willing and worthy candidate who would not have considered this mission a sentence of exile could well have compounded the difficulties.

When Ol′ga visited Constantinople as a Christian in 957, her presence there was perhaps connected, in addition to political and commercial matters, with

renewed efforts to obtain a bishop and mission for Kyiv. The patriarchate was from 3 April 956 occupied by the more worthy Polyeuktos, who, in standing up for the principles and canons of the church, quickly came into conflict with some of the bishops and with the emperor himself. Constantine began by fearing him and then went on to hate him with a passion that continued to his last breath.[18] No doubt, both the emperor and the patriarch, individually, would have favored Ol'ga's request, but when it came to agreeing on a candidate, intrigues and quarrels between the palace and Hagia Sophia would surely have led to a postponement of the decision. Thus, when the awaited pastor failed to appear in Kyiv in 958 or in the summer of 959, Ol'ga, sincere in her devotion to the faith, sent her embassy to Otto I in early autumn 959. The fact that she addressed her appeal directly to the German ruler attests to her good grasp of the prevailing ecclesiastical situation.

It was not rivalry between Constantinople and Rome over Rus', but local squabbles in both centers of the Christian world that had led to an ignoring of the great mission of the church in this period. John XII, elevated to the papal throne as an immature youth of seventeen, much as Theophylaktos, led a life of scandal and even crime. In both churches there was no lack of striving toward renewal, but the presence of unworthy individuals at the helm undermined the missionary efforts that had been undertaken. Under the circumstances, Otto I's efforts to regenerate the church in symbiosis with the state could not have escaped the attention of the regent of Rus'.

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Various factors doomed the Rus' mission to failure, Adalbert's faintheartedness being but the least among them. The attempts undertaken in Kyiv to draw closer to the Christian world, strong with the power of a newly discovered faith, but weak in social support, exposed the lack of any genuine interest in the Christianization of Rus' in Constantinople. In the Byzantine capital, political skepticism and ecclesiastical inertia were reinforced by popular fears of the Rus', who aroused a sense of apocalyptic doom.

Even though it did not lead to an immediate breakthrough, the conversion of Ol'ga, whom the chronicler hails as the herald and dawning light of Christianity in Rus', had far-reaching consequences. The number of Christians continued to grow—at the Kyivan court, among the nobles, and among the townspeople. Ol'ga's efforts to win her son Sviatoslav over to the new faith were unsuccessful, however. Even though the need for a change in the ideology and structure of the young state of Rus' was already strongly felt locally, there were still insufficient forces to break with the traditional worldview. Sviatoslav, the barbarous warrior and chieftain, taking the helm of rule from his mother after 960, became the guardian of this archaic order. In fact, however, his own activities ultimately served to destroy that system: his friendly contacts and

military struggles with Byzantium, as well as his efforts to establish his rule in Bulgaria, opened Rus′ to a greater extent than ever before to the influence of Christianity. Ol′ga herself was left with the possibility of influencing her grandchildren. One of these was Volodimer, who was raised at his grandmother's court. Even if he was brought up as a pagan at the wish of his father, Ol′ga doubtless did much to ensure that he came to know the new faith.[19] More than two decades were to pass, though, before that faith became the official religion in Kyiv.

Civil War in Byzantium and the Conversion of Rus′

The year 988 opened the Christian era for all of Rus′. It unfolded against an exceptionally colorful political background, one that has tended to obscure some of the essential details of the events of 986–989. Let us thus examine the tangle of events of that period which determined the entry of Rus′ into the Christian fold.[20]

The significant role ascribed to the city of Kherson (*Gk.* Cherson; Korsun′ to the Rus′ chroniclers) in the baptism of Rus′ since the days of the Rus′ Primary Chronicle is in need of revision. The Primary Chronicle account of 988 should not be seen as the basic source of our knowledge about the events relating to the conversion of Rus′.[21] An investigation of all the sources enables us to see the Primary Chronicle's tale of the baptism as a myth clad in historical robes, a literary compilation patched together more than a hundred years after the events it purports to describe. Its author sought to portray the baptism of Rus′ as a great religious event, and so arranged his assembled materials in an order calculated to emphasize the ordinances of Providence, even if that order contradicted the logical flow of events.

A significant place in this compilation is occupied by a text known as the "Korsun′ Legend." That legend, originally Greek in language and, more importantly, Khersonian in spirit, came to Kyiv in the 1070s or 1080s as a result of the broad contacts of the Kyivan Caves Monastery and its branch in Tmutorokan. Passing in silence over the reasons for the campaign of the prince of Rus′ against Kherson, the legend has him capture the Greek city and demand the hand of the sister of Emperor Basil II on the threat of further war. In the finalization of the mutually successful negotiations, a significant role is played by Kherson itself as the site of Volodimer's baptism and of his marriage to the imperial princess Anna. The desire of the text to emphasize the role of this city in the Byzantine-Rus′ rapprochement is quite obvious.[22]

Historians assessing the marriage of Volodimer to the *porphyrogennēta* Anna, daughter of Romanos II and granddaughter of Constantine, in the light of an imperial doctrine categorically forbidding the marriage of members of the imperial famly to foreigners, have viewed Volodimer's campaign against Kherson as an effort of that prince to win, by force of arms, the hand of an

imperial princess earlier promised to him in exchange for military aid.[23] This interpretative approach grows out of the conviction, as unshakeable as if it could be demonstrated from the sources, that a barbarian—and a pagan at that—could not have achieved such a great honor without exerting considerable pressure. The capture of Kherson supposedly played just such a role. However, these historians have failed to recognize that the matrimonial practice of the imperial court was not as rigid as its declared principles, and they have forgotten that political decisions are influenced first of all by political realities, and only then by doctrinal considerations.[24]

In fact, there is no support in the sources for the universally held view that Volodimer captured a Byzantine city loyal to Emperor Basil II and the Macedonian dynasty. Indeed, the chronology of events as well as facts from the history of Kherson itself lead one to quite the opposite conclusion. From the mutually supplementary accounts of contemporary historians (Leo the Deacon, Yaḥyā of Antioch, and Stephen [Step'anos] of Tarōn) about celestial phenomena it can be concluded that Kherson was captured probably by the end of 988 and surely before October 989.[25] During this same period, Basil II, with Rus' aid, won an enormous victory over the usurper, and the armies of Rus' continued to be involved until the late autumn in the crushing of still unextinguished centers of revolt in Asia Minor. It is inconceivable that at the same time as a Rus' force of several thousand was fighting victoriously under the command of the emperor, other Rus' troops sent by the same Volodimer would be capturing the city of Kherson, had it been loyal to the emperor. In fact, data from the tenth century permit us to conclude that in the civil war of 986–989, Kherson must have been in the camp of Basil II's opponents.

In the middle of the tenth century, Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos, referring to earlier attempts of Kherson to cast off imperial authority, had recommended measures to be taken in case of another revolt by this city. Among the most effective, in his view, would be an economic blockade, cutting off commercial contacts between Kherson and the Black Sea provinces of the empire: deprived of the possibility of selling hides and wax or importing grain and wine, the inhabitants of Kherson "will not be able to live."[26] The Byzantine emperor thus pointed to the circumstances that would dictate the choice of one political orientation or another by this city, so slow to surrender its traditional autonomy: it would have to submit to whoever controlled the southern coast of the Black Sea. Beginning in September 987, that coast was controlled by the pretender to the imperial crown, Bardas Phokas, who, as Leo the Deacon reports, "took all of the ports and coastal regions of Asia Minor with the exception of Abydos."[27] There must have been tensions in 970–971, when *patrikios* Kalokyros, one of the leading figures in Kherson and a trusted supporter of Emperor Nikēphoros Phokas, refused to recognize the new emperor, John Tzimiskes, after the palace coup of December 969, thereby tying his hopes for the future to the plans of the Phokas family and the bellicose

Sviatoslav.[28] At the beginning of the eleventh century, the revolt that broke out in Kherson was ultimately suppressed in 1016 by the joint actions of the imperial navy and a Rus' force.

These facts suggest that in 988 and 989 Rus' units were operating in the Crimea on the basis of the same understanding and to the same end as their comrades who had been sent to the Bosphorus by the Rus' prince. The imperial possessions in the Crimea, with Kherson in the lead, had come out against the Macedonian dynasty, and so Rus' troops besieged and captured the rebel city, returning it to the rule of Emperor Basil II—ally and brother-in-law of the ruler of Rus'.

This fundamentally different assessment of the place of Kherson in the developments of the years 986–989 thus leads us to a new interpretation of the sequence of events, showing how, on the one hand, they freed the Byzantine Empire from the confusion of civil war and, on the other, then placed Rus' inside the orbit of Christian civilization.

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A painful military defeat, and an even more painful loss of face in a battle with the Bulgarians on 17 August 986, had forced Basil II to reassess the empire's Bulgarian policy laid down by John Tzimiskes. Fresh memories of Sviatoslav's conquest of Bulgaria encouraged thoughts about reviving those articles of the treaties of 944 and 971 that had provided for Rus' military action against the enemies of Byzantium. It is quite probable that contacts were initiated with Kyiv for this reason soon after the retreat in Bulgaria. In any case, when the Byzantine aristocracy, emboldened by the misfortunes of the emperor, came out openly against the Macedonian dynasty a few months later, Basil, determined to break its political aspirations, no longer had any other way out. On news of the destruction of Basil's armies by the Bulgarians, Bardas Skleros mounted a new rebellion in December 986. Basil was forced to call back Bardas Phokas to his aid, a talented general and ambitious politician whose aspirations peaked in 970 and was suspected of participating in the conspiracy of 985. Phokas, though forced to swear an oath of loyalty to the emperor on everything holy, did not keep his word for long. Wasting no time, he already began negotiations with Bardas Skleros in May 987. Basil had already learned of Phokas' treason in June. After the pair of usurpers had agreed to a division of the empire, Phokas treacherously imprisoned Skleros at their second meeting in August, and on the day of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross, Wednesday, 14 September 987, proclaimed himself emperor.

Elite units of the Byzantine army were in the hands of Basil II's foes, with the Armenians casting their lot with Skleros and the Iberians backing Phokas. The emperor, faced with the hostility of the military and the landed aristocracy,

with opposition in the bosom of the church, and an unfavorable attitude on the part of the populace of the empire in general, could have little doubt that the alliances against him spelled the beginning of the end of his reign. He did what he could to hinder the common action of these threatening forces, but in order to save his throne he had to be able to counter the armies of the enemy with an equally respectable force. The contacts already established with Kyiv following news of the agreement between the two usurpers in June now assumed a character of the highest priority: the embassy was instructed not only to ensure that military reinforcements were sent, but also to win Volodimer over entirely to the cause of the Macedonian dynasty. The embassy must have set off in June or the beginning of July 987—the period most favorable for navigation on the Black Sea—and then arrived in Kyiv in July or August of that year. If earlier attempts to obtain Rus' military support had focused on action against Bulgaria, much more was hoped for and much more offered by the summer of 987. The rank of the embassy must have been appropriate to the gravity of the matters it was to discuss and the goals it was to achieve. It included, and was perhaps led by, Theophylaktos, the metropolitan of Sebastea. Entangled in violent conflicts with the Armenian clergy of that city, he had taken refuge in the capital in the spring of 987 after the outbreak of the revolt of the Armenians' supporter Skleros, thus linking his own fate with that of the Macedonian dynasty. The events of 986 and 987, the fact of the erection of the metropolitanate of Rus' sometime between 976 and 997, and the transfer of Theophylaktos from Sebastea to the see of Rus' during the reign of Basil II Porphyrogennētos, all show that the ecclesiastical dignitary, loyal to the emperor, was suited as no one else for a combined diplomatic and missionary undertaking of this kind. His success in this endeavor resulted in Theophylaktos becoming the first head of the church in Rus'.

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Three central issues were the subject of the discussions and mutually binding agreements in Kyiv: 1) the acceptance of Christianity by the ruler of Rus' and his land, 2) his marriage to the *porphyrogennēta* Anna, and 3) his provision of effective military aid to the empire. Let us examine each issue individually.

1. Volodimer declared his readiness to accept baptism in his own name and in that of his subjects: "the boyars and all the people of the land of Rus'." It was decided, for the purposes of the propagation and strengthening of the Christian faith there, to found a separate Rus' ecclesiastical province—a metropolitanate—jurisdictionally joined to the patriarchate of Constantinople, with the Byzantine side taking responsibility for its organization and the ruler of Rus' providing his protection and the necessary means of support.

2. Through their emissaries, the Emperors Basil and (his brother) Constantine expressed their desire to become kinsmen of the prince of Rus' and

their readiness to give their sister Anna to him in marriage as soon as he became a Christian.

3. Volodimer obligated himself to offer military aid against all the enemies of the empire by sending a contingent of several thousand to the Bosphorus to fight against the army of the usurpers as soon as possible. Probably then, or before long, an armed action against the Crimean city of Kherson, which had come out on the side of Bardas Phokas, was settled.[29]

Curiously, the most important stipulation of this now vanished treaty is nowhere reflected in Byzantine writings of the tenth and eleventh century.[30] The explanation should probably be sought in the fact that while Byzantine public opinion, alarmed by the threatening presence of the contingents from the north, doubted the sincerity of the conversion, court circles, for their part, sought just as resolutely to emphasize that the baptism of Rus' was a long-accomplished fact. Justification of such a point of view could be found both in the 867 encyclical of Patriarch Photios and in the views expressed by Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos in his *Life of Basil I*, written around 950.[31] Doubtless, too, more than real weight was ascribed to the Christian community that already existed in Kyiv. Such an explanation was opportune, as it would not have been fitting to admit that at the battle of Abydos, "on the day that"—to quote the Byzantine philosopher and theologian, Michael Psellos— "decided the future of the Empire," the most Christian of rulers had been forced to rely on the aid of pagan Rus' against his own subjects and fellow believers. For this reason, in order to maintain appearances in Constantinople, Rus' was treated as if it were already a Christian country, and the terms of the agreement concluded were represented as simply involving the personal baptism of Volodimer and those of his subjects who were not yet baptized, as well as the establishment of jurisdictional and organizational bases for the church in Rus'.

For the Byzantine side, the most important issue was the arrival of a strong Rus' force in Constantinople as soon as possible. If the alliance was concluded in August and September, there would still have been a possibility of sending a contingent of several hundred in the fall, before navigation became impossible, but months would have been needed to prepare and then dispatch an armada of several thousand warriors.[32] Volodimer must have provided additional troops, drawing them from various parts of his realm, as well as hired Varangians, perhaps from Scandinavia. Considerable time would have been needed to suitably equip an expeditionary corps of this kind and to prepare the 120 to 140 ships capable of carrying 40 to 60 warriors apiece down the river and across the sea. Volodimer must have ordered the assembled force to move southward no later than September of 987, as soon as circumstances were favorable for navigation, which would have meant April or May 988, when the high level of spring water would ease the passage of heavy war boats over the Dnipro cataracts. The route down the Dnipro was easier and faster at that time of year, taking about 20 to 23 days, and cabotage on the Black Sea—6 days. A fast-

moving military fleet could thus complete the Kyiv-to-Constantinople journey in about 26 to 30 days. Even in the case of a slightly slower pace, it could have been expected on the Bosphorus sometime in June of 988.[33]

It was no problem to set a date for the baptism of Volodimer and his subjects (meaning, for all practical purposes, the lords and military servitors and the inhabitants of Kyiv). Part of the social elite and its clientele and part of the merchant class were already Christian. The fact that a portion of the Byzantine embassy remained in Kyiv for missionary work permitted the preparation of catechumens and the performance of the baptismal rite at a leisurely pace, just as long as it was completed before the agreed-upon date for the arrival of the *porphyrogennēta* Anna in Rus'.[34] The earliest possible date would have been sometime in the summer of 988.

The giving away of a *porphyrogennēta* in marriage within less than a year from the conclusion of the agreement seems quite startling, considering the earlier experience of the Ottonians. Otto I had negotiated for three years with Emperor Nikēphoros Phokas to obtain the hand of a *porphyrogennēta* for his son Otto II, and unsuccessfully at that. Moreover, his emissary, Bishop Liutprand of Cremona, was told, during an audience at the imperial palace in 968, that "It is an unheard-of thing for a *porphyrogenita* born of a *porphyrogenitus,* that is, a daughter of one born in the (imperial) purple, who was then herself born in the purple, to be given away in marriage to a foreigner."[35] Subsequent efforts to win a *porphyrogennēta* for Otto III lasted for more than six years (995–1001).

When the initiative was taken by the emperor himself, however, the matter could be settled much more quickly: in the course of one-and-a-half years, for example, a marriage was concluded between Otto II and Theophanō, who was, it is true, not a *porphyrogennēta,* but only a relative of Emperor John Tzimiskes. Even the temporary difficulties of Tzimiskes that had forced him to revise his predecessor's policy toward the Ottonians were hardly comparable to the plight of Basil II. The events of 986–987 had made Basil an emperor without an empire. The Asiatic provinces were dominated by the rebellious Bardas Phokas, while the Bulgarians held sway in a significant part of the European half of the empire. The Armenian and Iberian units had thrown their support to the usurpers. Nor could Basil count upon the Greeks. According to Psellos, an overwhelming part of the army had declared itself for Bardas Phokas, who had also won the support of the most influential aristocratic clans. Basil was aware of the disloyalty among the *Romaioi.*[36] In his efforts to save his throne he could not afford to pay heed to any tradition, nor be held back by the warnings of his grandfather, who had called down anathema upon anyone who, in violation of tradition and imperial law, might be receptive to a request from "the unbelieving and contemptible inhabitants of the North" to become kinsmen of the emperor of the *Romaioi.*[37] Aware of the danger to him and to the Macedonian dynasty itself, he decided to break with the hitherto binding

principle of denying marriage of foreigners to daughters of the emperor born in the porphyrous chamber of the palace. Having concluded the agreement for the marriage of Anna to Volodimer, Basil was profoundly interested in carrying it to conclusion without delay. By having a sister in Kyiv, he could be certain of effective support from his brother-in-law and count on the arrival of Rus′ units to deploy against the rebellion. To be sure, the emperor and his entourage remembered well the lesson that Sviatoslav Igor′evich had taught the Byzantines almost twenty years before. And some close to Basil were aware that the Rus′ prince stayed true toward Nikēphoros Phokas and that Byzantine-Rus′ relations came to a volte-face and hostility only after this emperor's murder (11 December 969).[38] The thought of a new appeal for aid from Rus′ must have aroused some anxiety. Nonetheless, there was no alternative. All Basil could do was to take every possible step to avoid surprises from that quarter while assuring himself of continued military aid. The most reliable means of realizing this was the establishment of ties of kinship between the two dynasties. It was thus not the prince who forced this union, but it was the emperor himself, compelled by circumstances, who was the true initiator of the marriage of Volodimer and Anna. The "Korsun′ Legend" of the Primary Chronicle, which is oblivious to the civil war in Byzantium and the matter of Volodimer saving the throne for Basil II, betrays better knowledge of imperial matrimonial doctrine than of historical reality.

For Volodimer, an early wedding date was likewise most desirable. An honor that other Christian rulers had failed to attain had become the portion of the ambitious builder of a large and energetic state that was, after all, barbarian in the eyes of the heirs of the Roman Empire. The efforts of the Ottonians and their merely trifling success with the non-*porphyrogennēta* Theophanō, so poorly received, according to Thietmar, by many of the lords of the *Heiliges Römisches Reich*, was no secret to the court in Kyiv. Moreover, reports of the baptism of more and more Slavic and Scandinavian dynasts could well have encouraged a growing sense of isolation and a desire to open up Rus′ to the Christian world, an attitude no doubt encouraged by those members of the Kyivan ruler's entourage who had already converted to Christianity. The decision to accept baptism, already under consideration in Kyiv for some time and now coming to fruition, became particularly attractive in light of the opportunity to become a brother to the emperor of the *Romaioi.* The Kyivan ruler, making Rus′ part of the Christian *oikoumenē,* thus did not merely enter the European family of rulers, but, thanks to his marriage to a *porphyrogennēta,* immediately attained a leading position in that hierarchy.[39] The union between the two dynasties—Macedonian and Rurikid—significantly eased the difficult and historically important breakthrough that opened the road to the Christianization of Rus′. Hence the force of the political and ideological statement of the marriage of Volodimer I.

Since both sides were vitally interested in a hasty realization of their agreement, a Rus' betrothal embassy must have arrived in Constantinople that same autumn of 987. In its presence the treaty was to be ratified by the emperor himself. The procedure must have been similar to that known from the agreement between John Tzimiskes and Otto I in 971.[40] Part of the Byzantine delegation, consisting chiefly of clerics, remained in Kyiv to prepare and carry out the baptism of the prince of Rus' and his pagan entourage, but the rest, with the Rus' embassy and perhaps, as noted above, a military contingent of several hundred, made its way by sea to Constantinople while that route was still open to navigation. The assumption that this matchmaking embassy must have reached Constantinople by October, or at the latest early November, is given greater credence by the news that Volodimer's betrothal reached the European courts by January 988. Light is shed on the timing of the agreement by the thwarted plans of King Hugh Capet of France to obtain a *porphyrogennēta* for his son Robert.[41] All of this endorses the dating of the Byzantine-Rus' agreement to being concluded no later than September 987.

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An appeal to outside force in the course of a civil war could not have failed to have an impact on public opinion in the empire. Anxiety was fanned by circles opposed to the Macedonian dynasty, but even among neutral and loyal groups, the ruler's decision to bring in Rus' troops aroused serious misgivings, even after the victory—no doubt out of fear about the long-range consequences of such an action. These misgivings are expressed in a clear though indirect manner by Leo the Deacon in his history, written at the beginning of the 990s. Leo belonged to court circles, but was not an apologist for Basil II. The historian's silence about the presence of the Rus' at Chrysopolis and Abydos and about the marriage of the *porphyrogennēta* Anna should be understood as an expression of his disapproval of the means the emperor had employed to save his throne. Leo's treatment of the capture of Kherson by the "Tauroscythians" as yet another misfortune is witness to the fact that he was shocked by the turning over of what was, after all, a Greek city to pillaging by barbarians, whose excesses and cruelties in the wars with Sviatoslav were recalled and exaggerated, not by chance, just at the time of rapprochement. Leo, unsparing in his praise for Emperor Nikēphoros Phokas, and writing after the civil war had already ended in victory for Basil, paints a dark picture of the situation, so drastically different from the more fortunate reigns of Nikēphoros Phokas (963–969) and John Tzimiskes (969–976). He portrays the Rus' as a sinister and dangerous foe and a genuine menace to their neighbors, supporting his warnings with the prophesies of Ezekiel (*Historiae* lib. IX, 6).[42]

Leo the Deacon was not alone in deriving a pessimistic vision of the empire's future from the years of civil war. In poetic works written between

986 and 990, John Geometres contrasts an idealized portrait of Nikēphoros Phokas and his times with an image of the empire of the present, one encompassed with ruin and oppressed by a fratricidal war in which "brother aims his ax at the breast of brother" and "noble cities are humiliatingly trampled by the feet of foreigners."[43]

Aversion to the Rus' visitors is sharply expressed as well in a poetic epitaph for Nikēphoros Phokas. The poet appeals to the murdered emperor to rise up from his grave to defend his city against the Rus'. Particularly telling is the following five-line stanza:

> The armed forces of the Rus' come out against us.
> The tribe of Scythians is thirsty for slaughter.
> The lowest of foreigners plunder our city,
> They, whom once your statue alone,
> Before the gates of Byzantion, struck full of terror.[44]

This verse refers to the presence of the Rus' expeditionary corps in Constantinople in 988–989. The Rus', despite their thirst for slaughter, limited themselves to pillage. The behavior of foreign troops, even allied ones, was always a heavy burden for the inhabitants of the host country, and the warriors from Rus' were no exception, although the poet (whether under the influence of his own prejudices or of reports purposely spread by forces hostile to Basil or opposed to his policy) probably overstates the case. Evidence of misgivings and fears about Rus' during the time of Basil II is offered by the *Patria Constantinopoleos*, which is a guide to the landmarks of the capital. Referring to a monument on the Forum of Taurus (Forum Tauri), it describes how one of the reliefs on its side portrayed "the last days of the city, when the Rus' will destroy it."[45] The genesis of this legend about the future destruction of the city by the Rus' dates back to their unexpected attack on Constantinople in 860. It is noteworthy that the prophesy was still alive a few years after Abydos, in the early 990s, when the guide was compiled. Despite the new state of relations with Kyiv since 988, in the years that immediately followed, while elite Rus' units fought on the Bulgarian and Syrian fronts to restore the empire to its earlier strength and glory, a traveler guided across the Forum of Taurus was still treated to the same, unaltered commentary. The fact remains that the obsessive expectation of "the end of the city and the end of the world," a reflection of the growth of millennarian beliefs, singled out the Rus' as the ones who would execute the sentence.[46] The divisions from the years of civil war had not yet been overcome, and the opposition of broad sections of society had not yet died down. The events that long since have enabled us to credit Basil II with rebuilding the empire's strength appeared in much more somber hues to his contemporaries. The new policy of Basil toward Kyiv aroused distrust and anxiety about the future of the empire among the Byzantines, and this was translated into the language of eschatological prophecy by the common people.

Alongside his chief diplomatic initiative to ensure Kyivan aid, the emperor negotiated an understanding with the Fāṭimid caliph of Egypt between September 987 and April 988. It was no coincidence that at a time when the eastern regions of the empire were under the domination of Phokas, Basil sent an embassy to Cairo and agreed, as Arab historians confirm, to heavy terms—inclusive of prayers for the Fāṭimid Caliph al-ʿAzīz recited in the mosque of Constantinopole. At the cost of territorial concessions, he could count on Arab military action to tie down part of Phokas' forces on the Syrian border.[47] He did not hesitate to choose such means of assuring his victory, and likewise did not hesitate to sacrifice his own imperial sister to that goal. When his own existence was at stake, there was no time to follow the dictates of imperial doctrine.[48]

The Baptism of Rus' Viewed from Kyiv

At a time when the empire was wracked by civil war, three significant events were taking place: the baptism of Rus′, the marriage of Volodimer to Anna, and the siege and capture of Kherson by Rus′ armies. Our doubts about the reliability of the Primary Chronicle account also have to do with the sequence and location of events of which it writes. Not only the considerations outlined above, but an analysis of other Rus′ accounts as well, militate against the contention that the baptism of Volodimer and his marriage to the *porphyrogennēta* took place in captured Kherson. The Primary Chronicle's "Korsun′ legend" managed to forget the real reason for Rus′ action against Kherson and instead invested the city with splendor as the site of historical ceremonies. Nonetheless, in composing anew the history of those years, it conveyed details—still present in the eleventh century—connected with the siege and capture of the city, as well as with its real role in the Christianization of Rus′. Along with the trophies—relics of the saints, church vessels, and icons, urgently needed for the newly established churches of Kyiv—many clerics of Kherson also journeyed northward, though not of their own free will. Adapting themselves to life in Rus′, they came in time to be the propagators of this legend, one so flattering to their native city.

The date of Kherson's capture can be deduced from Leo the Deacon's reference to a comet that heralded the earthquake in Constantinople on 25–26 October 989. That comet appeared in July.[49] In accordance with the sequence of the Byzantine historian's account, the comet had appeared sometime after the battle at Abydos and the fall of Kherson, justifying the traditional view that Kherson was captured prior to July 989. In any case, the city fell before the earthquake of October 989. The breaking of the resistance of this Crimean fortress may have been linked with the arrival of news about the defeat and death of Bardas Phokas at Abydos on 13 April 989. The Rus′ action against Kherson grew out of the agreement of 987 and fits in well with the overall

outlines of the imperial policy toward the rebellious city. This new act of treason brought the issue to life again. Basil II decided to break the political ambitions of Kherson, and in order to provide exemplary punishment for the city, he consciously handed the city over for plunder. As further retribution, Kherson was also deprived of the right to mint its own coins.[50] The extent of the destruction remains under discussion, but it seems certain that Kherson never regained its earlier political brilliance nor its economic significance.[51]

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In reconstructing the sequence of events associated with the baptism of Rus′, it is impossible not to notice the coincidence between certain of our conclusions and the account of the *Memorial and Encomium for Prince Volodimer* which notes that: "after holy baptism the blessed prince lived twenty-eight years. In the second [i.e., following] year after his baptism, he went to the cataracts, and in the third he captured Kherson."[52] The differences in the order and chronology of events here from those in the *Primary Chronicle* permit us to conclude that the concise annalistic notes used by the *Memorial and Encomium*, which itself was compiled in the thirteenth century, originate from a different tradition. That tradition was still alive in Kyiv in the second half of the eleventh century, as shown by the *vitae* of Boris and Glěb. If we subtract those twenty-eight years from the death of Volodimer in 6523 (1015), the date of his baptism falls in 6495 (March 987–February 988). The same conclusion is supported by the reference to the capture of Kherson in the third year after the baptism. Counting from 6495, that year turns out to be 6497 (March 989–February 990), corresponding closely to Byzantine information about the date of that city's fall.[53]

Thus, the dating of Volodimer's baptism to the year 6495 has all the earmarks of a reliable tradition. The mission, which remained in Kyiv after the conclusion of the understanding in September 6495 (987), would have had sufficient time to convert the Rus′ ruler before the end of the year (February 988). The sacraments of baptism and confirmation could only have been performed by a bishop, and so it must be concluded that at least one hierarch of episcopal rank headed the mission. Because there was no need for excessive haste, the missionaries no doubt sought to endow the ceremonies with the most spectacular character possible. Most likely, the feast of the Epiphany, one of the nearest canonically established days suitable for the baptism of a ruler, was chosen as the day of the ceremony.[54]

On the basis of the ritual requirements of the Constantinopolitan *euchologion,* the preparation for baptism would have taken about two months. The first stage of the catechumenate had probably already begun in October, and certainly no later than the first half of November 987: after receiving instruction in prayer and being conducted into the church, the prince became an

"unbaptized Christian." Following forty days of prayer, fasting, catechism, and talks about the faith with his spiritual father, the bishop, Volodimer would have reached the second stage of the catechumenate, which had to last at least ten days, given the requirement of daily exorcistic prayers. The Christmas of 987 would have marked the beginning of the most significant period of this second stage: the renunciations required for the confession of faith. As one newly born into the faith, Volodimer received a new name at baptism: Basil (Vasilii). Since the rituals of baptism and confirmation contained formulae using the new baptismal name, the selection of the latter must have taken place beforehand. The name chosen was the same as that of the "Emperor of the Romaioi," thereby revealing Basil II as the patron of the Rus′ ruler's baptism and, as it were, *per procuram,* his godfather.[55] The feast day of the patron saint of both rulers, St. Basil the Great, was 1 January, coinciding with the feast of the Circumcision, and in 988 it fell on a Sunday. It could well have been the day for the catechumen Volodimer to decide on his new Christian name. Receiving the sacrament of baptism in the font and the sacrament of confirmation on 6 January 988, Volodimer thus became a Christian. The remaining heathen members of his court probably were baptized at the same time.

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The enigmatic reference in the *Memorial and Encomium* to Volodimer's trip to the Dnipro cataracts in the year 6496 (March 988–February 989) comes between two major events—his baptism in 6495 and the capture of Kherson in 6497. If the note was based on an original annalistic record, then its terseness would speak for it having been written at a time when the reason for the prince's trip to the cataracts would still have been obvious.

What could have led Volodimer to do this in the following year, shortly after his baptism—6496 or, to be more precise, during its first half (i.e., between the spring and the fall of 988)—the period favorable for navigation on the Dnipro? The prince of Rus′ undoubtedly went down to the cataracts to greet his betrothed and to ensure a safe journey for her entourage. The documented instances of later Rus′ princes' travel to the cataracts or even the mouth of the Dnipro to meet an entourage bringing a betrothed princess, support such an interpretation of this laconic "reference."[56] While Volodimer awaited the arrival of Anna at the cataracts, guarded by his warriors, a flotilla of Rus′ boats must have moved still further down the Dnipro nearer to the mouth to take the suite of the *porphyrogennēta* on board from their sea-going vessels. An understanding of these words of the *Memorial and Encomium* to be a reference to Anna's arrival in Rus′ in the calendar year (6496) after Volodimer's baptism, or, more precisely, in the summer of 988, is reinforced by the fact that both rulers had a genuine interest in carrying out their mutual obligations as soon as possible. A delay in cementing the alliance would not have been in the interests of the Macedonian dynasty.[57]

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If everything points to 988 as the year of Volodimer's baptism, then 6 January seems the most likely day for administering the sacrament, given its symbolism by twinning the baptism of the ruler with the feast of the Epiphany. Likewise, the day of the Descent of the Holy Spirit (Pentecost), which in 988 fell on 27 May, may well be linked with the mass baptism of the assembled Kyivans in the waters of the Dnipro as described in the Primary Chronicle: "Then Volodimer sent heralds throughout the city, proclaiming that if any inhabitant, rich or poor, did not betake himself to the river, he would risk the prince's displeasure. When the people heard these words, they wept for joy, and exclaimed in their enthusiasm: 'If this were not good, the prince and boyars would not have accepted it.'"[58] The equally zealous believer, Metropolitan Hilarion, provided a somewhat more sober assessment of the event: "No one dared to oppose Volodimer's pious command. And even if one did not come to baptism out of love, he did so out of fear of the one who had ordered it, for his piety was linked with authority."[59]

The "Korsun′ Legend" events surrounding the baptism of Rus′ are all related in the Primary Chronicle under the year 6496 (March 988–February 989). For the chronicler-compiler, the Kherson version seemed the most reliable, since it offered the most providential vision of the conversion of Rus′. But as he himself admitted, other versions were known to him, no doubt as laconic and mundane as the above mentioned notes from the *Memorial and Encomium*. He thus could have had the date of at least one of those events, and on that basis assigned a place to the "Korsun′ Legend" in the chronological structure of the chronicle. This could have been the date of Anna's arrival or of the departure of the expedition against Kherson, but most likely it was the year of the mass baptism of the Kyivans. In Kyiv, the memory of that Pentecostal day, that last Sunday in May of 988, when, along the Dnipro "a countless multitude assembled, [who] all went into the water [and] stood, some up to their necks, others up to their chests, the younger nearer the banks, the adults holding children in their arms waded while the priests stood by and offered prayers,"[60] must have lived on in the minds of several generations.

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This turning point in the religious, social, and political life of Rus′ is inseparably linked with the personality of its ruler, Volodimer. Already in the eleventh century a variety of commentators proclaimed the significance of his achievement, marking, as it did, the beginning of the spiritual transformation of the East Slavs, and the accuracy of their assessment was confirmed by the millennium that followed. Volodimer and his decision were soon compared to Constantine the Great and his achievement. The baptizer of Rus′ was styled

"equal of the apostles," and "apostle among rulers." But his spiritual side, his personality, was treated in a purely stylized manner. Thus, the monastic chronicler sharply contrasts the dark figure of yesterday's pagan with the shining visage of the Christian prince. From the oral—knightly and folk—*bylina* tradition, written down centuries later, there emerges a more colorful but equally idealized figure of the Christian prince.[61] The historian of today, wrenching the account of Volodimer's "choice of a faith" out of its chronicle context and thereby overlooking the role assigned to Providence in that account, unintentionally endows the proceedings with a grotesque character: Volodimer is portrayed as an able and effective ruler, who, when his reform of paganism has failed, pragmatically considers various propositions and reaches out to Christian teaching as the best means of consolidating the structure of the state and elevating its position by joining it to the family of Christian countries.

There exists almost nothing about the actual personality and religious convictions of the ruler, who, after all, himself became a Christian. Hilarion, sketching his unambiguously positive portrait of a believer more than thirty years after Volodimer's death, placed his emphasis, above all, on the cultivation of those values on Rus' soil of which he himself and his hero were zealous propagators.

The "baptism of Rus'" had been prepared by two preceding generations, and Volodimer's decision itself must have taken time to ripen. Hagiographic and bookish tradition notwithstanding, the transformation of Volodimer from pagan to Christian actually was not and could not have been a sudden one.

Volodimer, the third son of Sviatoslav, was born between 955 and 960 to Malusha, housekeeper of Princess Ol'ga and of an unfree court attendant's family. Her brother, Dobrynia, likewise made a career for himself at court. Malusha belonged to the inner circle of the regent's entourage, and as one of Ol'ga's closest servants must have been baptized along with her mistress. As a concubine of Sviatoslav and soon the mother of Volodimer, she continued to live at court, and thus Ol'ga, up until her death in 969, could easily have exercised an influence on the education of her grandson. Even if he was brought up as a pagan in accordance with the wishes of his father, his grandmother and mother would surely have imparted many of the ideas and values of the Christian faith to him. Shortly after Ol'ga's death, the young Volodimer, along with his tutor and uncle Dobrynia, was sent by Sviatoslav to Novgorod. The fact that it was Dobrynia whom Volodimer, after his own baptism in 988, entrusted with overseeing the introduction of Christianity in Novgorod, allows us to speculate that the brother of Malusha may already have been a Christian. One can thus confidently presume that Volodimer, from childhood, grew up in a Christian atmosphere and surely could not have been the convinced heathen as some insinuate. The baptism of the thirty-year-old Volodimer on 6 January 988, preceded by a period of catechumenate, had grown out of well-prepared soil. An emotional tie with Christianity, reaching back to childhood years, imbued with the religious zeal of his grandmother and mother, intertwined with

another, rational path to a knowledge of God: "reason illuminated his heart as to how to find . . . the one God." Belief in the unseen, in that which the senses cannot comprehend, was viewed in the young Christian society as a higher stage of intellectual initiation, an attitude expressed well in Hilarion's characterization of Volodimer's decision to be baptized as an act of wisdom. An act of faith and an act of reason have at least one thing in common: both demand a conscious concentration, an internal tension, a new sense of responsibility toward oneself and one's surroundings. This was forcefully expressed by the chronicler's metaphor of Volodimer as the plowman "who plowed and harrowed the soil when he enlightened Rus′ with baptism," and Iaroslav the Wise as the sower, "who sowed the hearts of the faithful with the written word."[62]

Some sense of the natural, human dimension of the faith of the ruler and baptizer of Rus′ can be derived from a few laconic but substantive remarks by the missionary bishop, Bruno of Querfurt, in a letter to King Henry II at the very beginning of 1009. The zealous missionary, aiming to convert the Pechenegs, spent no less than two months in Kyiv in 1008. Out of their conversations, characterized by a common concern for the extension of the *terra christiana,* and out of joint participation in worship and prayer, a bond of spiritual friendship was forged between Bruno and Volodimer. The relationship culminated in a dramatic farewell at the edge of the steppe: the missionary and prince, and those accompanying them, joined together in the mystery of the liturgy, united in prayer by a common language of faith and doubt, fear and hope.[63]

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The *Senior Ruzorum* must have made a strong impression on Bruno, in light of how the latter undertook to present him to his own senior, King Henry, as a model Christian and a model Christian ruler. In Bruno's view, Volodimer belonged to that rare category of princes who, like Constantine the Great and Charlemagne, had earned from God the title of apostle by their work for the conversion of the heathen and the enlargement of the church. In the course of his visit to Kyiv, Bruno must have encouraged the baptizer of Rus′ and his lay and ecclesiastical entourage in their sense of the apostolic character of their mission. That conviction continued to live on in Kyiv after the death of Volodimer as well. Not only was it expressed by Hilarion and the chronicler, it was made part of the legacy of the ruling house by Iaroslav the Wise, who wrote it into the decorative program of the metropolitan cathedral of Kyiv in the 1040s. The foundation scene in the western portion of the chief nave of St. Sophia, a fresco of substantial dimensions (about 25 sq m) portraying Iaroslav the Wise and members of his family, clearly corresponds to the mosaic frieze depicting the Eucharist on the curving wall of the apse at the opposite end of the nave. Looking at the two compositions, one cannot help being struck by the

way the twelve-figure princely procession approaching the enthroned Christ from either side echoes the procession of the apostles in the scene of the Eucharist opposite. This striking parallel, clearly comprehensible in the context of the overall Christological theme of the compositions in the main nave and transept (the central crossing of the church), is a visible symbol of the apostolic mission of the ruling dynasty toward its subjects and toward its domain—the land of Rus'.[64]

This charismatic apotheosis of the ruling house was reinforced—beginning in the mid-eleventh century—by the growing cult of saintly kinsmen: the princes Boris and Glěb, treacherously slain in the fratricidal struggle for the Kyivan throne that followed the death of Volodimer on 15 July 1015.[65]

By their very character, the two sons of Volodimer bore witness to their adherence to the highest Christian values. In this young Christian society, their voluntary sacrifice assumed the sense of martyrdom for the faith—a faith confessed in deed as well as word. The martyred deaths of Boris and Glěb, innocent and unresisting (as portrayed by both hagiographer and chronicler), began to be interpreted in due course as a readiness to lay down one's own life in sacrifice for the gospel of Christ. The chronicler, while drawing at the turn of the eleventh century on the hagiographic text, emphasized even more strongly the notion that the baptism of Rus', undertaken by Volodimer, had been brought to fruition by the blessing of the land of Rus' with the blood of the princely martyrs.[66] Such a voluntary sacrifice attested to a turning point of Rus' on a new path: Volodimer's two sons, bringing the gospel to life by their example of humility, nonresistance, and participation in the sacrifice of Christ, demonstrated how that gospel could transform a human life.

Such reflections on the act of baptism in 988, combined with a deepening awareness of the history of the Christian community, also led to speculation about the original source and earliest beginnings of the conversion—speculation that was not content to stop with the deeds of Volodimer, "equal of the apostles," and those of his forerunner Ol'ga. The search was sparked by a sincere, albeit naïve, desire to embellish the searchers' own prehistory, to trace their own path to salvation back to apostolic times. At the end of the eleventh century, the legend of the wanderings of the Apostle Andrew, who was also said to have established the episcopal see in Byzantion (the future Constantinople), had a Rus' motif grafted onto it. The chronicle likewise adopted a South Slavic tradition that portrayed the Apostle Paul as teacher of all the Slavs.

The Apostle Andrew's setting foot on the land of Rus', and his raising of the cross on the hills that would be become the site of future Kyiv, served, as it were, as a baptism of the land itself, a foreshadowing of the Christian realm that would one day arise there. The introduction of the Apostle Paul as a missionary among the Slavs in their prehistoric cradle, and the characterization of him as "the teacher of we Rus', since he preached to the Slavic race," supplemented the mission of Andrew. From the very presence of the Apostle

Paul, blessing flowed down upon the Slavs in their ancient Danubian homeland. Those who migrated to the Dnipro, moreover, settled on a land already blessed by the Apostle Andrew. Thus, according to the chronicler's conception, Christ, by the agency of the apostles, had already written the Slavs and the land of Rus′ into the history of salvation. Both legends were an expression of a yearning, so typical of the newly converted, to find a place in the genealogy of the church and the traditions of ancient ties to Christianity. The Rus′ legend about the wanderings of Andrew, originally an apocryphal work and then in the thirteenth century an officially recognized Byzantine tradition, endowed the ties between Kyiv and Constantinople, moreover, with a character of apostolic predestination.[67]

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The integrative potential of the Slavic language was already recognized in Rus′ in the tenth century. The Slavicization of the social elite, led by the dynasty, had begun even earlier. Igor′'s son Sviatoslav, born in the 930s, already bore a Slavic name (Igor′ itself is the Slavic version of Norse Ingvarr). The process was also reflected in the contemporary Slavic translation of the treaties of 911 and 944. A role in the recognition of Slavic as the state language of Rus′, despite the Scandinavian origin (judging from their names) of the majority of the Rus′ emissaries concluding the treaties, was undoubtedly played by the linguistically related Bulgarian culture, which penetrated the Dnipro region in the course of the tenth century. The latter development also made it easier for Volodimer, when receiving Christianity directly from Byzantium, to don a linguistic garb of his own choosing. The choice bears witness to the self-consciousness of the ruling circles of Kyivan Rus′, who understood and valued the social and political benefit of offering praise to the "newly known Christian God" in the Slavic language. It also enjoyed the support of the church, conscious, thanks to the Cyrillo-Methodian experience, of the importance of the language of ecclesiastical books and liturgy for the Christianization of a large realm.[68] Only with Christianization did Rus′ become capable of full political and social self-consciousness, finding a place for itself in the universal history of humanity and its salvation. The right of the ruling elite to power was now based not only on birth, valor, and wealth, but also on membership in a particularly high religious and intellectual culture as well as on its distinctiveness from the unconverted and unenlightened. The Slavic *nevěglasъ* meant "a heathen," but, as is clear from translations from Greek and Latin, it also meant "an uneducated, ignorant man, one not belonging to the sphere of thought."

Christianity meant access to knowledge and became a source of intellectual experience. The spiritual union of faith and reason rather than the dichotomy between them, characterized a young Christian society. The newly converted elite must have been particularly susceptible to the charm of the well-conceived

order linking church and written word with political authority and the fortress-town. In the era of the Merovingians and perhaps even more in the era of the Carolingians, Western Europe had lived through such a period, marked by the naïve absence of any distinction between religious ideals on the one hand and political and civilizational ones on the other—an era when Christianity was turned more toward rulers, their courts, their magnates and courtly and armed retinue, and appeared in harmony with earthly strivings toward legal order, building in stone, and education. Now it was the turn of the Eastern Slavs. For Emperor Basil and his entourage, preoccupied with immediate military and political goals, the conversion of the ruler of Kyiv and his subjects was of interest, above all else, from the point of view of an effective alliance. And so, for the moment, an assurance of its constancy was sought, with mercenary practicality, more in ties of kinship, though in the long run the imperial court was sensible to institute the foundations of a religious community.[69]

Although clerics and the means necessary to support the Christianization of Rus′ were dispatched from the imperial city on the order of the emperor, the conversion of that land was not decided on the Bosphorus. For all the importance of the theological, intellectual, and cultural achievement of the Byzantine and early Christian heritage in the transformation of the Eastern Slavs into a Christian society, there is no basis for ascribing the conversion of Rus′ to the initiative and activity of Byzantium. What we are accustomed to characterizing as "Byzantine influence" was in fact the work of the interested party itself, reaching out in search of new spiritual values. Nonetheless, the Byzantines who supported the measures and steps taken up by Anna and Basil II could consider the conversion of Rus′ a significant achievement on their part, even though many notables in fact failed to grasp the significance of the event in time.[70]

If, from the outside, it was the political aspect that was most clearly recognized, in Rus′ itself the newly converted elite had already managed in the course of the first century following the baptism to rise to a more complex appreciation of the event. The change itself and the new participation in the world of Christian values were understood, felt, and profoundly experienced. Moreover, this elite had succeeded in arriving at a considered understanding of its own conversion.[71]

The acceptance of Christianity was not dictated by chance. While the specific date and conditions of the baptism of the Rus′ ruler and his entourage grew out of a specific political situation, the entry of the Kyivan realm into the Christian community had been preceded by more than a century of infiltration of Christianity into the middle Dnipro region and of the growing stature of that faith among the Rus′ nobility and at the court in Kyiv (cf. the treaty of 944), particularly since the time of the baptism of Volodimer's grandmother, the regent of Rus′ Ol′ga-Helena, from 954, the imperial *zōstē patrikia*.

If the idea of the conversion of Rus′ had been born in Constantinople, a reversion to paganism would have been unavoidable—just as it had been shortly after the premature initiative of Photios in 867, or even after the attempt

under Ol'ga and her son Sviatoslav (when the need for change was already felt, but the fear of breaking with traditional values was still strong).[72] This fear had weakened in the course of the succeeding decades, and the conditions proposed by Basil II, born in an international context that reflected the constellation of real political forces, greatly eased Volodimer's decision. The permanence of the reception was decided, however, by the political readiness of the Rus' ruling strata to be baptized. The baptism of Rus' was a great religious act, but, at the same time, it was a significant political event.

The Metropolitanate of Kyiv and All Rus': The Propagation of Christianity. The Building of an Ecclesiastical Framework

The most important stipulation of the treaty concluded in September 987 between Byzantine Emperor Basil and Volodimer was the latter's agreement to make Christianity the official religion of Rus'. The Byzantine side expressed its readiness to participate actively in the realization of this task.

In the *Notitia episcopatuum* of the patriarchate of Constantinople, prepared and promulgated around 1087 under Alexios I Komnenos, the metropolitanate of Rus' is listed as number 60 among 80 metropolitanates. The metropolitanates are listed in the *Notitiae* in the order of their establishment. Immediately before the see of Rus', in positions 58 among 59 are the metropolitanates of Serres (Sérrai) and Pompeiupolis, both of which were still only titular archbishoprics in the time of John Tzimiskes, but figure as metropolitanates in a synod document of 21 February 997. They thus had advanced in rank sometime between 969 and 996. The metropolitanate of Alania, following Rus' in position 61, and thus established after it, was set up before 6506 (997–998), as indicated by a grant of privilege to its metropolitan in that year. The simple conclusion, then, is that the metropolitanate of Rus' was created sometime after 969 and certainly before 997. From one of the versions of the treatise *"Peri metatheseon"* [*De translationibus*], it is known that Theophylaktos was transferred from the cathedra of Sebastea to the see of Rus' during the reign of Basil II Porphyrogennētos (976–1025). It is likewise known that Theodore, the chronicler and metropolitan of Sebastea who was confirmed in his see in 997, must have become pastor of that city prior to that year. Moreover, the information about the translation was probably taken from Theodore's no longer extant chronicle of Sebastea. It would appear, then, that Theophylaktos was Theodore's predecessor in Sebastea and hence the very same metropolitan who had fallen into a violent conflict with the clergy and people of that Armenian city and region, and was forced, as a result, to leave Sebastea at the very beginning of 987.[73]

Thus, everything would seem to indicate that the metropolitanate of Rus', sixtieth in rank in the ecclesiastical province of the patriarchate of Constantinople, had already been established in the princely capital of Kyiv by the time the *porphyrogennēta* Anna and her suite of lay and ecclesiastical

dignitaries arrived there in 988. At the head of the clergy who had come to Rus' was the former metropolitan of Sebastea, a trusted supporter of Basil II. The fact that he had already been consecrated a bishop made it easier for the emperor to nominate him to this new post, avoiding difficult and time-consuming ecclesiastical procedure.

The Byzantine genealogy of the Rus' church was indicated ca. 1050 by Hilarion, himself soon to become metropolitan of Rus', in his *Sermon on Divine Law and Grace*. There he praised the deed of Volodimer and described the ruler's path to a knowledge of the one God—"Most of all, moreover, he heard of the ever Orthodox Greek land, loving Christ and strong in faith"—and later compared the Rus' prince to Constantine the Great—"That man, together with his mother Helena, brought the Cross from Jerusalem and established it, bringing glory to the faith throughout his world. You and your grandmother Ol'ga brought the Cross from the new Jerusalem, from the city of Constantine, and, establishing it on your land, affirmed the faith." The Cross serves here as a metaphor, expressing not only the triumph of Christianity in Rus', but also its genealogy and institutional ties. Iaroslav continued the work of his father: "he does not alter your acts, but affirms them," while the whole princely family "guards Orthodoxy in accordance with your will."[74] Hilarion's express emphasis on the continuity between the ecclesiastical policy of Volodimer and that of Iaroslav the Wise confirms that the status of the Church of Rus' had already been defined in the era of its baptizer.

The creation of an ecclesiastical province headed by a metropolitan (archbishop) meant the establishment of a number of bishoprics with suffragans subordinated to him within its structure. According to reliable data, several bishops came to Rus' with the metropolitan. The Arab historian Yaḥyā of Antioch reports that Emperor Basil sent "metropolitans and bishops" to the leader of Rus', and that they "baptized the king and all who inhabited his land."[75] This reference to "metropolitans" in the plural has led some to question the reliability of the account of Yaḥyā, who was a Christian historian. However, the circumstances under which Yaḥyā's report of the baptism came into being enable us to explain the remark. Yaḥyā wrote his history of events in Byzantium after moving in 1015 from Cairo to Antioch, where he was able to make use of local Greek sources. One of those sources, recounting the uprising of Bardas Phokas and the arrival of a Rus' force in Byzantium, could well have used the Greek collective term for bishops of varying rank: *archiereis*. In translating this term into Arabic, Yaḥyā must then have sought to convey its meaning by using two words borrowed from the Greek and known to Arabic Christians: *maṭārinat wa asāqifat* (metropolitans and bishops). Because he knew nothing more about the ecclesiastical organization in Rus' than his source provided, his translation could have been influenced by the situation in the patriarchate of Antioch, where many bishops used the title of metropolitan.

From a letter of the missionary bishop Bruno of Querfurt to the German King Henry II in 1008, we know that one of his missionary comrades was

consecrated (*consecravimusque nos*) bishop to the Pechenegs during Bruno's visit to Kyiv in that year.[76] According to the decrees of the Council of Nicaea, a new bishop had to be consecrated by at least three bishops, and hence, other bishops must have participated alongside Bruno in the ceremony, which took place in Kyiv after the return of the mission from the steppe. This is likewise indicated by Bruno's use of the plural in his letter. There were at least two of them, probably the metropolitan of Kyiv and one of his suffragans. The Primary Chronicle, written a hundred years later, confirms the arrival of bishops in Kyiv along with the *porphyrogennēta* Anna and their presence in Rus′ during the time of Volodimer.[77] Also decisive here is the statement of Hilarion, who praised Volodimer, saying, "and you often gathered together with our new fathers—the bishops—and took counsel with them in humility, about how to establish law among the people, who had just come to know God."[78] Hilarion must have met some of those who had taken part in the mass baptism in the waters of the Dnipro in 988. In the 1060s, "another brother by the name of Jeremy, who remembered the conversion of Rus′," was still living in the Monastery of the Caves. Hilarion's own memory would have reached back at least to the final years of Volodimer's rule, for he was a contemporary of that prince's sons.

In 1018, Bishop Thietmar of Merseburg had no doubt that the cathedral complex of St. Sophia in Kyiv had been occupied for years by *"archiepiscopus civitatis illius,"* i.e., the head of an ecclesiastical province. In other words, the church in Rus′ already had its own ecclesiastical provincial structure. An archbishop with the title of metropolitan, administering his own diocese, stood at the head of a group of suffragans, each of them administering a diocese of his own.

Thus, from the outset, the church in Rus′ was a metropolitanate, an ecclesiastical province of the patriarchate of Constantinople. From this it follows that the patriarch enjoyed certain defined rights here in administrative, judicial, and legislative matters, as well as in the interpretation of canon law. The most important of these was the right of filling the metropolitanate. In the tenth through thirteenth centuries the exercise of that right lay within the competence of the *endemousa synodos,* i.e., the permanent, standing patriarchal synod of bishops residing or visiting in Constantinople, who presented to the patriarch three candidates satisfying the canonical requirements. The one selected then received his episcopal consecration from the hands of the patriarch. Even if there was a candidate in mind from the outset, and frequently the will of the emperor came into play here, an attempt was nonetheless made to preserve the appearance of proper procedure. This was also the path to the see of Kyiv, and the metropolitans of Rus′ also took part in the work of the *endemousa* when they were in the imperial capital. The difference from other metropolitanates of the empire lay in the fact that the act of enthronement in Kyiv was one not only of ecclesiastical, but of political accreditation as well. That enthronement would take place in Kyiv's cathedral of St. Sophia on a Sunday shortly after the

arrival of the newly consecrated metropolitan. With the exception of three men of Rus' (Hilarion, Clement [Klym], and Cyril [Kirill] II), all of them were Greeks. Reception of a new arrival, permission to proceed with the enthronement ceremony, and the participation of the princely court in that rite served as a *de facto* confirmation of the act that had been performed in Hagia Sophia in Constantinople.

This method of filling the metropolitanate meant that every vacancy in the see of Kyiv lasted at least a year or, not infrequently, longer. Likewise, the periodic visits to Constantinople, made less frequently than at the prescribed interval of every two years because of the difficulty of the journey, lasted several months and sometimes a whole year. In the nearly 300-year period under discussion here, the metropolitanate of Kyiv was vacant for at least 60 years, a fact that points, on the one hand, to the relative weakness of its incumbent, who came to what was for him a foreign land partly without a knowledge of the Slavic language or the realities of ecclesiastical life, and, on the other, bears witness to the internal strength of the Rus' church.[79]

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With the establishment of a metropolitan see in Kyiv in 988 and, soon thereafter, episcopal sees in Bilhorod (Belgorod), Chernihiv (Chernigov), Novgorod, and Polatsk (Polotsk), the framework of an ecclesiastical organization for Rus' came into being. In this way, the organizational preconditions for the Christianization of the Eastern Slavs were created. The seats of bishops were situated in politically distinctive centers, which already possessed, by the second half of the tenth century, an urban character. They lay on the north-south river route known as the "road from the Varangians to the Greeks," the axis of the political dominion of the Rurikids.[80]

From the beginning, a special place was held by the bishop in the town of Bilhorod, a powerful fortress some 23 kilometers from Kyiv, which served as Volodimer's second residence. As a kind of palatial bishop and above all else as *protōthronos* (i.e., the first bishop of the province after the metropolitan), he enjoyed precedence over the remaining suffragan bishops and took the place of an absent metropolitan in certain functions. The position of the Bilhorod see was emphasized by the choice of the Holy Apostles as its patrons, a choice clearly linked with the title of the metropolitan cathedral, named for the Wisdom of God, which was identified with Christ as the second person of the Holy Trinity. This symbolic expression was supplemented by the title of Transfiguration of the Lord bestowed on the third cathedral created on the lands of Rus' proper—that of Chernihiv, the second most significant center on the middle Dnipro, about 150 kilometers from Kyiv.

The other centers chosen as the seats of bishops, the two most notable towns of the realm after Kyiv, lay far to the north: Polatsk, more than 700 kilometers

from the capital of Rus', and Novgorod, located more than 1,000 kilometers from Kyiv. In both, the cathedral churches were dedicated to the Wisdom of God—Sophia—and it was no coincidence. Traditionally, this has been seen as an expression of the rivalry of both cities with Kyiv, but the political conditions in the eleventh century, when Novgorod opposed itself to Kyiv on several occasions and the princes of Polatsk had to defend their rights against Iaroslav the Wise and his sons, cannot be projected back into the period of baptism and the building of the framework of ecclesiastical organization. In those days, Volodimer's oldest son, Iziaslav, was sitting in Polatsk, while in Novgorod paganism was being uprooted by Volodimer's governor, his uncle Dobrynia. The title of Sophia was consciously chosen by the bishops from Byzantium and approved by the newly baptized ruler. Since mostly metropolitan cathedral churches were dedicated to Sophia in the Byzantine domain, it cannot be excluded that the choice was made with intended long-range perspectives.

Three cathedrals in the three most important centers of Kyivan Rus', each bearing the same name, were thus linked to Hagia Sophia on the Bosphorus and embodied the complex and rich theological content of such dedication. To the newly converted, they proclaimed: "God is in the land of Rus', and with God's help it shall not be moved." This is the sense of the mosaic inscription of Psalm 45:6 in the conch of the Kyivan metropolitan cathedral, the thirteen copulas of which proclaimed the mission of Christ and his Apostles to the capital and all of Rus'. The Wisdom of God portrayed—and was, in and of itself—the victory of Christianity over paganism and the victory of Orthodoxy over heresy.[81] The latter victory had, since the reform of Byzantine Christianity in the eighth and ninth centuries, been understood above all as the triumph over the iconoclasts and found special expression in the iconographic programs of sacred edifices. It thus is no coincidence that, at the dawn of Christianity, the triumph of Orthodoxy among the Eastern Slavs manifested itself in the name of the three chief cathedrals of Rus', and occupied a central place in the religious life of the newly converted, expressed externally in a profound cult of the holy icon. The introduction, adoration, and contemplation of the icon in Rus' thus have their roots in the Christianization of that land, and we cannot accept those views that see the source of these practices in local and especially pagan and syncretistic traditions.[82] Only with the passage of time did a host of superstitions grow up around the cult of images. The Church in Rus' opposed itself, ultimately unsuccessfully, to the influences of sculpted figures, not because of their supposedly pagan origin, but because of the rejection of sculpted figures in the sacred art of Byzantium, with its cult of the icon, that resulted from the victory of Orthodoxy.

The divergence between this most modest diocesan structure and the enormous task of Christianizing a realm measuring an area of more than one million square kilometers and inhabited by approximately five million people, forces us to conclude that the Byzantine Church was totally unprepared and not fully aware of the extraordinary significance of the changes taking place. So the

Christianization process and ecclesiastical structures could not spread over the whole land through decades. Undoubtedly, it was also a matter of routine: a Byzantine metropolitan ecclesiastical province usually consisted of three to six dioceses.

In Hilarion's conception of the conversion of Rus', the crucial turning point was the decision of Volodimer. It is immediately emphasized, however, that the baptism merely opened the door to a genuine Christianization of the land: "Then the darkness of idolatry began to depart from us, and the dawn of a new faith appeared."[83] The Rus' side was thus aware that Christianity would be accepted by the various strata of society primarily in those places where political authority had been firmly established. Hence, Christianization could not immediately embrace the whole expanse of territory under the rule of Rus'. For example, the populace of those broad sections of the country whose subordination to the state consisted primarily of an obligation to pay tribute at first remained outside the new faith for the simple reason that the tributaries met with the princely administration but once or, at most, twice a year. That is why Christianization was concentrated first of all in the region of the middle Dnipro.

Apart, however, from any question of the level of consciousness or limitations on or unevenness of activity, a basic obstacle limited the progress of Christianization. What was decisive was not the number of bishops but the number of clergy and, more importantly, the number of those who knew the Slavic language. The priests who carried out evangelization prior to 988 had been but a drop in an ocean of enormous need. Related to this was the problem of equipping the churches, particularly with ecclesiastical books, especially those necessary for the celebration of the divine service. To satisfy the suddenly pressing need, recourse was had to a standard practice of those times. The equipment of any churches of Kherson, the city punished by the Byzantine emperor and his Rus' brother-in-law, went as booty to the north: undoubtedly, part of Kherson's clergy were also sent against their will to Rus'. However, the real, ongoing supply of church apparatus, and Slavic books in particular, flowed from Bulgaria, which was being conquered step by step during those years by Byzantine armies, half of which consisted of Rus' units; in 1016, a third of the trophies fell to the Rus'.[84]

Rus' troops participated in the Byzantine conquest with only short interruptions over the course of nearly twenty years, and the size of the spoils of war obtained must have been correspondingly large. It has long been known that many texts written in Bulgarian found their way to Rus'. The fate of the oldest manuscripts is an integral part of the history of Bulgarian-Rus' linguistic and literary contacts.[85] The only thing remaining unclear has been the path by which those manuscripts made their way to the banks of the Dnipro and Volkhov. Such manuscripts as the Codex of Tsar Symeon—the prototype of the *Izbornik* of Sviatoslav of 1073 or the Macedonian Gospel of Tsar Samuel (d. 1014) from which the Ostromir Gospel was copied—were evidently from

the palace church and library of the Bulgarian rulers. Their appearance in Rus′ can be explained convincingly only by *jus spolii*.[86] The ever growing number of churches constructed in the newly converted state had to be supplied with ecclesiastical books, and the choice of the Slavic language as the language of liturgy and evangelization encouraged recourse to this cheapest and fastest means of acquiring the needed materials. Plundering houses of worship in an enemy land with an eye to supplying one's own churches was quite customary in Christian Europe at the time, and, in this case, it provided the Byzantine ruler with a most convenient way of fulfilling the obligations he had assumed. It also helped to satisfy the wishes of his sister Anna and brother-in-law Volodimer, who were actively involved in the Christianization of Rus′. Probably, many literate Bulgarian clerics were also forced to journey to that region. The institution of an unfree clergy, known later in Rus′, undoubtedly had its origins in these early circumstances. Although it sounds paradoxical, the undeniable Bulgarian influence on Rus′ literature and more broadly, on its culture, was the result not of supposed ecclesiastical ties with Ochrid, but of the participation of Rus′ troops in the Byzantine conquest of Bulgaria. Ironically, the stripping of Bulgaria of Slavic books and clerics to meet the needs of the newly converted East Slavs had to facilitate the Hellenization of the church and religious life in Bulgaria itself after its conquest by the empire.

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The Christianization of Rus′, much as that of other regions, could not be carried out without the use of some coercion, both in the initial introduction of the new religion and in defense against various attempts at apostasy, especially on the part of the common people. The well-known uprisings of rural inhabitants under the leadership of soothsayers in the eleventh century and the apostasy of the people of Novgorod eighty years after the baptism of that city, forcibly suppressed by princely authority in collaboration with the clergy, were as much an expression of protest against the new order infusing the sociopolitical and economic fabric of the land as against the new religious order that supported it, imposed from above by the state.[87] The Church, in the words of its representatives, viewed compulsory baptism as a completely justifiable measure and pointed, with the sincerity characteristic of a proselyte, to fear of the ruler as the deciding reason for the recognition of the new religion by the majority.[88] A strong influence on the members of the simple urban mob was exercised by the example of the courts of the prince and the aristocracy, with whom they were linked by various ties. Religious instruction at the time of conversion to the new faith was something of an exception during the earliest period following the baptism of Rus′, a privilege reserved for the social elite. But the effectiveness of that instruction was also great. One hundred years after baptism, in the upper strata of society, the ecclesiastical sacrament of marriage had became a

common practice, and the church could turn to the task of winning over "the simple people," who continued to avoid its blessing when contracting their marriages, although the threat to impose ecclesiastical penances on the latter suggests that they, too, were already within its reach.[89]

The Christian custom of commemoration of the deceased—including memorial services, about which there are written references in relation to the ruling dynasty as early as the eleventh century—found particularly fertile ground, and was facilitated by the existing tradition of an ancestral worship. It is in this sense that we should view the baptism of the exhumed remains of Volodimer's brothers, the pagan princes Oleg (d. 977) and Iaropolk (d. 980) and their burial in the princely church. Such acts, which were at variance with church canons, may be explained by a desire to include in Christian commemorations those members of the dynasty who perished in fratricidal struggles. Christian piety as expressed in commemorations of the dead was being quickly incorporated into family life.

A striking indication of the permanence of the ideological and religious transformation of the ruling circles of Rus' is the fact that none of the competing parties in the interprincely struggles of the eleventh century sought to raise paganism as a banner to rally in support of its own political interests. The deep dynastic political crisis that exploded on the death of Volodimer in 1015, expressed in a fratricidal struggle for the throne of Kyiv and lasting with varying intensity until 1026, did not undermine the Christianization of the land. This is all the more remarkable in light of the fact that the Byzantine side supported the inheritance rights to the Kyivan throne of the children of Volodimer and the *porphyrogennēta* Anna.[90] The failure of this effort as a result of the assassination of Boris and Glěb did not slow the continued conversion of the country in the least, indicating that an authentic Christianization of the dynasty and the elites that supported it had taken place during the reign of Volodimer. An ability to distinguish between Christianity and its values, on the one hand, and the political undertakings of Byzantium, on the other, had likewise been fully attained.

What is more, once a curtain of total silence had fallen over the actual reasons for the political murder of Boris and Glěb, the official version of the violent deaths of these two sons of Volodimer found a sublimated interpretation in the cult of the two princes, who, by their example, offered a model of Christian attitudes and moral behavior worthy of imitation. The far-reaching effect of this dynastic political crisis was the entry of native martyr princes into the ranks of the saints and the creation of a tradition that gave young Rus' Christianity a unique profile of its own.[91] The cult, originally directed at a princely milieu, spread with astounding speed. In May 1115, the celebration of the translation of the sarcophagi containing the relics of Saints Boris and Glěb to a new walled church in Vyshhorod drew countless people of varying rank from all over Rus': princes, bishops, boyars—all with their retinues—clergy, monks, and common people, all come to pay homage, in continuous day and

night processions, to their own martyrs in Christ and advocates for the land of Rus′.

Similarly, in the decades of conflict between Iaroslav and his sons, on the one hand, and the princes of Polatsk, on the other, the latter, though threatened with the loss of their principality, did not appeal to heathenism, even though soothsayers still enjoyed respect at the princely court in Polatsk. On the contrary, Vseslav of Polatsk, in his struggle with the sons of Iaroslav, opposed the stone church of St. Sophia in Polatsk to the walled church of St. Sophia in Kyiv. In 1067 he plundered St. Sophia of Novogrod to enrich his own church in Polatsk. Giving four of his seven sons the names of Boris-Roman and Glĕb-David, Vseslav was among the first to contribute to the development of the cult of the martyr princes, in which he found a religious and moral justification for the right of opposition and the rights of his line to the throne of Polatsk. This political and ideological demonstration, incidentally, assured him the support of the Church, especially that of the Kyivan Caves Monastery.[92]

The support of the ruling strata for the new religion was so ostentatious as to create the appearance of a rapid Christianization of the whole land. The missionary archbishop Bruno of Querfurt, a zealous advocate of the conversion of all the remaining pagan peoples of Europe, when visiting Kyiv in 1008 considered Rus′ already to be a Christian land, able to support his intention to convert the Pechenegs—just twenty years after the baptism of Volodimer and the Kyivans. The forest of cupolas and crosses towering over Kyiv must have made a considerable impression on a visitor from Saxony, who in 1018 managed to report on his visit to that city to the chronicler and bishop, Thietmar of Merseburg. His reference to "more than 400 churches" has usually been questioned, despite the chronicle report of the destruction of 600 churches in Kyiv in the great fire of 1124. In both cases here, small wooden structures were mentioned. As is known from accounts from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, small churches of this type could be erected in a dozen days or so, or even, if prefabricated elements were used, in the course of a single day.

The capital city of Kyiv in 1018, with its 10-hectare princely fortress and eight marketplaces, was, from the perspective of observers west of the Elbe and the Salle, an exceptionally large and populous urban center.[93] Its houses of worship, however, with the exception of one stone palace church and about a dozen or so largish wooden communal churches (*publicae ecclesiae*), including the wooden metropolitan cathedral of St. Sophia (burned in 1017 and rebuilt in less than a year), consisted of hundreds of private oratories and chapels (*ecclesiae privatae*) belonging to the nobility of Kyiv. At the beginning of the eleventh century there must have been several hundred boyars' residences in Kyiv, considering that the city numbered no fewer than 15,000 inhabitants at that time (and a hundred years later—some 40,000). The example of the prince, and Byzantine (and probably even Western) custom as well, encouraged the establishment of such "houses of God" in individual residences, originally, at least, as an external expression of personal faith and loyalty to the ruler. Such

churches bore witness at the same time to the position and prestige of boyar families in the new Christian reality. Linked to the ecclesiatical foundations of Volodimer himself, his nobles yearned to affirm in this way their role in the confession and propagation of the new faith.

Half a century later, when the city—now encompassing a considerably greater walled area, with a main city entrance called "the Golden Gate" (70 hectares)—had acquired a dozen stone churches along with the still impressive, in its mass and beauty, St. Sophia cathedral (built 1037–1046), Adam of Bremen saw Kyiv as an *aemula*, i.e., imitation, of Constantinople,[94] no doubt, in large part, because of its many churches. Despite the fact that the princely stone church of the Virgin (Church of the Tithe)—abutting the stone palace—built by Byzantine masters in the 990s, continued to be for half a century the exception, the broad scale of Kyiv's wooden ecclesiastical architecture ensured from the outset that the city impressed every visitor as an extremely Christian one. Only under Iaroslav and his sons did the new fashion of ecclesiastical building in stone and brick begin to effect changes in the landscape of the cities of Rus', the impact of which gradually intensified in the twelfth and first decades of the thirteenth century. Today one can identify slightly under 300 relatively well-preserved remains of stone churches from the pre-Mongol era, just under a hundred of them in the middle Dnipro region, i.e., in Rus' proper.[95] Throughout the Middle Ages, construction in wood would continue to dominate the sacral architecture of Rus'.

The baptism of Rus' called into being a new group with a special social role, endowed with the exclusive right to represent the new religious ideology and possessing a significant unifying potential. Unlike the sacrificers, soothsayers, and other representatives of the old pagan religion, the whole Christian clergy was quite closely linked to the apparatus of political authority. That relationship resulted in a growing prestige for this social group, whose special status was underlined by distinctive dress and customs. outside as well as inside the church. The clergy in eleventh-century Rus' consisted to a large extent of persons of local origin. The clerics from Bulgaria, no doubt originally more numerous, quickly integrated themselves into the local Slavic environment. A less numerous, but significant element was the Greek clergy, who, among other things, occupied the highest positions in the ecclesiatical hierarchy. The latter, coming to Rus' with a strong sense of their own worth and a consciousness of their sociopolitical as well as ecclesiastical usefulness, brought with them ready-made models of relations between secular and ecclesiastical authority.

The formal ties linking the Rus' and Byzantine churches grew closer in the decades following the baptism thanks to the ideological ties of Rus' monasticism with the centers of monastic life in Byzantium.[96] It was these links that would ultimately decide the loyalty of the Rus' church to the principles of Byzantine Orthodoxy. Rus' monasticism, with its religious zeal and political sense, became, thanks to its intimate ties with the social elite of old Rus' society, a crucial factor in the development of Christianity and the church in

Rus'. The aristocratic Monastery of the Caves in Kyiv achieved a high degree of religious and moral authority in the second half of the eleventh century, becoming a center of particular influence on ecclesiastical, cultural, and political life in Rus'. An exceptionally important contribution here was made by one ascetic holy man produced by this monastery, Hegumen Theodosius [Feodosii] (d. 1074), whose renown as a saint, local at first, acquired an all-Rus' character in 1108.[97]

The primary activity of the clergy was concentrated in the religious field and in related social matters. Its constant, gradually growing influence on the mentality of society, and that of the upper strata in particular, led to a transformation of outlook that could not have been achieved at the moment of baptism itself in 988, but which it would be wrong to assume took centuries to accomplish. The adoption by old Rus' culture of the Christian value system progressed with varying degrees of success on various fronts, but much had already been accomplished in the course of the first century.[98]

The clergy as a whole, distinguished by its literacy, by its extensive reading, and sometimes by its knowledge of languages, production of books, and literary activity, served as an intermediary in transmitting the values of Christian culture to the Eastern Slavs. The beginnings of intellectual activity inspired by Christianity must be dated to the tenth century, for the personality and activity of Hilarion—such an outstanding example of a Byzantine education and the Christian worldview—who was capable of independent historiosophic speculation, could not have sprung out of a culturally virgin soil.[99] The clergy, a kind of medieval intelligentsia, likewise assisted in the diffusion of reading and writing and other elements of education among the laity—not only the princes, the boyars, and their retinues, but townspeople as well. In the generation after baptism, an ability to read and write was shared by all the members of the dynasty, women included, and traces of four princely libraries of the eleventh century had been preserved.[100]

The clergy, and particularly erudite monks drawn from aristocratic families, enriched the store of historical thought, which had hitherto developed as an oral tradition, by giving it a written form, adapting various genres of historical writing—the annalistic note, the relation, the narrative, and the tale—for this purpose. This development of a historical method and combination of varied forms into a single chronicle genre, produced, at the beginning of the second century after baptism, the Primary Chronicle, which was the result of historical thought spun out in monastic cells but driven by the ideas and political passions of this world. The central theme of this work was the state and Christianity in Rus', in which the creation and maintenance of princely authority were linked directly to the propagation of the Christian faith.[101]

These new cultural values became an important ally in the transformation of the local order and local ways of thinking. The very appearance of the churches, in their upward rising profiles contrasting with the surrounding wooden, earthen, and semi-earthen huts, had already begun to exercise an

influence on the psyche of the still really half-pagan Rus' Christian. The church, moreover, as an artistic composite, adorned with frescoes and icons, costly vessels and objects, and serving as a place of divine service, of liturgical activity and song, offered an unequalled setting for emotional, esthetic, and, ultimately, religious experiences.

From the very beginning, the church ascribed sacral traits to princely authority. Preachers and scholars propagated the conviction that the prince, like the biblical David and the Byzantine emperor, was the Lord's anointed; that princely authority was established by God; and that the prince, ruler of the land, was an icon of Christ, an earthly reflection of the ruler of the heavens.[102] To the prince, the church ascribed the roles of guardian of the flock of Christ, defender of Orthodoxy, and teacher and guide; it endowed him with the character of shepherd and archpriest, and taught all of his subjects that "disrespect for authority is disrespect for God himself." In the rich array of epithets added to the princely title in Rus' ("beloved of God, Christ-loving and beloved of Christ, Orthodox, most pious," etc.), expression was given to the charismatic character of authority and of the person of the prince. The same character was assumed by the ceremony of enthronement of the prince, which already in the eleventh century had become an ecclesiastical rite.

Princely authority certainly contributed to the Christianization of the country, but the contribution of the church and Christianization to the transformation of princely authority into a genuine state organization was likewise crucial. Christianization and the formation of the state were closely linked in the case of every people emerging onto the historical stage, and the East Slavs were no exception.

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We cannot exclude the possibility that the fifth diocese, with its cathedral of the Archangel Michael at Pereiaslav, 85 kilometers southeast of Kyiv, was founded under Volodimer, but there is more in favor of its having been erected together with the bishopric of "St. George on the River Ros" in Iuriev, and thus during the reign of Iaroslav the Wise, after his victory over the Pechenegs in 1036. It is notable that both of these cathedrals were entrusted to the patronage of holy warriors—the leader of the heavenly forces and the destroyer of the dragon, patrons of Christian soldiers in their struggles against unbelievers.

Both dioceses were created, not in the interior of the land, but on its steppe frontier. To be sure, after the disaster suffered by the Pechenegs before Kyiv in 1036, settlement in these regions intensified, as did the building of forts to guard the settlers, but this was chiefly colonization of a military type, aiming to create an effective barrier against the raids of the nomadic Pechenegs who roamed the steppes. The creation of the two border bishoprics, however, was not aimed merely at moral and religious reinforcement of the barrier shielding

the country from the steppe. Both patron saints were revered as humblers of the dragon—the symbol of the devil, of evil, of unbelief, of paganism—and the creation of the two bishoprics likewise had as one of its goals missionary work among the pagans, a program that was also in the interest of Byzantium, pressed as it was by the Pechenegs in the Danubian territories of the empire.[103] An attempt to Christianize these mobile and dangerous nomads was also the aim of the mission of Bruno of Querfurt and his successor, the anonymous bishop *in partibus Pezenegorum*. The subordination of the Pechenegs was an exceptionally vital matter for Kyiv as well as Constantinople. The results achieved by these missionary efforts were modest, but only with the appearance of new nomads—the Polovtsians, who visited disaster upon the Rus′ princes at Pereiaslav in 1068—and with the crushing of the Byzantine army at Manzikert in 1071, did the situation change so drastically as to make Byzantine-Rus′ efforts to draw closer together and establish secure communications lines through newly Christianized regions of the Pontic and Danubian steppe appear unrealistic.

Before Byzantium and Rus′ were made aware of the insurmountability of the steppe barriers that hindered contacts on either side, significant developments on another front had threatened to divide the ecclesiastical province of Rus′. In the 1060s and 1070s the bishops of Chernihiv and Pereiaslav were also granted the title of metropolitan. They received the title for life, and the dioceses they administered likewise achieved the status of titular metropolitanates for that period.[104] They differed from ordinary metropolitanates in that they did not represent ecclesiastical provinces with suffragan subordinate bishoprics, but in accordance with their new standing were directly subordinate to the patriarch. In Byzantium one can clearly observe the efforts of titular metropolitans to transform their sees into ecclesiastical provinces by setting up suffragan bishoprics on their territory. The strength of this tendency is suggested by the compromise imperial novella of 1084, which stipulated that only those titular metropolitanates that had enjoyed this status for more than thirty years could be recognized as regular metropolitanates.

In practical terms, the erection of titular metropolitanates in Rus′ resulted in the temporary removal of two dioceses that together represented nearly half of the territory of the state (almost all of the region east of the Dnipro) from the jurisdiction of the metropolitan of Kyiv. The elevation of the bishoprics of Chernihiv and Pereiaslav to the rank of titular metropolitanates was purely political in character, undoubtedly connected with the events of 1060, when the Rus′ princes Iziaslav, Sviatoslav, and Vsevolod inflicted a crushing defeat on the Uzes, who were threatening Byzantium. Since the Byzantine holdings in the Crimea as well as on the Danube frontier were vulnerable to pressure from the steppe dwellers, the Byzantine court was quick to recognize the value of Rus′ armies in the struggle against the nomads. The transformation of the two bishoprics into titular metropolitanates should be ascribed to the initiative of the imperial court, which was well informed about the political situation in

Rus'. After the death of Iaroslav the Wise, rule over Rus' was assumed not only by his eldest son Iziaslav, the senior in Kyiv, but by two other sons as well: Sviatoslav, prince of Chernihiv, and Vsevolod, prince of Pereiaslav. Their joint decisions on matters of war, law, and the assignment of other princely thrones permit us to speak of a triarchy in this period.[105] This balance of forces found its counterpart in the realm of ecclesiastical organization as well, as the Byzantine court needed to maintain direct, friendly contacts with all three rulers of Rus'.

Through the intermediary of these titular metropolitans, acting as Byzantine ambassadors *sui generis* in direct ecclesiastical contact with Constantinople, the imperial court sought to strengthen the alliance and make it more effective. It was encouraged in this approach by internal upheaval within the empire, which limited its own ability to oppose the Pechenegs and Uzes. Although the Byzantine side emphasized the ecclesiastical primacy of Kyiv by granting its metropolitan, George (Iurii), the high court rank of *synkellos* (member of the imperial senate), Kyiv was well aware of the danger threatened by the division, as clearly indicated by points 31 and 32 of the canonical answers of Metropolitan John (Ioann) II, dating from ca. 1083.[106] And even though subsequent political developments in Rus' removed the underlying causes, this temporary ecclesiastical-political arrangement had a braking effect on the further development of a diocesan structure.

The first and probably only titular metropolitan in Chernihiv was Neofit, who already held his title before 1072. He no doubt died not long after 1080, for in 1088 Bishop John had already been the incumbent in Chernihiv for some time. One may thus infer that the metropolitanate of *Maurokastron* (i.e., Chernihiv), that is, *Nea Rhōsia*, mentioned in one of the manuscripts of the *Notitiae*, compiled around 1072, was created in the 1060s.[107]

The situation was different in the case of the diocese of Pereiaslav. Its first titular metropolitan was the Greek Leo (Leontii), known for his polemical anti-Latin treatise against azymes (unleavened Eucharistic host). His successor, sometime before 1072, was Bishop Peter (Petr), who probably did not possess the honorary metropolitan title. In any case, he appears as an ordinary bishop in the account of the translation of the relics of Saints Boris and Glěb on 20 May 1072, in which Metropolitans George of Kyiv and Neofit of Chernihiv also took part. The vacancy in the see of Pereiaslav must be dated somewhere from 1068 to 1071, when the unstable political situation in Rus' (as a result of princely quarrels) and Byzantium (as a result of the defeat at Manzikert) would have supported a reassertion of the Kyivan metropolitan's rights over the diocese of Pereiaslav through the ordination of Peter as a regular suffragan bishop. However, after the death of Peter and, shortly thereafter, Metropolitan George, the situation changed, and probably in 1076–1077, or in any case prior to October 1078, Ephrem (Efrem), a former monk of the Kyivan Caves Monastery, returned from Byzantium with the title of titular metropolitan of Pereiaslav. The appearance of this metropolitanate before 1080 is registered by

three versions of the *Notitiae episcopatuum.*[108] Despite the change in the situation, when Vsevolod, the youngest member of the triarchy, became sole ruler of Rus′ after the death of his brothers, Ephrem retained his title until his own death in the 1090s.

In the midst of these changing political and ecclesiastical circumstances, a new diocese came into being in Rostov. Rostov at that time was the center of a region in the northeast of Rus′ that later was to be known as the Vladimir-Suzdal land. In the eleventh century it belonged to the principality and diocese of Pereiaslav. When Iziaslav was driven out of Kyiv on 22 March 1073, and his two brothers divided Rus′ between them, in the process establishing new spheres of influence and authority, the Rostov region passed under the rule of Sviatoslav—the new prince of Kyiv. Sometime later, this political decision was followed by an ecclesiastical one: the Rostov land became an independent diocese subordinate to the metropolitanate of Kyiv. The metropolitan at the time, George, was conscious that by this measure he would not only immediately broaden the range of his jurisdiction, but would also circumvent, or at least lessen, the threat that the titular metropolitanate of Pereiaslav might be transformed into a regular ecclesiastical province. The decision was undoubtedly facilitated by the fact that the current bishop of Pereiaslav, Peter, did not have the title of honorary metropolitan or, even more likely, that the see had already been vacated by Peter's death. The first bishop of Rostov was Leo (Leontii), a monk of the Kyivan Caves Monastery. Shortly after his arrival, perhaps as early as 1074, the new bishop died a martyr's death during disorders probably growing out of the crop failure of 1073 and the ensuing famine.[109] In Rostov, pagans still represented the majority. A similar uprising took place at this time in Novgorod: here the cause was the apostasy of significant numbers of the townspeople. The death of Bishop Leo bore witness to the fact that Christianity had not yet been accepted in peripheral areas such as Rostov, and indicated the degree of importance the continuing development of its diocesan structure was for the Christianization of the domain.

Despite the violent death of Rostov's first bishop, the diocese was able to maintain itself, being filled again by the new metropolitan of Kyiv, John II, in 1077–1078. The new bishop was Isaiah (Isaiia), hegumen of the Kyivan monastery of St. Demetrius. After his death in 1095, however, Rostov did not receive another pastor. As a result of changes on the Kyivan throne, the Rostov land had again passed, in 1094, to the rule of the prince of Pereiaslav, and the titular Metropolitan Ephrem succeeded in returning it to his jurisdiction. From the point of view of the metropolitan of Kyiv, this represented an ongoing vacancy in the see. Only around 1137 did Rostov regain its own bishop, when Iurii Dolgorukii, the first independent prince of Rostov and Suzdal, abandoned efforts to win the throne of Pereiaslav for himself. The restitution of the Rostov bishopric is also supported by the list of its bishops: the next after Isaiah (d. 1095) was Nestor, mentioned in the 1140s. The history of efforts to establish the diocese of Rostov shows how difficult the initiation and maintenance of

a bishopric could be. The difficult inception of the bishopric of Rostov must have provoked resentments, echoed in the later attempt of Prince Andrei Bogoliubskii of Vladimir-Suzdal to break away from the Kyivan ecclesiastical province and create a metropolitanate of his own in the 1160s.[110] This initiative, along with the plunder in 1169 of the churches and shrines of Kyiv—which this prince took as a model for the construction of his own capital—was an initially unsuccessful attempt at *translatio regni*, but with time acquired significance as a harbinger of things to come.

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The Christianization and ecclesiastical administration of a broad territory, often separated from the seat of the bishop by hundreds or even a thousand kilometers, was nearly impossible. Where the creation of new dioceses was too difficult, local units of episcopal administration, which could be characterized as territorial vicariates, were set up to satisfy a constantly growing demand. The bishop's representative, known as a *naměstnik* (vicar), exercised certain defined rights over a given part of the diocesan territory. The Byzantine church, with its dense network of dioceses, had no need of such subunits, and so could not serve as an example here. The institution was created locally, and the name given to these vicars was taken from terminology customarily applied to princely officials.[111] Some inspiration may also have been drawn from various early Christian officers created to assist the bishop in his work, such as the *chorepiscopos, periodeutēs,* or *archidiakonos.* And while the likelihood of actual borrowing is small, a comparison of the *naměstnik* in Rus' with the archdeacon in Western Europe seems justified, given that both offices grew out of a rationalization of episcopal administration in an effort to avoid division of dioceses. The progressive Christianization of the country dictated the creation of smaller units within the broader framework of the bishopric—the vicariates—which were naturally suited to the administrative structure of the state. For this reason, the bishop's vicars first appeared in the seats of the prince's sons or of his governors (*posadniki* or *naměstniki*). The bishop's *naměstnik,* an ecclesiastical personage charged with administration of a fixed portion of the diocese, exercised his office with the aid of a collective organ similar in certain respects to the bishop's *kliros,* a collegial administrative-judicial body corresponding to the Greek *presbyterion* or Latin *capitulum*—chapter. Such vicariates must have already begun to appear in certain centers in the eleventh century. Under favorable circumstances, where a city was the center of a principality, there was a possibility of the transformation of one of these subunits into an independent diocese. This was encouraged by the functioning of a *kliros* alongside the *naměstnik*, just as one did alongside a bishop. In such a case, it would simply be transformed into an episcopal *kliros*. The legal and property status of the *kliros*, it would appear from the foundation document of

the bishopric of Smolensk (ca. 1136), was independent of that of the bishop.[112] When and how an episcopal vicarship became an independent diocese depended on many circumstances, and undoubtedly involved more than just ecclesiastical circles in Rus'. A special need to create more dioceses emerged in the second half of the eleventh century, despite, and, in a certain sense, because of the appearance of the two titular metropolitanates. Kyivan Metropolitan John II even had to address this matter in his canonical responses: a diocese could be created, he explained, "particularly where there is a large population, many people and towns," and where it was a question of "Christian protection and pastoral care over them." This was to be done, however, "in a God-fearing manner," and was only permissible "when the incumbent of the first see of Rus' [i.e., the metropolitan] and the synod of the whole country give their permission."[113]

The metropolitan's reiteration of the general rules of the Church was obviously connected with specific events. At the beginning, he indicated that the question at hand involved a division planned by the princely authority and noted that while the prince naturally might propose the establishment of a new diocese, the decision lay ultimately in the hands of the bishops of the Rus' ecclesiastical province (i.e., the metropolitan and his suffragans). This commentary may well be connected with the establishment of new bishoprics in Volodymyr-in-Volhynia in 1078–1086 and Turaŭ (Turov) in 1088.[114] Despite the absence of any direct evidence in the sources, we can basically assume that both these centers were located within the boundaries of the metropolitan diocese proper, so that the new bishoprics had to be carved out of its territory.

When Vsevolod became the sole ruler of Rus' in October 1078, he assumed certain obligations vis-à-vis the sons of his older brother, Prince Iziaslav of Kyiv, who had just fallen on the field of battle. According to the law of seniority, the throne of Kyiv was to pass to the oldest son of Iziaslav, Iaropolk, on the death of his uncle Vsevolod. Among Vsevolod's first decisions was to grant Volhynia, with its seat at Volodymyr, and Polisia, with its center at Turaŭ on the Prypiat River, to Iaropolk. Iaropolk-Peter is the Rus' prince whose visage is known to us from the miniatures of the Cividale Codex (the "Trier Psalter").[115] Thanks to his sojourns at the courts of European rulers as well as at the papal court in Rome, he was one of the members of the Rurikid dynasty more conversant with the world, who understood well the need for and the value of ties between princely authority and the church. Moreover, in Rus' and at the Caves Monastery in particular, Iaropolk was viewed as a model Christian and a just Christian ruler. Suggestions about the supposed "Roman Catholic orientation" of Iaropolk and his parents Iziaslav and Gertrude are the result of an exaggerated, anachronistic view of the year 1054 as a sharp dividing line in ecclesiastical history. In Rome and Kyiv alike, Princes Iziaslav and Iaropolk were considered proper Christians. Also, Iziaslav's Polish wife was already active in Kyivan religious life in the 1050s and 1060s. She helped to admit the mother of Theodosius to the convent of St. Nicholas, which she founded, and

was held in high respect at the Kyivan Caves Monastery.[116] Thus, what we know of Iaropolk permits us to see him as the initiator of the founding of the bishopric of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia. Vsevolod and John II responded favorably to this wish, since it was a question of a country "with a great population" requiring pastoral care. It is significant that the first bishop of Volodimer was Stephen (Stefan), a former hegumen of the Caves Monastery. Volhynia at that time was considerably more Christianized than the Rostov land. In the 1060s there was and had been for some time past a "Holy Mountain" monastery near Volodymyr-in-Volhynia, which, as its very name indicates, owed its establishment to close contacts with the center of Byzantine monasticism, the Holy Mount of Athos.[117] Hence, while political considerations were decisive in the establishment of this bishopric, circumstances of an ecclesiastical nature were clearly at work here as well.

Political considerations are most obvious in the case of the founding of the bishopric of Turaŭ on the Prypiat. After the death of Prince Iaropolk of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia (22 November 1086), the anticipated successor to the throne of Kyiv became the second son of Iziaslav, Sviatopolk, who at that time held Novgorod. Sviatopolk's uncle, Prince Vsevolod of Kyiv, clearly understood the danger that would threaten his own heirs, should Sviatopolk follow him on the Kyivan throne while still retaining Novgorod. In order to avoid this, he persuaded his nephew, on the pretext of his impending succession, to move to a nearer center, Turaŭ, just about 200 kilometers from Kyiv. At the same time, a bishopric was established there. Here, for the first time, it can be seen clearly—although it was already detectable in the case of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia—how important, for reasons of prestige, was the presence of a bishop in a princely residence. Sviatopolk realized this fact, although he must have viewed Turaŭ as merely a temporary residence (in fact, he ended up ruling as prince there from 1088 to 1093). Accustomed to the presence of a bishop in Novgorod, he wanted one in Turaŭ as well. This indicates not only that the social elite had been Christianized, but that collaboration with the church had become characteristic of princely authority. And even though the erection of the bishopric of Turaŭ was the result of a temporary situation, it became a permanent feature of the country's diocesan organization.

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The names of the cathedral churches in the newly erected bishoprics in Rostov, Volodymyr-in-Volhynia, and Turaŭ on the Prypiat were identical: all were dedicated to the Holy Assumption of the Mother of God (*Uspenie, Koimēsis*—i.e., "Dormition"). In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, still other cathedrals were dedicated to the Dormition of the Mother of God. It is, in fact, no accident that all seven cathedral churches established between 1073 and 1213 bear this name. Indirect data permit us to trace the source of this custom to the Kyivan

Caves Monastery, the main church of which was dedicated to the Dormition. This pattern highlights the significant role that this monastery played in the Christianization of the Eastern Slavs and in the Slavicization of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Its significance in the history of the church in Rus′ can be read not only in the widespread occurrence of churches of the Dormition, but also in the consecration of about 50 bishops from that single monastery during the period prior to 1220.[118] In both the twelfth and the first half of the thirteenth centuries, half of the dioceses were occupied by bishops who had formerly been monks at the Kyivan Caves Monastery. And this is only one aspect of the activity of the Caves Monastery in transforming Rus′ into a Christian land. Its contacts were not limited to the princely court in Kyiv: through its branches and episcopal curiae, it reached the courts of the appanage princes as well.

The clergy of the Dnipro region and the monks from the Caves Monastery in particular also played an important role in the religious life and ecclesiastical structures of the rest of the East Slavic lands in the second half of the thirteenth century—for example, in the intensive colonization and Christianization of the Oka-Volga mesopotamia, a process underway since the twelfth century.

It is a telling circumstance that, from the second half of the eleventh century, bishoprics were established on foundations prepared by *naměstniks* in vicariates, where a main church dedicated to the Dormition of the Mother of God already existed. With the erection of a bishopric, this church was elevated to the rank of a cathedral. It is possible to infer from this that the organization of diocesan vicariates was likewise closely connected with the Caves Monastery. Undoubtedly, the questions posed to John II about the preconditions for creating a diocese were often discussed in this community, deepening the conviction that further Christianization and the development of a diocesan structure were inseparably linked with one another.

Indirect but eloquent testimony from Hegumen Daniel's (Daniil's) account of his pilgrimage to the Holy Land suggests that the question of the establishment of new bishoprics was very much alive at the beginning of the twelfth century. On his road to the holy places in Palestine in 1106, Daniel visited Cyprus, where he paid special attention to the diocesan structure, noting that there were "fourteen bishoprics but only one metropolitanate" on that island. It is interesting that it was precisely the church in Cyprus, and not the ecclesiastical organization in Palestine or any of the other lands or localities along the route of his pilgrimage, that attracted Daniel's attention. Obviously, there must have been something similar in the situation of the church in Cyprus to that in Rus′. Daniel underlined such an analogy by referring to the Cypriot church as a metropolitanate, rather than, in accordance with the Greek custom, as an archbishopric.[119]

Daniel had set off on his pilgrimage a dozen or so years after the special status of the two titular metropolitanates had died out. However, fears about a possible division of the heretofore unified Rus′ ecclesiastical province had not yet disappeared. At the same time, the question of creating new dioceses had

come to a head as a result of the successes in Christianizing the realm and the need to continue the process, as well as a result of changes in the political structure of Rus'. In various circles, including the court of the metropolitan of Kyiv, the future must have seemed unsettling. The experience of the Greek metropolitanates suggested that an increase in the number of suffragan bishoprics encouraged the more dynamic among them to seek the status of independent metropolitanates. In Cyprus, Daniel observed something that made him think about his own church. By this time there were nine bishoprics subordinate to the metropolitan of Kyiv. By pointing to the fourteen bishoprics in Cyprus, Daniel wanted to calm the doubts of those who feared an increase in the number of dioceses in Rus', and by emphasizing the presence of "just one metropolitanate" (*mitropolia zhe edina*), he expressed himself clearly in favor of preserving the unity of the Rus' ecclesiastical province. Such was the position of the majority of the Rus' clergy during the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. Addressing himself to his readers—princes and bishops, boyars and hugemens—for whom he had prayed in the Holy Land, Daniel sought to dispel any fears about an increase in the number of bishoprics in Rus', by pointing out that an even greater number of dioceses had not prevented the church in Cyprus from continuing to be a single ecclesiastical province. He represented here a position shared by the Kyivan Caves Monastery, which was, on the one hand, a proponent of the unity of the ecclesiastical province and, on the other, an active supporter of the further development of its diocesan structure.

There were, however, forces in the church in Rus' that, while they did not basically question this view, nonetheless opposed the establishment of new bishoprics in concrete instances. The history of the bishopric of Smolensk provides a good example of these tendencies. As long as the Smolensk land was part of the principality of Pereiaslav, it was under the jurisdiction of the bishops of that latter town. Sometime in the second half of the eleventh century, an episcopal vicariate was established in Smolensk to facilitate the ecclesiastical administration of this region, located some 600 kilometers away from Pereiaslav. After 1094, when the suzerainty of the princes and bishops of Pereiaslav over the Smolensk and Rostov-Suzdal lands was restored after a temporary hiatus, some thought was also given to the creation of a local ecclesiastical organization. At about the same time, immediately after 1096, the new prince of Pereiaslav, Volodimer Monomakh, and his bishop, the titular Metropolitan Ephrem, built a stone church in Suzdal in honor of the Dormition of the Mother of God. The building of the first stone church in the Rostov land just after the lapse of the bishopric in Rostov was designed to emphasize that decisions affecting the region were made in Pereiaslav, for with this action the episcopal vicariate was transferred to Suzdal. In Suzdal, moreover, a branch of the Kyivan Caves Monastery had already been in operation for some time. In 1101, probably after the completion of the edifice in Suzdal, Volodimer Monomakh and Ephrem's successor, Bishop Simon (Symeon) of Pereiaslav, began the construction of a stone church of the Dormition of the Mother of God

in Smolensk. The case of Suzdal makes it clear that no far-reaching plans for change in the structure of the metropolitanate were connected with the building of these churches. It was only a matter of ensuring, from the point of view of Pereiaslav, effective administration in the north. Only after 1113, when Volodimer Monomakh was seated upon the Kyivan throne, and particularly after 1117, when his political intentions and those of his heir Mstislav became clearer, did the two princes want to establish a bishopric in Smolensk. When Bishop Sylvester (Sil'vestr) of Pereiaslav died on 12 April 1123, the vacancy in the see provided a suitable opportunity for a division of the diocese. But here Volodimer ran up against the opposition of Metropolitan Nicetas (Nikētas). In revenge, the prince denied investure to the new candidate to the Pereiaslav see. Only after the death of Monomakh (19 May 1125) did his son Iaropolk, the new prince of Pereiaslav, accept Abbot Mark as bishop-elect, and finally on 4 November 1125, Metropolitan Nicetas consecrated him as bishop of Pereiaslav. The Kyivan Prince Mstislav continued, however, to strive for the establishment of a bishopric in Smolensk, the seat of his son Prince Rostislav. The sudden death of Metropolitan Nicetas on 3 March 1126, and the ensuing vacancy of several years in Kyiv contributed to further delay. The new metropolitan, Michael (Mikhail), who came to Kyiv in 1130, was clearly prepared to carry out the wish of the Kyivan ruler, as can deduced by the fact that he brought with him, in his entourage, the candidate designated to serve as bishop of that see, Manuel (Manuil). Nonetheless, Metropolitan Michael encountered opposition from Pereiaslav to the erection of a bishopric in Smolensk. Only after the death of Bishop Mark of Pereiaslav on 6 January 1135 was it possible to return to the project, and Manuel, the as yet unconsecrated bishop-elect, began administering his future diocese. The political situation—specifically, quarrels among the princes and continual changes on the princely throne of Pereiaslav—delayed a final decision, so that only in 1136–1137, was Manuel consecrated by Metropolitan Michael as the first bishop of Smolensk.[120] At the same time, the bishopric of Rostov was restored. The opposition of the Pereiaslav hierarchy and of the cathedral *kliros* in particular must have been quite stubborn, as the vacancy in the see of Pereiaslav lasted until 1141. With the creation of the Smolensk bishopric and the restitution of the Rostov bishopric, the jurisdictional area of the diocese of Pereiaslav had been reduced by three-quarters, being limited now only to the Pereiaslav land proper in the south.

The development of a diocesan structure was essential for further Christianization. This did not, however, prevent political motives from playing a part in the establishment of the new bishoprics. This was certainly true in the case of the bishopric in Halych. That region, roughly encompassing the upper and middle course of the Dnister and San rivers, took shape at the end of the eleventh and the first decades of the twelfth centuries as the domain of the heirs of Rostislav, grandson of Iaroslav the Wise. In characteristic fashion, the idea of an indigenous bishopric was born, but encountered misgivings in Kyiv and

stiff opposition from the princes and bishops of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia. Only the interprincely struggles that broke out in 1146, particularly the clash over an appointment to the metropolitan see connected with the elevation of Clement Smoliatich in 1147, made it possible to establish a bishopric in Halych, which only shortly earlier had become the capital of this principality. The efforts of Prince Volodimer of Halych were eased by the fact that Metropolitan Clement and the bishop of Volodymyr were supporters of Iziaslav Mstislavich, who was both the Kyivan senior prince and the prince of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia. In the struggle for the Kyivan throne between Iziaslav Mstislavich and Iurii Dolgorukii, Volodimer of Halych supported the latter. In addition, his alliance with Byzantium against the Hungarians, who were Iziaslav's allies, assured him the support of the empire in this ecclesiastical matter. Since Clement's elevation to the metropolitanate was viewed as an illegal act in Constantinople, the Halych church had the right not to recognize its earlier obedience. Only after the return to a legal situation acceptable to the patriarch, with the arrival of Metropolitan Constantine (Konstantin) in Kyiv in 1156, did it become possible to consecrate bishop-elect Kosmas as bishop of Halych.[121] In this way, the *de facto* existing bishopric of Halych was carved *de iure* out of the diocese of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia, to which it had heretofore belonged, territorially partly as the vicariate of Peremyshl (*Pol.* Przemyśl) as well.

Considerably less troubled was the birth of the bishopric of Riazan on the Oka. The Riazan-Murom principality had already split off from the principality of Chernihiv at the beginning of the twelfth century, but continued to be part of the diocese of Chernihiv. The princes of Riazan had no great interest in ecclesiastical independence. In order to counter the pressures of the princes of Vladimir-Suzdal, they were forced to seek the support of Chernihiv, and could count on the intervention of its bishop on their behalf. The ecclesiastical alienation of Riazan arose only when the princes of Riazan, as a result of their defeat of 1186, fell into dependence on Prince Vsevolod of Vladimir-Suzdal. Vsevolod was interested in breaking the ecclesiastical ties between Riazan and Chernihiv. The creation of the bishopric should be ascribed to the diplomatic skill of Metropolitan Nikēphoros II, who managed to take advantage of the favorable conditions and bring the princes of Chernihiv and Vladimir-Suzdal into agreement in the 1190s, and was able to obtain their consent to the creation of a Riazan bishopric' out of the diocese of Chernihiv. Despite the changing fate of its principality and the destruction of the city in 1237, Riazan was to remain permanently as a diocese of the Rus' ecclesiastical province.[122]

The division of the Rostov-Suzdal diocese and the creation of a second bishopric alongside Rostov in Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma took place as a result of the division of the domain of Vsevolod "Big Nest" among his eldest sons. The bishops of Rostov had already resided for some time in Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma, so the separation in fact returned its function of episcopal see to Rostov while recognizing the ecclesiastical role that Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma had played for nearly 50 years. The division of the diocese was also a result of

the progress in the Christianization of northeast Rus'. In November 1213 and at the beginning of 1214 bishops descended from the Caves community were consecrated for the two sees.[123]

King Danylo and Metropolitan Cyril: The Church in the Face of the Mongol Invasion

Shortly thereafter, a bishopric was established in the western borderlands of Rus' at Peremyshl, where—one can presume—there had already been a vicariate of the diocese of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia at the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. During that period a princely stone church dedicated to St. John the Baptist, which later became a cathedral, was also built here. After 1130, Peremyshl lost its primacy in the western lands of the Dnister basin to Halych.[124] Peremyshl, as the center of a land already advanced in its Christianization, was well suited to be the seat of a bishop, but in fact the city owed this status to an accident. Political events in Novgorod, the bishop of which had borne the honorary title of archbishop since 1165, resulted at the end of 1219 in the return of Archbishop Mitrofan to his throne, from which he had been removed on 23 January 1211. Because Mitrofan's successor since 1211, Archbishop Anthony (Antonii), was not inclined to withdraw, however, it was decided to send both bishops to Kyiv to submit to the mediation of the metropolitan. Metropolitan Matthew (Matfii) settled the problem by rehabilitating Mitrofan, who had originally been consecrated in 1201, and sending him back to Novgorod. The metropolitan also "honored" Anthony, giving him the bishopric of Peremyshl.[125] This was possible on the strength of an understanding between the metropolitan and Mstislav the Bold, who had become the ruler of the Halych principality in 1219. The latter, as prince of Novgorod (1210–1218), had become friends with Archbishop Anthony. Probably a vacancy in the see of Halych permitted the separation of the diocese of Peremyshl from the diocese of Halych without any great difficulties. And even though Bishop Anthony returned to Novgorod in 1225, this change could not threaten the existence of the newly created bishopric. Despite the passing circumstances behind the erection of an episcopal see and the political complications into which the town had fallen, there were also real justifications for such a step, and so the bishopric of Peremyshl became a permanent component of the ecclesiastical geography of *mikra Rhōsia* or "little Rus'."

Not long after the division of the diocese of Halych, there was a further partition of the diocese of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia. Before joining Halych and Volhynia together under his rule (1238), Prince Danylo had already established a bishopric in his residence at Uhrusk on the Buh, about 80 kilometers northwest of Volodymyr, conceived, no doubt, as a bishop's see at the ruler's court. Only when the princely court moved between 1240 and 1250 to Kholm (*Pol.* Chełm), which now emerged as the new capital of a unified Halych-Volhynian principality, was the office of court bishop transformed into a regular bishop-

ric.[126] At about the same time, probably before 1240 and in any case before 1250, a bishopric was established in Lutsk, one of the most important cities in eastern Volhynia.[127] That foundation mirrored the further development of ecclesiastical-religious life; it must be viewed, however, like that of Kholm, in the overall context of Danylo's political plans. As a ruler, he yearned to be a "prince of princes," a crowned king surrounded by bishops. The coronation of Danylo must be seen against the background of his political ambitions. As a ruler connected with European courts, he understood quite well that he could become a true king (*rex coronatus*) by receiving a crown from the pope.[128] The earlier foundation of a bishopric in Peremyshl furnished him with a good example, and, furthermore, a comparison with his neighbors—Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland—inclined him to further foundations. There are thus good grounds to suggest that Danylo consciously set out to increase the number of dioceses on the territory of his realm. There is no evidence, however, from which to infer that he sought to join his five dioceses into a new ecclesiastical province or to break up the metropolitanate of Kyiv. Nonetheless, his ecclesiastical administrative activity laid the basis for the future metropolitanate of *mikra Rhōsia*.

In the difficult years of the Mongol invasion, Danylo was a spokesman for the unity of the Kyivan ecclesiastical province: in the years 1239–1243 and 1246–1249 it was he who bore the title of Grand Prince of Kyiv. He held Kyiv the first time until 1243, when Khan Batu named Grand Prince Iaroslav Vsevolodovich of Vladimir-Suzdal the "eldest among all the princes of Rus'." After the death of Iaroslav, Danylo probably became grand prince of Kyiv again, being the only one to return to Rus' of all the princes who had traveled to the court of the Great Khan to pay homage in 1246.[129] Metropolitan Joseph (Iosif), who had come to Kyiv from Nicaea in 1236, quickly disappeared from the scene, either returning to his homeland or losing his life in Kyiv when it fell to the Mongols on 6 December 1240. In 1241 or at the latest in 1242, in this exceptional situation—further complicated by a vacancy on the patriarchal throne in Nicaea (1240–1244)—Danylo, as the nominal Grand Prince of Kyiv, entrusted the administration of the metropolitanate to metropolitan-elect Cyril.[130] The latter, however, could not have gone to Nicaea until after Danylo's journey to pay homage to Khan Batu in the spring of 1246, which resulted in the return of the title of Grand Prince of Kyiv to him. Only in 1247 was Cyril finally consecrated in Nicaea. Not long after his return to Kyiv in 1249, it was decided at the court of the Great Khan to entrust the title of Grand Prince of Kyiv to Alexander Nevsky, who also became Grand Prince of Vladimir-Suzdal in 1252. The new Grand Prince of Kyiv and the metropolitan of Kyiv developed a close working relationship with one another. Nonetheless, speculation about a supposed loosening of Cyril's ecclesiastical ties to Halych-Volhynian Rus' is groundless. A change in the bearer of the grand princely title was simply accompanied with the normal retention of Cyril as metropolitan of Kyiv. From the very fact that the edition of the *Nomokanon* produced under the

direction of Metropolitan Cyril was accepted in Volhynia in its earliest form and copied there in 1286, it follows that *mikra Rhōsia* continued to be as much under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan of Kyiv as were the other lands of Rus'.[131] Equally baseless is the assertion that Cyril transferred the seat of the metropolitanate to the Vladimir in the Suzdal land. Kyiv and its metropolitan see continued to function: synods took place there (e.g., in 1273 and 1284), and bishops were consecrated there as late as the 1290s (e.g., Clement of Novgorod and Theodore of Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma in 1276). The Kyivan St. Sophia likewise continued to be the final resting place of Kyivan metropolitans: the remains of Cyril, who died on 27 November 1281 in Pereiaslav Zaleskii during a pastoral visit to the Suzdal land, were transported back to Kyiv and buried on 6 December in the St. Sophia Cathedral there.[132]

Under Cyril's administration, two more bishoprics were established. Despite the fact that the principality of Tver was established in the 1240s, the advance of Tver to the rank of a bishopric can be confirmed only in connection with the treaty (1255–1258) between Grand Prince Alexander Nevsky and his brother Prince Iaroslav of Tver.[133]

The year 1261 witnessed the consecration of Mitrofan, first bishop of Sarai, which was the capital of the Golden Horde on the Volga. His successor, Theognostos, was made bishop both of Pereiaslav (near Kyiv) and Sarai in 1269. Theognostos journeyed three times to meet with the emperor and the patriarch in Constantinople at the behest of Metropolitan Cyril and Khan Möngke Temür. He was there on 12 August 1276, as indicated by an act of the patriarchal synod.[134] In literature on the subject, the bishop of Sarai has tended to be viewed more as a diplomatic representative than a pastor, but these synodal documents portray the involvement of Theognostos in matters of a strictly pastoral nature, related to the special circumstances of his post. It is known that the bishopric of Sarai had a precisely delineated area of jurisdiction. This is demonstrated by a quarrel with the bishop of Riazan about the boundary of the diocese. From the end of the thirteenth century, these two episcopal sees, located 750 kilometers one from the other, argued over the course of the boundary line running midway between them. One would have expected in that period to find open steppe and an absence of settlement between the rivers Don, Khopor, and Vorona. But even in the stormy thirteenth century, not only settlements, but Christian communities and a functioning ecclesiastical organization existed there. The settlers recognized the jurisdiction of the bishop of Sarai, counting on his effective defense of the Christian communities against abuses on the part of the Tatar-Mongol administration.[135]

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These events in political and ecclesiastical life lead us up to the hiatus associated with the Mongol invasion. While one certainly should not underestimate the significance of the invasion itself, which began in 1223 and reached its

peak of destruction and slaughter in the years 1237–1240, it is also true that the catastrophe, no matter how vast its immediate proportions may have been, proved truly fatal only in the long run, when it turned out to be irreversible. The deep dividing line thus comes not so much with those few years of armed conquest as with the continuing rule of the Mongols in the decades that followed. It was not defeat on the field of battle, but the ensuing half century that turned the course of history toward a permanent division of Europe.[136] Economic, political, and ecclesiastical life went on after 1240, despite the destruction of the many fortresses and towns that had put up resistance to the invaders. There were, after all, many remaining centers and settlements that had surrendered without a fight. The destruction of Kyiv meant the decline of a European city, but not the end of its existence.[137] Resistance was not entirely quelled, moreover, and continued to smolder in the decades that followed. Even the trips of the Rus' princes to pay homage at the court of the khan, the recognition of Mongol suzerainty, and the readiness to collaborate with the foreign conquerors do not lend themselves to a one-sided interpretation, but rather need to be evaluated within the context of the overall situation of the time. The tactic of collaboration with the victors enjoyed increasingly strong support from the upper strata and the church, as the conviction grew that resistance was hopeless and could only lead to a demolition of what remained of the state and to the total destruction of Christian society.[138]

From the political and religious points of view, the thirteenth century was a very difficult but fruitful one for the Church. It was a period in which the common experience of disaster, of the defeats and humiliations suffered, awakened a common confessional consciousness and served to enrich spiritual life. Despite the heavy human losses and the material destruction—the ruin of many churches and the loss of countless monuments of artistic and spiritual value—it became forcefully apparent just how deeply Christianity had penetrated the various strata of society. Christian consciousness, pitted against a godless, or, rather, religiously indifferent, invader, came to life in a defense of indigenous values expressed in a growing religious intolerance.

Ecclesiastical institutions were not only spared by the characteristically tolerant conquerors but were even encouraged in their activity by a variety of privileges (the oldest such charter/*iarlyk* dating from 1267). The Church and ecclesiastical hierarchy achieved a greater independence from their own princes in this period, but at the same time had to take greater responsibility upon themselves. It is worth noting that Metropolitan Cyril in the course of his long tenure (1242–1281), did not once appear at the khan's court. However, there is no evidence to support the contention that, because of his ties with King Danylo, Cyril did not enjoy the trust of the Horde.[139] Cyril managed to obtain privileges and benefits for the Church without involving himself in the excursions to pay homage at the court of the khans, and from this stance, a certain model of behavior for the bishops of the Rus' church took shape. Bishop Ignatius (Ignatii) of Rostov was even required to justify his journey to the

Golden Horde before a metropolitan tribunal in 1281.[140] For the metropolitan, who wanted to avoid such visits to the court of the khan, the maintenance of a permanent representative in the person of the bishop of Sarai became a necessary and valuable expedient. The permanent presence of a Rus′ bishop at Sarai was also valued by the Golden Horde, in view of its need for closer diplomatic ties with the Byzantine Empire.

One cannot help noting that, as a result of the Mongol invasion, the young Rus′ church was confronted with tasks of exceptional difficulty well before reaching maturity. But after more than thirty years of Mongol lordship over Rus′, a synod held in Kyiv in 1273 was able to come to a conclusion that, while containing nothing new, did offer a decisive pastoral program of ecclesiastical reform for coping with this difficult era of foreign rule.[141] The need to collaborate with the conqueror in the ecclesiastical-political sphere was not translated into the language of pastoral care, and sermons were not embellished with praise for the invaders. On the contrary, the pastoral letter of Metropolitan Cyril from Kyiv in 1273 reminded the faithful of the dark and humiliating realities: "Has not God scattered us throughout the whole land? Have not our cities been captured? Have not our powerful princes been cut down by the sword? Has not our youth been led away into captivity? Have not our houses of divine worship been violated? Do not the godless and criminal pagans torment us day after day?" Metropolitan Cyril's suffragan, Bishop Serapion of Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma, who had been until recently (1249–1273) archimandrite of the still functioning Caves Monastery in Kyiv, struck a similar chord in his admonition of 1274. Warning of extermination, he called for a purification of souls and a moral renewal, and did not fear to say of the Mongol yoke: "Has not our country fallen into slavery? Have not our strongholds been captured? Was it so long ago that our fathers and brothers lay down in battle? Have not our women and children been led away into captivity? Have not those who survived been trapped in a bitter yoke by the foreigners? And it has lasted nearly forty years, this torment and suffering, and heavy dues bear down upon us without ceasing . . . ." Likewise, in another sermon, Serapion complains that "our riches have been taken by the pagans, our country has become the possession of foreigners, our neighbors look upon us with scorn—we have become the laughingstock of our enemies."[142]

Such was the Church of Rus′ and such were its pastors in the first decades of the Mongol yoke. They succeeded in obtaining privileges from the conquerors and in strengthening their own position. They also stood guard, however, over national and spiritual traditions. Recounting the defeat and suffering, urging the preservation of values inherited from the past, they awakened a spirit of resistance, an internal rejection of the imposed reality. It is true that the young church as an institution and its pastors as individuals did not always act with appropriate dignity, but the Church was not broken: it found the inner strength and social support necessary to continue its mission.

The devastated and depopulated cities and settlements, and the burned and profaned churches, evoked horror in the accounts of those who survived. The armed invasion of the Mongols in 1237–1240 was a heavy defeat and was perceived by contemporaries as utter annhihilation, but in fact it did not result in a total destruction. Despite everything, life continued; finding support in the Church, the conquered remained unreconciled to their fate.

The Mongol invasion inaugurated a major break in the continuity of the history of Rus', but the further course of events was not immediately apparent. The fatal turning point was the result not of the invasion of the Mongols itself, not of the plundering and mass slaughter of the population, not of the fall of Kyiv or Vladimir-on-the-Kliazma, but above all of the profound changes in the internal life of the country that took place under the influence of these events and the continuing presence of the Mongols in the life of Rus'. The increasingly coercive course, so disastrous for the land, was influenced more by the Tatar register of 1257–1259 than by the destruction of the years 1237–1240.[143]

These changes meant, among other things, an end of the Kyivan era in the history of the Church in Rus', an era of a single Church common to all the East Slavs. Metropolitan Cyril, probably of Halych-Volhynian origin, was the last pastor to preside over such a unity. His successor, the Greek Maxim (Maksim) who arrived in 1283, sought to uphold tradition, but, in 1299, in the face of a difficult reality, he decided to transfer his court and the Sophia *kliros* to the Vladimir in the Suzdal land.[144]

Four years later, in 1303, a decision was made by Constantinople to carve a second ecclesiastical province—with the seat of the new metropolitan at Halych and his five suffragans initially in Volodymyr-in-Volhynia, Peremyshl, Lutsk, Turaŭ, and Kholm—out of the metropolitanate of Kyiv with its twelve bishoprics.[145] In the official note of the Patriarchate of Constantinople concerning the erection of the metropolitanate of Halych we find for the first time the phrase *"mikra Rhōsia,"* paralleling the name *"Megale Rhōsia,"* which had been used for the first time in the twelfth century in reference to the metropolitanate of Kyiv. Both of these names, despite their subsequent roles as ethnopolitical and geographical terms,[146] function here exclusively as Byzantine conceptions of ecclesiastical geography, serving, on the basis of the number of suffragans in each, to distinguish the smaller Rus' ecclesiastical province from the larger.

In tenth- to twelfth-century Byzantium, it was known that the geographical term "Rus'" (*Rhōsia*) was employed in Rus' first and foremost in referring to the territory on the middle Dnipro with its center in Kyiv, while the domain of the Kyivan princes extended to a significantly broader territory. At the same time, this geographical term was also used, for practical purposes, in referring to the whole area of Kyivan rule just as it is, for that matter, in contemporary historiography. However, sometimes the need for greater precision was felt. Hence, Constantine VII Porphyrogennētos localizes Novgorod in "outer Rhōsia," having in mind the extent of Kyivan rule beyond Rus' proper. Similarly, in the

chancellery of the patriarch, use of the term "great Rhōsia," served to emphasize the congruency between the jurisdictional range of the metropolitanate of Kyiv and the territorial domain of Rus′ as a state.

Moreover, the identification of the metropolitanate of Kyiv as the metropolitanate of "great Rus′," in the sense of all, or the whole, of Rus′, may already have begun in Byzantium at the end of the eleventh century in the face of political and ecclesiastical centrifugal forces that challenged the unity of the patriarchate's Rus′ province. The counterpart of this "great" Rus′ is the phrase *"pasēs Rhōsias,"* or *"vseia Rusi,"* employed by metropolitans and princes of Kyiv alike. From the moment of the division into two metropolitanates, the adjective "great" regained its basic semantic sense, serving, in a pairing with "little" or "minor," to distinguish a larger structure.

As later history would show, it was no easy matter to translate this division, deepening in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, into the language of definitive ecclesiastical administrative decisions, but the course had been set. The processes leading to these transformations had begun earlier, but the events of the thirteenth century had accelerated them dramatically.

The metropolitanate of Halych was not a stable structure. Among the factors responsible for this was the crucial one: the extinction of local branches of Rurikids. When, toward the end of the twelfth century, the line of Rostislaviches of Halych died out, it seemed that they would be successfully replaced by the Volhynian line of the scions of Volodimir Monomakh: Prince Roman (d. 1205) and his son King Danylo (d. 1264; he even competed successfully for Kyiv). Their successors, in the face of the persistent Mongol-Tatar pressure, increasingly limited themselves to local matters and rivalries, and then by the year 1322 came the extinction of the male line of the Halych-Volhynian Rurikids. Claims to the throne and power in Halych on the part of related neighbors—members of the dynatsies of the Piasts, Gediminids and Arpads—had a negative impact on the history of these lands, though they initially brought political order and economic prosperity. There is no doubt, however, that in the longer perspective the loss of its own dynasty, whose roots reached back to the Kyivan era, weighed heavily on the fate of Rus′-Ukraine and found reflection in its religious life as well.

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NOTES

This essay was originally conceived as an introduction to a collection of essays on the history of religious life in Ukraine, which was not published because of the landmarks of 1991. It was based largely on my analytical studies, which I reference below, as well as on my critical discussion of previous studies on this subject. Here I consider mainly studies related to the Millennium of Christianity in Rus'/Ukraine.

1. "Photii epistolae," no. XIII, chap. 35, in Jacques-Paul Migne, ed., *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series graeca*, 161 vols. (Paris, 1857–1866), vol. 102, pp. 735–38. Cf. Ihor Ševčenko, "Religious Missions Seen from Byzantium," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 12/13 (1988/1989): 7–27 (reprinted as "Religious Missions Seen from Byzantium: The Imperial Pattern and its local Variants," in his *Ukraine Between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century* (Edmonton, 1996), pp. 27–45). The interchangeability of [ō] and [ū] (graphemically, ω/Ω) in the Greek of the Byzantine era (until the thirteenth century?) permits us to hypothesize confidently that the name "*Rhōs, Rhōsia*" was pronounced in Byzantium in a manner similar to the Slavic "*Rus'*" and the Latin "*Rusia.*" Compare Liudprand, Bishop of Cremona's (ca. 960): "*gens . . . quam Graeci vocant . . . Rusios*" (*Antapodosis* b. V, c. 15). Ω was pronounced as a long ū, as shown by the Latin spelling of the Greek sound of the name, Theophanu (Theophanō in Greek spelling). For literature on the Christianization before 988, see the second Russian edition, with corrections and bibliographic additions, of Gerhard Podskalsky [Podskal'skii], *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura v Kievskoi Rusi 988–1237 gg.* (St. Petersburg, 1996), pp. 17–29.
2. Tadeusz Lewicki, *Źródła arabskie do dziejów Słowiańszczyzny,* vol. 1 (Wrocław, 1956), pp. 76ff, and the commentary on pp. 126–38. See Omeljan Pritsak, "An Arabic Text on the Trade Route of the Corporation of Ar-Rūs in the Second Half of the Ninth Century, " *Folia Orientalia* 12 (1970): 242–59; cf. M. Hrushevsky [Hrushevs'kyi], *History of Ukraine-Rus',* vol. 1 (Edmonton, 1997), pp. 217, 218, 316, and 388. On some implications in reconstructing the original text and in enlarging the dating for the whole ninth century, see Thomas S. Noonan, "When Did Rūs/Rus' Merchants First Visit Khazaria and Baghdad?" *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 7 (1987–1991): 213–19.
3. Samuel Hazzard Cross and Olgerd P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor, eds. and trans., *Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text* (Cambridge, MA, 1953), p. 77. Since the term *sobornaia tserkvi* has often been translated as "cathedral church," which would assume the presence of a bishop in Kyiv even prior to 944, it should be remembered that *sobornaia* represents an exact translation of the Greek *katholiki*, in this context, meaning a common, public church; in other words, a church serving the congregation of believers [*publica ecclesia*] in contrast to an oratory or private church [*privata ecclesia*].

4. A. P. Motsia, *Naselennia pivdenno-Rus'kykh zemel' IX–XIII st. za materialamy nekropoliv* (Kyiv, 1993), pp. 6–46 and 74–102; A. Chernetsov, "Nachalo khristianstva na Rusi v svete arkheologicheskikh dannykh. Sostoianie izuchennosti voprosa," *Slavia antiqua* 38 (1997): 81–93. It seems that it is too early to evaluate the degree of Christianization on the basis of findings of 2 to 9 percent of the graves with Christian signs on them from the eleventh-thirteenth centuries, if one considers that in the thirteenth century there was a decline in the number of such graves, as compared with the twelfth century. There is no clear proof to state that "by the end of the 12th century almost all urban graves were Christian" (Simon Franklin and Jonathan Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus' 750–1200* [London, 1996], p. 352); cf. also pp. 174–76; the white stone rotunda in Peremyshl (*Pol.* Przemyśl) cannot be dated to the tenth century (p. 159) but only to first half of the eleventh, and it is most likely a fragment of a palatium not of a church.

5. Cf. also N. A. Makarov, "K otsenke khristianizatsii drevnerusskoi derevni v XI–XIII vv.," *Kratkie soobshcheniia Instituta arkheologii* 205 (1991): 11–21; V. V. Sedov, "Rasprostranenie khristianstva v drevnei Rusi," *Kratkie soobshcheniia Instituta arkheologii* 208 (1993): 5–11, takes into account earlier writings (controversial). See also Tat'iana Panova, "Khristianskaia simvolika v gorodskom pogrebal'nom obriade Rusi (XI–XVvv.)," *Russia mediaevalis* 9(1) 1997: 54–77.

6. Aleksandr Zimin, ed., "Pamiat' i pokhvala Iakova Mnikha i Zhitie kniazia Vladimira po drevneishemu spisku," *Kratkie soobshcheniia Instituta slavianovedeniia* 37 (1963): 72; *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, trans. and with an introduction by Paul Hollingsworth (Cambridge, MA, 1992), p. 171.

7. Joannes Scylitzes [John Skylitzes], *Ioannis Scylitzae synopsis historiarum,* ed. Johannes Thurn (Berlin–New York, 1973), p. 282. If we accept Gyula Moravcsik's *(Byzantium and the Magyars* [Budapest, 1970], pp. 104 and 106) dating of the baptism of both Hungarian princes (Bulcsu 948 and Gyula 952) then the baptism of Ol'ga should have followed shortly after 952.

8. Gennadii G. Litavrin ("Russko-vizantiiskie sviazi v seredine X veka," *Voprosy istorii* 1986 [6]: 41–52) dates Ol'ga's baptism in a similar way, although he dates the princess' visit, described in *De ceremoniis*, as having taken place in the year 946. See A. Poppe, "Once Again Concerning the Baptism of Olga, archontissa of Rus'" *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 46 (1992): 271–77.

9. Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus [Porphyrogennētos] *De ceremoniis aulae byzantinae*, vol. 1 (Bonn, 1829), pp. 594–98 (hereafter, *De ceremoniis*); G. Ostrogorsky has already noticed that Ol'ga had been equated with *zōstē patrikia.* I have only developed that idea (see above n. 8). Here it can only be added that in the fall 957 Ol'ga was evidently Christian. As a *zōstē* she had the right to wear imperial *loros* for a palace reception, a very heavy garment which reduced her act of *proskynēsis* to

the bending of her head (*De ceremoniis*, p. 597). Since the *loros* symbolized the cross as the implement of Christ's victory, as stated by Constantine himself on another occasion (*De ceremoniis*, p. 638), Ol'ga's baptism prior to that visit cannot be questioned.

10. R. Guilland, "La patricienne à ceinture," *Byzantinoslavica* 32(2) 1971: 269–75; A. J. Deér, "Zur Praxis der Verleihung des auswärtigen Patriziats durch den byzantinischen Kaiser," in *Byzanz und das abendländische Herrschertum* (Sigmaringen, 1977), pp. 424–37.

11. "*Continuatio Reginonis Chronicon*" in *Ausgewählte Quellen zur deutschen Geschichte des Mittelalters*, vol. 8 (Darmstadt, 1977), pp. 214–15.

12. So oversimplified by J.-P. Arrignon ("Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia Kievskoi Rusi v seredine X veka i kreshchenie kniagini Ol'gi," *Vizantiiskii vremennik* 41 [1980]: 121–23), who met with the right reply by G. G. Litavrin ("Puteshestvie russkoi kniagini Ol'gi v Konstantinopol'. Problema istochnikov," *Vizantiiskii vremennik* 42 [1981]: 38–39).

13. See the intitulation formulae in *De ceremoniis*, pp. 686–92, especially p. 691; cf. E. Dölger, "Das Byzantinische Mitkaisertum in den Urkunden," in *Das Byzantinische Herrscherbild* (Darmstadt, 1975), pp. 13–48. The office of *conregni more Graecorum* was known very well to Adalbert, the supposed author of the *Continuatio Reginonis Chronicon*, since Otto I had crowned his son Otto II in this way in 961.

14. While Adalbert should be appreciated as an historian, we have to keep in mind that his works contain many mistakes and inaccuracies. See M. Lintzel, *Ausgewählte Schriften II* (Berlin, 1961), pp. 399–406 (especially pp. 400–401).

15. *Continuatio Reginonis Chronicon*, pp. 214–19.

16. See Otto I's letter of 968 in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* I (1884), no. 366. For the limits of Magdeburg archbishops' early jurisdiction, see J. Fried, *Otto III und Bolesław Chrobry* (Stuttgart, 1989), pp.144–47. The myth about the continuity of the German "Drang nach Osten" was often politically modernized first of all in German historiography, but also in Polish and Russian approaches. The hypothesis that the Ottonian dynasty attempted to involve Rus' in the sphere of the Latin church has no basis, but has been repeated to this day. For a preliminary revision of this hypothesis, see A. Poppe, "Polityka Ottonów wobec Rusi Kijowskiej," in *Katolicyzm w Rosji i Prawosławie w Polsce, XI–XX w.* (Warsaw, 1997), pp. 24–28.

17. The Hungarian Prince Gyula, baptized ca. 952, received at the same time a missionary bishop. The monk Hierotheos, to whom Hungary was known earlier, obtained consecration from the patriarch (Scylitzes, *Synopsis historiarum*, p. 239). Cf. P. T. Antonopoulos, "Byzantium, the Magyar Raids and Their Consequences," *Byzantinoslavica* 54(2) 1993: 263, 265–66.

18. Scylitzes, *Synopsis historiarum*, pp. 242–44, 247. The view presented in patriotically oriented historiography, which maintains that in Constantinople Rus' was the focus of political and diplomatic attention, has no basis. As has been rightly stressed, "for Constantine VII alliance with the Pechenegs was the key to Byzantine diplomacy in the north." See D. Obolensky, "Byzantium, Kiev and Cherson in the Tenth Century," *Byzantinoslavica* 54(1) 1993: 109. It was not until the year 987 that a sudden shift in politics occurred— Rus' came into prominence.

19. See A. Poppe, "Vladimir als Christ. Versuch eines psychologischen Porträts des Kiever Herrschers," *Österreichische Osthefte* 35 (1993): 553–75.

20. This section is based on my study "The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus'," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 30 (1976): 197–244; reprinted with eight other papers in my *The Rise of Christian Russia* (London, 1982). For a historiography, see Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. I, pp. 444–49; Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, pp. 28–41. Ihor Ševčenko, in his brilliant essay, "The Christianization of Kievan Rus'" (in *The Polish Review* V (1960), reprinted in his *Ideology, Letters and Culture in the Byzantine World* [London, 1982], pp. 29–35), noticed that researchers and organizers of the future *Russiae sacrum millenium* had enough time to agree on the exact date and place of Volodimer's baptism. The organizers of meetings have more than fulfilled expectations, while researchers lagged behind, despite help offered by a multitude of amateurs. We continue to argue about the date, place, and circumstances of Volodimer's baptism.

21. This traditional opinion still has many followers, but is most clearly articulated (and for years) by D. Obolensky. See his "Byzantium, Kiev and Cherson in the Tenth Century," pp. 108–13; in compatibility with Obolensky's view and in polemic with me is J. Shepard —"Some Remarks on the Sources for the Conversion of Rus'," in *Le Origini e lo sviluppo della cristianità slavo-bizantina* (Rome, 1992), pp. 59–95.

22. Cf. A. A. Shakhmatov, *Razyskaniia o drevneishikh russkikh letopisnykh svodakh* (St. Petersburg, 1908), pp. 133–61; D. S. Likhachev, *Izbrannye raboty v trekh tomakh*, vol. 2 (Leningrad, 1987), pp. 99–104.

23. This traditional interpretation predominates in writings on the Millennium, most cogently by D. Obolensky, "Cherson and the Conversion of Rus': An Anti-Revisionist View," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 13 (1989): 244–56; perplexedly (in all religious and church matters), in Franklin and Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus' 750–1200*, pp. 158–69; already hesitantly and inconsistently (and with many inaccuracies), by S. Senyk, *A History of the Church in Ukraine*, vol. 1 (Rome, 1993), pp. 61–71; and, unskillfully, in the jubilee publication of W. Seibt, "Der historische Hintergrund und die Chronologie der Taufe der Ruś (989)" in A.-E. N. Tachiaos, ed., *The Legacy of Saints Cyril and Methodius to Kiev and Moscow: Proceedings of the International Congress on the Millen-*

nium of the Conversion of Rus' to Christianity (Thessaloniki, 1992), pp. 289–303.

24. See Franz Tinnefeld, "Byzantinische auswärtige Heiratspolitik vom 9. zum 12. Jh. Kontinuität und Wandel der Prinzipien und der praktischen Ziele," *Byzantinoslavica* 54(1) 1993: 21–28; J. Fennel, *A History of the Russian Church to 1448* (London, 1995), pp. 37–38.

25. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the focus of the discussion is the time of events. Thus, Obolensky, ("Byzantium, Kiev and Cherson in the Tenth Century," especially p. 248) stresses that the events took place later than 989, and so moves the conquest of Kherson to the year 990. Although I basically maintain my arguments in agreement with the way of dating astronomical phenomena by V. G. Vasil'evskii (1876) and V. R. Rozen [*Imperator Vasilii Bolgaroboitsa. Izvlecheniia iz letopisi Iakh"i Antiokhiiskogo* (St. Petersburg, 1883)], I have decided to disregard the phenomenon of pillars of fire because of its uncertain character, linked, perhaps, to biblical reminiscences. Unprofessional attempts to compile chronological data based on previously made assumptions (O. M. Rapov, *Russkaia tserkov' v IX–pervoi treti XII v.: priniatie khristianstva* [Moscow, 1988]) have been criticized, and rightfully so, by N. M. Bogdanova, "O vremenii vziatiia Chersona kniazem Vladimirom," *Vizantiiskii vremennik* 47 (1986): 39–46 and A. L. Ponomar'ev, N. I. Serikov, "989 (6496) god—god kreshcheniia Rusi (Filologicheskii analiz tekstov, astrologiia i astronomiia)," in *Prichernomor'e v srednie veka*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1995), pp. 157–85. In the latter article, the authors propose an original solution: after Basil II's defeat in Bulgaria in August 986, Volodimer decided to take advantage of the weakness of the empire in order to conquer Kherson in 987 and 988, and later demand the hand of the *porphyrogennēta* and agree to be baptized (989). While the remarks on the dating of astronomical phenomena are noteworthy, the authors of this paper ignore the fact that the famous earthquake that caused the western cupola of Hagia Sophia to collapse has been confirmed by a few independent testimonies, which point to 25–26 October 989. See Poppe, "The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus'," pp. 211–12; G. Downey, "Earthquakes at Constantinople and Vicinity, A. D. 342–1454," *Speculum* 30 (1955): 599–600; A. P. Kazhdan, ed., *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, vol. 1 (New York and Oxford, 1991), pp. 669–70; C. Mango, "The Collapse of St. Sophia, Psellus and the Etymologicum Genuinum," in *Gonimos: Neoplatonic and Byzantine Studies Presented to L. G. Westerink* (New York, 1988), p.168. Ponomar'ev's and Serikov's suggestion (ibid., pp. 178–80) to date this earthquake as having taken place two years earlier (987) cannot be accepted. The authors ignore or dismiss records that contradict their thesis. Thus, they claim that Asoghik [Asołik] (Stephen of Tarōn) made a mistake when he wrote several dozens of years later about the event; however, the earthquake took place in the lifetime of this Armenian historian, who finished writing his history around the year 1003.

26. Constantine Porphyrogenitus [Porphyrogennētos], *De administrando imperio,* Greek text ed. by Gy. Moravcsik; English trans. by R. J. H. Jenkins, revised ed., vol. 1 (Washington, DC, 1967), p. 53.

27. *Leonis diaconi Caloensis Historia libri decem,* ed. C. B. Hase (Bonn, 1828), p. 173.

28. A. Poppe, "Nie mieczem a piórem: Swiętosław Igorewicz i Leon Diakon," in *Człowiek w społeczeństwie średniowiecznym* (Warsaw, 1997), pp. 341–46.

29. Kalokyros, a member of Kherson's nobility, was evidently a trusted person of Emperor Nikēphoros Phokas, and in 970–971, of his brother Leo and nephew Bardas, while they kept struggling for power against Tzimiskes. What wonder, then, that Kherson's magnates sided with the same Bardas Phokas seventeen years later? Obolensky,"Byzantium, Kiev and Cherson in the Tenth Century," p. 255, is right in understanding that it is "hard to believe that the Byzantine government, which attached the highest importance to its Crimean possessions, and had struggled for centuries to prevent neighboring peoples from interfering in the affairs of Kherson, should have conceded by treaty this right of interference to the ruler of a people that had shown itself four times in the past seventy-five years a determined enemy of the empire." Such reservations could have their place in the context of traditional interpretations of the Khersonian campaign; it bears remembering that "for centuries" the emperors had problems with the rebelliously inclined Kherson and that in the past seventy-five years, Constantinople, without any pressure to protect the Byzantine Crimean possession in terms of the treaties of 944 and 971, entitled this "determined enemy" to interventions (to stop the Black Bulgars from raiding Kherson) in order to provide direct military assistance, and practically made the Rus′ occasional allies (*symmachoi*) of the empire. I refer here to F. Wozniak's opinion which is very close to Obolensky's view and who did not know my 1976 published interpretation of those treaties (Poppe, "The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus′," p. 239 and nn. 144 and 145). I am already taking into account Obolensky's reservations—pertaining to the withdrawing of linguistic amendments to the 944 treaty and to remain explicit— (see "Cherson and Conversion of Rus′: An Anti-Revisionist view," pp. 247 and 254): "By the terms of the treaty of 944 the Greeks sought to utilize this naval and military potential of the Russians not only in recruiting them into their army, but also in the protection of Kherson even though the Rus′ themselves potentially threatened this city." See Frank E. Wozniak, "The Crimean Question, the Black Bulgarians and the Russo-Byzantine Treaty of 944," *Journal of Medieval History* 5(2) 1979: 115–26, especially p. 122. So a 987 allied treaty between Constantinople and Rus′ referring to Kherson was of a traditional nature only under totally different circumstances. Not the Byzantine government, but personally Basil and the Macedonian dynasty were in grave danger, and Anna, as the wife of the Rus′ ruler, could help her brother and assure the constancy of the close alliance.

30. A. Poppe, "How the Conversion of Rus' Was Understood in the Eleventh Century," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 11(3/4) 1987: 287–302.

31. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, "De Basilio Macedone," in *Theophanes continuatus, Ioannes Cameniat, Symeon Magister, Georgius monachus*, ed. Immanuel Bekker (Bonn, 1838), pp. 342–43. Cf. L. Havlikova, "À propos de la Christianisation de la Russie en IX siècle," *Byzantinoslavica* 54(1) 1993: 102–107. H. Birnbaum, "Christianity before Christianization: Christians and Christian Activity in Pre-988 Rus'," *California Slavic Studies* 16 (1993): 42–62.

32. On the mobilization potential of Rus' and the figures of operational units see Poppe, "The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus'," pp. 228–9. The campaign against Kherson (2,000–3,000 warriors) could be easily simultaneous to the main expedition of about 6,000 soldiers. Obolensky's suggestion ("Cherson and Conversion of Rus': An Anti-Revisionist view," pp. 248–49) that the main military aid was sent by Volodimer to the Bosphorus already in the fall of 987, can be accepted. But we must remember that the first battle (Chrysopolis) they engaged in happened by the turn of January 989, and indirectly their presence on the Bosphorus comes to light in the summer of 988. For detailed arguments on the dating of the Chrysopolis battle, see my "The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus'," pp. 235–38. M. Kotliar (*Zaprovadzhennia khrystianstva na Rusi* [Kyiv, 1988], p. 68) questions my way of dating events, deferring to the authority of V. Vasil'evskii. But it was precisely Vasil'evskii's suggestion (his *Trudy*, vol. 1 [St. Petersburg, 1908], p. 197n. 2) that prompted me to collect evidence for the correctness of such dating.

33. For travel conditions and time, see D. Obolensky's commentary on the *De administrando imperio* reprinted in his *Byzantium and the Slavs: Collected Studies* (London, 1971), pp. 31–32, 37–40, 48, 54–55, and A. Poppe, "La dernière expédition russe contre Constantinopole," *Byzantioslavica* 32(2) 1971: 239–45, 249.

34 Matchmaking and various procedures, as well as the preparation of wedding ceremony documents for *filiae sancti imperii*, must have been similar to the ones we know from the agreement between Tzimiskes with Otto I regarding the marriage of Otto II and Theophanō. But the Byzantine side must have been more active due to its experience and requirements. See W. Ohnsorge, "Die Heirat Kaiser Ottos II mit der Byzantinerin Theophano (972)," *Braunschweigisches Jahrbuch* 54 (1973): 35–37; W. Georgi, "Ottonianum und Heiratsurkunde 962/972," in *Kaiserin Theophanu. Begegnung des Ostens und Westens um die Wende des ersten Jahrtausends*, vol. 2 (Cologne, 1991), pp. 148–54.

35. *Liutprandi Legatio*, chap. 15 in E. Dümmler, ed., *Liutprandi episcopi Cremonensis opera omnia* (Hannover, 1987), p. 133.

36. Michael Psellus [Psellos], *Chronographie; ou, Histoire d'un siècle de Byzance (976–1077)*, ed. and trans. E. Renauld, vol. 1 (Paris, 1926), pp. 18–19 (libs. 1, 10, 13).

37. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De administrando imperio*: 73, chap. 13.

38. See n. 28.

39. See G. Ostrogorsky, "The Byzantine Emperor and the Hierarchical World Order," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 35(84) December 1956: 5–14; T. Wasilewski, "La place de l'État russe dans le monde Byzantine pendant le haut Moyen-Age," *Acta Poloniae Historica* 22 (1970): 43–51.

40. See n. 34.

41. For a more detailed discussion, see Poppe, "The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus′," pp. 232–35.

42. *Leonis Diaconi Caloensis,* p. 149; cf. M. Ia. Siuziumov, "Lev Diakon i iego vremia," in G. Litavrin, ed., *Lev Diakon. Istoriia* (Moscow, 1988), pp. 137–65.

43. See J. A. Cramer, comp., *Anecdota graeca e codd. manuscriptis Bibliothecae regiae parisienses*, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1841), pp. 271, cf. 282–83, 322–25, 341–42; Vasil′evskii, *Trudy*, vol. 2, pp. 112–23; F. Scheideweiler, "Studien zu Johannes Geometres," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* (1952): 300–19.

44. Scylitzes, *Synopsis historiarum*, p. 282; cf. Vasil′evskii, *Trudy*, vol. 2, pp. 114–15; Scheidweiler, "Studien zu Johannes Geometres," pp. 307–309. This poem is preserved in Skylitzes' chronicle where he says that the poem's author is John, the metropolitan of Melitene. The latter has usually been identified as John Geometres. On dating and attribution, see A. Poppe, "The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus′," pp. 215–17. For different opinions of contemporaries on Nikēphoros Phokas, see A. Markopoulos, "Zu den Biographien des Nicephorus Phocas," *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 38 (1988): 225–33, R. Morris, "The Two Faces of Nikephoros Phokas," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 12 (1988): 83–115.

45. In T. Preger, ed., *Scriptores originum Constantinopolitanarum*, vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1907), p. 176; A. Berger, *Untersuchungen zu der Patria Konstantinopoleos* (Bonn, 1988), pp.187–93, 323–24.

46. C. Diehl, "De quelques croyances byzantines sur la fin de Constantinople," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 30 (1930): 194–95. For a new look at state of mind, religiosity, and human activities while expecting Judgment Day, see J. Fried, "Endzeiterwartung um die Jahrtausendwende," *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 45 (1989): 381–473.

47. But in 995 Basil II, with the participation of Rus′ troops, expelled the Fatimid army from Syria. See A. Hamdani, "Byzantine-Fatimid Relations Before the Battle of Mantzikert," *Byzantine Studies* 1(1) 1974: 200–209.

48. And the unheard-of thing happened: a *porphyrogennēta* became the wife of a barbarian ruler. Was she forced to go to Kyiv, as the traditional historiography tells us, in order to save the imperial city from an attack by Rus'? It could have been that way, but it was not. A twenty-six-year-old young woman went to Kyiv; she was raised in a palace and well-educated. She went there because she was flexible, knew methods of ruling, and also because she felt responsible for her new domain and the success of its conversion. It suffices to take a look at her mother Theophanō, her nieces who later became empresses—Theodora and Zoe—as well as the German empress, the Greek Theophanō, to realize that Anna was an intellectually mature woman, and well aware of the role she had to play: *filia sancti imperii,* married to the newly converted Volodimer. As a Christian, she must have liked the idea of spreading the new religion, which she did through building new churches, as we know thanks to Yaḥyā. She may have been afraid of the severe climate and heathen customs, but at least she knew the language: as a girl, she was frequently in the company of Bulgarian princes and princesses of her age, who were related to her and who lived for a few years in the imperial palace. Thus, the Slavic vernacular was not alien to her. It may have been for this reason that she was called a Bulgarian in Kyiv. Political and religious roles were also known to her. The emperor could rely upon his sister and help her spread the new faith. For details on Anna and her political role, see A. Poppe, "Der Kampf um die Kiever Thronfolge nach dem 15. Juli 1015," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 50 (1995): 275–95. Anna's recognized activities in Rus' have also been examined by F. Kämpfer, "Eine Residenz für Anne Porphyrogenneta,"*Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 41 (1993): 101–10.

49. According to Ponomarev and Serikov ("989 [6496] god—god kreshcheniia Rusi," pp. 171, 181) it was not Halley's comet but an ordinary one that was seen on 17 July 987, so there are grounds to consider that the comet which was seen in Asia Minor on 27 July 989 was another one.

50. It was not until the end of the eleventh century that native Khersonian coins were produced again, but on a smaller scale. See I. V. Sokolova, *Monety i pechati vizantiiskogo Khersona* (Leningrad, 1983), pp. 52–63, 116–17.

51. The interpretation on dating of archaeological excavations leaves much to be desired. In the 1980s (A. Romanchuk) a trend began toward the revision of earlier results (A. L. Jakobson and his school) about the decline of Kherson after 989. The traces of ruin and fire are no longer adduced in connection with Volodimer's action. But it is out of the question that "some parts of the city were destroyed and burned, but the causes are unknown." The new proposition that "it happened sometime in the eleventh century" lacks clear arguments. See N. M. Bogdanova, "Kherson v X–XV vv. Problemy istorii vizantiiskogo goroda," in

Prichernomor'e v srednie veka, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1991), pp. 92–94, 134n89, 145–46. The style of revision arouses suspicions that the archaeological dating has no stable, fixed criterion and demonstrates too extensive an adaptability. Some could think that it is improper to portray Kherson—a place of the baptism of Volodimer and his wedding with the *basilissa* Anna—as a destroyed city.

52. Aleksandr Zimin, ed., "Pamiat' i pokhvala Iakova Mnikha i Zhitie kniazia Vladimira po drevneishemu spisku," p. 72; *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, p. 175, but here there is an error in translation: reference is made to "eight years" and "ten years," where instead it should be "in the eighth year" and "in the tenth year."

53. It is usually supposed that the dates as given in the *Memorial's* annalistic records are in the March style (the standard used in eleventh century Rus'), but dating with the Byzantine (September) year cannot be excluded. Ponomarev and Serikov ("989 [6496] god–god kreshcheniia Rusi," pp. 163–65) made the right critical remarks about the interpretation on *Memorial's* dates by O. M. Rapov, but that cannot be the reason to dismiss this tradition itself, since it has other sequences not supporting their suggestion that Kherson was taken by Volodimer before his baptism (ibid., p. 182).

54. See M. Arranz, "Catecumenado y bautismo en tiempos de Volodymyr," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 54 (2) 1988: 277–308; and the Russian version, "Chin oglasheniia i khreshcheniia v drenei Rusi," *Simvol* 19 (1988): 69–100. The ritual of catechumenate and the sacrament of baptism, based mainly on the Byzantine *Euchologion*, has been thoroughly presented by M. Arranz in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 49 (1983): 42–90, 284–302; 50 (1984): 43–64, 372–97; 51 (1985): 60–85; 52 (1986): 145–78; 53 (1987): 59–106. S. Senyk's doubts (*A History of the Church in Ukraine*, p. 67) concerning M. Arranz's and my own attempt for reconstruction of Volodimer's baptism have remained unfounded. I did not claim that Volodimer's baptism had two parts to it because the selection of the name on 1 January belonged to the final part of the catechumenate. The choice of the name must have been made before its conferment during the the baptism itself, which Senyk should have known. Her claim that any other day would have been equally good for Volodimer's baptism shows that she does not know the history of the baptism and the close connection between Theophania and the theological meaning of this sacrament, so important in the case of a ruler's baptism.

55. On the imperial patronage, see A. Angenendt, *Kaiserherrschaft und Königstaufe: Kaiser, Könige und Päpste als geistliche Patrone in der abendländischen Missionsgeschichte* (Berlin, 1984), pp. 5–11, 91–105, 295–96. E. Patlagean, "Christianisation et parentés rituelles: Le Domaine de Byzance," *Annales* 3 (1978): 625–36; R. Macrides, "The Byzantine Godfather," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 11 (1987): 139–62.

56. Cf. *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (hereafter, *PSRL*), 2nd ed. vol. 1 (*Lavrent'evskaia letopis′*) (Leningrad, 1926–1928), pp. 340–41.

57. The author of the jubilee "debut" was so impressed by the rebuff Otto I experienced when he tried to secure a "*porphorogenita*" for his son's wife that he excluded the possibility of Basil II's breaking of the matrimonial doctrine. The same author also deemed the idea that Volodimer conquered rebellious Kherson at the emperor's wish as impossible (W. Seibt, "Der historische Hintergrund und die Chronologie der Taufe der Ruś (989)," pp. 297–99). Therefore, he did not notice that the "unheard-of thing" became a fact after twenty years. Also, if it is assumed that Basil was forced to give his sister away in order to regain Kherson, why would it have been absurd for the emperor to arrange his sister's marriage in order to save much more, that is, his throne and life?

58. *Russian Primary Chronicle,* p. 116.

59. A. M. Moldovan, ed., *Slovo o zakone i blagodati Ilariona* (Kyiv, 1984), p. 93; cf. Simon Franklin, trans., *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'* (Cambridge, MA, 1991), p. 19. Hilarion expressed here, shortly before Bruno of Querfurt, the acceptability to conduct the conversion of people under pressure, according to the evangelical principle *compellere intrare* 'compel them to enter in' (Luke 13:23).

60. *PSRL*, vol. 1, p. 117.

61. On Volodimer as he is portrayed in literary and oral tradition, see Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus′,* vol. 1, pp. 407–409, 447–49.

62. Moldovan, ed., *Slovo o zakone i blagodati Ilariona*, pp. 92, 95; *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'*, pp. 18, 20; *Russian Primary Chronicle*, p. 137.

63. See Bruno of Querfurt's letter to King Henry II (as edited by J. Karwasińska), in *Monumenta Poloniae Historica* n.s., vol. 4 fasc. 3 (Warsaw, 1973), pp. 101–102.

64. A. Poppe, "Kompozycja fundacyjna Sofii Kijowskiej," *Biuletyn Historii Sztuki* 30(1) 1968: 1–29; F. Kämpfer, *Das Russische Herrscherbild von den Anfängen bis zu Peter dem Grossen* (Recklinghausen, 1978), pp. 78ff.

65. See Poppe, "Der Kampf um die Kiever Thronfolge nach dem 15. Juli 1015," pp. 275–96.

66. *Russian Primary Chronicle*, pp. 129–30. See A. Poppe, "O zarozhdenii kul′ta svv. Borisa i Gleba i o posviashchennykh im proizvedeniiakh," *Russia mediaevalis* 8(1) 1995: 21–68.

67. A. Poppe, "Two Concepts of the Conversion of the Rus′ in Kievan Writings," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 12/13 (1988/89): 488–504. On the Rus′ legend of the Apostle Andrew, see Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, pp. 17–20.

68. Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, pp. 94–107; V. Vavřínek, "The Introduction of the Slavonic Liturgy and the Byzantine Missionary Policy," in *Beiträge zur byzantinischen Geschichte im 9.-11. Jh.* (Prague, 1978), pp. 255–81; G. A. Khaburgaev, *Pervye stoletiia slavianskoi pis'mennoi kul'tury. Istoki drevnerusskoi knizhnosti* (Moscow, 1994), pp. 12–18, 80–113, 155–65.

69. According to a widespread opinion, Basil II had an aversion toward culture and intellectuals and focused only on military affairs. Based on that, I stated in my earlier works that the emperor had been interested mainly in a lasting military alliance with Rus', while he treated other relations as more or less necessary accessories. However, in light of Barbara Crostini's studies, I have to change my view. Not only does she show Basil's broad interests and deep religiosity, but also his role in inspiring cultural and spiritual life which was rapidly developing in the eleventh century. See B. Crostini, "The Emperor Basil II's Cultural Life," *Byzantion* 66(1) 1996: 55–80. In light of Crostini's well-documented arguments, it could be concluded that the emperor had great understanding for his sister's project of Christianization of Rus' and that he actively helped her and his brother-in-law in their endeavors. Such a view becomes more plausible if we take into account that the lifestyle of the emperor-warrior was steeped in asceticism and religiosity. He felt personally responsible for the empire and the church also after his life. Therefore, Basil willingly directed northward church accouterments, books taken from the Bulgarian churches, and, last of all, the clergy themselves.

70. Cf. A. Poppe, "How the Conversion of Rus' Was Understood in the Eleventh Century," pp. 287–95; for a discussion of the shortsightedness of political and cultural activity in the tenth century, see H. G. Beck, *Das Byzantinische Jahrtausend* (Munich, 1978), pp. 297–303. It seems relevant to quote, in the context of Byzantine external activities, the sentence by C. Mango, *Byzantium: The Empire of New Rome* (London, 1988), p. 55: "The Byzantines were content to sit at home and wait for foreign traders to come to them."

71. See Poppe, "Two Concepts of the Conversion of the Rus' in Kievan Writings," pp. 488–504.

72. Cf. A. Poppe, "Christianity and Ideological Change in Kievan Rus'. The First Hundred Years," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 25(1–4) 1991: 3–26; cf. D. Obolensky, "The Byzantine Impact on Eastern Europe," in his *The Byzantine Inheritance of Eastern Europe*, vol. 3 (London, 1982), pp. 148–68; on the prejudices towards the "bloodthirsty barbarians," see H. Ahrweiler, *L'idéologie politique de l'Empire Byzantin* (Paris, 1975), pp. 49–59.

73. For a more detailed discussion, see Poppe, "The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus'," pp. 203–205, and my "The Original Status of the Old Russian Church," *Acta Polonica Historica* 39 (1979): 5–10, both

reprinted as chapters in my book *The Rise of Christian Russia* (London, 1982).

74. Moldovan, ed., *Slovo o zakone i blagodati Ilariona*, pp. 92, 96–98; *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'*, pp. 18, 22–24.

75. I. Kratchkovsky and A. Vasiliev, eds. and trans., "Histoire de Yahya-ibn-Saïd d'Antioche," *Patrologia Orientalis* 23(2) 1932: 423. See the Russian translation in Rozen, *Imperator Vasilii Bolgaroboitsa. Izvlecheniia iz letopisi Iakh"i Antiokhiiskogo*, pp. 23–24.

76. Bruno of Querfert to King Henry II, p. 100. As a missionary archbishop (honored by the pallium), Bruno was able to consecrate the bishop to the Pechenegs himself, but he did not do it during his stay in the steppe. The consecration took place in Kyiv after his return. Also, the fact that Bruno uses the plural form makes it more plausible that a few bishops participated in the consecration; when the author of the letter speaks only about himself, he uses the singular form.

77. *PSRL*, vol. 1, pp. 110, 126. A sentence in *The Primary Chronicle* s.a. 988, "*sanovniki někii i presvitery*," has been misunderstood and mistranslated. As a result, it has been thought that there were no bishops present in Anna's entourage. However, *sanovniki* means one in a position of dignity (*san* = Greek *aksiōma*, Latin *dignitas*) in their midst, a clergyman of the highest order; that is, a bishop regarded equally with lay dignitaries.

78. Moldovan, ed., *Slovo o zakone i blagodati Ilariona*, p. 96; *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'*, p. 23. *PSRL*, vol. 1, p. 189. On Thietmar's 1018 record and the wooden cathedral in Kyiv see A. Poppe, "The Building of the Church of St. Sophia in Kiev," *Journal of Medieval History* 7 (1981): 15–66 (reprinted in *The Rise of Christian Russia*).

79. A recent attempt at evaluation of Greek metropolitans who supervised the church in Rus' is not very flattering; it basically reiterates the view that has been current over the last hundred years. See Ia. N. Shchapov, *State and Church in Early Russia: Tenth to Thirteenth Centuries* (New Rochelle, NY, 1993), pp. 169–79. Gradually, we have more and more access to data that allow us to form more just opinions. There is complete lack of data about candidates' lives prior to their appearance in Rus'. Nevertheless, the presence of such distinguished Greek personalities as John II Prodromos (1076–1089)—about whom the chronicler says with admiration: "there was no such one in Rus' before him and there will be none after him" (*PSRL*, vol. 1, p. 208)—among the Kyivan metropolitans did not have to be an exception. Constantine I (1155–1159) was a distinguished theologian and he was sent to Rus'. On the metropolitans, see Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, pp. 446–71. The candidacy for Rus' of Leontios from Strumitsa, the hegumen (abbot) of Patmos monastery, (shortly afterwards appointed Patriarch of Jerusalem in 1176), who was recommended by Emperor Manuel I Komnenos, proves that Constantinople saw a need for sending exceptionally quali-

fied church dignitaries to Rus' (a study is in preparation); see also G. Podskalsky, "Der Beitrag der griechischstämmigen Metropoliten (Kiev) Bischöfe und Mönche zur altrussichen Originalliteratur (Theologie)," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 24 (1983): 498–513. S. Franklin, "Greek in Kievan Rus'," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 46 (1992): 69–81.

80. The order in which the dioceses are positioned determines their rank. The oldest list of dioceses in Rus', recorded around 1162, has been preserved as part of *Notitia episcopatuum* (*Codex Athen.* no. 1371), which was compiled around 1170. Hence the bishop of Belgorod is listed as the first *protōthronos* of the Kyivan metropolitan, although this dignity was taken over by Novgorod in 1165. See J. Darrouzès, *Notitiae Episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae* (Paris, 1981), p. 367; Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura,* p. 458; for information and bibliography concerning dioceses, see ibid., pp. 52–60. For a detailed study of the diocesan structure of Rus' in the eleventh-thirteenth centuries, see. A. Poppe, "L'organisation diocésaine de la Russie aux Xe–XIIe siècles," *Byzantion* 40(1) 1970: 165–217 (reprinted in *The Rise of Christian Russia*); and my "Werdegang der Diözesanstruktur der Kiever Metropolitankirche in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten der Christianisierung der Ostslaven" in *Tausend Jahre Christentum in Russland* (Göttingen, 1988), pp. 251–90.

81. For the theological sense of a Greek inscription on a mosaic in a conch of the Kyivan cathedral and its connection with the idea of the Holy Wisdom, see. S. S. Averintsev, "K vyiasneniiu smysla nadpisi nad konkhoi tsentral'noi apsidy Sofii Kievskoi," in *Drevnerusskoe iskusstvo. Khudozhestvennaia kul'tura domongol'skoi Rusi* (Moscow, 1972), pp. 25–49; K. K. Akent'ev, "K proiasneniiu smysla nadpisi nad konchoi sv. Sofii Kievskoi," in *Vizantiiskoe iskusstvo i liturgiia: novye otkrytiia: kratkie tezisy dokladov nauchnoi konferentsii, posviashchennoi pamiati A.V. Bank (11–12 aprelia 1990 g.)* (Leningrad, 1991), pp. 16–19; K. K. Akent'ev, "Mozaiki Kievskoi sv. Sofii i 'Slovo' mitropolita Ilariona v vizantiiskom liturgicheskom kontekste,"*Vizantinorossica*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1995), pp. 75–94.

82. Those tendences, widely known in every religion, were and are, in a very exaggerated way, imputed to the East Slavs under the magically untranslated definition of *dvoeverie* and discussed as a specifically Slavic occurrence. Cf. the apt remarks of V. M. Zhivov, "Dvoeverie i osobyi kharakter russkoi kul'turnoi istorii," in *Philologia Slavica* [a collection of essays to honor N. I. Tolstoi] (Moscow, 1993), pp. 50–59; it should also be remembered that some discoveries of "pagan relics" in pieces of Christian art must be connected with a noble desire to save them at a time when they were in danger of being eliminated or destroyed. Some Western Slavists took these vestiges very seriously.

83. Moldovan, ed., *Slovo o zakone i blagodati Ilariona*, p. 93; *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'*, p. 19.

84. Scylitzes, *Synopsis historiarum,* p. 355; cf. A. Dain, "Le partage du butin de guerre d'après les traités juridiques et militaires," in *Actes du VIe Congrès International d'Études Byzantines* (Paris, 1950), pp. 347–54. While the numerical force of the Byzantine army operating in Bulgaria was ca. 14,000, the number of Rus' warriors can be estimated at approximately half this number, since a third of the booty belonged to the emperor's fisk and a third was given to the domestic troops.

85. See D. Freydank, "Byzantinische und bulgarische Tradition in der altrussischen Literatur," in *Byzanz in der europäischen Staatenwelt* (Berlin, 1983), pp. 127–33. Francis J. Thomson, "The Bulgarian Contribution to the Reception of Byzantine Culture in Kievan Rus': The Myths and the Enigma," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 12/13 (1988–1989): 214–61. For a survey of writings in translation, mainly of Bulgarian origin, see Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura,* pp. 95–127. Khaburgaev, (*Pervye stoletiia slavianskoi pis'mennoi kul'tury,* p. 163) explains the appearance of old Bulgarian texts in Rus' in an original but puzzling way. According to him, many Slavic books written in Cyrillic appeared in Byzantine monasteries during lively Byzantine-Bulgarian relations in the second quarter of the tenth century during Tsar Peter's reign. Beginning with the end of the tenth century, they were gradually sent to Rus'. Such splendid manuscripts of the Preslav school as Tsar Symeon's codex, copied in Kyiv as Prince Sviatoslav's miscellany in 1073, or Ostromir's *Gospel* of 1057, copied (in Novgorod) from the *Macedonian Book of Gospels* that belonged to Tsar Samuel, could have appeared in Rus', only as trophies. But the codex was not booty from Sviatoslav's 971 expedition, as its editors claim, repeating an outdated opinion. Cf. P. Dinekov, ed., *Simeonov Sbornik (po Svetoslavoviia prepis ot 1073 g.),* vol. 1 (Sofia, 1991), p. 97.

86. This phenomenon was widespread; cf. A. T. Lucas, "The Plundering and Burning of Churches in Ireland. Seventh to sixteenth century" in E. Rynne, ed., *North Munster Studies* (Limerick, 1967), pp. 172–229. As early as 1063, Prince Vseslav of Polatsk took advantage of this rule when he pillaged St. Sophia Cathedral in Novgorod in order to benefit his own cathedral in Polatsk, for which he was competing at the time. Under the year 1202 the Kyivan chronicler recorded that much evil was done in Rus' of the kind—plundering, burning of churches, and conquest—Kyiv had not experienced since its baptism. (*PSRL,* vol. 1, p. 418). So it seems that in 1169 the plundering of Kyiv and the taking of icons, church books, and other articles from its churches by the troops of Prince Andrei Bogoliubsky of Suzdal-Vladimir (*PSRL,* vol. 1, p. 354) was not all that harmful, although in the historical perspective it turned out to be a political turning away of Rus' "beyond the forests" from Kyiv. Cf. J. Pelenski, "The Sack of Kiev of 1169: Its Significance for the Succession to Kievan Rus'," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 11(3/4) 1989: 303–16.

87. Cf. A. Gieysztor, "Mouvements para-heretiques en Europe centrale et orientale du IXe au XIe siècle: Apostasies," in *Heresies et sociétés dans l'Europe pre-industrielle, XIe–XVIIIe siècles* (Paris, 1968), pp.159–67.

I. Ia. Froianov, *Drevniaia Rus'. Opyt issledovaniia istorii sotsial'noi i politicheskoi bor'by* (Moscow, 1995), pp. 160ff. See also the additional commentary by M. B. Sverdlov in *Povest' Vremennykh Let* (St. Petersburg, 1996), 2nd edition, pp. 623, 629–30.

88. Moldovan, ed., *Slovo o zakone i blagodati Ilariona*, p. 100.

89. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava* (St. Petersburg, 1880), part 1 (no.1), p. 30. Cf. Shchapov, *State and Church in Early Russia*, pp. 121–27. But we have to remember that John II wrote on the basis of Byzantine experiences, while in Western Europe in the eleventh century the church wedding was still not practiced by the majority of the population, which was, after all, Christian.

90. Poppe, "Der Kampf um die Kiever Thronfolge," pp. 275–95.

91. Poppe, "O zarozhdenii kul'ta svv. Borisa i Gleba," pp. 45–56, 66–68. See also a suggestion on the dating of the origins of the cult to the 1030s in L. Müller, "O vremeni kanonizatsii sviatykh Borisa i Gleba," *Russia Medievalis* 8(1) 1995: 5–20.

92. *PSRL*, vol. 1, pp. 155, 167, 172, 193, 274, 281, 283;

93. Thietmar, Bishop of Merseburg, *Chronik,* trans. with commentary by Werner Trillmich (Darmstadt, 1957), pp. 530–31, VIII, 32; *PSRL*, vol. 1, 293.

94. Adam of Bremen, "Magistri Adami Bremensis Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesiae pontificium," in *Quellen des 9. und 11. Jahrhunderts zur Geschichte der hamburgischen Kirche und des Reiches* (Berlin, 1961), p. 226, II, 22 [=*Ausgewählte Quellen zur Deutschen Geschichte des Mittelalters*, vol. 11]; In the English translation by Francis J. Tschan (*History of the Archbishops of Hamburg-Bremen* [New York, 1959]), it is also wrongly translated as *rival.*

95. See P. A. Rappoport, *Building the Churches of Kievan Russia* (Brookfield, VT, 1995), pp. 313–41.

96. In the eleventh century, especially with the Mount Athos and Stoudios monasteries. An attempt to question the connections between the Kyivan Caves Monastery and Mount Athos, especially the statement that the Holy Mountain (*Hagion Oros*) is absent in the accounts of the origin of the Caves Monastery around the middle of the eleventh century, is flawed because of the monosemantic evidence of *The Primary Chronicle* and the *Life of Theodosii of the Caves*. On the other hand, the role of St. Anthony of the Caves and of the Rus' monastery at Athos, especially in the eleventh–thirteenth centuries, must be seriously discussed with Francis J. Thomson; see his "Saint Anthony of Kiev—the Fact and the Fiction: the Legend of the Blessing of Athos Upon Early Russian Monasticism," *Byzantinoslavica* 56 (1995): 637–68; cf. the helplessness of S. Franklin in dealing with Thomson's overskepticism in *The Emergence of Rus' 750–1200*, pp. 303–305, 308. My own polemics on the subject are being prepared for publication.

97. For pertinent literature, see Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, pp. 84–93, 207–14. The best monograph on the monastery is still L. Goetz, *Das Kiever Höhlenkloster als Kulturzentrum des vormongolischen Russlands* (Passau, 1904). See also the English translation of the Caves Paterikon by M. Heppell, *The* Paterik *of the Kievan Caves Monastery* (Cambridge, MA, 1989) and the English translation by P. Hollingsworth of "The Life of Our Venerable Father Feodosij, Superior of the Caves Monastery," in *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, pp. 33–95. Cf. also F. von Lilenfeld, "The Spirituality of the Early Kievan Caves Monastery," in *Christianity and the Eastern Slavs* (Berkeley, 1993), pp. 63–76.

98. Cf. A. Poppe, "Christianity and Ideological Change in Kievan Rus': The First Hundred Years."

99. Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura,* pp. 49–50, 148–55, 449–50; cf. N. N. Rozov, "Ilarion," in D. S. Likhachev, ed., *Slovar' knizhnikov i knizhnosti Drevnei Rusi,* vol. 1: *XI–pervaia polovina XIV v.* (Leningrad, 1987), pp. 198–204.

100. On Iaroslav, his sons Volodimer in Novogorod, Sviatoslav in Chernihiv/Kyiv and Volodimer Monomakh, see A. Poppe, "Książki, skryptoria i biblioteki na Rusi," in *Słownik Starożytności Słowiańskich,* vol. 2 (Wrocław, 1965), pp. 544–48; idem, "Dans la Russie médiévale X–XIIIe siècles. Écriture et culture," *Annales* 1 (1961): 12–35. This instant education could be connected rather with the palatial manners brought by Anna. Her granddaughter Anna, queen-widow of France, wanted surely to impress her courtly circle by personally signing in Cyrillic letters one of the documents in 1063, thereby going against the custom. Cf. G. Shevelov, *In and Around Kiev* (Heidelberg, 1991), pp. 44–51.

101. The formation of Rus' historiography (which was obviously Christian in approach as well as in the choice of themes) in the eleventh century and the compilation of the framework, the *Primary Chronicle* itself at the beginning of the twelfth century, are still disputed and many questions are still as open now as they were at the beginning of the twentieth century. Cf. the English translation, M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus',* vol. 1, pp. 450–71; Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, pp. 330–75; for a useful characterization of the *Primary Chronicle* in English, see Franklin and Shepard, *The Emergence of Rus' 750–1200*, pp. 317–19. A setback in the studies on the oldest chronicle-writing was the necessity to defend research work from the pre-Soviet era, especially those by A. A. Shakhmatov. A good example of countering the growth of ignorance is Ia. A. Lur'e's astute critique of A. G. Kuz'min's guesswork, addressed to a wider audience. The "canonization" of Tatishchev's history from the eighteenth century as a treasury of lost information from the Middle Ages created a serious confusion. Also, attempts at "revealing" ever older chronicles, supposedly existing as early as the eleventh or even tenth century, played a negative role.

102. See A. Poppe, "Le prince et l'Église en Russie de Kiev depuis la fin du Xe s. jusqu'au debut du XIIe s.," *Acta Poloniae Historica* 20 (1969): 95–119 (reprinted in *The Rise of Christian Russia*). Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura,* pp. 61–71, 244–47, 508–509, 511; I. S. Chichurov, *Politicheskaia ideologiia srednevekoviia: Vizantiia i Rus'* (Moscow, 1990), pp. 127–53. It is a misconception to say that Rus' princes were not God-anointed. Certainly, they were not anointed with oil mixed with balsam in the presence of the church, but they were anointed by God in the same sense that Byzantine emperors were. The act of anointing was not a material one, which was so important for rulers from Latin culture, but it was a spiritual, invisible, and imperceptible act taking place directly between the celestial emperor and the terrestial one. Therefore, in the Byzantine refined and subtle understanding of these matters, there was no place for and no necessity of mediation by the church's hierarchy. Byzantine writers often call emperors "the anointed ones" but it is obvious that they give this expression a higher, figurative sense. It was only in the thirteenth century that this act came into being and evolved into a "real anointment," following the Western example. See G. Ostrogorsky, *Zur byzantinischen Geschichte* (Darmstadt, 1973), pp. 142–52; cf. J. L. Nelson, "Symbols in Context: Rulers' Inauguration Rituals in Byzantium and the West in the Early Middle Ages," in her *Politics and Ritual in Early Medieval Europe* (London, 1986), pp. 259–81. When inheriting the throne was at stake in Byzantium, the successor (usually the emperor's son) was considered as anointed "in his mother's womb." That is why in the Rus' dynasty all of the Rurikids were jointly considered as anointed by God. The metropolitan wrote to Volodimer Monomakh "by God . . . in womb consecrated and anointed." See N. V. Ponyrko, *Epistoliarnoe nasledie Drevnei Rusi XI–XIII v. Issledovaniia, teksty, perevody* (St. Petersburg, 1992), p. 67; cf. also 56 (another letter). But what is even more important, the princes themselves were aware that they were the Lord's anointed. When the same Monomakh writes a letter to his German cousin Oleg in 1096 and summons him to make peace, he quotes "by God anointed David" as an example to follow (ibid., p. 45). Finally, we have to point out the ceremony of enthronement of Prince Konstantin, son of Vsevolod, in the St. Sophia Cathedral in Novgorod, which took place on 20 March 1205. During the ceremony, the newly enthroned prince was lauded with the words of the Bible: "God anointed thee, thine God" (*PSRL*, vol. 1, p. 423). Therefore, if a researcher states that it is unfounded to refer to the Rurikids as anointed by God, it obliges a medievalist to work on this topic. A study of the ceremony of enthronement of princes in Rus', as well as their anointment by God, is in preparation.

103. See E. Malamut, "L'image byzantine des Petchenegues," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 88 (1995): 105–47, especially pp. 115–32. A. P. Kazhdan, "Once More About the 'Alleged' Russo-Byzantine Treaty (ca. 1047) and the Pecheneg Crossing of the Danube," *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 26 (1976): 65–77; cf. L. S. Chekin, "The Godless

Ishmaelites: The Image of the Steppe in Eleventh–Thirteenth-Century Rus'," *Russian History* 19(1–4) 1992: 9–28.

104. A. Poppe, "Uwagi o najstarszych dziejach Kościoła na Rusi, cz. 2 i 3," *Przegląd Historyczny* 55 (1964): 557–72; 56 (1965): 557–59; Poppe, "Titularmetropolien im 11. Jh. Ruś," in *Das heidnische und christliche Slaventum* (Wiesbaden, 1970), pp. 64–75. Cf. Shchapov, *State and Church in Early Russia*, pp. 56–62. Since then, the thesis about the existence of two ephemeral metropolitan sees has gained a more solid foundation. Among the newly published lists of metropolitan seats, there is Pereiaslav (*hē Rhōsia Presthlába*), known to us in this role up to now only from Rus' sources. It makes it more plausible to identify the metropolitanate of Maurokastron as Chernihiv (*Nea Rhōsia*), known to us from a similar list. See *Notitiae episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae*, pp. 124–25, 344, 350, 382.

105. Cf. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusi*, vol. 2 (Lviv, 1905; reprint, New York, 1954), pp. 51–60; A. Presniakov, *Kniazhoe pravo v Drevnei Rusi* (St. Petersburg, 1909; reprint, Moscow 1993), pp. 42–47; A. V. Nazarenko, "Rodovoi siuzerenitet Riurikovichei nad Rus'iu," in *Drevneishie gosudarstva na territorii SSSR* (Moscow, 1986), pp. 146–57.

106. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, pp. 31 and 32. On the seal belonging to John, the metropolitan of *pasēs Rhōsias* which has been ascribed to John II (1077–1089), the addendum "all" could have been caused by these concerns. See A. Soloviev, *Byzance et la formation de l'État russe* (London, 1979) IXa and IXb, pp. 294, 317–19. But according to V. L. Ianin this attribution is not certain; it could be dated almost a hundred years later to John IV.

107. Maurokastron is mentioned in only one notitia (the manuscript *Coislinianus*, 211), where this metropolitanate is listed after Basileion (founded in 1059–1071) and before Nazianzos (founded in 1068–1071). That means that the advance of Neofit to the rank of titular metropolitan of Chernihiv must have happened in the 1060s. See n. 105 above. During the ceremonies at Vyshhorod on 20 May 1072, the metropolitan of Chernihiv, Neofit, is listed second, according to the hierarchy of ranks, just after the metropolitan of Kyiv, George. Cf. *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, pp. 122–23. This text from the *Tale of the Miracles* (about the events of 20 May 1072) is original in relation to the Primary Chronicle for the year 1072 (*PSRL*, vol. 1, pp. 181–82); cf. *The Hagiography of Kievan Rus'*, pp. 200–201.

108. *Notitiae episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae* (Paris, 1981), pp. 344, 350, 382 (*Notitiae*: 11; 12; 15 in the sequence of 78, 80 or 81 positions). Pereiaslav was mentioned as a metropolitanate in six manuscripts. See *Notitiae episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae*, p. 382. It is always listed between Rhusion and Lakedaimon—metropolitan sees that had been founded closer to 1080. However, we know that the titular metropolitanate of Pereiaslav had already existed in the 1060s.

An ephemeral titular metropolitan see did not occupy a constant position in the *ordo thronorum,* but was put on the list when a given bishop was given this honorary title and was crossed out after his death. The notitia which preserved the metropolitanate of Pereiaslav reflects the conferment of this title on Ephrem, which took place between 1073 and 1078. Because Attalea is mentioned last (founded 1084), the notitia must have been edited around 1085, which would explain why Maurokastron-Chernihiv is absent from the list. It was recorded after the titular metropolitan. Neofit had died, and his successor was an ordinary bishop. That is the reason why we know more precisely the time of the editing of the list from the manuscript *Coislinianus,* 211: it was compiled after the death of the metropolitan of Pereiaslav, Leo, but before the nomination of Ephrem—that is, at a time when Peter was the bishop of Pereiaslav (without the honorary title), around 1072.

109. The founding of this diocese took place in the early 1070s, according to M. D. Priselkov, *Ocherki po tserkovno-politicheskoi istorii Kievskoi Rusi X–XII vv.* (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 135–40. Shchapov (*State and Church in Early Russia*, pp. 46–48) proposes to ascribe the establishment of the Rostov see to Metropolitan Ephrem of Pereislav, but he has not taken into account that titular metropolitans had no right to found bishoprics and divide their dioceses. For the dating of disorders, see A. Kuchkin, *Formirovanie gosudarstvennoi territorii Severo-Vostochnoi Rusi v X–XIV vv.* (Moscow, 1984), p. 64. According to the Kyivan Caves Paterikon, written in the 1220s, Leo "was the first to occupy the Rostov see, and suffered many torments at the hands of unbelievers; he was the third citizen of the land of Rus′, together with the two Varangians, to be crowned by Christ, for whose sake he suffered" (*The* Paterik *of the Kievan Caves Monastery*, p. 118). But we must remember that since the twelfth century to the begining of the twentieth, the foundation of the Rostov see was generally connected with the baptism of Rus′ at the turn of the tenth century. For this reason Leo is named the "third martyr" (after the two Varangians murdered in 986). Hence Saints Boris and Glĕb are not passed over in silence, as some thought, because they were not recognized as martyrs "in Christo."

110. See P. Sokolov, *Ruskii arkhierei iz Vizantii i pravo ego naznacheniia do nachala XV veka* (Kyiv, 1913), pp. 93–158 (still the basic text); Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura,* pp. 77–78; cf. also Pelenski, "The Sack of Kiev of 1169: Its Significance for the Succession to Kievan Rus′," and W. Vodoff, "Remarques sur la politique ecclésiastique d'André de Bogoljubovo," *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale* 17 (1974): 193–215.

111. In the colophon of a Greek psalter from the fourteenth century, a Greek priest, the hieromonk Malakhias, who was the vicar of the Moscow metropolitan in Vladimir-on-Kliazma calls himself "*namestnikos tou Volodimirou.*" Cf. E. E. Granstrem, "Chernets Malakhiia filosof," in *Arkheograficheskii ezhegodnik za 1962 g.* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 69–70.

112. The document pertaining to the founding of the bishopric in Smolensk shows the legal and financial status of the *kliros* as independent from the bishop. In this case we are not dealing with the constitution of a new bishop's *kliros*, but with the transformation of a vicariate's *kliros*, under the Pereiaslav bishop, into the *kliros* of the Smolensk diocese. See the document edited by Ia. Shchapov in *Drevnerusskie kniazheskie ustavy, XI–XV vv.* (Moscow, 1976), pp. 141–46. It is noteworthy that the Greek *kleros*, serving to define clergy in its entirety, when it became part of colloquial speech in Rus', was exclusively associated with "chapter" clergy; the meaning of this word became much more narrow and institutional. For information on the institution of the *kliros* and the bishop's *naměstnik*, see E. E. Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 2, part I (Moscow, 1901; reprint, 1969), pp. 376–88; A. Poppe, "Fundacja biskupstwa smoleńskiego," *Przegląd Historyczny* 57 (1966): 552–55; Shchapov, *State and Church in Early Russia*, pp. 124–31.

113. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, p. 32.

114. For a more detailed discussion, see Poppe, "Werdegang der Diözesanstruktur," pp. 275, 277–78.

115. The prince is presented in them with his wife, Irene, and his mother, Gertrude; see Kämpfer, *Das Russische Herrscherbild von den Anfängen bis zu Peter dem Grosse*, ill. 64 and 67.

116. See the life of St. Theodosius in S. I. Kotkov et al., eds., *Uspenskii sbornik XII–XIII vv.* (Moscow, 1971), pp. 84–85.

117. Ibid., p. 95. It was a monastery, on the land route to Constantinople and Mount Athos, that was founded surely before 1066—probably, but not necessarily, as a branch of the Kyivan Caves Monastery.

118. See *The* Paterik *of the Kievan Caves Monastery*, pp. 118–19; Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, pp. 84–92.

119. See Abbot Daniel's *Khozhdenie. Wallfahrtsbericht. Mit einer Einleitung und bibliographischen Hinweisen von Klaus Dieter Seemann* (Munich, 1970), p. 10. W. F. Ryan's English translation, "Journey to the Promised Land" in John Wilkinson, ed., *Jerusalem Pilgrimage, 1099–1185* (London, 1988); A. Poppe, "Soobshchenie russkogo palomnika o tserkovnoi organizatsii Kipra v nachale XII veka," in *Epetēris tou Kentrou Epistēmonikōn Ereunōn Kyprou 8* (Leukosia, 1978), pp. 53–72; cf. *Notitiae episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae*, pp. 157, 338; Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, pp. 321–26.

120. *PSRL*, vol. 1, pp. 238, 293, 296; The reference by the founder to "the prayers of the father and the grandfather" allows one to assume that Volodimer Monomakh contemplated the foundation of the bishopric of Smolensk; cf. Shchapov, *Drevnerusskie kniazheskie ustavy, XI–XV vv.*, pp. 141, 144. It is well worth analyzing in depth the remarks made by V. L. Ianin, "Zametki o komplekse dokumentov Smolenskoi eparkhii XII veka," *Otechestvennaia istoriia* 6 (1994): 104–20. I accept his criticism that the date of the consecration of Bishop Manuel as 26 April 1136 is

based on the not very credible Nikonian chronicle and must be verified. As for the date of the writing of the act of foundation, I lean toward the view that the draft of this document preceded the ordination and hence there are additions made at the moment of its formal issuing. However, V. Ianin is of the opinion that the foundation document was written a few years later (between 1138 and 1142). The fontologic problems are exceptionally complicated and even if not all of the proposed solutions seem correct, they are important enough to make us reevaluate our own solution and encourage us to study the issue further.

121. M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusi*, vol. 2, pp. 150–54, 417–20. Poppe, "Werdegang der Diözesanstruktur."

122. After 1237, the residence of the bishops of Riazan was Murom, and in the second half of the fourteenth century the bishop moved to the new political center of Pereislavl Riazanskii (called Riazan from the sixteenth century, but officially only since the eighteenth).

123. See Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 1, part 1, pp. 697–98; Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, p. 296; Kuchkin, *Formirovanie gosudarstvennoi territorii*, pp. 98–103; J. Fennell, *The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200–1304* (London, 1983), pp. 46–51.

124. Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 1, part 1, pp. 698–99; M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusi*, vol. 2, p. 418 ff. and index; I. P. Kryp'iakevych, *Halyts'ko-Volyns'ke kniazivstvo* (Kyiv, 1984), pp. 30–32, 90–91; Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, pp. 457, 464, 467–68; Shchapov (*State and Church in Early Russia*, p. 50) suggests moving the date of the founding of the bishopric in Halych back to 1139–1145, but he thinks that until that time the Dnister region was directly a part of the metropolitan diocese and did not belong to the bishopric of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia.

125. *PSRL*, vol. 1, p. 502; A. N. Nasonov, ed., *Novgorodskaia pervaia letopis' starshego i mladshego izvodov* (Moscow, 1950), pp. 52, 60; Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, p. 464; Shchapov (*State and Church in Early Russia*, pp. 40–42) is ready, with reference to Tatishchev, to date the Peremyshl episcopal see to 1119–1128, because Prince Volodar "founded there the church dedicated to John the Baptist which later was a cathedral"; this is uncritically repeated by Senyk, *A History of the Church in Ukraine*, pp. 141–42.

126. Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 1, part 1, p. 699; M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusi*, vol. 2, pp. 381–84; Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, p. 465; cf. Shchapov, *State and Church in Early Russia*, pp. 52–54.

127. Golubinskii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 1, part 1, p. 700; M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusi*, vol. 2, pp. 384–85 (but his view that the bishopric of Lutsk was founded already in the twelfth century is not plausible); Shchapov, *State and Church in Early Russia*, p. 54. In any case, Lutsk became the capital of the diocese before 1237 but after

Peremyshl (1220), which follows from the chronicle and notitia of dioceses. (*PSRL*, vol. 2, p. 926; *Notitiae episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae*, p. 403). Unfortunately, the order of the bishoprics was compiled in this notitia after 1303.

128. Cf. the basic collection of data on Danylo (still to this day) by M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusi*, vol. 3, pp. 17–91. A convincing characterization of Danylo's policies is presented by G. Stökl in *Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands,* vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1980), pp. 508–26.

129. See *PSRL*, vol. 1, pp. 470, 472; vol. 2, pp. 782, 785–86, 806, 808–809.

130. Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura,* pp. 427–29, 468–71; concerning Cyril II's first years, see also G. Stökl, "Kanzler und Metropolit," in his *Der Russische Staat im Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit* (Wiesbaden, 1981), pp. 98–123. Various assumptions about the role that a hegumen from Kyiv, Petro Akerovych, who had escaped the Tatars, was supposed to have played in contacts with the Roman church, were properly disproved by O. Tolochko ("Petro Akerovych—hadanyi mytropolyt vseia Rusi," *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 1990 (6): 45–54). One might say that a puzzling "quidam archiepiscopus de Russia nomine Petrus . . . a Tartaris exterminatus" (Matthaeus of Paris, *Chronica maiora*), who participated in the 1244 Council of Lyons, was a usurper but perhaps he could have been an archimandrite (abbot) of a monastery in Rus' because archbishops were also given that title in the West, and so it could have been simply a mistake in reversible translation (cf. Charles Du Cange, *Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis* 1: 891; *Mittellateinisches Wörterbuch,* vol. 1 [Berlin, 1967], p. 891). The surprising and ephemeral title of *protōthronos* for Rus' metropolitans, which the Bulgarian despot Iakov-Svietoslav gives to Cyril II around 1261 (cf. Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, p. 470n15), would most easily be explained by recalling the confusion in the Byzantine church, which caused a temporary transfer of the patriarch's residence to Nicaea in Bithynia (until 1261). At that time, Caesarea in Cappadocia, where the metropolitan was the patriarch's *protōthronos*, was destroyed to such an extent, especially after being conquered by the Mongols in 1243, that it ceased to be the seat of the metropolitanate. In this situation the patriarch could have come to the conclusion that rapid changes in church geography and the need for improving contacts with the Mongols justified such a promotion of the metropolitan of Rus'. If this patriarch was Arsenios Autoreianos, then it becomes understandable that after 1265 the new solution was forgotten.

131. See Ia. Shchapov, *Vizantiiskoe i iuzhnoslavianskoe pravovoe nasledie na Rusi v XI–XIII vv.* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 146–57, 209–12, 240–46, 270–72.

132. Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, p. 469n14. The first mentioned synod took place in Kyiv in 1273 (and not 1274), as Shchapov rightly proved (ibid., pp. 181–85).

133. V. Borzakovskii, *Istoriia Tver'skogo kniazhestva* (St. Petersburg, 1876; reprint, 1993), pp. 68–83, 205–206. Kuchkin, *Formirovanie gosudarstvennoi territorii*, pp. 111–21; J. Fennell, *The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200–1304*, pp. 107–18, 127.

134. For the Greek and Rus′ texts, see *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, part 1, pp. 129–40 (no. 12), supplement 1–12 (no. 1). Cf. *PSRL*, vol. 1, p. 476, and Golubinskii, *Istoria russkoi tserkvi*, vol. 2, part 1, pp. 41, 60–61.

135. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, part 1 pp. 159–66 (nos. 18 and 19), supplement 1, paragraph 15. Cf. A. Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus'* (Moscow, 1940; reprint, 1969), pp. 45–47.

136. Cf. Nasonov *Mongoly i Rus';* B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Russland 1223-1502,* 2nd edition (Wiesbaden, 1965); Charles J. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde. The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History* (Bloomington, 1985). In the discussion about the Mongolian influence on the history of Rus′, an important place belongs to J. Fennell. *The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200–1304.* After this and other studies on the Mongols in Rus′ (see, for example, Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, pp. 142–45), Leo de Hartog's clear yet simplistic book, *Russia and the Mongol Yoke* (London, 1996), is disappointing. Eurasian studies are useful if we wish to gain some distance from issues at hand. As far as new publications are concerned, the books of the historiosophically oriented, talented writer Lev N. Gumilev dominate the field. Gumilev, who prefers to cross boundaries and refuses to be a professional historian or a medievalist, easily exaggerates and, although he has a critical mind, at times falls into the trap of becoming a visionary or, as he would say himself, of falling prey to excessive *passionarium.* Gumilev's constructs are built on a grand scale, but not without a nationalistic narrowing of the mind. Huge colorful canvasses and panoramic pictures can either be accepted wholesale or rejected, but one can also enrich one's knowledge through a view that goes beyond Eurocentric borders, in this case exceptionally so, without differentiating between Western and Eastern Europe. See, for example, L. N. Gumilev, *Drevniaia Rus' i velikaia step'* (Moscow, 1989). Gumilev, who was persecuted earlier but has become very popular today, is to be commended for always being true to himself and refusing to guard himself with an academic shield.

137. See M. Hrushevs′kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusi*, vol. 3, pp. 147–53. And his *Ocherk istorii kievskoi zemli* (Kyiv, 1891; reprint, 1991), pp. 427–43, 506–509. This excellent historian's thesis about the survival of Kyiv is also substantiated by new studies of G. Ivakin; see, for example, his *Kiev v 13–15 vekakh* (Kyiv, 1982), pp. 12–23, 57–65, 82–102.

138. An exaggerated idealization and perpetuation of a hagiographical-like image of Alexander Nevsky in historiography had to trigger a reaction, which, however, was usually ignored or relabelled (for example, the earlier contrast between "Soviet historiography" and "bourgeois histori-

ography" is now replaced by a new opposition: *zarubezhnaia* (foreign)–*otechestvennaia* (native). But the crux of the matter is the scaling down of Prince Alexander's image to the proportions that it had in the thirteenth century, although a certain amount of exaggeration in historicizing his image cannot be avoided. See Fennell, *The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200–1304*, pp. 97–124; cf. W. Leitsch, "Einige Beobachtungen zum politischen Weltbild Aleksander Nevskijs," in *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 25 (1978): 202–16; cf. also my attempt in *Lexikon des Mittelalters* 1 (1980): 370–71.

139. See Nasonov, *Mongoly i Rus'*, pp. 40–49, 329n95. This interpretation gave rise to the thesis about the founding of the bishopric in Sarai as a result of Mongolian mistrust toward the metropolitan of Rus' and of a need for closer diplomatic ties with Byzantium.

140. Cf. *PSRL*, vol. 1, pp. 525–26; a later report focuses on accusing the bishop of removing the grave of Rostov's Prince Glěb, who died in 1278, from the cathedral.

141. *Pamiatniki drevnerusskogo kanonicheskogo prava*, part 1, pp. 83–100 (no. 6), especially p. 86. Cyril's pastoral letter played a preparatory role for resolutions made at the Kyivan Synod in 1273; cf. Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, pp. 427–32. Extreme judgments and accusations against the Rus' church of servility during the Mongol Yoke have been replaced by more moderate assessments. See N. A. Okhotina, "Ruskaia tserkov' i mongol'skoe zavoevanie," in *Tserkov', obshchestvo i gosudarstvo v feodal'noi Rossii* (Moscow, 1990), pp. 67–83; A. L. Khoroshkevich and A. I. Pliguzov, "Russkaia tserkov' i antiordinskaia bor'ba v XIII–XIV vv. Po materialam kratkogo sobraniia khanskikh iarlykov russkim mitropolitom," *Tserkov', obshchestvo i gosudarstvo v feodal'noi Rossii*, pp. 84–102. See also the original panoramic view of the thirteenth century Rus' church and Christianity by V. N. Toporov, *Sviatost' i sviatye v russkoi dukhovnoi kul'ture*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1998), pp. 203–94.

142. The Five Sermons of Serapion are published in *Pamiatniki literatury drevnei Rusi: XIII vek* (Moscow, 1981), pp. 440–55, especially pp. 444, 448; See also the English translation partly edited by S. A. Zenkovsky, *Medieval Russia's Epics, Chronicles and Tales*, 2nd edition (New York, 1974), pp. 243–48; cf. Podskalsky, *Khristianstvo i bogoslovskaia literatura*, pp. 179–83. On Serapion's conciousness, see W. Philipp, *Ansätze zum geschichtlichen und politischen Denken in Kiever Russland* (Darmstadt, 1967), pp. 60–64.

143. Cf. T. T. Allsen, "Mongol Census Taking in Rus', 1245–1275," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5(1) 1981: 32–53; D. Ostrowski, "The Mongol Origins of Muscovite Political Institutions," *Slavic Review* 49(4) Winter 1990: 525–42.

144. *PSRL*, vol. 1, pp. 485, 528; cf. D. Ostrowski, "Why Did the Metropolitan Move from Kiev to Vladimir in the Thirteenth Century?" *California Slavic Studies* 16 (1993): 83–101.

145. *Notitiae episcopatuum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae*, pp. 399, 403; M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusi*, vol. 3, pp. 269–74, 543–44. The attempt to date the foundation of the Lithuanian metropolitanate before 1303 (instead of around 1316) in light of the notitia is unfounded. Cf. M. Giedroyć, "The Arrival of Christianity in Lithuania: Between Rome and Byzantium (1281–1341)," *Oxford Slavonic Papers* 20 (1987): 15–19.

146. Cf. the article by M. Hrushevs'kyi, "Velyka, Mala i Bila Rus'," reprinted in *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 1991(2): 77–85.

The Postwar Fate of the Petliura Library and the Records of the Ukrainian National Republic*

PATRICIA KENNEDY GRIMSTED

The 1996 commemoration in Kyiv of the 70th anniversary of Symon Petliura's death marked a dramatic break with the Soviet characterization of him as a dangerous bourgeois nationalist, antisemite, and antipopular dictator. Petliura, as the head of the short-lived Ukrainian National Republic, had fought the Bolsheviks in Ukraine. Then, as head of the Ukrainian government in exile, he continued to be perceived as a major threat to the Soviet regime until his assassination in Paris in 1926. The French trial (and acquittal) of his assassin raised the question of Petliura's complicity in the 1919 pogroms in Ukraine—and polarized Western attitudes toward him. In Soviet Ukraine, Petliura officially remained anathema, and "Petliurite" became synonymous with "enemy of the people." Against this backdrop, the 1996 commemoration was remarkable: Petliura had finally been rehabilitated, and his aspirations for an independent Ukraine, for which he had sacrificed his life, were now recognized in his homeland. To perpetuate Petliura's memory, a documentary collection of Petliura's political and family letters was issued in Kyiv, in collaboration with the Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris.

In the preface to the publication, Vasyl′ Mykhal′chuk, a former director of the Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris, relates the sad wartime fate of the archival materials deposited before World War II in that library: "Together with the library holdings and all the archives, they were confiscated by the Gestapo in 1940 and taken to Germany. Their fate is unknown."[2] Thus, even in 1996, it was not public knowledge that many of those materials were in the metropolises of Ukraine and Russia. Coincidentally, most of the archival materials from the Petliura Library that are now in Kyiv are actually located in the same archive that houses the records of the UNR Foreign Ministry, on which the first part of that same 1996 publication was based.

Among the documents published for the first time are political and diplomatic letters of Petliura drawn from the records of the UNR Foreign Ministry now held in Kyiv. They were probably among those which the Nazis had discovered in Tarnów and processed in Cracow during the war and which

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Soviet SMERSH counterintelligence agents had seized from Cracow in March 1945. This information was not known to the compilers of the publication, but serves to illustrate the extent of the odyssey of documents relating to the national statesman who was forced into exile. It also testifies to the lack of public disclosure about such documents held in Kyivan archives.

The letters of Petliura's wife, Ol'ha, and his daughter, Lesia, came from family correspondence in Paris and Prague, but the precise archival designations are also not provided. In fact, these documents came from the papers of Oleksander Siropolko, a relative and close friend of the Petliura family in Prague, and Stepan Siropolko from Paris, which were recently transferred to Ukraine and presented to TsDAVO, the same Kyiv archive that houses the major collections from the Petliura Library and UNR records in Kyiv. Another published letter from Ol'ha Petliura to the librarian of the Petliura Libary in Paris, Ivan Rudychiv (1881–1958), dated 7 June 1941 (corresponding to the period he was in Berlin) is now also located in that same archive in Kyiv.[3]

In 1997, barely a year later, another collection of articles and conference presentations was published in Kyiv also to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of Petliura's assassination, in the introduction of which the editors allude to the history of the Petliura Library in Paris:

> The prewar holdings of that library were completely lost, taken away to Germany by the Fascist occupiers, although some suppose that now they might be found in KGB cellars in Moscow, or perhaps were earlier transferred to the Secret Section (*spetskhran*) of the Russian State Library.[4]

Such speculations, however, can now be put to rest. At last we know more about the odyssey and the fate of that library. It can be confirmed, for example, that many of its archival holdings have survived and are accessible to researchers in Moscow and Kyiv, if they know where and how to request them. However, they are also so widely dispersed that researchers would be at a loss to identify their provenance or original arrangement as collections from the Paris library. In the late 1980s some remains of the library books that were identified in Minsk were transferred to Ukraine, but the rest, unfortunately, remain diffused, some to be sure in the former Secret Section mentioned.

In the companion piece to this article, I described the fate of the Petliura Library during the war, after the Nazis had confiscated the holdings from the sealed library building in January 1941.[5] Rudychiv, the librarian of the Petliura Library from the start, was sent by the Nazis to Berlin under the pretext of assisting with the reopening of its holdings transferred there, but he never saw the library again. While in Berlin, he left behind his diary from the period of the Nazi seizure and transport of the library, together with an account of the library, some of its treasured documents, certain of his own papers, and momentos of Petliura and his family. These materials have now surfaced in Kyiv. Under the auspices of the Special Command of Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg—the infamous ERR (Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg)—the

Petliura Library was incorporated into the so-called *Ostbücherei*, the special "Eastern Library" relating to Bolshevik and other Eastern European matters, developed under the Rosenberg command for its anti-Bolshevik research center in Berlin. The same fate befell the much richer Turgenev Library, which had been confiscated in Paris at the same time as the Petliura Library.

Starting in the summer of 1943, major ERR research and library operations, including the *Ostbücherei*, were transferred from Berlin to the relatively isolated city of Ratibor (*Pol.* Racibórz), 80 kilometers southwest of Katowice on the Oder (*Pol.* Odra) River in Silesia. The extensive ERR Ratibor operations were scattered among many buildings within the city and its surroundings, which together housed over a million books and a vast array of archival materials looted from occupied countries of Western Europe and the Soviet Union. The elegant castle of the Prince of Pless in the town of the same name (*Pol.* Pszczyna), 60 kilometers to the east of Ratibor, housed the newspaper division and the special unit working on the captured Communist Party archive from Smolensk. Operations continued there until the end of 1944.

In the face of the fast approaching Red Army during January of 1945, some of the materials evacuated from Ratibor were abandoned en route back to Germany, while major library holdings and most of the Communist Party archives from Smolensk were abandoned in the railroad station near Pless. According to the last ERR report from Ratibor, many of the most important office records from Ratibor itself had already been evacuated by the end of January 1945. The remaining Ratibor office files were being prepared for destruction, but the ERR decided not to destroy the *Ostbücherei*, because they still had plans to return to resume its use, if the war situation changed, or at least to take the materials with them. Otherwise, they assumed (quite correctly, as it turned out) that the abandoned materials would be "captured by the Bolsheviks."[6]

Soviet Postwar Archival and Library Retrieval

The Paris Slavic Libraries to Minsk and Moscow

Documentation on the postwar Soviet archival retrieval and "trophy" cultural seizure operations is still fragmentary and dispersed throughout a number of different groups of records. Those materials that might be anticipated among the records of military units and military intelligence (or counterintelligence such as SMERSH) are still not publicly available. Recently, however, it has been possible to examine some important files among other record groups that have been declassified, including some containing reports of the Trophy Brigade for Libraries, the Main Archival Administration under the NKVD (later, the MVD), and some collections of reports that were forwarded to Communist Party authorities. New facts are emerging about where, when, and why various

Nazi-looted archival collections were seized by the Soviet authorities (and often with them the surviving records of Nazi wartime operations).

It was Soviet archival practice to separate the foreign "trophy" archives that the Nazis had captured from the Nazi agency records themselves. They also divided up collections by establishing separate "fonds" for each subgroup of files they could identify with a specific creating agency, thereby obscuring integral collections and the working order of documents in Nazi hands. When examined together, the documentation that survives in various Soviet archives—including both Soviet reports and Nazi records—as well as the "trophy" archives, provide new clues about their provenance and migration. In some cases, these amount to hard evidence of the Ukrainian collections the Nazis had taken from Paris and other West European centers; the materials Nazi authorities had succeeded in evacuating from Berlin to Silesia, and from Silesia to the West; and of the more extensive materials that were recovered and seized by Soviet authorities after the war.

Major portions of the archival materials confiscated by the Nazis from the Petliura Library in Paris fell into Soviet hands after the war together with the looted books. As noted earlier, it has not been possible to establish how many of these were actually held by the ERR in Ratibor or in other nearby Nazi centers in Silesia. It has also not been possible to determine where all of them were recovered by Soviet forces. Apparently, they were not all recovered at the same time, nor from the same place, which helps explain why the materials are now dispersed in several different archives and libraries. Many of them were found together with vast library collections from occupied Soviet lands that the Nazis had plundered, a large portion of which had been taken to the Ratibor area in Silesia.

In March 1945, at the railroad station of Pless (*Pol.* Pszczyna), the Red Army found "approximately 100,000 books in 580 crates . . . predominantly from Riga, Reval [Tallinn], Pskov, and Vilnius" and "about 80,000 volumes of journals packed in 660 crates . . . from the libraries of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences and the Lenin Library of the BSSR . . . , the transport of all of which would require some ten to twelve railroad freight cars." These were portions of the materials that the ERR had collected for the *Ostbücherei*, but which the Nazis had abandoned. This shipment retrieved by the Red Army also included four railroad wagons of records from the Communist Party Archive of Smolensk Oblast—the ERR had succeeded in evacuating to the West only a small portion (about 500 files) of it.[7] The Red Army shipped everything they found back to the USSR, but we do not know if there were any books of West European origin among this transport of materials.

Another large cache of ERR library collections, constituting over one million volumes (54 freight-car loads), was collected further north in the Katowice area and transferred to Minsk in the fall of 1945, but precise documentation about their recovery or contents is not yet available. This batch included many

of the books from Belarusian libraries seized by the Nazis that had been shipped to Ratibor for the *Ostbücherei*, but also consisted of books from West European collections—the Turgenev and Petliura libraries, for example. Many of these were later transferred to various libraries in the Belarusian SSR, and many of the books were subsequently transferred to Moscow.[8]

According to a 1946 Soviet report, most of the holdings of the Turgenev Library was identified in Masłowice (170 kilometers north of Ratibor), together with thousands of books that had been looted from Belarusian libraries. Hence the shipment back to Minsk from there. Many books from the Turgenev Library, however, were transferred to a Red Army officers' club in Legnica, although some of the most valuable materials were taken directly to Moscow. The Petliura Library was not mentioned in available Soviet reports, hence we can only speculate as to how many of its books and Ukrainian archival materials were together with the Turgenev Library during its travels from Berlin to Ratibor, and from Masłowice (via Legnica) to Minsk and Moscow. We know that the books were in Ratibor, and that some of the books and many of the archival materials surfaced again in Moscow and Kyiv, as will be explained below.

Tragically, many books with Turgenev Library markings were destroyed in Minsk during Soviet-period "cleansing" campaigns, as confirmed by one librarian in the Belarusian capital who risked censure by trying to save some of the title pages with dedicatory autographs.[10] Perhaps some books from the Petliura Library met a similar fate there. More volumes originating in the Turgenev Library—along with a few from collections at the International Institute of Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam, and others from West European collections—have recently been identified in Minsk.[11]

Approximately 240 books from the Petliura Library were found in Minsk in the late 1980s, and in 1989 were "returned" to Kyiv.[12] Found in what is now the National Library of Belarus in Minsk (earlier the Lenin Library), 180 books of predominantly Ukrainian provenance and another 60 books with foreign imprints (mostly French and a few German) are now held in the Parliamentary Library of Ukraine, partly among the former special (secret) collections and partly in the "foreign" division.[13] The Parliamentary Library reported the purchase of another 10 books bearing stamps of the Petliura Library at an auction in Kyiv in the early 1980s, and an additional volume came with a collection they received from Prague.[14] More books bearing stamps of the Petliura Library have recently been found in the National Library in Minsk, but further details await verification.[15]

Scattered UNR Records found in Poland

Several cartons of fragmentary UNR files were recovered by Polish specialists in October 1945 in Silesia west of Wrocław, along with other manuscripts and

rare books from the University and Ossolineum Libraries in Lviv, the Polish Library in Paris, and other Polish collections that were evacuated by the Nazis.[16] The Ukrainian segment of that shipment, most of which was presumably evacuated earlier under Nazi auspices from Lviv to Cracow, has recently been described in a survey by Lviv archivist Halyna Svarnyk.[17] The shipment had in part been gathered by the Nazis in Cracow, and there were no materials known to have been in Ratibor. It is now difficult to tell whether the assorted UNR military files were the same that had been earlier identified by Nazi reports in Lviv. Since that shipment also included books from several different Polish libraries, it is possible that some of the Ukrainian archival materials included could have come from other sources. The existence of a major segment from the Polish Library in Paris in that shipment suggests that those portions of that library came from Cracow rather than Ratibor.[18] As far as can be determined, there were no materials from the Petliura Library in Paris with that shipment. The UNR materials that were found there are now held in the Biblioteka Narodowa in Warsaw. It is possible that some of the scattered military records had been brought to Lviv in 1925–1926 and housed with the Sheptyts′kyi archive. As evident from a wartime report, the Nazis knew about the files of the UNR General Staff and there were efforts to take them westward in their final evacuations from Lviv.[19]

Moscow: The Former "Special Archive"—TsGOA/TsKhIDK (now part of RGVA)

Development of TsGOA

The former top-secret "Special Archive"—TsGOA (Tsentral′nyi gosudarstvennyi osobyi arkhiv) in Moscow was founded in March 1946 specifically for processing, "utilizing," and preserving the large quantity of captured or "trophy" records of foreign provenance that had been seized by Soviet authorities during or after the war and brought back to Moscow. Its existence was first publicly revealed in a series of newspaper articles in February 1991 entitled, "Five Days in the Special Archive."[20] Those stories mentioned only the Nazi records held there, but finally, in October 1991, the extent of holdings from other foreign countries (most of which had previously been captured by the Nazis) was revealed.[21] Officially renamed and opened to public research in June 1992, the archive, until March 1999, bore the name of the Center for Preservation of Historico-Documentary Collections—TsKhIDK (Tsentr khraneniia istoriko-dokumental′nykh kollektsii). In March 1999 it was abolished as a separate federal archive, and all of the former TsGOA/TsKhIDK "trophy" holdings became part of the Russian State Military Archive—RGVA (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv).[22] During the Soviet period, TsGOA functioned for the purpose of processing the materials brought back from the war for postwar "operational" purposes of Soviet security services and other high-level government agencies.

Most of the Ukrainian émigré archival materials brought to the Soviet Union after the war went directly to Kyiv, and stayed there. But many that arrived in Moscow intermixed with other collections—as they had been in Nazi hands—remained in Moscow. The most extensive collection of materials from the Petliura Library of any archive in the former USSR is now among the holdings of the former Special Archive. Most of these materials arrived in Moscow via Minsk. Presumably, they were retrieved from the Ratibor area by Soviet forces as part of the library shipments from Silesia mentioned above. One batch of 55 file units of Petliura Library documentation—in Soviet parlance, "records of Ukrainian nationalists"—were transferred to the Special Archive in Moscow from the Central State Archive of the October Revolution of the Belarusian SSR (TsGAOR BSSR) in December 1954, but documentation is not available about the accession of the rest.[23] The introductions to some of the inventories (*opisi*) prepared for those fonds in TsGOA also affirm that they were acquired from Minsk, and in many cases that same origin is also indicated in one of TsGOA's working lists of fonds.[24]

A few of the Ukrainian émigré holdings may have been received with the RSHA foreign archival materials from Wölfelsdorf (*Pol.* Wilkanów) near Habelswerdt (*Pol.* Bystrzyca-Kłodzko). The Ukrainian officer serving as an archival scout in one of the Red Army trophy brigades who first reported the cache there had announced the existence of some Ukrainian émigré holdings. Some of those Ukrainian files and émigré publications apparently first went to Moscow, and others were later transferred to Moscow from Kyiv.

The collections of archival documentation from the Petliura Library now in Moscow are barely recognizable in terms of their original arrangement. Following Soviet archival arrangement regulations, these materials have been separated into a series of splinter fonds, based on Soviet conceptions of the creating agencies from which the documents originated. Many of these appear quite artificial, in some cases overlapping, and apparently some files have been intermixed from other sources. Typical of Soviet postwar archival processing, individual file units within fonds have not been grouped in rational categories, nor chronologically in terms of their creation dates. In Paris, by contrast, archival materials in the Petliura Library had never been broken down into separate fonds according to the creating agencies, nor had they been fully processed. Some were held as ongoing office records of the library or the journal *Tryzub* (Trident), the editorial offices of which were situated in the same building; others were kept as subject-oriented collections of documents. Because many of these materials had not been fully cataloged in Paris, and because not all of them bore library stamps or other markings, it is exceedingly difficult to identify their provenance.

It is now even more difficult to determine how many printed volumes from the Petliura Library are held among the former TsGOA holdings. According to Soviet archival rules, printed books would normally have been differentiated from other archival materials. However, in processing these and similar émigré

materials, Soviet archivists often treated many of the press bulletins or newsletters of émigré organizations as archival, rather than printed library materials. Many of them were issued in a duplicated or mimeographed format, and often were not officially registered as publications. Today, most libraries abroad, as well as those in Eastern Europe, would treat them as individually unique library materials for cataloging purposes. Soviet archivists, however, frequently arranged them as file units within archival fonds and did not assign separate cataloging data under their title or issuing agency. Even more problematically, in assigning unit numbers to such serials within fonds, archivists did not respect serial grouping by keeping issues in chronological order or assigning contingent file unit numbers to issues of the same or successor serial. Sometimes in these record groups, a single issue of a serial constitutes a separate file unit, but often several issues have been grouped together as one. Accurate titles, issuing agencies, issue numbers, and dates frequently do not appear in the archival inventories (*opisi*), further complicating research access.

Many of the printed books and some serial issues from the Petliura Library that were received by TsGOA were separated from the "archival" materials. To the extent that they were not transferred to other libraries, they remain housed separately among the printed library collections in the TsGOA building. However, these were only partially cataloged for those in Cyrillic (Russian and Ukrainian) and for those in Latin alphabets. Today, because thousands of volumes remain virtually inaccessible in cardboard boxes, and others from many different sources mixed together on unmarked shelves, a thorough examination of the holdings has not been feasible. Because preliminary catalog slips provide no indications of provenance, source of accession, or book markings, we really have no idea of how many books with Petliura Library stamps might exist in library collections from the former TsGOA.

As was the case with other library materials received by the Special Archive, some other books or journals may have been transferred to various libraries. However, the specifics of such transfers are almost impossible to trace at this point, because Soviet archivists rarely recorded details about specific collections of books with distinguishing stamps or other markings they transferred elsewhere. A prefatory note in the inventory (*opis´*) for the main fond with records of the Petliura Library ominously informs the reader that in 1982 an unspecified number of "duplicate printed editions were destroyed," following evaluation by the "Expert Appraisal Commission." Similar notices appear in the *opisi* of two other related fonds.[25] Although the Nazis have always been blamed for the destruction of the Petliura Library, it accordingly appears that Soviet archival authorities may also have played a role in that process. Not surprisingly, many books from the Petliura Library remained in Minsk, as was the case of many books from the Turgenev Library, especially those that had been turned over to libraries—as opposed to state archives—there.[26]

With these generalities understood, we can now distinguish several discreet fonds as presently organized in the archive that comprise materials known to have come from the Petliura Library in Paris. These include parts of the records of the Petliura Library itself, amalgamated in the same fond with scattered materials from its serial holdings and a few materials from its archival collections. Another fond has been assigned for the editorial records of the UNR journal *Tryzub* (Trident), which had its office in the library in Paris, and another for materials relating to the trial of Petliura's assassin, Samuel (or Sholem) Schwarzbard (the pro-anarchist Jewish émigré from the Russian Empire, who first came to France in 1910 and died in South Africa in 1938), which were collected by those associated with the foundation of the library. There are three other adjacent fonds of Ukrainian émigré organizations in Paris and two for personal papers, all of which probably came from the Petliura Library, although some materials may be of other origins. The name assigned to the fond with miscellaneous materials from "Ukrainian Émigré Organizations in Czechoslovakia" probably represents incoming materials to the library. Finally, there is one fond identified as being of Parisian Ukrainian provenance, but which was among the French security records seized from a RSHA hideaway in Czechoslovakia.

None of the Ukrainian émigré fonds described below (except the artificial fond for Tymofii Kotenko) are unique to RGVA. In most cases the institutional origin of the documents and publications encompassed is not clear and in many cases the materials are intermixed. When publications are included with actual archival materials, they do not necessarily represent those issued by the agency named by the fond, and in most cases they appear to be those that had been received by the Petliura Library as part of its serial holdings. Noticeably, in every case the other archives in Moscow and Kyiv that received materials from the Petliura Library have established parallel fonds, containing other fragments of the same body of documentation and scattered issues of the same serial bulletins or other journals from the same émigré groups. Interestingly enough, the names of the fonds established are similar, but the breakdown of materials is equally jumbled. Obviously, these materials were all processed in haste with little regard for the creating agency or order in their originating office or collection.

1. *S. Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris (Ukrainskaia biblioteka im. S. Petliury. Parizh/Ukraïns'ka biblioteka im. S. Petliury. Paryzh) (RGVA, fond 271K; 196 units; 1892–1942).* Of special significance among the former TsGOA holdings is this separate record group which is actually a somewhat miscellaneous collection. It includes a group of folders from the administrative records of the library with documents about its foundation and organization in the late 1920s, correspondence with Ukrainian émigrés and émigré organizations in various countries, and some account registers and receipts of donations from the 1930s (nos. 1–42).

The fond also contains numerous printed materials and unpublished documents that were collected by the Petliura Library (scattered among nos. 43–195); namely, a few printed UNR legal materials and copies of limited-edition Ukrainian émigré printed publications, including press surveys, bulletins, journals, and newspapers (undoubtedly part of the library's periodical holdings).

Among the miscellaneous memoir materials are manuscript or typescript documents, which may well have been part of some of the library's prewar collections, such as a folder pertaining to Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts′kyi and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in 1938–1939 (no. 73) and a folder of correspondence and materials relating to Transcarpathia (1926–1939), which includes protests about the Hungarian occupation (no. 74). The collection also contains the original manuscript and proofs of Petro Zlenko's bibliography of publications about Petliura that was published by the library in 1939 (no. 183). Newspaper and periodical clippings constitute a large group of file units within the fond (nos. 75–134), interspersed with issues of a number of different émigré publications mentioned above.

2. *Editorial Records of the Ukrainian Weekly* Tryzub, *Paris (Redaktsiia ezhenedel′nika* Trizub [*sic*]. *Parizh/Redaktsiia tyzhnevyka* Tryzub. *Paryzh) (RGVA, fond 270K; 106 units; 1925–1940).* There is no doubt about the provenance of remaining files from the UNR journal, the editorial offices of which were in the Petliura Library. According to the preface to the inventory (*opis′*), the fond was transferred in 1955 from TsGAOR BSSR. In addition to duplicated printed matter, some additional materials, such as "resolutions and protocols," had been singled out for destruction by the Appraisal Commission in 1982.

The fond contains editorial copies, draft articles, and proofs from the journal (nos. 25–56, 59). It should be noted that additional similar materials have been assigned to the main library fond (fond 271K, nos. 47, 63–72). There is correspondence with émigré organizations and individuals (nos. 69–78, 80–90). There are also—as a further example—some conference materials (1928–1934) (nos. 65–67). Scattered copies of printed press bulletins and serials from Ukrainian organizations (nos. 79, 93–94, 96–100) now included as part of this fond (similar to the preceding one), originally came from the main library holdings, as many of them even bear its stamps.

3. *Legal Commission of Ukrainian Emigrants, Paris (Sudebnaia komissiia ukrainskykh èmigrantov. Parizh/Sudova komisiia Ukraïns′kykh emihrantiv) (RGVA, fond 268K; 83 units; 1917–1927).* As explained in the Russian-language *opis′*, the Commission had been founded in connection with the trial of Schwarzbard. Documentation about the trial is known to have been among the collections held by the Petliura Library before 1940.

Files include the following: some biographical materials on Schwarzbard; copies of reports of the investigations for the trial; hearings, and press clippings

relating to the trial (in French and Ukrainian); copies of testimony at the trial and commentaries; minutes of the meetings of the Commission; materials collected by the procommunist attorney Henri Torrès, who defended Schwarzbard; and materials relating to pogroms in Ukraine. There are also scattered copies of UNR limited-edition bulletins (1917–1919), again probably from the Petliura Library holdings.

Quite by coincidence, among the materials probably received from the RSHA archival center in Wölfelsdorf were some personal papers of Torrès from Paris. Appropriately, these had been arranged in a separate small fond in TsGOA (fond 143; 2 *opisi*; 12 units; 1925–1953). The Torrès papers were returned to Paris in March 2000. Given the fact that none of the files relate to the Schwarzbard trial, it is inconceivable that these scattered papers would have been held by the Petliura Library.

4. *Society of Former Combatants of the UNR Army in France, Paris (Obshchestvo byvshikh voennosluzhashchikh armii Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliki (UNR) vo Frantsii. Parizh/Tovarystvo buvshykh voiakiv armiï UNR u Frantsiï. Paryzh) (RGVA, fond 269K; 48 units; 1921–1940).* According to the introductory notes in the *opis′*, the Society was founded in Paris in 1927 with sixteen local branches in France. According to Society documents, it was founded in Paris in 1923 by General Oleksander Udovychenko, one of the founders of the Petliura Library. Documentation of the Society was among the collections reported as held by the library before the war. Similar to the first two fonds listed, the current *opis′* for this fond notes that "duplicate materials" therein were destroyed on instructions from the Expert Appraisal Commission in 1982.[27]

Files include regulations, questionnaires, and cards of members. There is some correspondence with veterans' associations in Czechoslovakia and Belgium among others. There are accounts of the Society (nos. 44 and 45) and materials from meetings. There are several autograph letters of Petliura, 1921–1923 (no. 36) and biographical data about General Udovychenko. There are also copies of émigré bulletins, which probably came from the Petliura Library.

5. *The Ukrainian Society for the League of Nations in Paris (Ukrainskaia assotsiatsiia pri Lige Natsii. Parizh/Ukraïns′ke tovarystvo dlia Lihy Natsii. Paryzh) (RGVA, fond 273K; 86 units; 1918–1940).* This Ukrainian émigré organization in Paris was active during the interwar period, associated as it was with other branches of the Society in Prague, Belgium, and other countries.[28] While the materials here were all plundered by the Nazis from Paris, it is not possible to ascertain if all of the materials that now comprise the fond came from the Petliura Library itself. Files include protocols (officially approved minutes) of meetings of the Society, letters and correspondence, reports, and a manuscript article.

6. *Tymofii Kotenko—"Ukrainian Nationalist Writer" (RGVA, fond 267K; 3 units; 1922[?]–1939).* Background data on Kotenko are lacking. This fragmentary fond contains only three manuscript poems, which probably were either submitted to the UNR journal *Tryzub* or deposited with other collections in the Petliura Library.

7. *Pavlo Ivanovych Chyzhevs'kyi (RGVA, fond 272K; 8 units; 1919–1926).* Pavlo Ivanovych Chyzhevs'kyi (1860–1925) served as Minister of Finance in the Central Rada and was later an official representative of the Ukrainian Trade Mission in France, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland. His papers were deposited in the Petliura Library before 1940.[29]

This fond contains only a few fragmentary papers of Chyzhevs'kyi, mostly dating to the years before his arrival in Paris (1919–1923). These consist of correspondence, papers relating to a legal project, and minutes (protocols) of meetings.

8. *Ukrainian Nationalist Organizations in Czechoslovakia (Ukrainskie natsionalistichcheskie organizatsii v Chekhoslovakii/Ukraïns'ki natsionalistychni orhanizatsiï v Chekhoslovachchyni) (RGVA, fond 274K; 16 units, 1922–1938).* TsGOA archivists designated this a "consolidated archival fond," meaning it contains documents of miscellaneous provenance. They also established Prague as its source. But it cannot be discounted that these documents represent incoming receipts by the Petliura Library in Paris, which obviously were received or collected from other Czech sources. The 16 files contain fragmentary materials from six different Ukrainian organizations in Prague and Poděbrady, including some reports of a committee to construct a monument to Petliura (nos. 10–13), the Ukrainian Academic Committee, and the Ukrainian Economic Academy in Poděbrady. At least some of the documents included here may have been received in Kyiv from Prague and then were later forwarded from Kyiv to Moscow, but conclusive identification of their origin and acquisition is not possible at present.

9. *Ukrainian National Union in France (Collection), Paris (Ukrainskii narodnyi soiuz vo Frantsii. Parizh/Ukraïns'kyi narodnyi soiuz v Frantsiï. Paryzh) (RGVA, fond 65K; 26 units; 1933–1939).* Prefatory notes in the RGVA *opis'* do not indicate the provenance of this fond that actually groups together miscellaneous files from several Ukrainian émigré organizations in Paris. It was initially suspected that at least some of the files might also have come from the Petliura Library. However, a November 1945 communication from the chief of the Glavarkhiv Division of Utilization to his counterpart in Kyiv explained that materials from this organization were found among the files of the French security services. At that time he forwarded a survey of these documents to Kyiv which, in his judgment, would be useful for "operational

work" in the Ukrainian capital and "to establish a report on the Prosvita Society."[30] Given this communication, it is now apparent that these files in fact came to TsGOA with the French security service records (Sûreté Nationale and Police) that were captured by Soviet authorities in Czechoslovakia. They represent documents that had been seized by French security authorities from Ukrainian émigré organizations in Paris and incorporated into their own records, which were later seized by the Nazis.[31] An introduction (added to the *opis′* in 1987), explains that the "Narodnyi Soiuz" was founded in 1932 as an organization of Ukrainian fascists, based on the ideology of Dontsov, who earlier in Prague had published its *Vestnyk*; its aim, according to the introduction, was "to attract the working class and hide from the French." Unlike the previous materials received from Minsk, these materials were obtained in 1945.[32] Despite this prefatory note, the relationship of the files included in the "collection" to "Narodnyi Soiuz" is not clear.

Most of the files included are from two Ukrainian émigré groups in Paris: "Prosvita" and the Taras Shevchenko Society (*Hromada im. Tarasa Shevchenka*). The "Prosvita" files comprise protocols of meetings, 1938–1939 (no. 10), correspondence registers, 1937–1939 (nos. 24, 25), financial records (nos. 12, 13), and files on members (nos. 7–9). The material pertaining to the Shevchenko Society includes financial records (no. 11) in addition to files on individual members, some with their personal correspondence (nos. 1–5). In both cases, there are membership lists. There are also some miscellaneous pamphlet publications (15, 16, 19–21) and files of poetry (nos. 17, 18).

Boris Lazarevskii Papers

A few letters from the Russian and Ukrainian writer Boris Aleksandrovich Lazarevskii [Borys Oleksanderovych Lazarevs′kyi] and those of his brother, Hlib (*Rus.* Gleb), ended up in Kyiv after the war and were requisitioned from there by TsGOA in 1956, together with other UNR documents and Ukrainian émigré publications from Paris and Warsaw. Then held in TsDAZhR URSR, they were among the documents transferred to Moscow in 1957.[33] Their fate in Moscow has not been determined, but as yet they have not been located among Ukrainian holdings in the former TsGOA.

Trophy archival materials of a literary orientation, according to Soviet regulations in postwar decades, were transferred to the Central State Archive of Literature and Art—TsGALI, which in 1992 was renamed the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art—RGALI. RGALI maintains a fond for the personal papers of Boris Lazarevskii (1871–1937), who is there identified as a Russian writer. However, the Lazarevskii files held in RGALI date only through 1925, that is, before Lazarevskii's emigration, and hence cannot be considered of foreign "trophy" origin.[34] There is no indication that the materials forwarded to TsGOA from Kyiv, which were of West European provenance, were added to the Lazarevskii fond in RGALI.

The son of the prominent Ukrainian historian Oleksander Lazarevs'kyi, Lazarevskii had written for *Vestnik Evropy*, *Russkoe bogatstvo*, and other journals before 1917, but then emigrated and died in Paris. His brother Hlib (1877–19??) was active in the Ukrainian émigré movement as a journalist in Poland and France. He returned to Ukraine in 1940 and presumably remained in the USSR until his death, though his fate has not been determined.

According to émigré sources, Boris also occasionally wrote in the journal *Ukraïna*, which appeared in the immediate postrevolutionary period under the Ukrainian form of his name (Borys Oleksandrovych Lazarevys'kyi). Once abroad, and especially in the years immediately before his death in Paris, he was associated with the UNR journal *Tryzub*, the editorial offices of which were housed in the Petliura Library. Some of his correspondence and a few other papers were reportedly housed with the Petliura Library in Paris before the war and were seized by the Nazis with the *Tryzub* editorial records. These may indeed be the materials that Soviet authorities brought to Kyiv after the war, but were then sent to Moscow in 1957.

Moscow: The State Archive of the Russian Federation—GA RF

Ukrainian Holdings from Prague and the RZIA Division of GA RF

A second large concentration of materials from the Petliura Library in Paris is now held on the other side of Moscow in a similar series of separate splintered fonds in the State Archive of the Russian Federation—GA RF (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii). These fonds were all formerly held by the pre-1992 Central State Archive of the October Revolution—TsGAOR SSSR, as part of the formerly secret section designated for émigré materials from the Russian Foreign Historical Archive (Russkii zagranichnyi istoricheskii arkhiv) in Prague—RZIA.[35] Although that division was established soon after the receipt of the nine freight-car loads of RZIA materials that arrived in Moscow just after New Year's Day in 1946, its holdings actually are from a myriad of émigré sources in many different countries, as well as those from Prague. As far as can be determined, no materials from the Petliura Library were transferred to RZIA in Prague before 1940. Further confusion arises, however, because many of the RZIA materials arriving from Prague had never been thoroughly processed there. What is more, archivists working with the émigré materials in Moscow and Kyiv in the postwar period were principally oriented towards "operational" goals, and had no time to spare for determining provenance or migration data. Little did they understand the sources of the materials and little did they care.

After the foundation of the parallel Ukrainian Historical Cabinet (Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi kabinet—*UIK*) in Prague in 1929, Ukrainian or Ukrainian-related archival materials were principally deposited there. In October

1945 the entire contents of the Ukrainian Historical Cabinet in Prague were shipped to Kyiv "as a gift to the Ukrainian people." With it came some scattered UNR documentation that had been deposited in UIK. Almost all of the UIK and related holdings shipped from Prague in October 1945 have remained in Kyiv. One of the most notable exceptions were the files of the Party of Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries from Prague, which were requisitioned by Moscow in 1956.[36] To further add to the confusion, many UNR materials came to Kyiv from other sources, including a large body of UNR records from Cracow that the Nazis had brought there from Tarnów. And, as will be explained further below, some materials from the Petliura Library that Soviet authorities retrieved elsewhere in Prague went to Kyiv, and there became intermixed with the UIK materials.[37]

Despite the general Soviet policy that Ukrainian émigré materials were to be concentrated in Kyiv, some UNR documentation came to Moscow from RZIA and has remained there. Prior to 1929, a number of important groups of Ukrainian materials, including fragmentary UNR diplomatic files, had been deposited in RZIA and were never transferred to UIK. Similarly, during the subsequent decade, a number of UNR files came to RZIA rather than UIK as part of larger collections received from Russian or Russian-Ukrainian émigré sources. The Ukrainian materials were never separated from RZIA in Prague and accordingly were shipped to Moscow. In the 1960s a number of splinter RZIA fonds with UNR military documentation were sent to Kyiv from Moscow. However, there is no explanation why the UNR diplomatic and other government files, most of which also came from RZIA, have remained in Moscow (See the fonds which I have numbered 7–11, listed on pp. 413–16).

Because the TsGAOR division for émigré fonds long bore the RZIA designation, many archivists there were not aware until very recently of the multifaceted provenance of those holdings. This fact and the fact that the fonds of materials from the Petliura Library all bore RZIA designations for the fonds to which they were assigned in TsGAOR SSSR, have been the cause for considerable confusion and misconception about their true origin. Most of these Ukrainian émigré fonds are listed in the sixth volume of the GA RF guide, but not all of them with correct attributions of provenance.[38]

The process of preparing the 1999 inter-repository guide to the RZIA collections has led to a better understanding of this problem. Particularly since some of the GA RF archivists engaged in that research were consulting this author about the fonds to be covered for the present article, further clarification has been possible.[39] Initially, most of the Ukrainian fonds described here were slated to be included in the RZIA guide, which embraces all of the materials that came to Moscow from RZIA in 1946, among them those that were later dispersed in over thirty other repositories throughout the former USSR. This author's own research in cooperation with archivists in GA RF uncovered the fact that most of these Ukrainian materials had not come from Prague, but

rather had been received from other sources. Spot checks of files in these current Paris fonds revealed stamps of the Petliura Library and other dedicatory inscriptions. At the same time, the inspection of UNR materials together with RZIA records yielded RZIA stamps, and hence that attribution of provenance must be respected. However, not all the questions about the provenance of these materials have been resolved.[40]

Transfer of Ukrainian Émigré Materials to TsGAOR SSSR from the Lenin Library

Those materials that can convincingly be identified as having come from the Petliura Library and related Ukrainian émigré organizations in Paris (which I have numbered nos. 1–6 below, pp. 410–13) were in fact received by the GA RF's predecessor, TsGAOR SSSR, in November 1948 among the 170 crates of archival materials transferred from the Lenin Library in Moscow. The official transfer document from the Lenin Library does not mention the Petliura Library, but it does specify files of the Ukrainian National Committee and the Orthodox Church in Paris, records of the Turgenev Library, and materials of "Ukrainian émigré organizations in Paris, among others." The act of transfer notes that the materials were directed to the RZIA division in TsGAOR, having been received by the Lenin Library from Berlin in 1946–1947.[41] It is safe to assume, for the most part, that the "materials of Ukrainian émigré organizations in Paris" transferred from the Lenin Library would have included those of the Petliura Library, since there were and still are no others of Parisian Ukrainian provenance in TsGAOR/GA RF.

There was also a transfer of two large fonds of Ukrainian émigré organizations received from the Lenin Library (GBL) in 1949, which are likewise held in GA RF and might initially have been thought to have originated in the Petliura Library. This was especially true of the records of the Ukrainian Press Bureau in Lausanne, since other Ukrainian press bureau records were in fact received by the Petliura Library on the eve of World War II. Earlier listed in TsGAOR with an attribution of provenance to RZIA, both of them (see the fonds numbered 12–13 listed on p. 416) had been received by the Lenin Library from Geneva, together with the papers of the bibliographer, writer, and bookman Nikolai Aleksandrovich Rybakin (1862–1946).[42]

As is apparent in the 1948 act of transfer, the Ukrainian materials involved were undoubtedly intermingled with those from the Turgenev Library that were found in Silesia in 1945–1946, quite possibly constituting part of the materials that the ERR was trying to evacuate from Ratibor. As mentioned above, the Turgenev Library materials were sorted by the Soviet Library Brigade in Silesia before dispatch to Moscow and Minsk. The Lenin Library transfer document noted that the administrative records of the Turgenev Library came to TsGAOR from the Lenin Library as part of that same 1948 transfer. The fragmentary Turgenev Library records received were assigned to a separate

fond in the RZIA Division of TsGAOR, and for a long time archivists also assumed those materials were from Prague, although clearly they were taken by the Nazis in Paris at the same time they seized the Petliura Library.[43] GA RF also has a separate fond with a "Collection of Letters from Russian Soldiers on the French Front Gathered by the Turgenev Library in Paris," which undoubtedly was received at the same time. In this case the fond designation is misleading, since the files involved are letters from soldiers regarding the loan of books from the Turgenev Library and are clearly part of the administrative records of the library.[44] The fact of the seizure of its administrative records was confirmed in Paris, along with paintings and portraits that decorated the library. Fortunately, the Nazis apparently did not seize all of the "Russian Literary Archive," which had been established as an autonomous entity within the Turgenev Library at the beginning of 1938.[45] But in the case of the smaller Petliura Library, nothing was left behind.

The fact of the transfer of archival materials from the Lenin Library—now the Russian State Library (RGB)—raises the strong possibility that some books from the Petliura Library may now be held there. We know from other sources that the Lenin Library kept many books that had come its way from the Turgenev Library in its classified Secret Section, although some were distributed to other divisions, and others were used for exchange with foreign libraries.[46] Recently, some books bearing stamps of the Turgenev Library have been identified in Moscow in the library of the former Institute of Marxism-Leninism (IML pri TsK KPSS), which has been redesignated the State Socio-Political Library—GOPB (Gosudarstvennaia obshchestvenno-politicheskaia biblioteka). Other Turgenev Library books have been identified in the library of Voronezh State University.[47] At the time of writing, however, no books bearing stamps from the Petliura Library have been discovered in any of those libraries, although a thorough search has not been undertaken.[48] Vasyl′ Mykhal′chuk, in his 1999 historical memoir account of the Petliura Library, mentioned a fragmentary second-hand report of a box of books marked "Ukrainian Library—Paris" found in the basement of the former Lenin Library (now the Russian State Library) in the early 1990s.[49] Colleagues in that library deny this possibility, since, according to their records, all trophy books it received were processed in the immediate postwar decade.

Given what we already know about the prewar archival holdings of the Petliura Library and the fragments of those archival materials held elsewhere in Moscow and Kyiv, we can now identify a number of separate fonds in GA RF that retain its materials. There are a number of related Ukrainian émigré fonds now organized in GA RF that were of Parisian provenance, but that had been merged with the materials from the Petliura Library while they were in Nazi hands. We also can designate several Ukrainian émigré fonds in GA RF with scattered files from UNR records, most of which undoubtedly came from RZIA in Prague, although questions remain about parts of some of the fonds.

Files in some of the Ukrainian émigré archival fonds from Paris described below possibly were added to those fonds from other sources. A number of files in some of the fonds may have been misarranged. Certain of those fonds have stray file units and stray documents of alternate provenance, including some that may well have been received with the Prague RZIA shipment. That shipment itself included materials from other émigré institutions in Czechoslovakia in addition to RZIA. Further research and verification are still necessary for a number of reasons: the effects of the multiple archival transfers in the postwar decades; the fact that all of the incoming miscellaneous collections were broken down into unduly specific fonds without regard to the archive where they were last held or the collection with which they were received; and because of the lack of precise provenance attributions. Nevertheless, the general outline of the situation is clear for a start. In the list below, the Russian name of the fond that follows the English translation is the form currently used in GA RF. The Ukrainian names have been added.

GA RF Fonds from the Petliura Library

1. *S. Petliura Ukrainian Library, Paris (Ukrainskaia biblioteka im. S. Petliury. Parizh/Ukraïns′ka biblioteka im. S. Petliury. Paryzh) (GA RF, fond R-7008; 1* opis′; *141 units; 1909, 1914–1917, 1919–1920, 1922, 1924–1939).* There is no doubt about the Parisian provenance of the fond designated for the Petliura Library itself, which originally contained only 64 file units, but was later augmented by 77 more "from unsorted bundles of miscellaneous fragments." TsGAOR/GA RF archivists had earlier been attributing provenance to RZIA, but clearly that is not the case for most of the files.[50] The vast majority of the files were in fact looted by the Nazis from the library in Paris, and most of the documentation had never been in Prague. Some of the documents even bear stamps of the Petliura Library, dedicatory inscriptions, or other indications of their Parisian source.

The Petliura Library fond in GA RF is not arranged in an orderly manner, and its contents are similar to the parallel fond in RGVA. Scattered throughout the fond are the following: folders with administrative records of the library, such as the library statutes in French and Ukrainian (no. 111); incoming correspondence from all over the world (many of the letters had enclosed monetary contributions) relating to the opening of the library in 1929 (no. 32); an account register from 1927–1931 (no. 93); and an acquisition register of book receipts in 1929 (no. 87).

Of particular importance to the Petliura Library, and something not found in the parallel fond from TsGOA, are various volumes of the library's own book catalogs, some typewritten but many in manuscript notebooks, covering different subjects: "Ukraine—History, Geography, Ethnography" (1908–1940), with an inserted loose notebook labeled "Duplicates" (no. 65); "Scientific Subjects" (1939–1940) (no. 66); "Religion and Philosophy" (no. 67); "Ukrainian Litera-

ture" (October 1940) (no. 68); "Music" (1911–1931) (no. 76); "Military Affairs" (no. 82); "Ukrainian journals" (1921–1938) (nos. 90–92); and so forth. There are also catalogs of the branch libraries in Vésines-Chalette (no. 85) and Audun-le-Tiche (no. 39), the one for the latter having an inserted list of books for the branch in Grenoble.

In addition to the library records, many files contain archival materials donated to the library collections. There are scattered manuscript materials, some of them with the original letters or inscriptions of donation to the Petliura Library, such as a large collection of articles, speeches, and notes about Petliura presented to the library during the 1930s (no. 11), and another with memoirs on the Civil War inscribed as a donation to the Petliura Museum in Paris (no. 12). A large part of the fond consists of printed (or hectographed) laws and regulations of the UNR or other Ukrainian organizations; hectographed or typewritten lectures on various subjects; and press clippings regarding Ukrainian politics, the Schwarzbard trial, and memorial events at the library.

Among printed materials from the library are scattered issues of Ukrainian press bulletins, student journals, and newsletters of Ukrainian émigré organizations in different countries. Many of them bear the stamp of the Petliura Library and would have been classified among its book and serial collections rather than as archival materials. Hence they should be considered among the "missing" publications held by the library.

2. *Editorial Records of the Ukrainian Journal* Tryzub, *Paris (Redaktsiia zhurnala* Trizub [*sic*]. *Parizh/Redaktsiia zhurnalu* Tryzub, *Paryzh) (GA RF, fond 7498 [earlier 3882s]; 93 units; 1918–1944).* The *opis′* of this fond also bears the designation "RZIA," although the provenance is now correctly identified as Paris.[51] As we now know, the *Tryzub* records had never been acquired by RZIA and remained in the Petliura Library in Paris until they were seized by the Nazis. Complementing the other *Tryzub* records in RGVA, this fond contains fragmentary correspondence files (e.g., nos. 85, 91, and 92) and proofs of articles for the journal (e.g., nos. 88, 90), including a manuscript article by Volodymyr Leontovych (no. 93), which was added to the fond in 1973.

The bulk of the files, however, contain scattered issues of Ukrainian press bulletins and periodicals, undoubtedly from the main library's periodical holdings. There are also press clippings from different newspapers, including, for example, several files of clippings and press surveys relating to Schwarzbard (nos. 5–8, 78). Many of these belong among the holdings of the Petliura Library itself, rather than to the editorial records of *Tryzub*.

3. *Committee to Honor the Memory of Petliura, Paris (Komitet po chestvovaniiu pamiati S. V. Petliury, Parizh/Komitet dlia vshanuvannia pam'iati S. V. Petliury, Paryzh) (GA RF, fond R-7437; 5 units; 1926–1929).*[52] Some of these files that now form a separate fond most probably came

from the records of the library itself, since the Committee in question was in fact organizing the library as a monument to Petliura during that period. GA RF archivists indicate that the materials were acquired by RZIA in 1926 and 1928, but further verification is needed because these acquisitions may comprise only the few posters in one file with RZIA stamps.[53] None of the remaining documents bear RZIA stamps, and there is no indication that all of the other documents were acquired by RZIA, especially those addressed to Paris. There was a parallel committee operating in Czechoslovakia, and an extensive campaign was waged there to raise money for the library. Rudychiv, who was then still in Prague, was active in the Czechoslovak capital until he moved to Paris. The fact that this fond has intermixed documents from Paris and Prague makes it impossible to assign definitive provenance at this point.

In the collection are protocols of meetings in Paris involving the library founders, including General Oleksander Udovychenko and Oleksander Shul′hyn (no. 1). The correspondence (1926–1928) comprises incoming letters from Prague (no. 2), some of them containing money sent to Paris for the library (with receipts for donations from *Tryzub*). That file, however, also contains a few receipts and letters sent to the Czechoslovak committee in Prague and Poděbrady, including a few addressed to Rudychiv in Prague. Only a few of the documents (most of them, small posters or billboard notices) in that large file bear RZIA stamps, as noted above. Contingent files contain more receipts from the Commission (nos. 3 and 5), along with communications from the Commission (no. 4) and a duplicated "Komunikat" of the S. Petliura Society.

Other GA RF Fonds from Ukrainian Émigré Organizations in France

4. *Union of the Ukrainian Community in France, Paris (Ob″edinennaia ukrainskaia obshchina vo Frantsii. Parizh/Ob'iednana ukraïns′ka hromada u Frantsiï. Paryzh) (GA RF, fond R-9107; 1* opis′*; 14 units; 1924–1936).* These files, which have been established as a separate fond, may have come from the materials of the library itself, although quite possibly the Nazis acquired them from other Ukrainian émigré sources in Paris. This is a good example of an artificial fond created from intermixed documents, and further analysis is required to verify their provenance.

The fond contains protocols of meetings, resolutions, and account registers. There are also some printed brochures and serial publications.

5. *Society of Former Combatants of the UNR Army in France, Paris (Obshchestvo byvshikh voennosluzhashchikh armii Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliki vo Frantsii. Parizh/Tovarystvo buvshykh voiakiv armiï Ukraïns′koï Narodnoï Respubliky u Frantsiï. Paryzh) (GA RF, fond R-6406; 667 units; 1918–1940).*[54] This Society was established in Paris in 1923 and headed by General Udovychenko, one of the founders of the Petliura Library. We cannot

be sure that all of the materials in this collection were held by the Petliura Library itself, but documentation from the Society was reported among the prewar library holdings. Similar to the counterpart fond in RGVA (no. 4), it would appear that the materials came from Paris and not Prague. Nor is there any indication that they would have been transferred to Prague, since the Society itself remained active in France until the Nazi invasion. Although GA RF archivists still attribute provenance to RZIA in Prague (on the grounds that the materials were received with RZIA no. 4412 in 1946), further analysis of the fond's provenance is necessary. Further confusion arises owing to some labels suggesting that the fond was originally devoted to "Constituent Members of Russia in Paris." The *opis´* lists 630 file units that were first verified in 1952 and another 37 that were added later.

The files contain, among other documentation, correspondence, correspondence journals, and protocols of meetings. There are also printed brochures and scattered serial publications.

6. *Supreme Church Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in France, Paris (Vysshii tserkovnyi sovet Ukrainskikh pravoslavnikh prikhodov vo Frantsii. Parizh/Vyshcha rada Ukraïns´koï pravoslavnykh tserkov u Frantsiï. Paryzh) (GA RF, fond R-9106; 1* opis´*; 14 units; 1925–1936).* These few files that now form a separate fond may have come from the Petliura Library itself, although the Nazis may have picked them up from other sources in Paris. The TsGAOR 1948 act of transfer mentions materials from the Orthodox Church in Paris, and it is quite possible that while the materials were in Nazi hands, Ukrainian Orthodox Church files were combined with Russian ones. No stamps have been found on the files examined that would indicate their provenance.

The files contain protocols of meetings (no. 1), correspondence, books of members (1930–1935) (no. 2), document registers (1926–1927—no. 8; and 1931–1938—nos. 9–11), and accounting records (1931–1932—nos. 12 and 13).

UNR Government and Diplomatic Documentation from Paris and Prague (RZIA)

7. *Chancellery of the UNR Rada [Poland] (Kantseliariia Soveta Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliki/Kantseliariia Rady Ukraïns´koï Narodnoï Respubliky) (GA RF, fond R-7526; 1* opis´*; 16 units; 1920–1930).* This fragmentary fond appears to be of heterogeneous provenance. Documents in the first part of the *opis´* (nos. 1–11, first prepared in 1954) bear no stamps, but some documents in one of the files among the later additions (nos. 12–16, added in September 1960) bear RZIA stamps. Hence, these files may have been acquired by RZIA with other UNR documents, but no confirmation has been found.[55]

The first file contains a fragmentary UNR law. Subsequent files contain drafts or copies of protocols of meetings of the UNR Rada in Poland (June–August 1921) (nos. 2–8), a report on the Rada's legal work (February–June 1921) (no. 9), a report on financial work in Poland (January–April 1921) (no. 10), and a list of deputies to different commissions (1921) (no. 11). Among the files added later, no. 12 contains printed UNR handbills and declarations bearing RZIA stamps.[56] Remaining files contain a copy of the treaty of peace between the UNR and Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey (n.d.); a regulation issued by the Rada (3 March 1921); a secret letter from the Volhynian and Podilian Committee (7 April 1921) to the UNR (no. 15); and a letter from the Head of the Rada to V. P. Lystovnych in Tarnów (31 December 1922).

8. *UNR Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Tarnów, Poland] (Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliki/Ministerstvo zakordonnykh sprav Ukraïns′koï Narodnoï Respubliky), 1918–[1921] (GA RF, fond R-6087; 1* opis′*; 17 units; 1918–1923).*[57] A separate fond was established in TsGAOR SSSR for scattered files from the UNR Foreign Ministry, which in fact came to GA RF with the RZIA collections. The earlier erroneous TsGAOR/GA RF attribution of its provenance to Tărnovo, Bulgaria, has recently been corrected.[58] The first batch of documents came to RZIA in 1924, a second installment arrived in 1926 from Sergei P. Postnikov, and others were received from S. Elachich in 1935. According to the TsGAOR *opis′* (first copy) and administrative record of the fond (*delo fonda*), eleven units and three kilograms of fragmentary papers (*rospysi*) were destroyed in 1956 as being of "no scientific value." Six items were added to the fond in May 1960.

The initial file contains regulations issued by the UNR Directorate (1919–1921) and a later one bears excerpts of regulations (no. 6). Intervening files have annual journals of meetings of the UNR Council of Ministers (nos. 2–5—1918–1921). Several others appear to be consular files, mostly concerning relations with Poland and efforts of the International Red Cross to help Ukrainians in Poland (no. 9) and Germany (no. 11).

9. *UNR Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (Delegatsiia Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliki na mirnoi konferentsii v Parizhe/Delehatsiia Ukrains′koï Narodnoï Respubliky na myrnii konferentsiï v Paryzhi), 1919–1920 (GA RF, fond R-7027; 1* opis′*; 40 units; 1918–1921).*[59] A separate fond was established in TsGAOR for the UNR delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920), which did not have official diplomatic recognition. It was headed by Count Mykhailo T. Tyshkevych. Files of the UNR Delegation in Paris would probably have originally been merged with files from the UNR Diplomatic Mission in Paris (no. 10), under which name the same delegation functioned. RZIA accession numbers suggest the overlap and confirm that these files also

came from Prague.[60] RZIA reports from the late 1920s and/or 1931 affirm the acquisition of 500 pages of documents of the Ukrainian delegation in Paris (1919–1922), but the fate of the remainder of the documents is not known. The two GA RF fonds hardly total that number.[61] Two folders of these files were noted in a 1960 list of Ukrainian émigré fonds held in TsDIAK in Kyiv, but have not been located there.[62]

10. *UNR Diplomatic Mission in Paris (Chrezvychainaia diplomaticheskaia missiia Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliki [UNR] v Parizhe/Nadzvychaina dyplomatychna misiia UNR v Paryzhi), 1920–1921(GA RF, fond R-6275; 1 opis′; 27 units; 1917–1921, 1926, 1928).*[63] A separate fond was formed in TsGAOR for the UNR Diplomatic Mission in Paris, which, like the UNR delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, lacked official diplomatic recognition. In point of fact, however, these files were undoubtedly originally consolidated with files from the UNR delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (no. 9), because their dates overlapped and the same individuals were involved. The delegation was first headed by Count Tyshkevych; in 1921 Oleksander Shul′hyn was named ambassador.

GA RF now correctly attributes this fond as having been received from RZIA, as all of the files with publications examined bear RZIA stamps with RZIA acquisition numbers added. Judging by the numbers involved, the documents came to RZIA intermixed with those assigned to the separate fond 7027 (no. 9).[64] Initially, 22 items were assigned to the fond in 1951 and 6 more were added later.

Some confusion has arisen because other records of the UNR Diplomatic Mission in Paris were acquired by the Petliura Library in 1939. Most of them (6,809 documents) remain in the Petliura Library in Paris having escaped confiscation by the Nazis.[65]

The collection comprises several official documents about the establishment of the Mission, other communications sent from the UNR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Mission in Paris (nos. 5 and 24), and memoranda on the question of accepting Ukraine into the League of Nations. A 1920 printed brochure requests Ukrainian admission to the League of Nations (no. 11). There is also a copy of a letter from Petliura to Tyshkevych about preparations for a new Ukrainian offensive against the Bolsheviks (December 1920), and documentation concerning assistance to Ukrainian émigrés in France. There are several printed bulletins and brochures.

11. *Embassy of the Ukrainian National Republic in Germany, Berlin (Posol′stvo Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliki v Germanii/Posol′stvo Ukraïns′koï Narodnoï Respubliky v Nimechchyni) (GA RF, fond R-5889; 1 opis′; 36 units; 1918–1926).*[66] Some of the fragmentary files that were grouped together in TsGAOR SSSR as what is now a fond designated for the UNR

Embassy in Berlin bear a RZIA Prague inventory number.[67] The files were acquired by RZIA in the late 1920s or early 1931, and an additional part was obtained in 1934.[68] The first 28 units that initially comprised the TsGAOR fond were acquired by RZIA as part of a collection that included documentation from the UNR delegation in France, UNR missions in England, Turkey, Italy, Vienna, and other countries; and a large packet from the UNR Ministry of Finance (1919–1920).[69] These other materials may have been among the UNR papers that were transferred from the TsGAOR SSSR to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1947.[70]

Many of the files in the present fond in GA RF are of relatively minor interest, being reports of the mission's press bureau, rather than actual diplomatic correspondence. This corroborates the German assessment during World War II that the UNR documentation in Prague was fragmentary and not essential for removal. The same decision apparently was made by Soviet authorities. Although the UNR Berlin Embassy files were on the list of RZIA documentation to have been transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR at the end of 1946, they do not appear on the official acts of transfer. All the initial 28 files that then comprised the fond remained in TsGAOR in 1948.[71]

Of more interest in the present GA RF fond 5889 are some folders that were added later (as per an endorsement on the *opis′*), including a letter by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and another from 1919 regarding UNR funds in the Berlin Reichsbank. Most notable among these later additions is the personal correspondence of Petliura and the UNR ambassador in Berlin, Viktor Porsh. That latter folder (no. 34) includes a letter of presentation to RZIA (1934) and a note about the Petliura letter that was sold to RZIA.[72]

Ukrainian Émigré Fonds from Lausanne

12. *Ukrainian Press Bureau, Lausanne (Ukrainskoe press-biuro v Lozanne/ Ukraïns′ke press-biuro v Lozanni) (GA RF, fond R-7050;* 2 opisi*; 2,011 units; 1902–1944).* Earlier listed in TsGAOR with an attribution of provenance to RZIA, this group of materials was in fact received from the Lenin Library in 1949 from Geneva, together with the papers of the bibliographer, writer, and bookman Nikolai Aleksandrovich Rybakin. Other records of the Ukrainian Press Bureau had been acquired by the Petliura Library before the war, but it is not clear if any of these might be interspersed in the present fond.

13. *Editorial records of the journal* Ukraïna, *Lausanne (Redaktsiia zhurnala* Ukraina/*Redaktsiia zhurnalu* Ukraïna*) (GA RF, fond R-7063; 257 units; 1911–1924).* Acquired from the Lenin Library in 1949 with the preceding fond from Geneva.

Materials from the Petliura Library and Other UNR Records in Kyiv

Ukrainian Émigré Holdings from Prague to TsDIAK and TsDAZhR

Even before the nine wagon loads of RZIA materials had arrived in Moscow in early January 1946, a railroad freight car of collections from the Ukrainian Historical Cabinet was transferred directly from Prague to Kyiv in October 1945. Coming "as a gift of the Czechoslovak government to the Ukrainian people," along with the Czechoslovak *opisi* and copies of the relevant administrative archive of UIK in Prague, it also included extensive archival materials from other Ukrainian émigré institutions in Prague, only part of which had been formally accessioned to UIK.[73] According to the official top-secret Archival Administration report to Nikita Khrushchev in Kyiv and Lavrentii Beria in Moscow, "the so-called Ukrainian Archive, formed on the basis of the Ukrainian University in Poděbrady (Czechoslovakia)," comprised documentary materials of the ministries of the Ukrainian "bourgeois-nationalist 'governments' of Skoropads'kyi, the Central Rada, Petliura, and others. The archive also holds a large quantity of personal fonds of known individuals in the Ukrainian national movement."[74] That description was inaccurate, since UIK was in fact formed under the auspices of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry in Prague, not the University in Poděbrady, although some collections from Ukrainian institutions in Poděbrady had been accessioned.[75]

Immediately after the war, all of the many émigré materials brought to Kyiv from various points abroad, and most notably from Prague, were initially placed in the Special Division of Secret Fonds—OOSF (*Osobyi otdel sekretnykh fondov*) of the Central State Historical Archive in Kyiv—TsDIA URSR (later TsDIAK). According to Moscow instructions, that section was organized as one of the main centers for "operational" analysis in the search of wartime collaborators and "anti-Soviet" émigrés. The émigré materials were broken down into over 300 often fragmentary fonds according to the archivists' determination of their alleged creating agencies, which, in fact, frequently obscures their true provenance.[76] By 1948, the section had prepared reports on 19,298 predominantly "Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist émigrés," and sent the MGB detailed reports on several organizations of Ukrainian nationalists abroad.[77]

Some UNR files, together with related records from the period of struggle for Ukrainian independence during 1917–1921, went to the Central State Archive of the October Revolution of the Ukrainian SSR (TsDAZhR URSR), which was still located in Kharkiv. Before World War II, that archive had brought together all possible records from the UNR period remaining in the USSR, as well as a few émigré and military records. In the 1960s parts of the TsDIAK émigré holdings were transferred to TsDAZhR. After construction of the new building for the Ukrainian Central State Archives in Kyiv in 1972, all

of the émigré holdings were consolidated in what became the Special Division of Secret Fonds of TsDAZhR. These postwar developments and transfers, together with the pressure for immediate "operational" analysis, explain the further fragmentation of the materials today and complicate assigning provenance to many files and determining the history of individual fonds.

Unfortunately, no comprehensive list of fonds covering the former Secret Division is currently available to researchers. It is accordingly very difficult, if not impossible, for researchers to identify all of the UNR records and related fonds now held in the successor to the TsDAZhR—now known as the Central State Archive of Highest Organs of State Power and Administration of Ukraine, TsDAVO Ukraïny (Tsentral′nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv derzhavnoï vlady i upravlinnia Ukraïny). A brief survey of records in TsDAVO from the UNR period appeared in 1996, but the archivist who wrote that first overview of the holdings does not mention the Parisian collection.[78] While noting that there are now some 400 fonds from the period of the UNR, she only mentions a few of those specifically relating to Petliura and the UNR itself.

Petliura Library Materials from Paris

It has not yet been possible to establish where Soviet authorities found the fragmentary archival materials from the Petliura Library in Paris that are now in Kyiv, and details about their source of acquisition by the archive have not surfaced. Recently, lists of postwar holdings of the Special Division of TsDIAK have been found confirming acquisition in January 1946 of several groups of émigré papers from Paris that are now held in TsDAVO in Kyiv.[79] But details of where they came from or of the Soviet agency that held them before transfer to the archive are lacking.[80] A letter to the chief of the Ukrainian Archival Administration, Panteleimon P. Gudzenko, dated 4 June 1947, mentions "half a carload of documents . . . which arrived from Germany in a wagon amidst library books and among which are some documents from Paris in French."[81] But those are most likely later additions, and not necessarily Ukrainian émigré ones, because later lists of fonds in the Special Secret Division of TsDIAK show no new Ukrainian émigré fonds from Paris that did not appear on earlier lists.

The existence of the Parisian materials in Kyiv has hitherto not been widely known because there is no publicly available list of holdings in the formerly Secret Division of TsDAZhR URSR. Some preliminary descriptive words about these materials therefore are in order here, although a more professional survey and comprehensive list of fonds is still among the high priority archival reference needs in Kyiv. Given the extent and complexity of the UNR holdings from Prague that are now in Kyiv, as well as the UNR holdings that were already held in Kyiv and Kharkiv before World War II, no attempt will be made here to survey them.

It could have been suspected that the materials from Paris in Kyiv would have come with the records of the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR), which were received in Kyiv in TsDIA from Dresden in December of 1945. We already know that the Petliura Library was in Ratibor, and that the ERR succeeded in evacuating some of their records as the Red Army was approaching (January 1945). However, there is no mention of the fonds from Paris in any of the appraisals of the ERR materials after their receipt in Kyiv.[82] Possibly, they were among those not evacuated, but that were retrieved by Soviet authorities in Silesia in the spring of 1946 and first shipped to Minsk. Some of the Parisian materials in Kyiv mesh exactly with the additional files from the same Paris sources that are now held in Moscow, and which we now know were received in 1955 from Minsk. However, no transfer documents from Minsk to Kyiv involving these materials have been found.[83] Some of the Ukrainian émigré materials from Paris conceivably came via these two channels, but, given the chaotic situation in the Kyiv archive in 1945 and 1946, the details of such transfers apparently were never recorded.

Another more likely explanation for the acquisition of at least some of the materials from the Petliura Library in TsDAVO has recently emerged with the availability of a report by Rudychiv, the aforementioned long-time librarian of the Petliura Library, who was present when the Nazis confiscated the library and its archival holdings in Paris in January 1941. Rudychiv, it will be recalled, was subsequently summoned to Berlin in May 1941, purportedly to work with the library. Although he stayed in Berlin until the fall of 1942, he never did see the library before he was permitted to return to Paris. Following his return, Rudychiv prepared a report for the Petliura Library Council in France in December 1942.[84]

According to that report, Rudychiv gave the memoir account he had written in Berlin about the Nazi seizure of the library, "Iak tse bulo," to his old friend Ievhen Vyrovyi (or Jevhen Vyrovyj) from Prague, whom he met in Berlin. Indeed, that autographed memoir account ("Iak tse bulo") is now among the Petliura Library documents in Kyiv. Rudychiv also mentions having given Vyrovyi some other documentation relating to the library for the Museum of the Struggle for the Liberation of Ukraine in Prague before he left Berlin.[85] If Vyrovyi succeeded in taking Rudychiv's papers and the other documentation that Rudychiv had saved from the Petliura Library to Prague, then these materials probably came to Kyiv with the holdings that Soviet authorities seized from Prague after the war.[86] Significant amounts of documents held by the interwar Museum of the Struggle for the Liberation of Ukraine (sometimes translated as the Museum of Ukraine's Struggle for Independence) in Prague were seized by Soviet authorities and transferred to Kyiv. However, those transfers took place only in 1958 and 1962.[87] Furthermore, although some of the materials went to TsDIAK at that time, many of those later Soviet seizures from Prague went directly to the KGB or MVD in Kyiv rather than to the state archives.

It is unlikely that Vyrovyi would have transferred that documentation to the Museum in Prague during the war. Vyrovyi, just as NKVD agents were coming to arrest him, committed suicide in Prague in May 1945. If Rudychiv's papers and other documents remained with Vyrovyi himself, then perhaps they were confiscated at that time or soon afterwards, which would explain their accession in the Kyiv archive in January 1946.[88]

In addition to the Rudychiv papers now in TsDAVO, there are several other fragmentary fonds comprising additional materials that presumably came from the Petliura Library in Paris. Paralleling materials from the same sources in Moscow, it is not immediately apparent from their dates and contents that these materials would have been with Rudychiv in Berlin. However, all of them, as noted in the immediate postwar lists of fonds in the Special Division of TsDIAK where they were originally housed, were apparently received at the same time as the Rudychiv papers.

There quite possibly are other similarly fragmentary fonds in TsDAVO today that have been assigned for materials originating from the Petliura Library or related Ukrainian organizations in Paris, including fonds of personal papers. And perhaps, too, files from the Petliura Library were dispersed among other fonds. Because no comprehensive list of fonds covering the former Secret Division is currently available to researchers, it is impossible to identify other materials from Paris assigned to separate fonds that might now in fact be held in TsDAVO. However, all those that were identified in the 1947–1949 lists of holdings in the Special Secret Division of TsDIAK are now accounted for in TsDAVO, and are described in the list below.

Still other fragmentary materials from the Petliura Library and other files from the UNR are today held across the city of Kyiv by the former Communist Party Archive, now the Central State Archive of Public Organizations—TsDAHO. In 1988, a considerable group of archival materials that had been held by the KGB and/or MVD in Kyiv was transferred by the MVD to the former Communist Party Archive. This group comprises most of the materials from the Museum of the Struggle for the Liberation of Ukraine that were seized in 1958 and 1962 in Prague, and then separated from the other materials that went to TsDIA or TsDAZhR. They also include other Ukrainian émigré materials collected by secret service agents from disparate sources in Prague and other cities, along with some fragmentary materials brought to Kyiv earlier that had been turned over to the MVD/KGB at various times for specific investigations. They came to the former Party Archive in unsorted packages; by the spring of 2000 they had not been fully processed.[89] A folder of letters that Rudychiv received in Berlin and other documentation about the Petliura Library can be found among these materials.

The Ukrainian émigré archival holdings from Paris now in Kyiv are exceedingly fragmentary, and in almost all cases they represent files contingent to those already described among the former TsGOA/TsKhIDK holdings in RGVA and those in GA RF in Moscow. Their distribution into multiple frag-

mentary fonds is also similar to the arrangement of the contingent records in Moscow, although with a few notable exceptions. Their division between two different archives in Kyiv is unfortunate, but given the problems in Kyivan archives today, it is unlikely that the separation can be corrected.

UNR Records from Cracow/Tarnów in Kyiv

Much more politically significant than the fragmentary files from the Petliura Library and Ukrainian émigré organizations in Paris were the records of the UNR government itself that the Soviet authorities also transferred to Kyiv after the war. As was described earlier, during the war Nazi archival authorities from the Reichsarchiv had overseen the processing of a major body of records of the UNR Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance. Discovered in Tarnów, these materials had been brought to Cracow where German inventories were prepared between 1942 and 1944.[90]

Soviet SMERSH agents removed these records from the State Archive in Cracow in March 1945.[91] Confirmation of the Soviet removal of these UNR materials has been found in Soviet sources in the recently declassified files of the Soviet archival administrations in both Moscow and Kyiv. On 12 March 1945 the head of the Lviv Oblast Archival Administration informed NKVD archival authorities in Kyiv that a SMERSH unit of the Fourth Ukrainian Front in Cracow "was in the possession of Petliura documents in the Ukrainian language from the years 1918–1922."[92] So important was this "find" to Soviet authorities that the news was forwarded to Moscow ten days later with the request for orders to transfer the materials to Kyiv.[93]

According to a later report, "a freight-train wagon load of documentary materials of the former Petliura Directorate and its ministries, under the jurisdiction of counterintelligence 'SMERSH' of the Fourth Ukrainian Front transported from Vienna," arrived in Lviv at the end of May 1945. However, the fact that the shipment also included "six freight-train wagons of documentary materials removed by the German-Fascist occupiers from the Lviv Archive of Early Acts," which had been recovered near Cracow, and other such references, confirms that the shipment included the Cracow Petliura materials and makes it unlikely that the shipment came from Vienna (although the Cracow wagons could have been added to a train originating in Vienna). Valentyn Riasnyi, the Ukrainian Commissar of Internal Affairs, ordered the transfer of the Petliura materials to the Archive of the October Revolution (TsDAZhR) in Kyiv.[94] Gudzenko, the Ukrainian Archival Administration Chief, subsequently confirmed that the six wagons had returned from Cracow to Lviv, and that "documentary materials of the Ukrainian counterrevolutionary government from the 1917–1927 period consisting of eighteen fonds (6,234 units) . . . found by SMERSH in Cracow" were transferred to TsDAZhR in Kyiv.[95]

No further reports have been detected on what specific materials (if any) may have been transported from Vienna in that same shipment. Some files

relating to the Petliura government were brought to Kyiv from Vienna at the end of the war, along with some other émigré Ukrainian fonds of Viennese provenance. A few are listed among the postwar holdings in TsDIAK, although details about their recovery, transfer, and date of acquisition are not available.[96]

From Polish and Nazi sources we already know that among the materials SMERSH removed from Cracow were the most important extant records of the UNR Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, for which German summary inventories are available. In TsDAVO today, there is a fond for the UNR Foreign Ministry and several other splinter fonds into which the materials may have been divided. However, details of their migration from Cracow have been suppressed, and a history or administrative record of the main Foreign Ministry fond is not available. It is impossible to reconstruct the "eighteen fonds (6,234 units)" initially projected, nor is it possible to confirm that all the materials in question remain in TsDAVO.

Approximately 30 letters and telegrams from the UNR Foreign Ministry records in Kyiv (fond 3696, *opys* 2) were published in the aforementioned 1996 volume of documents honoring the 70th anniversary of Petliura's assassination.[97] The compiler did not, however, present any more details he might have gleaned about the files themselves or their provenance. Most probably these documents all came to Kyiv with the Tarnów materials, but further analysis is needed to arrive at a more definitive conclusion.

Printed Books from the Petliura Library in Kyiv

As yet, the most significant collection of printed materials from the Petliura Library identified in Kyiv are the 240 books "returned" to Kyiv from Minsk in the late 1980s that are now held in the Parliamentary Library. It has recently been confirmed that some books from the Petliura Library were among one of the shipments of "trophy" books to Kyiv which arrived from Leningrad in 1946–1947. They were deposited in the State Historical Library in Kyiv, together with others with stamps of the Turgenev Library. A librarian working there in the early 1980s recently related that she encountered some books (in English and French) with those stamps in the foreign-language department, where she worked in 1983, when the library was ordered to remove books that were so identified. She lost her job when she wrote a letter to the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee in an effort to preserve the books from destruction. The few books that the library may have managed to preserve from the "cleansing operations" were shorn of their library stamps, which today would make their identification impossible. Other books may have been destroyed in earlier "cleansing" operations, much like those from the Turgenev Library which met a similar fate in Minsk.[98]

Some books from the Petliura Library are quite possibly held in the Central Library under the State Committee on Archives (DKAU) in Kyiv, which would

have been transferred there in the process of arranging the various fonds containing materials from the Petliura Library now stored in TsDAVO.[99] Inadequate data in acquisition registers, along with the lack of provenance data on library cards, would make it a labor-intensive task to check for Petliura Library books in that library, and we cannot rule out the possibility that Petliura Library stamps or book markings would have been expunged.

In June 1947, the head of the Ukrainian Archival Administration received an unspecified number of "published brochures of the League of Ukrainians in France" (1939) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in Moscow. According to the accompanying memorandum, these "could be good reference tools for identifying fellow-countrymen by operational organs and your Division of Utilization."[100] We do not know the disposition of these materials after their arrival in Kyiv.

Similar to the fonds from the Petliura Library deposited in Moscow, many scattered issues of émigré journals and press information bulletins have been incorporated as file units in several of the Ukrainian émigré fonds in TsDAVO, which otherwise would have been part of the original library holdings. Appropriate cataloging data or records of serial holdings are not currently available. According to archival regulations, books that might have come to the archives with archival materials in Kyiv should have been either deposited in the archival library (as was the case of many of the receipts from Prague) or transferred to other libraries. Transfers to other libraries were less likely in many cases, because restricted émigré materials were involved. Because of minimal library transfer and acquisition records—and because current catalogs do not indicate previous library markings on books—it would be a difficult task to try to find them.

Ominously, "brochures and information bulletins of Ukrainian émigré organizations in France" are specifically mentioned in connection with a shipment of 6,661 printed books requisitioned from Kyiv (TsDIAK) to Moscow (TsGOA) in 1956. The TsDIAK copy of the 1956 act of transfer is preserved, but a copy of the list that was to have been attached has not been found in the Kyiv file.[101] No incoming copy has surfaced in Moscow. Given the current lack of cataloging in the former TsGOA library in Moscow, it has not been possible to determine what books were involved, and no record of the incoming shipment has been found. Hence it is not possible to determine how many Petliura Library books might have been part of that shipment.[102]

In the former Communist Party Archive (now TsDAHO), where cataloging efforts are underway for the Ukrainian émigré documents from Prague transferred to that archive from MVD sources, a collection of Ukrainian émigré publications has been identified. But again, these are being designated as part of an archival fond. Item-level cataloging has not been undertaken, and there has as yet been no possibility of examining the volumes for book stamps, ex libris, or other markings.

Kyiv: Petliura Library and Seized UNR Records in TsDAVO

Distinguishing Documentation from the Petliura Library and other UNR Records

Given what we already know about the prewar archival holdings of the Petliura Library and the fragments of those archival materials held in Moscow, we can now identify a number of separate fonds in TsDAVO that retain materials from the Petliura Library (nos. 1–4). And there are a number of related Ukrainian émigré fonds of provenance in Paris (nos. 5–8). In some cases, they may have been intermixed with the materials from the Petliura Library while they were in Nazi hands, or after their arrival in Kyiv. Certain files in some of those fonds appear to be misarranged. Several fonds have stray file units, or even stray documents of alternate provenance, including some that may well have been received with the Prague UIK shipment.

Unlike the situation in GA RF, but like RGVA in Moscow, there are no current lists of fonds in the archive available to researchers in TsDAVO. Hence we can only rely on recently declassified typescript lists from the immediate postwar period, which in most cases do not even reflect current TsDAVO fond numbers. Because of the multiple archival transfers in the postwar decades—and because of the lack of precise provenance attributions and the fact that all of the incoming miscellaneous collections were broken down into fragmentary fonds without regard to the archive where they were last held or the collection with which they were received—further research and verification are still needed. Nevertheless, a preliminary outline of the fonds in question can be presented.

It is virtually impossible at this point to identify even the principal fonds that contain documentation from the UNR Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance that were shipped to Kyiv from Cracow in 1945. Given the potential importance of these materials and the lack of previous attribution of their provenance, some conjectures are appropriate. A separate analysis is needed to identify other UNR documentation in TsDAVO.

Fonds from the Petliura Library

1. *Symon Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris (Ukraïns'ka biblioteka im. Symona Petliury v Paryzhi) (TsDAVO, fond R-4362; 31 units; 1929–1941).* The fragmentary 31 files in TsDAVO that have been assigned to this fond are not the same type of administrative records of the Petliura Library as those found in either of the two Moscow archives described above (RGVA, no. 1 and GA RF, no. 1). Undoubtedly, these documents are what remained of the personal papers that Rudychiv had with him in Berlin in 1941 and 1942. According to Rudychiv's report of 1942, materials relating to the library were handed

over to "his friend from Prague for the Museum of the Struggle for the Liberation of Ukraine."[103] Although some of these documents may have come from the library in Paris, Rudychiv undoubtedly had brought them with him to Berlin. Others he received or prepared there. Thus, it is most likely that the 31 files forming fond R-4363 all went from Berlin to Prague (via Vyrovyi) and thence went to Kyiv from Prague. A few other Rudychiv papers have recently surfaced in TsDAHO amidst the documentation received from MVD sources, but none were cited in earlier descriptions of the archival materials that had been held by the Museum of the Struggle for the Liberation of Ukraine. That would be understandable if they only reached Prague in 1942, and it is unlikely that Vyrovyi would have immediately turned them over to the Museum. Closer examination of the files in this fond supports this hypothesis.

Of particular interest among these files are the following: two different versions of a handwritten history and description of the library Rudychiv prepared in Berlin (nos. 4 and 5), presumably by order of his Nazi "hosts"; a typewritten version (in several copies) of "Iak tse bulo"—Rudychiv's account of the Nazi arrival and confiscation of the library in Paris (1940–1941) and his subsequent transfer to Berlin in June 1941, which he prepared at Nazi request in July 1941 (no. 3); and his brief handwritten diary entries, spanning the period of fall 1940–1941 (no. 29). There are fragments of Rudychiv's personal correspondence with Ukrainian émigrés and émigré organizations, mostly from the period he was in Berlin. There are also some clippings and notes from the Ukrainian press, which Rudychiv prepared in Berlin (1941–1942), possibly at Nazi request.

A packet of letters, clippings, photographs, and notes of sympathy pertaining to the death in 1941 of Petliura's daughter, Lesia (no. 24), were undoubtedly collected by Rudychiv after the Nazis closed the library. One file (no. 31) contains many of Rudychiv's personal identification documents—a student lecture card from his period at Kamianets-Podilskyi State University in 1918 and registration cards in various cities following his emigration—Berlin, Vienna, and Prague.

The only substantial records of the library are 9 files containing annual reports and clippings about the library, mostly from *Tryzub* (nos. 6–14; 1929–1940). There is also a file with draft budgets for the library (no. 17; 1930–1940), a list of books and periodical publications presented to the library in 1940 (no. 18), a register of negative and positive photographs held by the library (no. 26), and statistics on subscribers (no. 27; 1929–1940). One file contains various announcements and clippings about Petliura's funeral (no. 19), another concerns memorial celebrations honoring Petliura in subsequent years, and still one more holds illustrated printed booklets describing the library and museum (no. 2; 1936–1940), which were probably prepared by Rudychiv.

2. *Editorial Records of the Ukrainian Journal* Tryzub, *Paris, (Redaktsiia zhurnalu* Tryzub *v Paryzhi) (TsDAVO, fond R-3537; 6 units; 1933–1934).* There are only 6 files in Kyiv from the editorial correspondence for the journal published at the Petliura Library, and then only some fragments from a few years. The more extensive files remain in Moscow. The 6 files comprise correspondence (1933–1934), lists of subscribers (1933–1934), and a copy of an article. There is also a printed bulletin of the Ukrainian Press Bureau in Paris (no. 4).

Of particular interest is a file added later that contains correspondence of Boris Lazarevskii (1930–1936; 50 fols.), which dates from the period he was working with the journal, but which does not necessarily belong to *Tryzub* records. Earlier, there had been more correspondence of Lazarevskii held in TsDIAK and TsDAZhR, but transfer documents were found, whereby correspondence between Lazarevskii and his brother Hlib and others in Poland was requisitioned from TsGAOR UkrSSR and sent to the former Special (*Osobyi*) Archive (TsGOA SSSR) in Moscow in March 1957.[104]

3. *Commission for the Conduct of the Trial on the Case of the Assassination of S. Petliura, Head of the Directorate and the Head Otaman of the Army of the UNR (Komisiia dlia vedennia sudovoho protsesu v spravi vbyvstva Holovy Dyrektoriï i Holovnoho otamana viis′k UNR S. Petliury) (1926–1928).* These files come from the commission established in connection with the trial of Schwarzbard after his assassination of Petliura in Paris and, according to available accounts, were most probably held by the Petliura Library before the Nazi invasion. The Commission included the same people involved in establishing the library, and its documentation remained in the library.

This fond includes appraisals of Petliura's conduct during the Jewish pogroms in Ukraine 1917–1919 with a number of press clippings (including a series of articles from the journal *Ukraïna* in 1919 and *Tryzub* articles about the trial—no. 23). It also contains descriptions of the preparation of witnesses and inquiries for the trial in Paris (nos. 1, 2), published acts and articles about the judicial inquiry, copies of letters to and about Petliura that were presented at the trial (nos. 3–8, 13), and additional materials about the Jewish pogroms in Ukraine (nos. 9–11, 14).

4. *Pavlo Ivanovych Chyzhevs′kyi (TsDAVO, fond R-3534; 23 units; 1919–1926).* This fond has fragmentary personal papers of Pavlo Ivanovych Chyzhevs′kyi (1860–1926), the Minister of Finance in the Central Rada, who subsequently served as an official representative of the Ukrainian Trade Mission in France, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland. Chyzhevs′kyi's papers were held by the Petliura Library before the war as affirmed in several sources.[105] Another few files of his papers are held in Moscow (RGVA, no. 7).

The files comprise the following: biographical documents (no. 1); business papers (nos. 7–13), including those relating to the League of Nations, 1919–

1925 (no. 8); correspondence (1919–1927) (nos. 14–22); published articles (nos. 2, 3); a manuscript for a geographic journal (no. 5); and proofs of an article on Ukraine and France (in French) (no. 23). One file contains printed (or duplicated) Ukrainian Press Bureau reports (no. 4).

Other Fonds from the Ukrainian Émigré Community in France

5. *Society of Former Combatants of the UNR Army in France, Paris (Uprava tov-va buvshykh voiakiv armiï UNR u Frantsiï. Paryzh) (TsDAVO, fond 4176; 1 unit; 1933–1936).* The fond parallels similarly entitled fonds in RGVA and GA RF. Only a single folder is now held in this separate fond, although a 1949 TsDIAK list indicated that at the time it had comprised 18 units (1930–1939). The fate of the additional units has not been determined.

The 10-page folder has documents relating to assistance for Ukrainian émigrés in France (1933–1936).

6. *Directorate of the [Ukrainian] Emigration Council in Paris (Holovna emihratsiina rada v Paryzhi) (TsDAVO, fond 3534 [earlier 247];* Opys *1—10 units; 1924–1935;* Opys *2—6 units; 1926–1936).* The first *opys* was prepared in 1949 with 8 units; 2 more were added in 1951. A second *opys* was prepared in TsDIAK in 1961 with 6 additional units. None of the predominantly printed or duplicated publications bear stamps or markings.

The first file contains mimeographic and proof copies of the protocols of the Council's First Conferences in Prague (published in Paris, 1929) (duplicate copies are in no. 9 and *opys* 2, no. 6) and the statute of the Council. It also has mimeographed copies of the Protocols of the Third Conference (1934) (nos. 3 and 10; and *opys* 2, no. 3). Other files contain letters (no. 4), newspaper clippings (no. 7), a printed brochure and a bulletin of the Ukrainian telegraph agency (1930–1935) (no. 6), and two articles in French on Ukraine (nos. 7 and 8). The second *opys* contains more duplicated communications of the Council from Paris (1934–1935) (no. 1), protocols of meetings (1926) (no. 2) and (1936) (no. 4), and other émigré bulletins.

7. *Ukrainian Community in France (Paris) (Ukraïns'ka hromada u Frantsiï) (TsDAVO, fond 3901; 12 units; 1928–1938).* This fond contains fragmentary files and publications of the Paris *Hromada* with indications of several different addresses in the French capital. One issue of the Society's *Vistnyk* (1931) (file no. 4) bears the stamp of the Association (with the address: 22, rue Barrault, Paris 13è). There are no other stamps or markings to suggest the materials had been acquired by the Petliura Library. A few related materials regarding this organization were sent from TsDIAK to the Special Archive in Moscow (TsGOA SSSR) in 1957: namely, a brochure about its first conference and an information bulletin of Ukrainian émigré organizations in France.[106]

Fragmentary files of this Ukrainian émigré organization include information for the membership (no. 1), protocols of meetings of the directors (1930—no. 2; and 1934–1935—nos. 7, 8), and correspondence (no. 3). There are copies of the organization's publication, *Vistnyk* (1931–1937) (nos. 4–6, 9, 10), and *Biuleten′* (1937, nos. 1–3) (file no. 12).

8. *Ukrainian Society for the League of Nations in Paris (Ukraïns′ke tovarystvo prykhyl′nykiv Lihy Natsii v Paryzhi) (TsDAVO, fond R-3535; 5 units; 1923–1940).* This fond was originally arranged in TsDAZhR in March 1951 with 4 units; a fifth was added later. The Society was founded in 1921 in Prague, under the presidency of Professor Andrii Yakovliv. Also active in Prague was Professor Oleksander Shul′hyn (Alexandre Choulguine), who was simultaneously the president of the Supreme Council of Ukrainian Émigrés. The social seat of the Society was in Paris, its secretary being M. B. Boiko (2, rue Denfort-Rochereau, Paris 5è). There were branches in Poland, Belgium, and Romania.

The contents of the fond are highly miscellaneous with a number of different printed or duplicated bulletins and other documents from various émigré organizations. One of the duplicated bulletins of the Society (in no. 2) bears a red stamp of the Ukrainian Historical Cabinet in Prague, but no other markings have been found.

File units of the fond contain copies of correspondence (1929–1930) (no. 1), with some letters addressed to the President of the Society in Prague. There are two copies of the Society's bulletin and a separate appeal of the League of Nations (no. 2). The third file consists of bulletins of the Press Bureau of the UNR Diplomatic Mission to Romania (1923)—one issued by the Society itself in Paris, a resolution of the Commission on Minorities, and a report on the financial situation of the Society, among other miscellaneous documents. A fourth folder contains a typescript essay on the international situation (1940), an annual report of the Society (1931), and copies of the Society's bulletin (1923–1936).

Petliura Papers from Other Sources

9. *Petliura, Symon Vasyl′ovych (TsDAVO, fond 3809; 2* opysy*; 17 units; 1907–1923:* opys *1, 6 units [1907–1919];* opys *2, 11 units [1920–1923].* TsDAVO also has a small separate fond with personal papers of Petliura himself, all of them dating to the period before Petliura's arrival in Paris. These files were apparently acquired before World War II from sources other than Paris, and there is no indication that any of these files came from Paris with the other Petliura materials described above. Most of the files in the first *opys*, which predate Petliura's exile, apparently came to Kyiv from TsDAZhR in Kharkiv, having been acquired early on from sources within Ukraine.

The provenance of the files now grouped in a second *opys* (established in 1954) has not been determined, and they pertain to the years that Petliura was

based in Poland. The documents in the second *opys* may have come to Kyiv with the UNR Tarnów materials (see below), or with the materials from the Ukrainian Historical Cabinet (UIK), or with other collections in Prague that had been earlier held by security services. Recently, some additional files have apparently been added to the second *opys*, with a few extending into 1924. It is conceivable that these came from the materials turned over to the archive from private sources in Prague, but provenance data is not presently available.

A few Petliura letters from this fond were published in a 1997 collection commemorating the seventieth anniversary of Petliura's assassination. The editor could not furnish exact archival citations, because, as he explained, the materials were still being processed. He was unable to glean provenance data, but suggested the materials may have come from the MVD and may have been among those seized from the collections of the Museum of the Struggle for the Liberation of Ukraine in Prague.[107]

Records of the UNR Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian National Republic (Ministerstvo zakordonnykh sprav UNR) (TsDAVO, fond no. 3696; 3 opysy*; 189, 703, and 51 units).* Archivists in TsDAVO have been unable to furnish details of the provenance and history of this fond. It is impossible at present to determine the provenance of its various parts because of the inadequate nature of inventories of the UNR records in TsDAVO, the unsystematic arrangement of files, and the lack of data about the history of the fond. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to coordinate the *opysy* of this fond with the German-language inventory of the UNR Foreign Ministry records that the Nazis prepared in Cracow, or to determine if all the materials seized from the Cracow inventory are now held in Kyiv.[108] In contrast to the careful arrangement imposed in Cracow, which appeared to follow the office of origin for the records involved, the Kyiv arrangement is much more random.

The Foreign Ministry files in the first *opys* obviously came to the archive earlier from other sources. The first *opys* (189 units) itself had initially been prepared in January and August 1943, apparently when those parts of TsDAZhR had been evacuated to the east by Soviet authorities.

From cursory examination, it would appear that the second *opys* (703 [earlier 694] units) and the third *opys* (51 [earlier 46] units; 1918–1924), both arranged in the early 1950s with later additions, do contain some files of probable Tarnów provenance, but not the quantity nor the content indicated in the German Cracow inventory.[109] Nor has it been possible to identify the "eighteen fonds (6,234 units) from the 1917–1927 period" in the full "freight-train wagon," that was specified in the Soviet shipping reports for the Cracow shipment. Given the dates of the documents involved, many of the files described in the German inventory from Cracow could not be identified in that group of records in Kyiv. Those may well have been among the other splinter

fonds into which the Cracow files were divided in Kyiv, but a study to confirm this remains to be done.

As determined by postwar archival reports, apparently the materials received from Cracow were first accessioned by the Historical Archive TsDIA URSR (later TsDIAK), which was then housed in Kyiv rather than TsDAZhR (which was then operating in Kharkiv). TsDIA reported in 1948 that the Special Division of Secret Fonds had finished processing the UNR Foreign Ministry fond that year. Their top-secret list of fonds in 1949 indicates a UNR Foreign Ministry fond covering the years 1918–1923 with 858 file units. The fond number (346s) corresponds to the old fond number indicated on the present *opysy*, but the number of file units and dates on the present *opysy* does not correspond to that information. Today there are two other fonds containing documentation from the UNR Foreign Ministry, but both of those predate the UNR regime in exile.[110]

Part of the problem comes from the fact that after their arrival in Kyiv, the Cracow UNR records were broken down into many different fragmentary fonds. This may explain the earlier reference to materials from Cracow "comprising eighteen fonds." Postwar TsDIA URSR lists of fonds from 1947 and 1948 also contain contingent fonds for UNR diplomatic missions in several different countries, which suggests that those fonds were broken out separately. According to the German inventory, the records involved were incoming or copies of outgoing records from Tarnów relating to UNR missions in the different countries.[111] For example, a separate fond was established in Kyiv for the Ukrainian Press Bureau in Berlin (probably material extracted from the UNR Foreign Ministry records transferred from Cracow), while in the German inventory an entire separate section is devoted to the Press Division of the UNR Foreign Ministry.[112] Other examples of the additional splinter fonds created from the Cracow shipment need further investigation. The fact that the archival arrangement of the records was completely revised in TsDIA explains the lack of concordance with the German inventory.

At some point during the 1950s, fond numbers were changed, and some of the fonds themselves were reorganized. At least some of the fonds, including UNR Foreign Ministry records, were transferred to TsDAZhR URSR in October 1954.[113] A 1962 list of émigré fonds in TsDIAK, however, still mentions one fond of the UNR Foreign Ministry (fond no. 3696; 17 units). Some of the additional fonds for UNR diplomatic missions in other countries were still housed in TsDIAK.[114] The materials were all consolidated in TsDAZhR URSR when it was moved from Kharkiv to Kyiv in 1972.

Only since approximately 1990 have researchers had open access to the UNR Foreign Ministry records in Kyiv (fond 3696), but there still is no analysis or published survey of the fond and its varied provenance. As noted above, approximately 30 letters and telegrams from the second *opys* of the fond, including some original Petliura letters, were published in part of the 1996 volume of documents honoring the seventieth anniversary of Petliura's

assassination, but with no details of their provenance.[115] Most probably these documents all came to Kyiv with the Tarnów materials, but it cannot be said for certain.[116]

It has already been noted that another 17 file units of the UNR Foreign Ministry (1918–1923) are today held in GA RF in Moscow, which also probably came from Tarnów via RZIA in Prague.[117] No information has as yet been found about the possible transfer of sensitive UNR Foreign Ministry files from Kyiv to Moscow. Had they been transferred, they most probably would have gone to the Archive of the Foreign Ministry, rather than to TsGAOR SSSR. Also noted above, some fragmentary files in GA RF were assigned to a separate fond of the UNR Mission in Berlin, but those files all clearly came from RZIA.

Ministry of Finance of the Ukrainian National Republic (Ministerstvo finansiv UNR) (TsDAVO, fond no. 1509; 6 opysy; *357, 39, 83, 16, 1,004, and 16 units; 1918–1925).* Some records of the UNR Ministry of Finance were reportedly also received in Kyiv with the UNR Foreign Ministry records from Cracow. A brief German handwritten summary of an inventory for those records, presumably from Cracow, was found in Moscow among the scattered records of the Reichsarchiv (Potsdam).[118] However, it has also not yet been possible to verify the fate of the 58 packets from the Ministry of Finance that were included in that Nazi inventory, or to even determine how many of them are now held in TsDAVO. Similar types of problems and questions apply to the Foreign Ministry records. For example, in the 1961 list of fonds of Ukrainian émigré organizations in TsDIAK, only 8 files are listed in a fond for the UNR Ministry of Finance in Tarnów (fond 1509), 4 files for agents of the Ministry of Finance in Berlin, and 1 file in a separate fond for the State Bank of Ukraine in Tarnów.[119] A corresponding list of fonds in TsDAZhR in that period has not been located, so it is not possible to determine if other related files had been assigned to that archive. Further study of the history and provenance of this fond is obviously needed.

Kyiv: Petliura Library and Related Ukrainian Émigré Materials in TsDAHO

Considerable progress has been made in the last few years to process the Ukrainian émigré documentation that was acquired by the former Party Archive in Kyiv from MVD (and KGB) sources in 1988. As of the fall of 1999, when a relatively final draft of the new guide for TsDAHO was completed, a 30-page section was devoted to the 1,644 file units now grouped in fond no. 269, under the fond name of the Ukrainian Museum in Prague (Ukraïns′kyi muzei v Prazi, to which the Museum of the Struggle for the Liberation of Ukraine was renamed after November 1945). It is a misnomer to group all of the documentation in this collection under the name of the Ukrainian Museum, because clearly the materials come from a number of different Ukrainian

émigré sources in Prague, Berlin, Paris, and other places. The collection had been haphazardly gathered at different times by the MVD (and undoubtedly also the KGB) in Kyiv. Certainly, many of the materials had never been formally acquired by the Ukrainian Museum in Prague.

It would be a safer and more professional archival designation to call it a "Consolidated (or Amalgamated) Collection of Ukrainian Émigré Documentation from Different Sources," as is even clearly stated in the draft introduction that provides an administrative history for the fond:

> To the fond 269 "Ukrainian Museum in Prague," in addition to materials from MVBU, came also various documents from other archival collections of the Ukrainian emigration (the Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris, the Society of Former Combatants in the UNR Army in France, and others). Although it has not been determined in which year they came to the archive, they were identified in the process of scientific-technical processing of the fond in 1997–1999. Most of the documents and materials in fond 269 are of a fragmentary character and other small parts of their fonds or collections remain in other archival repositories in Ukraine, or even abroad in the Czech Republic.[120]

Unfortunately, because these materials were officially transferred to the Party Archive, it has not been possible to consolidate the collection with the contingent documentation in TsDAVO or other archives in Ukraine to which receipts from Prague (including the Museum in question) were dispersed. Some of the documents probably were taken by the NKVD/MVD (and/or KGB) from files that were received by TsDIAK or TsDAZhR earlier, including those that came from UIK as well as other émigré sources. But on the other hand, at this point an attempt to unite these files in TsDAVO might serve further to obscure and complicate attributions of provenance to documentation now in TsDAVO. At least researchers should bear in mind that many of the documents now dispersed between the two archives originally came from the same agencies, organizations, or individuals, as is apparent even in the names of the subdivisions established for the collection in TsDAHO.

A third *opys* of the fond comprises printed émigré editions, many of which are rare among holdings in Kyiv and deserve to be cataloged on an item-level, according to accepted library practice. These publications have not yet been examined for library stamps, ex libris, and other dedicatory markings, which may be helpful in assigning their provenance. Thus, it is not possible to determine if any of them might have come from the Petliura Library in Paris.

Because the documentation in question is still being processed in TsDAHO, it has not been possible to examine or even sample most of the relevant files *de visu*. The following list of relevant subdivisions is therefore extracted from the forthcoming guide. Annotations have been added by the author. The files mentioned and the different headings correspond to fonds in other archives described earlier in this report:

Opys 1: Documentation and Materials of Ukrainian Organizations, Associations, and Societies in the Emigration

Governmental, Diplomatic, Military,
and Legal Agencies of the UNR and ZUNR

Foreign Files of the Credit Chancellary of the UNR Ministry of Finance (Zakordonna ekspozitura kredytovoï kantseliariï Ministerstva finansiv UNR) (1919–1923). Although no immediate indication is apparent, this group may contain some of the missing materials from the UNR Ministry of Finance received from Cracow.

Some of the other groups of materials from UNR diplomatic missions listed in this section may also hold missing materials from the UNR Ministry of Foreign Affairs received from Cracow. They obviously complement those that came from RZIA to Moscow, some of which were forwarded to the Foreign Ministry Archive.

Political Parties and Organizations

Foreign (Prague) Group of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (USDRP) (Zakordonna [Praz′ka] hrupa Ukraïns′koï sotsial-demokratychnoï robitnychoï partiï [USDRP]) (1911–1936). These materials supplement those that were requisitioned by Moscow from Kyiv and are now held in GA RF (see n. 36), having regrettably been transferred there in 1956 from the UIK collections in Kyiv. (Not from the Petliura Library or other UNR sources.)

Community Organizations

Ukrainian Society for the League of Nations (Ukraïns′ke tovarystvo [prykhyl′nykiv] Lihy Natsii) (1917–1924). From the available description, it would appear that these files all came from Prague, complementing those in TsDAVO and RGVA.

Committee for the Foundation of a Monument Honoring S. Petliura, Head of the Directorate and the Head Otaman of the Army of the UNR, Poděbrady (Komitet dlia vshanuvannia pam'iati Holovy Dyrektoriï i Holovnoho otamana viis′k UNR S. Petliury v Podebrodakh) (ChSR) (1926–1929). The files involved appear to complement those in TsDAVO relating to the fund-raising drive for the foundation of a monument to Petliura and the library in Paris.

Commission for the Conduct of the Trial on the Case of the Assassination of S. Petliura, Head of the Directorate and the Head Otaman of the Army of the UNR (Komisiia dlia vedennia sudovoho protsesu v spravi vbyvstva Holovy Dyrektoriï i Holovnoho otamana viis′k UNR S. Petliury) (1926–1928). Includes

letters and telegrams to the Commissions in Paris and Warsaw and other Ukrainian émigré groups relating to the Jewish pogroms in Ukraine in 1919, all in connection with the trial in Paris. The materials are related to files in TsDAVO and RGVA.

Military Societies and Organizations

Society of Former Combatants of the UNR Army in France (Tovarystvo buvshykh voiakiv Armiï UNR u Frantsiï) (1921–1938). Files include statutes of the Society, proclamations, correspondence with members and commanders of the UNR; Polish record books of the Third Sharpshooters' Division of the UNR Army for 1920 under Oleksander Udovychenko; copies of Army reports (October 1921), among others. They appear to contain contingent files to other files from this organization in GA RF and TsDAVO.

Cultural-Enlightenment Organs

Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris (Ukraïns'ka biblioteka im. S. Petliury v Paryzhi) (1927–1941). Files include copies of the Library Council reports (1933–1941), the accession register of books and other printed matter pertaining to the library (1927–1929), and a catalog of the library collection in religion, philosophy, history, archaeology, ethnography, geography, language and literature, and belles-lettres (1939), complementing those in GA RF. Also included are copies of printed publicity-information bulletins about the Petliura Library's activities (1927–1929).

Religious Organizations

Ukrainian Orthodox (Autocephalous) Committee in Paris (Ukraïns'kyi pravoslavnyi [avtokefal'nyi] komitet v Paryzhi) (1925–1930). Files comprise lists of members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Committee in Paris, and appeals for financial aid and registration books for the Ukrainian Orthodox Parish in Paris, thereby complementing files in GA RF.

Publishing and Editorial Agencies

Editorial Records of the Ukrainian Socio-Political and Literary-Artistic Periodical Tryzub *(Paris) (Redaktsiia hromads'ko-politychnoho i literaturno-mystets'koho tyzhnevyka* Tryzub *[Paryzh]) (1925–1926, 1933–1934, 1938).* Files include letters to the editorial office relating to the *Ukraïns'ka zahal'na entsyklopediia* (Lviv) and the monthly *Ridna mova*, among them those penned by V'iacheslav Prokopovych, Stepan Siropolko, Oleksander Shul'hyn, and Mykola Levyts'kyi regarding organizational and business matters; typewritten and manuscript editorial materials; political and economic reviews of the So-

viet press (for issues of 1929–1930); and proof copies of *Tryzub* from 1927. The files complement those in RGVA, GA RF, and TsDAVO.

Opys 2: Documentation and Materials of Ukrainian State, Military, Socio-Political Figures, and those Representing Science, Culture, and Enlightenment, and Other Persons

Ievhen Vyrovyi (1920–1941). Personal papers of Vyrovyi include correspondence with Rudychiv.

Ivan Rudychiv (1936–1942). Among Rudychiv's personal papers is correspondence with various Ukrainian émigré friends and colleagues, including Dmytro Doroshenko, Andrii Levyts′kyi, Ol′ha Petliura, V'iacheslav Prokopovych, Stepan Siropolko, Stepan Skrypnyk, Oleksander Skoropys-Ioltukhovs′kyi, Oleksander Udovychenko, and Panas Fedenko. Incoming letters to Rudychiv primarily date from 1941 and early 1942, when he was in Berlin. Presumably, these letters came from the same source as those in the Petliura Library fond in TsDAVO, having been separated from the main group of the Rudychiv papers in Kyiv at some point, or simply removed by the secret police for their own direct examination.

Petliura Letters. Although there is no special separate group designated for Symon Petliura himself, there are a few letters by Petliura among the holdings in this fond in TsDAHO, most of which came to Kyiv from Prague. One important group of Petliura letters is found in the group for the Kost′ Matsiievych papers, representing Petliura's correspondence with him from Prague (1920, 1924–1925).

Conclusions: Return to Paris?

Almost all of the agreed upon archival restitution from Russia to France was completed with the 26 October 2000 transfer in Moscow of the latest group of records of French provenance held in RGVA. However, none of the archival materials from the Petliura Library or others of French Ukrainian émigré provenance described here were returned. All of the Petliura Library holdings and other Ukrainian émigré materials from Paris in the former "Special Archive" (now part of RGVA) were included in the official list of French holdings designated for restitution to Paris appended to a French-Russian diplomatic agreement in 1992.[121] The official French-Russian restitution list covers only materials from the former "Special Archive" (now part of RGVA, before March 1999, TsKhIDK). But archivists there were not aware that most of the Ukrainian archival materials listed came from the Petliura Library in Paris, or that the library still existed. They had no idea about their provenance or the facts of their migration from Paris.

Unfortunately, the official 1992 list does not include any of those materials held across the city in GA RF. Before the research for this article was underway, archivists in GA RF were convinced that the Petliura Library holdings, like the UNR ones described here, came from RZIA in Prague. They believed that, accordingly, there should be no pretensions for restitution, because the materials were part of the 1945 Czechoslovak "gift" of RZIA to the Soviet Union. Besides, Russian archivists were not inclined to include "émigré" records, such as those in GA RF, as candidates for prospective restitution along with the acknowledged "trophy" records held in the former "Special Archive."

The French-Russian diplomatic agreement of 1992 called for restitution by the end of 1994. In Moscow, archival restitution to France was in motion during the winter of 1994, with the blessing of Russian archivists, who had prepared the French materials in TsKhIDK for return. But in the spring of 1994, restitution to France was dramatically halted by the Russian Duma, pending passage of the Russian law nationalizing the cultural treasures displaced by the war that ended up in the Soviet Union.[122] After the law was finally signed by President Yeltsin in April of 1998, a new act of the Russian Parliament provided for the completion of the archival restitution to France, although officially it was called an "exchange" for Russian-related archival materials in France, and the term "restitution" was not used.[123]

As late as the fall of 1997, however, officials handling restitution negotiations at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Quai d'Orsay did not know that the Petliura Library still existed in Paris. At the same time, the administration of the Petliura Library in Paris was still not aware of the official archival restitution list, nor had they filed an official claim. When this author visited with the older directors of the Petliura Library at that time, they had a vague notion that some of their library materials might be in Moscow, but they had not investigated the matter.[124] After those November 1997 meetings, representatives of the Petliura Ukrainian Library in Paris were in contact with the Quai d'Orsay to verify the situation.

Then in 1999, just as articles by this author were going to press in Cambridge, MA, the new director of the Petliura Library, Jaroslava Josypyszyn, on the basis of preliminary drafts of these articles, prepared a brief summary of the findings—showing where the archival materials from the library were distributed in Moscow and Kyiv—which would assist in establishing a claim. Noting that only the seven fonds from TsKhIDK (now part of RGVA) had been on the official list for restitution, she concluded with some optimism: "We place our hopes in the negotiations between France and Russia so that what belongs to us may be returned."[125] Since that summary was prepared, more details about the provenance of these materials have come to light. Ukrainian specialists in Paris may place hope in negotiations, but no one connected with the Petliura Library has tried to verify the holdings in Moscow, or to search any of the pertinent libraries for possible Petliura Library book stamps. Why has it taken half a century, or even a decade since most of the holdings in the former RZIA

Division of GA RF were declassified? Why, almost a decade since holdings in the former "Special Archive" were revealed, were researchers in Paris still unaware of these Ukrainian émigré materials in Moscow?

Part of the problem lies with the lack of openly available information in Moscow and Kyiv about captured or "trophy" (as they are called in Russian) archives and their provenance. In the case of these Ukrainian émigré materials from Paris, Prague, and Tarnów, before this article was first prepared, there has been no published list that specifies the origins, content, or location of the Ukrainian "trophy" materials from the Petliura Library and other UNR records. As this article was in preparation, a monograph appeared in 1998 on Russia abroad and archives, which listed in an appendix the fonds of Ukrainian émigré archival materials from Paris in GA RF. Although constituting the first mention of any of them in print, the author did not distinguish them as Ukrainian, nor did he list any of the Ukrainian émigré fonds among the former TsGOA holdings now part of RGVA.[126] A preliminary English-language list of fonds in TsKhIDK was posted on the Internet during 1998, having been prepared by a Russian commercial group working on a guide and anxious to sell copies of documents from that archive. The Ukrainian fonds were mentioned, but the records of the Petliura Library and other Parisian Ukrainian émigré organizations were erroneously stated to have their provenance in Ukraine. It was thus little wonder that, during the French-Russian archival restitution negotiations in October 1999 and still after, Russian archivists were not willing to consider restitution of the émigré Ukrainian materials from Paris to French authorities.[127]

Now for the first time we know more precisely which materials from the Petliura Library in Paris are currently held in Kyiv and Moscow, even if we do not know all of the details about their wartime and postwar odyssey. Among the problems that remain are lingering questions about the provenance of some of their files from Paris, or contingent émigré files from Prague. We still do not know the fate of all of the library books that the Nazis seized from the Petliura Library, nor can it be determined how many of them survived the purges in Minsk, Moscow, and Kyiv. The Petliura Library in Paris today has replaced only a few of the 20,000 looted books, but the dedicatory inscriptions are gone.

In terms of archives, special collections in the Petliura Library in Paris today are devoted to such subjects as: "Symon Petliura: His Collaborators and His Times," "The Ukrainian War of Independence, 1917–1940," "The Ukrainian Periodical *Tryzub*, 1925–1940," and "Documents of the UNR Diplomatic Mission in Paris and to the Peace Conference, 1918–1936," along with the postwar records of the library. But researchers who are interested in these subjects today would be well advised to journey to Kyiv and especially to Moscow—at least until restitution and/or until full microform copying arrangements can be negotiated with Russian and Ukrainian archival authorities on behalf of the Petliura Library in Paris.

There is no question that the Petliura Library's own records, its related collections, and those of the journal *Tryzub* it fostered, should be reunited in their Parisian home and remain there as long as the library continues to operate. The foundation act for the library clearly affirms its Paris location and no other. Other archival materials associated with the library before the war and those of the Ukrainian community that patronized it also deserve preservation in Paris, where they were created, as long as there is an active Ukrainian émigré community and research center to support them. Some may prefer today to see their personal archival legacy in exile reunited in archives in the home country, now that Ukraine has achieved independence. Such should be the choice of those advocating this preference. Yet as long as there is an émigré community, its strength can be important to the newly independent Ukrainian nation in many ways. Petliura himself believed that a strong library and cultural center is essential to an émigré community, as he pronounced not long before his assassination in Paris. Poland understood that, too, when it returned all that was found of the Polish Library from Paris—part of it immediately after the war and the rest in 1992.[128]

By way of comparison, only one of the 100,000 books seized by the Nazis from the Turgenev Library has thus far come home from the war to Paris (as of fall 2000), and that one by sheer accident. A Dutch-language volume bearing the Turgenev Library stamp was returned in 1992 to Amsterdam with a shipment of Dutch books from the Library of Foreign Literature (VGBIL) in Moscow, and Dutch librarians duly returned it to Paris.[129] Other books from that library have recently been located in Voronezh, Minsk, Kyiv, as well as in Moscow.

Even more politically important than the archival materials from the Petliura Library are the UNR Foreign Ministry records that the Nazis brought from Tarnów to Cracow and that the Soviets brought from Cracow to Kyiv. The stray contingent UNR files in Moscow deserve to be consolidated with those now divided between two archives in Kyiv. As they are reunited in Kyiv with any other files that remain of the Ukrainian regimes that failed in their bid for Ukrainian independence, their provenance should be revealed and known facts of their migration openly explained. Their future in Kyiv, where they undoubtedly belong, however, is contingent on the new Ukrainian government's commitment to support a strong national archival system with professional finding aids—the likes of which do not exist in Kyiv today.

The archives in Kyiv do not now have money for light bulbs and paper clips, let alone for the professional staff they need. That may explain why they have been unable to produce even a list of fonds as presently arranged for the UNR and other materials brought to "the home country" from Prague and Cracow a half century ago. The predecessor Soviet regime had interest in the records only for "operational" or counterintelligence purposes against the Ukrainian emigration abroad. Today they need to be professionally arranged and described, so that they can be open for public research. We still cannot tell if the

UNR Foreign Ministry files from Tarnów are all in Kyiv or how they were reprocessed there. We have found 17 others in one fond and some additional fragments in another in Moscow, but it is now clear that these arrived via RZIA in Prague.

The terrible fragmentation and dispersal of archival and library collections wrought by postrevolutionary emigration, the Nazi regime during the war, and the Soviet regime thereafter remains a serious detriment to national culture, émigré communities, and scholarship in both East and West. Our story here of the Petliura Library is a microcosm of that larger tragedy. The dispersal of documentation from the Ukrainian struggle for independence, and especially the Petliura regime, throughout the world resulted from the larger political expediencies that dispersal served. If today there is a real spirit of political renewal, as one would expect, we should also hope that restitution could reunite the archival collections of the Petliura Library and the UNR regime. Even if some of them can only be brought together in library microform, we still need a thorough publicly available inventory of their contents, their present whereabouts, and the known facts of their migration.

It is doubtful that the remnants of the Petliura Library or other UNR archival materials that have now surfaced in Moscow and Kyiv will resolve the controversies that still surround the life and death of Symon Petliura or the brief regime he led in the struggle for an independent Ukraine. But the survival of that documentation, and our knowledge about it, may help promote more open research on those issues than has been possible in the past. Many of the French intelligence and security service records (Deuxième Bureau and Sûreté Nationale) are now returned to Paris from Moscow, following their parallel odyssey at the hands of the Nazi and Soviet regimes.[130] We do not know how many of their files have been dispersed along the way or if they may also hold further clues, because not all of them are as yet arranged and open to the public. Other much more important clues about Petliura and his assassin undoubtedly remain hidden in the inner sanctum of diplomatic and intelligence archives in Paris, Warsaw, and Kyiv, and, especially, Moscow. When they will come to light, or to what extent, remains an even more perplexing question.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT AND NOTES

AVPRI	Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii (Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire), Moscow
BAB	Bundesarchiv (Federal Archives), Berlin-Lichterfelde
DKAU	Derzhavnyi komitet arkhiviv Ukraïny (State Committee on Archives of Ukraine). Before December 1999, HAU

ERR	Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (Special Command of Reichsleiter Rosenberg)
GA RF	Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archive of the Russian Federation), Moscow. Formerly, TsGAOR SSSR and TsGA RSFSR
Glavarkhiv	Glavnoe arkhivnoe upravlenie (Main Archival Administration). Alternatively, and earlier usually, GAU (*Ukr.*, HAU)
GPIB	Gosudarstvennaia publichnaia istoricheskaia biblioteka Rossii (State Public Historical Library of Russia), Moscow
HAU	Holovne arkhivne upravlinnia (Main Archival Administration). *Rus.*, GAU, Glavarkhiv
IISH/ IISG	International Institute of Social History (Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis), Amsterdam (*Dutch*, IISG)
MID	Ministerstvo inostrannykh del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
MVD	Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del (Ministry of Internal Affairs). Before 1946, NKVD
NKVD	Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs). After 1946, MVD
RGALI	Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstva (Russian State Archive of Literature and Art), Moscow. Formerly, TsGALI SSSR
RGASPI	Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial′no-politicheskoi istorii (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History), Moscow. Formerly, Central Party Archive (TsPA) and RTsKhIDNI
RGVA	Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv (Russian State Military Archive), Moscow. Formerly, TsGASA

	SSSR, and now includes holdings from TsKhIDK (formerly, TsGOA)
Rosarkhiv	Federal′naia arkhivnaia sluzhba Rossii (Federal Archival Service of Russia). Before August 1996, Gosudarstvennaia arkhivnaia sluzhba Rossii (State Archival Service of Russia)
RTsKhIDNI	Rossiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniia dokumentov noveishei istorii (Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Modern History), Moscow (1991–1999). Formerly, Central Party Archive (TsPA), and now RGASPI
RZIA	Russkii zagranichnyi istoricheskii arkhiv (Russian Foreign Historical Archive), Prague
SMERSH	"Smert′ shpionam" (literally, "death to spies")—military counter-espionage units under GRU [Glavnoe razvedyvatel′noe upravlenie] (Chief Intelligence Directorate)
TsDAHO	Tsentral′nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads′kykh ob'iednan′ Ukraïny (Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine), Kyiv. Formerly, Arkhiv KPU (Archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine).
TsDAVO	Tsentral′nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv derzhavnoï vlady i upravlinnia Ukraïny (Central State Archive of Highest Organs of State Power and Administration of Ukraine), Kyiv. Formerly, TsDAZhR URSR
TsDAZhR URSR	Tsentral′nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Zhovtnevoï Revoliutsiï URSR (Central State Archive of the October Revolution—official full name varied), Kyiv (*Rus.*, TsGAOR), now TsDAVO
TsDIAK (TsDIA-K)	Tsentral′nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny, Kyiv (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine; earlier, of the Ukrainian SSR) after 1958: TsDIA URSR u m. Kyievi (often, TsDIA-K) (*Rus.*, TsGIA UkrSSR, or TsGIAK)

TsGAOR	Tsentral′nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Oktiabr′skoi Revoliutsii [i vysshikh organov sotsialisticheskogo stroitel′stva]—official full name varied (Central State Archive of the October Revolution [and Socialist Construction]) —SSSR (of the USSR), Moscow (now part of GA RF) —UkrSSR (of the UkrSSR), Kyiv (now TsDAVO) (*Ukr.* TsDAZhR)
TsGIAK	Tsentral′nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv UkrSSR, Kyiv (Central State Historical Archive [of the UkrSSR] in Kyiv). After 1958, often TsGIA-K (*Ukr.*, TsDIA)
TsGOA SSSR	Tsentral′nyi gosudarstvennyi osobyi arkhiv SSSR (Central State Special Archive of the USSR), Moscow (1992–1999, TsKhIDK). Now part of RGVA
TsKhIDK	Tsentr khraneniia istoriko-dokumental′nykh kollektsii (Center for the Preservation of Historico-Documentary Collections), Moscow. Formerly, TsGOA SSSR, and now part of RGVA
UIK	Ukraïns′kyi istorychnyi kabinet (Ukrainian Historical Cabinet), Prague
UNR	Ukraïns′ka Narodna Respublika (Ukrainian National Republic)

Technical Note: The archival term "fond" has been anglicized, since there is no exact translation. The term came to the Soviet Union from the French *fonds*, but not without some change of usage. In Russian a "fond" is an integral group of records from a single office or source. American archivists might prefer the more technical term "record group," which in British usage would normally be "archive group," but the Russian usage of the term is much more extensive, as a "fond" can designate personal papers and/or collections as well as groups of institutional records.

In citations from former Soviet-area archives, numbers are given sequentially for *fond* (record group, etc.)/*opis′* ([Ukr. *opys*], a series or separate numbered file list or inventory within a fond)/ and *delo* ([Ukr. *sprava*], file or unit) numbers.

Some commonly used geographic terms, such as "oblast′" and "krai" have also been anglicized, and hence do not appear in italics—and in the former

case, without the final soft sign. A few personal and geographic names such as Yeltsin, and Cracow (*Pol.* Kraków) have been retained in the form most generally known in the West, but most others have been rendered in a more strict LC transliterated form. Family names have usually been rendered here as they appear in the sources, unless another preferred spelling is known.

For historical references to localities then officially part of the Reich during the war, such as Silesia, official (and usually more familiar) German forms are used with the present Polish versions in parentheses on first reference—Ratibor (*Pol.* Racibórz), Danzig (*Pol.* Gdańsk), etc., unless there is a common accepted English variant, such as Silesia. Variant forms are repeated as necessary to add clarity to references in the text.

NOTES

* The first part of this study was published as "The Odyssey of the Petliura Library and the Records of the Ukrainian National Republic during World War II," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 22(1–4) 1998: 181–208.

1. Vasyl′ Mykhal′chuk, ed., *Symon Petliura ta ioho rodyna: Do 70-richchia ioho trahichnoï zahybeli: Dokumenty i materialy* (Kyiv, 1996).

2. Mykhal′chuk, "Peredmova," in *Symon Petliura ta ioho rodyna*, p. 11.

3. Only vague remarks about the source of the documents appear in the preface by Vasyl′ Mykhal′chuk. See ibid., p. 11. I have since been able to identify them, thanks to Serhii Kot and archivists in TsDAVO. The recently acquired Siropolko family papers in TsDAVO have been processed as a second *opys* (276 units) of fond 4433. That fond for Siropolko (undoubtedly from Prague) already existed with 10 units in *Opys* 1.

4. Vasyl′ Mykhal′chuk and Dmytro Stepovyk, eds., *U 70-richchia paryz′koï trahediï, 1926–1996: Zbirnyk pam'iati Symona Petliury* (Kyiv, 1997), p. 132. Reference is to the former Lenin Library in Moscow.

5. See Grimsted, "The Odyssey of the Petliura Library," pp. 181–208.

6. ERR Stabsführer Gerhard Utikal to Rosenberg, "Aktenvermerk für den Reichsleiter—"Dienstgut in Oberschlesien" (25 January 1945), BAB, NS 8/261 (cc in NS 30/7); the text is published in Ulrike Hartung, *Verschleppt und verschollen: Eine Dokumentation deutscher, sowjetischer und amerikanischer Akten zum NS-Kunstraub in der Sowjetunion (1941–1948)* (Bremen, 2000), pp. 204–205 (Doc. I/87). Regarding U.S. Army recovery of ERR materials there after the suicide of Kurt von Berg and his wife, see Grimsted, *The Odyssey of the "Smolensk Archive": Communist Records in the Service of Anti-Communism* (Pittsburg, 1995), pp. 52–53.

7. A report by the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army intelligence service (RKKA), I. V. Shikin (1 March 1945) to G. M. Malenkov, TsK VKP(b) (1 March 1945), RGASPI, 17/125/308, fols. 11–12; G. F. Aleksandrov and I. V. Shikin to G. M. Malenkov, TsK VKP(b) (1 March 1945), RGASPI, 17/125/308, fols. 14–17. The reports were published by Valerii Shepelev, "Sud′ba 'Smolenskogo arkhiva,'" *Izvestiia TsK KPSS* 1991 (5): 135–36. See also V. N. Shepelev, "Novye fakty o sud′be dokumentov 'Smolenskogo arkhiva' (po materialam RTsKhIDNI)," in *Problemy zarubezhnoi arkhivnoi rossiki: Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1997), pp. 124–33.

8. A report on the Minsk developments was kindly furnished me by Frits Hoogewoud on the basis of a letter (dated 25 June 1993) he received from H. N. Oleinik, Director of the National Library of Belarus

(*Natsyianal'naia Bibliiatieka Belarusi*). In that letter, Oleinik dated the transfers to Moscow to the late 1970s and early 1980s, but we have indications that other shipments occurred earlier.

9. The report on the Turgenev Library is no. 31 "Turgenevskaia biblioteka v Lignitse (Pol'sha)," in "Spisok bibliotek, obsledovannykh predstaviteliami Komiteta kul'tury v Germanii za period 1-go ianvaria–1 maia 1946 goda," GA RF (earlier, TsGA RSFSR), A-534/2/1, fol. 182–182v (original ribbon copy; cc in A-534/2/10, fol. 137–137v); published in a German translation by Ingo Kolasa and Klaus-Dieter Lehmann, eds., *Die Trophäenkommissionen der Roten Armee: Eine Dokumentensammlung zur Verschleppung von Büchern aus deutschen Bibliotheken* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1996), p. 141. The date of the shipment to Belarus is not specified, but apparently there was a shipment in the fall of 1945 (noted above) which contained some books from the Turgenev Library. For confirmation of the Legnica location, see also the telegram from Morozov addressed to Aleksei D. Manevskii and Margarita Rudomino (22 January 1946), GA RF, A-534/2/8, fol. 187. There is a handwritten resolution on the telegram addressed to Rudomino (24 January 1946) to check if the materials could be removed from Poland. Subsequently, in March 1946, the "cream" of the Turgenev Library in terms of "manuscripts, first editions, autographed books by well-known authors" was personally delivered to the Lenin Library by Soviet Major Shaporovich.

10. Regarding the fate of the Turgenev Library in the Soviet Union, see a lengthy footnote by Nikolai V. Kotrelev, "Plach o pogibeli russkoi biblioteki," in *Redkie knigi i rukopisi: Izuchenie i opisanie (Materialy Vsesoiuznogo nauchno-metodicheskogo soveshchaniia zaveduiushchikh otdelami redkikh knig i rukopisei bibliotek vuzov. Leningrad, 24–26 ianvaria 1989 g.)* (Leningrad, 1991), pp. 107–109; or the English version: "Lamentation on the Ruin of the Russian Library," *Kul'turologiia: The Petersburg Journal of Cultural Studies* 1(3) 1993: 147–50. In a footnote on the fate of "trophy books" (that deserves expansion as a separate study), Kotrelev documents the rescue of several title pages with dedicatory autographs by important Russian writers from several volumes with stamps of the Turgenev Library that were designated for destruction "in an outlying Soviet library." Kotrelev (in conversation with this author) has since identified that library as being in Minsk, and has further evidence that subsequently most of it was destroyed during an "ideological purification" campaign.

11. See my forthcoming article on the fate of the Turgenev Library in Paris. It was reported to Hélène Kaplan that Minsk librarians have recently identified more books with Turgenev Library markings. A list of books with IISH prepared by Belarusian librarians is available at IISH in

Amsterdam, but none of them is of a value meriting restitution efforts. Regarding other West European books in Minsk, see the report by Vladimir Makarov, "Involuntary Journey of Books from Paris to Minsk," *Spoils of War: International Newsletter* 6 (February 1999): 25–27.

12. Adam Mal′dzis, who heads the National Commission on Restitution in Belarus, cites the "return to Kyiv" (with no details) in his 1995 New York conference presentation, "The Tragic Fate of Belarusian Museum and Library Collections during the Second World War," in Elizabeth Simpson, ed., *The Spoils of War: The Loss, Reappearance, and Recovery of Cultural Property* (New York, 1997), p. 80. It is also mentioned appreciatively by Olena Aleksandrova in her report at the 1997 conference in Minsk. See her "Poteri bibliotek Ukrainy: Problemy vyiavleniia i poiska," in *Restytutsyia kul′turnykh kashtoŭnastsei: Prablemy viartannia i sumesnaha vykarystannia* (Minsk, 1997), p. 95 [=*Viartanne*, 4].

13. This author initially received confirmation of the transfer in a letter from Adam Mal′dzis, who dated the transfer as having taken place in 1993–1994. The receipt was kindly verified for me by Olena Aleksandrova, Deputy Director of the Parliamentary Library in Kyiv, who established, however, that the books were received earlier, in 1989, although the exact date was not immediately known.

14. That purchase was also reported by Olena Aleksandrova, Deputy Director of the Parliamentary Library in Kyiv.

15. The identification of more books from the Petliura Library in Minsk is mentioned in a personal letter to this author by Adam Mal′dzis.

16. The shipment of about five freight cars, found in a shed on an estate in Kswary Świerkowski, near Złotoryja (*Ger.* Goldberg) and Adelina (*Ger.* Adelsdorf), 80 kilometers west of Wrocław—was described in a 25 October 1945 report by Dr. Bohdan Horodyski of the Biblioteka Narodowa (Warsaw). The head of the Manuscript Division of the Biblioteka Narodowa kindly showed me a copy of the report and inventory. The shipment, which had been abandoned by Nazi authorities in February 1945, also included books from the Polish Library in Paris, which was taken by the Nazis at the same time as the Petliura Library. It moreover comprised manuscripts and rare books from several libraries in Lviv, including the Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh). It is now difficult to tell whether the scattered and badly mixed up Petliura military files found there came from Lviv, or whether they were part of the UNR military files that had earlier been taken by the Nazis to Vienna or Danzig-Oliva. Possibly, some of the other fragmentary UNR records may have come from Polish sources, or may have been separated from those the Nazis had removed from Tarnów during the war.

17. Halyna Svarnyk, "Arkhiv Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka v Natsional'nii bibliotetsi u Varshavi," in *Z istorii Naukovoho tovarystva imeni Shevchenka* (Lviv, 1998), pp. 232–41.

18. No mention has been found in Nazi reports that any books from the Polish Library were in Ratibor. Indeed, as explained in documents cited by Michael Burleigh, the ERR was forced to turn the library over to another Nazi agency for use of the Institut für Ostarbeiten in Cracow, which may explain why it was found in Silesia with other books evacuated from Cracow at the end of the war. See Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastward:* Ostforschungen *under the Third Reich* (Cambridge and New York, 1988), pp. 228–30. Another 747 crates of books from the Polish Library were found by Soviet authorities after the war in a brick factory in the German town of Neugersdorf (Saxony) near the Czech border. There are no clues as to where this portion of the books had been earlier. See the report "Pol'sko-frantsuzskaia biblioteka," in "Spisok bibliotek, oblsedovannykh," GA RF, A-534/2/1, fol. 133v, and 10, fol. 178v; published in German translation in *Die Trophäenkommissionen der Roten Armee*, p. 133. According to another Soviet report, 742 crates were shipped to Moscow for the Historical Library in Moscow (GPIB) (16 May 1946), GA RF, A-534/2/8; or, as published in German translation in *Die Trophäenkommissionen der Roten Armee*, p. 171. According to the present director of GPIB, Mikhail D. Afanas'ev, who has been researching these matters, all of the Polish books were removed from GPIB under instructions from the security services in the 1960s for shipment to Poland. He and his staff have not encountered any books with stamps and dedications from the Petliura Library in GPIB.

19. ERR report (March 1942–March 1943), TsDAVO, 3206/5/26, fols. 4–5.

20. Ella Maksimova, "Piat' dnei v Osobom arkhive," *Izvestiia* 7–21 February 1991.

21. The first published mention of the massive fonds of French intelligence archives, for example, came in the interview with P. K. Grimsted by Evgenii Kuz'min, "Vyvezti. . . unichtozhit'. . . spriatat' . . ., Sud'by trofeinykh arkhivov," *Literaturnaia gazeta* 2 October 1991: 13; publication of that interview was delayed for almost a year and it was permitted in print only after August 1991. In a follow-up interview with Ella Maksimova a week later, the former director of the Special Archive, A. S. Prokopenko, confirmed and expanded on the holdings in the Special Archive—"Arkhivy Frantsuzskoi razvedki skryvali na Leningradskom shosse," *Izvestiia* 9 October 1991. The story broke in Paris later in November—for example, Thierry Wolton, "L'histoire de France dormait à Moscou" (interview with Anatolii Prokopenko), *L'Express* 21 November 1991.

22. Since the merger, former TsGOA/TsKhIDK fond numbers continue to be the same, but with the addition of a "K" following the number, as apparent in the citations that follow.

23. Deputy Director of RGVA Vladimir I. Korotaev kindly verified for me "the receipt of a total of fifty-five units of records of Ukrainian nationalists in fonds nos. 267–73 from TsGAOR BSSR, according to 'Rasporiazhenie GAU,' no. 21/3/09053 (29 December 1954)." There are now a total of 530 units in those 7 fonds, which leaves open the question about the acquisition of the remaining file units. Unfortunately, the administrative files for those fonds (*dela fondy*) are not available to researchers, so it is not possible to try to clarify the history of their formation. According to Soviet archival practice, the obligatory files kept for every fond would necessarily record details of any transfers in or out of the fond and more details about any destruction of materials from the fond as authorized by the "Expert Appraisal Commission." So far, access has also been denied to the TsGOA accession registers and to incoming correspondence files that might well contain more detailed inventories of materials transferred from other archives.

24. Details about the receipt of the fonds from Minsk are found in marginal notes in the typescript list of fonds for what was earlier known as the "French" Division of former TsGOA (typescript with manuscript notes and annotations), which this author was first permitted to see in 1996. When I first found a description of these TsKhIDK fonds in the list of fonds for the "French Division" of TsGOA, the words "Ukrainian nationalist" were part of their official titles, as recorded in the *opisi* as well. These descriptions, however, have recently been dropped.

25. For example, RGVA, fond 271K, *opis′*, preface, fol. 2; destruction notes also appear in the prefatory remarks for fond 269K and fond 270K. No numbers are given in any case, and as yet it has not been possible to locate other corroborating data or reports of the Appraisal Commission. Since permission has not been granted to see the *delo fonda*, any confirming data recorded there cannot be reported.

26. See notes 11 and 15.

27. Again, the *delo fonda* (administrative file) for this fond has not been available for examination. As noted in the *opis′*, this fond earlier comprised 45 units; 3 more units were brought from TsGAOR SSSR in November 1989. However, as explained below, GA RF (the successor archive to TsGAOR SSSR) still holds a much larger fond from this organization (GA RF, R-6406).

28. In Ukrainian, this organization was alternately known as Ukraïns′ke tovarystvo dlia Lihy Natsii and Ukraïns′ke tovarystvo prykhyl′nykiv Lihy Natsii. See the subsequent discussion elsewhere in this study on related materials in GA RF and in TsDAVO in Kyiv.

29. These papers were mentioned by Rudychiv in his account of the Petliura Library (signed 1 October 1941), TsDAVO, 4362/1/5, fol. 14v. They are also mentioned in the recently published prewar account by Symon Narizhnyi, "Ukraïns′ka biblioteka im. S. Petliury v Paryzhi," *Ukraïns′ka emigratsiia: Kul′turna pratsia ukraïns′koï emigratsiï mizh dvoma svitovymy viinamy*, vol. 2 (Kyiv, 1999), p. 39. See also the Chyzhevs′kyi papers in RGVA (no. 7).

30. Captain GAU NKVD SSSR Gur′ianov to Lieutenant Andrii Iaroshenko, Chief of the Division of Utilization AU NKVD UkrSSR (17 November 1945), GA RF, 5325/2/1423, fol. 93.

31. The Soviet archival practice with trophy records of removing "incorporated documents" from the agency records with which they were found, explains why these were established as a fragmentary separate record group. The fact that this fond has a lower number than, and is not in sequence with, the other Ukrainian émigré fonds from TsGOA described above, confirms this analysis (the French security records were among the first to be processed in TsGOA).

32. The *opis′* in this case was signed as having been completed in August 1946. The preface to the *opis′* says there is a survey available—"obzor fonda," no. 75/1, but I have not been able to examine it.

33. See the letter from Lt. Col. V. I. Sheludchenko to the director of TsGIA UkrSSR (14 March 1956) requesting the transfer of archives relating to "Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist organizations in Poland (1920–1927)" and specifying "letters to B. A. Lazarevskii in Paris from his brother Gleb [Hlib] and others in Poland." TsDAVO, 4703/2/35, fols. 3–4. In response to the Moscow request, eight letters of that description were found in TsDAZhR URSR, and were noted in a transfer document specifying "sixteen files in Polish and other languages relating to 'Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalists'" from TsDIA URSR to TsDAZhR URSR (29 February 1957), TsDAVO, 4703/1/193, fol. 31. Specific mention of publications transferred is found in a letter from TsDIAK to TsGOA SSSR (29 March 1957), TsDAVO, 4703/1/193, fol. 43. Note that often the brothers are identified differently: Boris as a Russian, because he published extensively in Russian before emigration, and Hlib as a Ukrainian. This explains the divergent primary forms of their names.

34. Lazarevskii's papers now constitute fond 278 in RGALI (82 units, 1900–1925). They are briefly described in the first volume of the guide to RGALI's predecessor TsGALI: *Tsentral′nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i isskustva: Putevoditel′*, ed. N. F. Bel′chikov and A. A. Volkov et al. (Moscow, 1963), pp. 257–58. Post-1991 guides or other finding aids to RGALI give no indication that any later papers were added to the fond, and archivists have not been able to identify any émigré components.

35. See Tat′iana F. Pavlova, "Russkii zagranichnyi istoricheskii arkhiv v Prage," *Voprosy istorii* 1990 (11): 19–30, the first scholarly account about RZIA to appear in the USSR in the period of glasnost. The most detailed study of RZIA is Pavlova's unpublished dissertation—I am grateful to her for making the typescript available to me. See also the 1990 interview by Natal′ia Davydova with MGIAI specialist Valerii Sedel′nikov, "Arkhiv, o kotorom dolgo molchali," *Moskovskie novosti* 15 April 1990: 16.

36. These materials now constitute fond R-7744, Kolektsiia materialov zagranichnykh organizatsii Ukrainskoi partii sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov, Prague, 1919–1938. As currently listed in GA RF, the fond is supposed to have 10 *opisi*, although elsewhere it is listed with only one. Within the first *opis′* (unit no. 3) is one of the original Kyiv *opisi* from TsDIAK—(*opys* 3, prepared on 10 July 1946), indicating 122 units (1928–1938) under the Ukrainian title "Holovnyi politychnyi komitet Ukr.P.SR (za kordonom) v Prazi." Documents regarding the transfers to Moscow are found in the TsDIAK correspondence file for 1954 (TsDAVO, 4703/2/31), where there are references to transfers on 20 February 1954 (fol. 5) and on 10 March 1954 (fol. 6) to TsGAOR SSSR, which encompassed 444 folders of Ukrainian SR fonds (and some files of Jewish committees) from Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Poland, and another on 18 October 1954, referencing 381 folders of Ukrainian SR files.

37. Regarding the transfers of RZIA and UIK from Prague and the Ukrainian materials affected, see chap. 9 of Grimsted, *Trophies of War and Empire: The Archival Heritage of Ukraine; World War II; and the International Politics of Restitution* (Cambridge, MA, 2001).

38. *Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Putevoditel′*, vol. 6: *Perechen′ fondov Gosudarstvennogo arkhiva Rossiiskoi Federatsii i nauchno-spravochnyi apparat k dokumentam arkhiva*, ed. S. V. Mironenko et al. (Moscow, 1998). More detailed fond-level descriptions will be included in a subsequent volume of the GA RF guide series covering "Fonds for the History of the White Movement and Emigration (1917–1946)."

39. *Fondy Russkogo Zagranichnogo istoricheskogo arkhiva v Prage: Mezharkhivnyi putevoditel′*, comp. O. N. Kopyleva et al., ed. T. F. Pavlova et al. (Moscow, 1999). Publication subsidy was provided by a consortium of European research institutions—IISH (Amsterdam), BDIC (Paris-Nanterre), and the Feltrinelli Foundation (Milan). The guide appeared just as this study was going to press, but archivists in GA RF had discussed the production with me from the outset and kindly showed me proof copies of appropriate sections.

40. Limited staff assistance and the restriction on the number of files that can be shown to a researcher in one day (usually no more than ten) made it impossible to complete the checking process within a reasonable time.

41. The official receipt in the records of TsGAOR SSSR was signed by Mikhail Il′ich Rubinskii, chief of the RZIA Division of TsGAOR SSSR (9 November 1948), GA RF, 5142/1/423, fols. 140–41. GA RF archivist Ol′ga Kopylova found this document among TsGAOR SSSR records and kindly showed it to me after I had questioned the accuracy of the attribution of the provenance of the Petliura Library files to RZIA or other Prague sources.

42. See the official act of transfer to TsGAOR SSSR (16 July 1949), GA RF, 5142/1/449, fol. 72. Other Rybakin papers are held in the archive of the All-Russian Book Chamber (VKP).

43. Scattered administrative records of the Turgenev Library now held in GA RF (fond 6846, 141 files) are described briefly in the 1994 guide, *Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossisskoi Federatsii: Putevoditel′*, vol. 1: *Fondy GA RF po istorii Rossii XIX–nachala XX vv*, ed. S. V. Mironenko and Gregory Freeze (Moscow, 1994), p. 214. This author was permitted to examine those records in the spring of 1991, at which time TsGAOR archivists were still under the impression that the materials had come from RZIA. I showed them the Paris stamp of the Turgenev Library and other markings on many of the files, although at that time I had not discovered the other documentation presented in this article.

44. This collection bears a separate designation (fond R-6162, 1 *opis′*; 13 units, 1919). Many of the files were personally examined in the spring of 2000.

45. A separate article on the fate of the Turgenev Library is forthcoming in Paris. Regarding the Nazi seizure and the sense of loss suffered among the Russian emigration in Paris, see the symposium memorial volume, *Russkaia obshchestvennaia biblioteka imeni I. S. Turgeneva. Sotrudniki–Druz′ia–Pochitateli: Sbornik statei* (Paris, 1987). Regarding the Russian Literary Archive, see the 1938 announcement (p. 107). On the 1940 seizure by the Nazis, see the article by Mikhail Osorgin, "Gore v Parizhe: Unichtozhena Turgenevskaia Biblioteka" (pp. 111–13) and N. N. Knorring, "Gibel′ 'Turgenevskoi biblioteki' v Parizhe" (pp. 115–19).

46. This author has personally seen books with Turgenev Library stamps, and in some cases dedicatory inscriptions, in the former "Special Collection" (*spetskhran*) of the former Lenin Library, now the Russian State Library (RGB). Russian colleagues have reported many more sightings and some have shown me books in their personal libraries that bear Turgenev Library stamps, which they purchased from second-hand book dealers in Moscow (with appropriate stamps to that effect).

47. A report on the findings in Voronezh was presented at an international conference at the All-Russian State Library of Foreign Literature (VGBIL) in Moscow in April 2000. Among the leaflets issued by the Zonal′naia nauchnaia biblioteka of the Voronezh State University in 2000 that describe trophy books recently discovered in the region, is one listing twenty-six books from the Turgenev Library and another listing fifteen books from the Polish Library in Paris (see the series of leaflets *Universitetskaia biblioteka v litsakh, sobytiiakh, knigakh,* no. 3: "Knigi iz Russkoi Turgenevskoi biblioteki v Parizhe, khraniashchiesia v NB VGU," and no. 5: "Iz kataloga knig 'Pol′skaia biblioteka v Parizhe'").

48. Book stamps are normally not indicated on library catalog cards, and because of the volume of trophy book receipts after the war, precise records of their provenance were not prepared.

49. Vasyl′ Mykhal′chuk, *Ukraïns′ka biblioteka im. Symona Petliury v Paryzhi: Zasnuvannia, rozvytok, diial′nist′ (1926–1998)* (Kyiv, 1999), p. 103.

50. A draft annotation prepared for the GA RF catalog of archival materials received from RZIA, which was shown for review to this author in 1997, notes that "Information about the acquisition of these files in RZIA has not been established. Presumably, the basic part of the fond was received in exchange for printed editions."

51. Archivists had initially intended to include this fond in the RZIA guide, although they had not found proof of its acquisition. Like the preceding fond, it was dropped when the Parisian source became apparent.

52. See a more detailed description in *Fondy RZIA*, p. 153.

53. A few documents in file no. 2 (mostly posters) bear RZIA stamps: fols. 6–7 bear the RZIA no. 6407; fol. 9 from the parallel committee in Prague bears RZIA no. 6430; fol. 10—no. 7390; and fol. 11—no. 6464. The fond was apparently first established in 1965.

54. See a more detailed description in *Fondy RZIA*, pp. 148–50.

55. The fond is not listed as of RZIA provenance and hence is not described in *Fondy RZIA*.

56. A number of the handbills and printed declarations bear RZIA stamps: fol. 1—no. 1863; fols. 15, 16, and 23—no. 7233; fol. 21—no. 6850; and fol. 25—no. 7554. A few bear the stamps of Lukasevych.

57. See a more detailed description in *Fondy RZIA*, pp. 99–100.

58. A typescript list of fonds of émigré institutions and organizations prepared by GA RF in preparation for the forthcoming fourth volume of its guide, listed this fond under Diplomatic Missions in Tărnovo, Bulgaria, and it is also so listed in the 1998 GA RF *Perechen′ fondov.*

59. See a more detailed description in *Fondy RZIA*, pp. 125–26.

60. All five files examined in fond 7027 bear the RZIA no. 7486 (the same number as for three files in fond 6275 above).

61. The RZIA annual report for 1928 lists 500 pages of documents of the Ukrainian delegation in Paris (1919–1922) among receipts. GA RF, 7030/1/114, p. 7. Clearly, only a fraction of these remain in the present fond. UNR diplomatic documentation from Paris is specifically mentioned in an undated letter among RZIA acquisition correspondence in a descriptive list of a UNR collection received by RZIA, GA RF, 7030/1/91, fols. 7–8.

62. TsDAVO, 4703/2/39, fol. 41. The problem of determining the present location of these files in Kyiv has not been resolved.

63. See the more detailed description in *Fondy RZIA*, pp. 126–27.

64. RZIA no. 7486 (the same one as for all 5 files examined in fond 7027 below) was found on 3 files. Two other files bore nos. 8262 and 8598. The fond bears an acquisition no. of 4412. See more details about acquisition notes below.

65. The brief historical report on the history of the Petliura Library in Paris published in 1977 notes that these materials had been moved out of the main library building before the Nazis sealed it. Pavlo Shumovs′kyi, "Korotkyi narys istoriï i rozvytok Biblioteky im. S. Petliury," *Bibliothèque Ukrainienne Symon Petlura à Paris/Ukraïns′ka Biblioteka imeny S. Petliury v Paryzhi, Informatsiinyi Biuleten′* 38 (1977): 2. A typescript inventory is available in Paris.

66. See the more detailed description of contents in *Fondy RZIA*, pp. 54–55.

67. RZIA no. 8306 (Petliura Embassy in Berlin) covers the first 28 items in the fond.

68. The RZIA report printed in 1931 mentions that some files of the UNR Embassy in Berlin were received that year. GA RF, 7030/114, 1931 report, p. 7. The RZIA accession register also lists receipts in 1934.

69. Several other RZIA annual reports in the same folder (1928–1931) also mention the receipt of UNR diplomatic documentation. Several other RZIA annual reports (1928–1931) mention the receipt of UNR documentation (GA RF, 7030/114). Note that other parts of the records of the UNR Ministry of Finance were found in Tarnów during the war and transferred to Cracow and then, after the war, to Kyiv.

70. The 1946–1947 transfer to the Foreign Ministry, however, did include diplomatic documents of the Petliura government and Ukrainian representatives in West Europe, which are apparently now held as part of a Collection of Documents from the League of Nations. These are listed as

AVPRI, fond 415, *opis′* 1 (1914–1937), including Prague inventory nos. 1840–1859.

71. An official request for transfer addressed to I. I. Nikitinskii from V. Khvostov of MID (24 December 1946) is accompanied by a seven-page list of the files involved—GA RF, 5325/2/1705a. The original typescript list with a covering letter from Madik to Kruglov (dated 24 June 1947) remains in another file, GA RF, 5325/2/2286a. The UNR Berlin Embassy was included in the initial list. However, the Prague inventory number 8306 (Petliura Embassy in Berlin) does not appear in the official acts of transfer dated in September 1947. GA RF, 5142/1/407, fol. 22. I appreciate the assistance of GA RF archivist Ol′ga Kopulova in acquainting me with the transfer documents and the administrative record (*delo fonda*) for fond 5889.

72. GA RF, 5889/1/34. The Vynnychenko letter is in file unit no. 26, and the letter of 1919 about UNR funds, in unit 29a. The Petliura letter (autograph), sold to RZIA by V. L. Forna with a receipt for 600 korunas, is referred to along with the RZIA inventory no. 8827.

73. Copies of the official act of transfer (30 August 1945) in Ukrainian, Czech, and Russian, are found in the recently opened secret *opys* of the administrative archive (AA) of TsDIAK, which is now officially cited as TsDAVO, 4703/2/2, fols. 13 and 14. An English translation appears as Appendix VIII in Grimsted, *Trophies of War and Empire*.

74. This text follows the official announcements with description of the "gift" by Valentyn Riasnyi to Nikita S. Khrushchev (25 September 1945), TsDAVO, 4703/2/2, fols. 28–30, and to Beria, fols. 31–33, and also appears in Moscow copies. For example, Nikitinskii to S. N. Kruglov, "Spetsial′noe soobshchenie o sostave 'Ukrainskogo arkhiva'" (September 1945), GA RF, 5325/2/1353, fol. 88–88v.

75. Regarding the transfer of UIK to Kyiv and the related Ukrainian materials from RZIA from Prague in Moscow, see more details in Grimsted, *Trophies of War and Empire*, chap. 9.

76. When the often artificial fonds were established in Kyiv, no reference nor correlation was made to the earlier archival disposition, numeration, or existing finding aids for the materials in Prague or other sources.

77. "Otchet o rabote Osobogo otdela sekretnykh fondov za 1948 god," TsDAVO, 4703/2/13, fol. 35.

78. Nataliia Rubl′ova, "Dokumenty TsDAVOV Ukraïny periodu UNR," in *U 70-richchia paryz′koï trahediï*, pp. 147–50. Although providing no descriptive details about the contents of individual fonds, this is nonetheless the first such information published in Kyiv. Rubl′ova no longer works in TsDAVO.

79. These lists were found in the recently opened files from the administrative records of TsDIAK. Those of Parisian provenance appear as fond nos. 245–48, 250, 251, and 253—TsDAVO, 4703/2/6, fol. 35; it is noted there that they were received on 10 January 1946. Later, in the 1949 list, they appear as fonds nos. 243, 246–48, 250, and 256—"Spisok fondov Osobogo otdela sekretnykh fondov TsGIA UkrSSR, podlezhashchikh uporiadocheniiu v 1949 g." (25 January 1949), TsDAVO, 4703/2/16, fols. 10–18. They were also listed among the 100 fonds that the TsDIA Special Division had processed in a report to Glavarkhiv in Moscow (30 December 1946), GA RF, 5325/2/2253, fols. 13–18. It was thanks to these lists and the names of fonds there provided, that it was possible to survey the fonds in TsDAVO today, because otherwise there are no public lists that include holdings from that former Special Secret Division. Further research is needed to confirm migratory details for these materials and to determine from which agency they were received by TsDIAK.

80. Reference is to the 1947 list—TsDAVO, 4703/2/6, fol. 35.

81. Iaropenko to Panteleimon Gudzenko (Lviv, 4 June 1947), TsDAVO, 4703/2/11, fol. 8. Specific mention was made of a Kerensky journal published in French.

82. "Kharakteristika dokumental'nykh materialov Shtaba reikhsliaitera Rozenberga" (11 October 1947), TsDAVO, 4703/2/12, fols. 3–13. See also A. V. Bondarevskii to Gudzenko (11 July 1947), TsDAVO, 4703/2/10, fols. 19–20; with the separate list—"Spisok i kratkoe soderzhanie fondov i grupp dokumentov na frantsuzskom iazyke, vyiavlennykh v fonde 'Ainzatsshtaba Rozenberga'" (Kyiv, 26 November 1947), TsDAVO, 4703/2/10, fols. 33–40, 51–52 (cc. fols. 41–50). See more details about the ERR materials in Kyiv in Grimsted, *Trophies of War and Empire*, chap. 9.

83. Notice of other transfers from Minsk to Kyiv has surfaced, including portions of the Dnipropetrovsk Party Archive that the Nazis had taken to Ratibor. TsDAVO still denies access to their acquisition registers and has not opened any files from the postwar secret section of the administrative records of their predecessor archive (TsDAZhR UkrSSR), if such files still exist. The administrative records of TsDAZhR UkrSSR now available to researchers in Kyiv do not contain any of the secret *opysy* from the postwar period (TsDAVO, fond 4665).

84. Ivan Rudychiv, "Prymushenyi vyïzd bibliotekaria Ivana Rudycheva i ioho perebuvannia v Berlini (Dopovid' na zasidaniiu Rady Biblioteky 3-ho hrudnia 1942 roku)," typescript, pp. 65–66. Professor Arkady Joukovsky kindly furnished me a copy of the report, which is retained in the Petliura Library in Paris. Although much less detailed and interesting

than Rudychiv's diary and the reports he prepared while he was in Berlin, all of which are now located in Kyiv (TsDAVO, fond 4362), a few details presented there are of significance in explaining the migration of the archival materials from the Petliura Library now held in Kyiv.

85. "Prymushenyi vyïzd bibliotekaria," pp. 65–66. For further elaboration on the Rudychiv story, see the first part of this article, "The Odyssey of the Petliura Library," p. 182.

86. Regarding the postwar seizures of Ukrainian émigré archives in Prague, including those from the Museum of the Struggle for the Liberation of Ukraine, see Grimsted, *Trophies of War and Empire*, chap. 9.

87. See Pil′kevich to TsDIAK Chief Mykhailo Teslenko (18 December 1958), TsDAVO, 4703/2/39, fol. 2 and fol. 8. A list of 25 fonds follows (fols. 3–7). The 1958 and 1962 Prague receipts (fols. 58–62, and fol. 79), together with the lists of other fonds received from Prague earlier (fols. 65–78 and 85–98), are bound together in a recently declassified folder. Regarding the Museum, see Mykola Mushynka, *Muzei vyzvol′noï borot′by Ukraïny ta dolia ioho fondiv* (Melbourne, 1996).

88. If we believe the January 1946 acquisition date, the Rudychiv papers and other archival materials from the Petliura Library in TsDAVO came to Kyiv before other materials from that museum that arrived much later.

89. The first announcement to this effect was circulated on electronic mail by TsDAHO in February 1994. TsDAHO director Ruslan Ia. Pyrih showed these materials to this author in 1994. Their transfer from Prague is mentioned in the article by Larysa Iakovlieva, "Praz′ki fondy v Kyievi," *Pam'iatky Ukraïny* 1994 (3–6 [26]): 121.

90. See the account of the wartime transfer of these records from Tarnów to Cracow and the Nazi processing of them there in Grimsted, "The Odyssey of the Petliura Library," pp. 193–95.

91. As documented in Grimsted, "The Odyssey of the Petliura Library," p. 194.

92. Report of Hryhorii P. Neklesa (Lviv, 12 March 1945), TsDAVO, 14/7/56, fol. 2–2v.

93. Communications from the deputy commissar of the NKVD UkrSSR to his Moscow counterpart and from Gudzenko to the Chief of Glavarkhiv SSSR, I. I. Nikitinskii, dating from 27 March 1945. Diatlov to Kruglov (Kyiv, 21 March 1945), TsDAVO, 14/7/56, fols. 3–4. Gudzenko to Nikitinskii (Kyiv, 27 March 1945), GA RF, 5325/2/1353, fol. 17; TsDAVO, 14/7/56, fol. 11. Although there are two days difference in the dates recorded in Cracow and Kyiv, this communication would appear to confirm the pencilled note on the report in the Archiwum Państwowe w Krakowie in my earlier account (Grimsted, "The Odyssey of the Petliura

Library," p. 207n64). Gudzenko requested that "you resolve the question of the transfer of these documents to archival organs of the NKVD UkrSSR through the Main Administration of Counterintelligence (Glavnoe upravlenie kontrrazvedki) 'SMERSH' NKO SSSR."

94. Gudzenko and Abram Grinberg to Nikitinskii (Kyiv, 30 May 1945), GA RF, 5325/2/1353, fol. 39; and (31 May 1945), TsDAVO, 14/7/56, fol. 13. He concluded, "Once we have sorted these materials, we will report more precise details about the fonds involved." A subsequent report has not surfaced.

95. Gudzenko report (25 July 1945), GA RF, 5325/2/1326, fol. 116; the same is reported at the end of the year (fol. 229). As the report was in Russian, it used the form "TsGAOR."

96. These are listed in several different postwar lists of fonds in TsDIAK, now held among the administrative records of TsDIAK in TsDAVO, 4703/2.

97. *Symon Petliura ta ioho rodyna.*

98. I am grateful to Serhii Kot, of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, for arranging my interview with Mariia Evgraf'evna Samoilova, now a department head in the Parliamentary Library of Ukraine, who recounted her story of the fate of the "trophy" books from the Petliura and Turgenev Libraries that had been acquired by the State Historical Library in Kyiv after the war. Regarding the 240 books from the Petliura Library transferred from Minsk and now held by the Parliamentary Library, see above and nn. 12–13.

99. In a special search, librarians in the current Archival Administration of the Central Library in Kyiv have recently identified 533 Ukrainian and 129 foreign-language books from the Ukrainian University in Prague. They did not recall seeing any from the Petliura Library from Paris nor had they seen the stamp of the library before I showed it to them. They only sighed at the difficulty of a thorough search.

100. MID SSSR to Gudzenko (4 June 1947), TsDAVO, 4703/2/11, fol. 7.

101. TsDIAK to TsGOA SSSR (29 March 1957), TsDAVO, 4703/1/193, fol. 43.

102. The act of transfer to the TsGOA (4 January 1956) notes an attached list, but a copy has not been retained in the TsDIAK records, TsDAVO, 4703/2/33, fol. 1. See also the act of transfer dated 8 December 1955, TsDAVO, 4703/1/192, fol. 77. So far, an incoming copy of the list has not been available in TsGOA records. Archivists at RGVA insist that the records of the archive have not been processed adequately to be submitted for declassification proceedings. A spot check of the catalog slips that are available for the library books in TsGVA today reveals only a handful

that might conceivably have come from the Petliura Library; this author is still waiting for a response to her inquiry about these volumes.

103. This is explained in Rudychiv's report, "Prymushenyi vyïzd bibliotekaria," pp. 65–66.

104. In this case, Borys is cited in Ukrainian, although he has often been recognized in Russia as a Russian writer. See above, nn. 33 and 34. The letter from the TsGAO SSSR director to the TsDIA UkrSSR director, V. I. Sheludchenko (14 March 1957), TsDAVO, 4703/2/35, fol. 5, requests the transfer. A letter of transfer for 16 files regarding Ukrainian "bourgeois-nationalists" in Polish and other languages, which included "eight letters of B. A. Lazarevskii to his brother and others in Warsaw," was dated earlier (29 February 1957), TsDAVO, 4703/1/193, fol. 31.

105. See n. 29.

106. TsDIAK to TsGAOR SSSR (29 March 1957), TsDAVO, 4703/1/193, fol. 43. Also included at the same time in the five crates with 77 file units were many French and German materials that had been acquired and held with the ERR records in Kyiv, and some scattered files of Ukrainian émigré organizations in Poland.

107. Mykola Shudria, "Lysty Petliury z Pol′shchi," in *U 70-richchia paryz′koï trahediï*, pp. 200–201. See the prefatory remarks, p. 201. The article surveying UNR materials in TsDAVO cited above, prepared by an archivist there, however, does not mention this. She writes, as this author also found when she last examined the *opysy*, that there are only 17 files in the fond. Note below that most of the Prague Museum collections was deposited in the former Communist Party Archive in Kyiv, now TsDAHO.

108. "Verzeichnis des Archivs des Aussen-Ministeriums der Ukrainischen-Volks-Republik, 1918–1926" (dated 1943), BAB, R 146/ 73. When this author first found that inventory among the records of the Nazi State Archival Administration (*Reichsarchivverwaltung*), it was still located in Koblenz, but the entire record group has since been moved to the Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde.

109. The second *opys* contains 703 [earlier 694] file units (prepared in 1951). The third *opys* currently contains 51 [earlier 46] files; an earlier version of that *opys* (now no. 47) was apparently prepared in 1954. An additional 4 files received from the Lithuanian SSR were added to that *opys* in 1969. Many of the files included predate the UNR move to Tarnów, and again dates do not correspond with those in the German inventory.

110. Fond 2592 (earlier 344s/259s) came from TsDIA as the fond of the Secretariat of National Questions of the Ukrainian Central Rada, but its *Opys* 1 (4 *opysy*; 121 units) has one group of files of the National

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the UNR (*Narodne ministerstvo sprav zakordonnykh UNR*) (1917–1918). Fond 3766 (3 *opysy*) has predominantly earlier materials labeled from "Ukraïns'ka derzhava (Hetmanstvo)." Different *opysy* were prepared at different times and the transfers among different fonds complicate their identification.

111. "Spisok fondov Osobogo otdela sekretnykh fondov TsGIA UkrSSR" (April 1949), TsDAVO, 4703/2/18, fol. 51. It has not been possible to verify these data with the TsDIA URSR accession registers.

112. The German inventory of the UNR Foreign Ministry records prepared in Cracow has a large section for the press division of the Ministry (C. Presse-Abteilung, 1919–1922, nos. 74–111). There are also contingent files of Press Bureau records, as noted above, in the UNR Berlin Embassy fond held in GA RF in Moscow, which had been acquired via RZIA in Prague.

113. The transfer protocol listed 18 émigré fonds, including UNR MID records (26 October 1954), TsDAVO, 4703/2/31, fol. 38.

114. "Spysok fondiv orhanizatsii, ustanov ta osobystykh fondiv ukraïns'kykh emihrantiv viddilu fondiv respublikans'kykh ustanov TsDIA URSR" (6 January 1962), TsDAVO, 4703/2/39, fol. 96. Coincidentally, the number of units in this fond corresponds to the 17 units listed for a fond by that name in GA RF (no. 8), but those came from RZIA.

115. *Symon Petliura ta ioho rodyna.*

116. The administrative record of the fond (*dela fonda*) has not been available for examination, and there was no historical data presented in the very rough handwritten *opys*.

117. See nn. 54–55.

118. RGVA, 1255K/2/13. The first 5 fols. give an administrative history of the Ukrainian government; fols. 6–9 constitute a draft *opis'* of sections of the records of the Ministry of Finance (1918–1921).

119. See the 1961 list, "Spysok fondiv orhanizatsii, ustanov ta osobystykh fondiv ukraïns'kykh emihrantiv viddilu fondiv respublikans'kykh ustanov TsDIA URSR" (6 January 1962), TsDAVO, 4703/2/39, passim.

120. Colleagues in DKAU kindly provided me with a typescript review copy of this section of the new TsDAHO guide in May 2000, from which the present appraisal is prepared. See also the survey article by the TsDAHO archivist who has been processing this collection—Anatolii V. Kentii, "Fond 'Ukraïns'kyi muzei u Prazi' TsDAHO Ukraïny iak skladova 'Praz'koho arkhivu' (za rezul'tatamy vporiadkuvannia)," *Arkhivy Ukraïny* 2000 (1–3): 43–49. I am very grateful to Kentii for making available to me his preliminary card file and consulting with me about these materials (as authorized by Ruslan Pyrih).

121. I was shown these listings from the official French-Russian agreement at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. As of my visit in November 1997, the Quai d'Orsay authorities did not even know the coordinates of the Petliura Library in Paris, although they explained to me that the Petliura Library would have to file a claim for their wartime losses and verify the fonds on the official list. The library subsequently did so.

122. See Grimsted, "'Trophy' Archives and Non-Restitution: Russia's Cultural 'Cold War' with the European Community," *Problems of Post-Communism* 45(3) May/June 1998: 3–16, and the earlier, more detailed coverage in Grimsted, "Displaced Archives and Restitution Problems on the Eastern Front in the Aftermath of World War II," *Contemporary European History* 6(1) 1997: 27–74.

123. "Ob obmene arkhivnykh dokumentov Frantsuzskoi Respubliki, peremeshchennykh na territoriiu Rossiiskoi Federatsii v rezul'tate Vtoroi mirovoi voiny, na arkhivnye dokumenty rossiiskogo proiskhozhdeniia, nakhodiashchiesia na territorii Frantsuzskoi Respubliki": Postanovlenie Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo sobraniia RF ot 22 maia 1998 g., no. 2504–II GD, *Sobranie zakonodatel'stva RF*, 1998, no. 24, st. 2662.

124. I am grateful to Professor Joukovsky for meeting with me at the Petliura Library at that time. I appreciate the assistance of my friend and colleague, Hélène Kaplan, President of the Turgenev Library Association, for arranging my visit to the Quai d'Orsay, where Madame de Nomazy kindly received us, briefed us about the French negotiations, and showed us the proposed restitution list.

125. Jaroslava Josypyszyn, "Les archives de la Bibliothèque ukrainienne de Paris retrouvées," *Bulletin de l'Association française des études ukrainiennes* 3(13) Novembre 1999: 3–6.

126. Andrei V. Popov, *Russkoe zarubezh'e i arkhivy: Dokumenty rossiiskoi emigratsii v arkhivakh Moskvy. Problemy vyiavleniia, komplektovaniia, opisaniia, ispol'zovaniia* (Moscow, 1998), p. 301.

127. As reported to this author by colleagues in Rosarkhiv and RGVA.

128. Documentation regarding the odyssey of the Polish Library is being prepared for a separate essay.

129. This incident was reported to the author by Frits Hoogewoud, Deputy Curator, Bibliotheca Rosenthaliana, Amsterdam University Library. See Hoogewoud's published conference report about the migration and fate of the returned collections, "Russia's Only Restitution of Books to the West: Dutch Books from Moscow (1992)," in *The Return of Looted Collections (1946–1996): An Unfinished Chapter: Proceedings of the International Symposium to Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Return of Dutch Book Collections from Germany in 1946, Amsterdam, 15 and 16 April 1996* (Amsterdam, 1997), pp. 72–74.

130. Claire Sibille, "Les Archives du ministère de la Guerre recupérées de Russie," *Gazette des Archives* 176 (1997): 64–77; Dominique Devaus, "Les Archives de la direction de la Sûreté rapatriées de Russie," ibid., pp. 78–86.




Illustration: Title page of *Pam'iaty Ivana Franka,* comp. Mykhailo Vozniak (Vienna, 1916), showing the Petliura Library stamp crossed out and the stamp of the CPSU Republic Library of Ukraine affixed.

A Recent Contribution to the Corpus Editionum of Medieval Slavonic Texts

THOMAS ROSÉN

PANDEKTY NIKONA CHERNOGORTSA V DREVNERUSSKOM PEREVODE XII VEKA (IURIDICHESKIE TEKSTY). By Kirill A. Maksimovich. Moscow: Iazyki russkoi kul'tury (Studia Philologica), 1998. 574 pp. ISBN 5-7859-0069-6.

The comparatively intense research to which the Old Church Slavonic Canon has been subjected sets it apart from the majority of medieval Slavonic texts, many of which have still barely been studied. A new contribution to the study of an insufficiently known text—Dr. Kirill A. Maksimovich's edition of the *Pandectae of Nikon of the Black Mount*—is therefore to be welcomed by the international community of Slavists.

Although Maksimovich's edition does not include the entire text of the *Pandectae*, his is the first and largest of its kind. Several editions were published in the late nineteenth century, but none of them covers more than small fragments of the text. It would thus be appropriate here to say a few words about the original author of the *Pandectae*, Nikon of the Black Mount (or Nikon of the Black Mountain), and the text in its original language, Greek, before evaluating Maksimovich's edition and the state of research on the Slavonic translation of the *Pandectae*.

The work known as the *Ἑρμηνεῖαι τῶν ἐντολῶν τοῦ κυρίου*, or *Pandectae*, of Nikon of the Black Mount, is a compilation of texts from some three hundred different sources, including resolutions of ecumenical and local councils of the Church, extracts from secular law, hagiography, and patristic writings. The *Pandectae*, traditionally viewed as a guide to various aspects of monastic life, crosses over many borders of genre set up by modern scholars. In fact, since it is of such a heterogenous nature, the *Pandectae* could be placed in either one of the traditional genres of liturgy, canon law, or theology.[1]

The entry on Nikon in the *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*[2] tells us that he was born into a family of *archontes* in Constantinople, probably sometime around 1025. He later served in the army of Constantine IX, subsequently withdrew from secular society, and took up residence in the Monastery of the Black Mount near Antioch, where he was tonsured by its founder, Luke, the former metropolitan of Anazarbos. Nikon, apparently a man of considerable religious zeal, was later compelled to leave the Black Mount following a clash

with members of his monastic community when he pressed the issue of introducing stricter discipline. The date of Nikon's death is not known with certainty, though it is probable that he died sometime between the years ca. 1100 and 1110. The place of his death is also a matter of some debate. Possible sites are the monastery of St. Symeon the Stylite the Younger, not far from Antioch—to which he moved after having tried to found his own monastery—or the monastery of the Virgin of the Pomegranate.

Nikon's literary production or, rather, whatever fragments have survived to modern times, consists of two large compilations, the *Pandectae* and the *Tacticon*. The latter, which was compiled after the *Pandectae*, contains valuable personal information about the author.[3] Whereas the text of one of the Greek manuscripts containing the *Tacticon* was edited in prerevolutionary Russia,[4] no similar edition of the *Pandectae* exists.

At the time of the compilation of the *Pandectae*, around the year 1060, the Seljuk Turks began to make their presence known in Syria. A plausible aim of the compilation might therefore have been to secure the future existence of a large number of texts that might otherwise have become casualties of war.[5]

The existing literature on the Greek tradition of Nikon's work is not extensive, comprising articles by Nasrallah, Graf, Solignac and de Clercq.[6] Minor parts of the Greek manuscript tradition are to be found, in edited form, in Migne's *Patrologia Graeca*.[7]

Maksimovich's recent contribution is an edition of the "juridical" parts of the *Pandectae*. The sources represent a vast number of works on Orthodox canon law.

In the table of contents, one finds that Maksimovich's book consists of a Preface ("Predislovie," pp. vii–xiv), an Edition ("Teksty," pp. 1–470), and three Appendices: "Prilozhenie I. Iuridicheskie terminy 'Pandektov' Nikona Chernogortsa. Grechesko-slavianskii slovoukazatel'," pp. 471–524; "Prilozhenie II, Iuridicheskie terminy 'Pandektov' Nikona Chernogortsa. Slaviano-grecheskii slovoukazatel'," pp. 525–57; "Prilozhenie III. Index juridicus," pp. 559–72. The third appendix, the "Index juridicus," is a list of the sources of the approximately 300 canonical and secular rules and regulations that make up the *Pandectae*. The book ends with a short bibliography (pp. 573–74).

In the Preface, Maksimovich presents his work as the first critical edition of the earliest known Slavonic translation of the juridical texts of the *Pandectae* of Nikon of the Black Mount. Originally composed in Greek in the eleventh century, the *Pandectae* were translated into Church Slavonic in the second half of the twelfth century. Maksimovich characterizes this first translation as "russkii," thus implying that it may have been made in the East Slavic area (p. vii).

In the fourteenth century, Maksimovich asserts, the first translation was followed by a second one, this time South Slavic. This second translation is the

one most frequently encountered in the manuscript material, and it has been edited twice, the first time in Vilnius in 1591 and the second time in Pochaïv in 1795 (the Pochaïv edition was later re-edited in Moscow in 1889).[8]

Having briefly presented the two translations, Maksimovich goes on to discuss a couple of his predecessors in the investigation of the oldest translation of the *Pandectae*, mentioning the works of Sreznevskii[9] and Tikhvinskii.[10] Sreznevskii's edition of parts of the *Pandectae* is flawed by an excessive number of misprints and the lack of a parallel Greek text. This—as Maksimovich correctly points out—makes it unsuitable for scientific purposes (p. viii).[11] Having provided the reader with this characterization of the work of one of his predecessors, Maksimovich refrains from elaborating on the existing research on the Slavonic translations of the *Pandectae*.

Maksimovich's edition of the text is designed according to the rules of so-called "lingvisticheskie izdaniia" of early East Slavic literary monuments (p. viii).[12] The edition consists of the text of the oldest known "russkii" manuscript (i.e., the so-called *Iaroslavskii spisok*, "Я," dated to the beginning of the thirteenth century), supported by a critical apparatus comprising ten additional witnesses, ranging from fragments to complete texts (labelled: "Г," "Син," "У," "М," "Ч," "П," "Яр," "С," "Пн" and "А").[13] The *Iaroslavskii spisok* is used only for the first half of the edition, while the second half is made up of a text taken from the manuscripts of the apparatus. The *Iaroslavskii spisok* was chosen as the base text by Maksimovich by virtue of its seniority: it is more than 150 years older than any of the other witnesses. In view of the fact that the *Iaroslavskii spisok* presents many errors and lacunae, though, Maksimovich briefly discusses the possibility of choosing another manuscript as his base text (p. xi).

The "*drevnerusskii*" text is accompanied by a parallel text in Greek taken from one "*osnovnoi spisok*,"[14] called "L" by the editor, and two "*vspomogatel'nye spiski*," "C" and "P."[15]

Maksimovich's editorial principles are clearly stated and the edition does not cause any significant problems as far as interpretability is concerned.

To date, there exists no textological investigation of East Slavic manuscripts containing the *Pandectae*, and Maksimovich's contribution does not change this fact. The author states that a large number of witnesses remained beyond his reach for the duration of his work, and he therefore chooses to refrain from constructing a *stemma codicum* (p. x). He does, however, provide the reader with some comments about the relationships of the various manuscripts. First, he writes, the situation is complicated by the fact that many of the witnesses are in a fragmentary state of preservation. Second, the majority of witnesses contain only the first half of the *Pandectae*.[16] The second half is poorly attested in the material (p. xi).

According to Maksimovich, the *Iaroslavskii spisok* is textologically most closely related to the *Chudovskii* copy, "Ч." They appear to have a common protograph, although "prikhoditsia predpolozhit' nalichie po krainei mere

dvukh posredstvuyushchikh zven'ev" (p. xii). Besides this, the author identifies two other groups among the witnesses: "Син," "М," "Пн," and "П," "Яр," "С." Another one of the witnesses, labelled "Г" (short for "Gosudarstvennaia Publichnaia Biblioteka"), represents a state intermediate between the three identified groups (p. xii). Maksimovich does not attempt to classify two fragmentary witnesses, "У" and "А," which are mentioned on p. ixff. The author never states whether he has had access to the manuscripts themselves or to microfilm copies of them. In a single case, that of fragment "А," he declares that the readings are taken from a secondary source (p. x).[17]

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On the whole, Maksimovich deserves to be congratulated for having made a valuable contribution to the *corpus editionum* of early Slavic texts. On the one hand, the fact that he has restricted himself to the "juridical" parts of the *Pandectae* might be deplored by some, but Maksimovich's decision to do so may clearly be defended when one considers the sheer size of the text. An edition of the entire text, in all of its sixty-three chapters, would have produced a very bulky edition that might then have had to be divided into two volumes. Moreover, from the point of view of content, Maksimovich has "streamlined" the text by leaving aside "extraneous" elements (for example, those of theology and hagiography).

On the other hand, there are grounds for objection to Maksimovich's manner of selecting his material, since the result gives a somewhat distorted picture of what kind of text the *Pandectae* really is. By choosing to eliminate from his edition everything that is not purely "juridical," in his understanding of the word, Maksimovich excludes one of the most important authors, the ubiquitous St. John Chrysostom. In the words of de Clercq: "[...] Saint Jean Chrysostome surtout, qui est l'auteur le plus cité dans les *Pandectes*: son commentaire sur l'évangile de Saint Mathieu forme dans de nombreux chapitres comme le fil conducteur, le cordon tressé d'or sur lequel s'enfilent d'autres textes."[18]

As far as its usefulness to other scholars is concerned, Maksimovich's edition prompts mixed impressions. To scholars interested in Slavonic renderings of canon law it is, of course, exceptionally useful. For others, its utility is less obvious, due to a number of drawbacks—some of them of a serious nature.

Before addressing these concerns, however, it should be noted that the author clearly states in the preface that the present edition is not accompanied by a textological investigation of the manuscript tradition. This is, in general, quite acceptable. Indeed, if it were required that all editions of early Slavic texts should necessarily come with beautifully drawn *stemmata*, explaining the relationships within manuscript traditions in all their minute details, there would be significantly fewer medieval texts for Slavists with which to work. Maksimovich has not attempted to come up with such a *stemma*, and he is to be

commended for not having done so; clearly, the research on the Slavonic *Pandectae* is still in its infancy, and any self-assured comments regarding filiation, based on incomplete evidence, would have been premature. Maksimovich's edition will certainly be useful to whoever decides to solve the question of the textological relationships of this particular manuscript tradition. That having been said, the problematic aspects of Maksimovich's edition must still be addressed.

The first and foremost concern has to do with Maksimovich's complete avoidance of the question of the provenance of the first Slavonic translation of the *Pandectae*. In his preface, as already noted, Maksimovich mentions a pair of Russian nineteenth-century scholars: Sreznevskii, who worked with three East Slavic manuscripts, the *Iaroslavskii, Sinodal'nyi* and *Chudovskii* copies (Maksimovich's sigla: "Я," "Син" and "Ч") and was also one of the earliest editors of parts of the *Pandectae*; and Tikhvinskii, who described the paleographic and morphological features of the oldest East Slavic manuscript, the *Iaroslavskii spisok*. But beyond these two scholars, Maksimovich remains silent concerning the state of research on the earliest translation of the *Pandectae*. This silence begs the questions: is Maksimovich aware of the existence of any of the work that has been published on the subject during the last century? Is he familiar with the articles by Likhachev,[19] Franko,[20] Isakin,[21] Ivanova-Konstantinova,[22] Pavlova,[23] Thomson,[24] and Bogdanova?[25] Judging from what he writes in his preface, one is inclined to believe that he is not.

Thus, before taking the discussion any further, it seems germane here to review the existing evidence concerning the provenance of the oldest Slavonic translation of the *Pandectae*.

Quite independently of his learned predecessors, and without references of any kind to other relevant works, Maksimovich affirms, already in the second sentence of his preface, that "ètot trud [...] byl pereveden vo vtoroi polovine XII v. na tserkovnoslavianskii (drevnerusskii) iazyk i okazal znachitel'noe vliianie na dukhovnoe prosveshchenie drevnerusskogo chitatelia" (p. vii). The wording of this sentence is highly problematic in more ways than one.

First, it seems to declare that the dating of the translation has been decided once and for all. This seems odd, since all we know for certain is that the date of translation must fall somewhere between the original compilation of the material in Greek (1060s at the very earliest) and the oldest surviving Slavonic manuscript ("Я," beginning of the thirteenth century). Maksimovich's date, "vtoraia polovina XII v." [second half of the twelfth century], may be an educated guess, but it remains exactly that: guesswork.

Second, this sentence gives the impression that Maksimovich either considers Church Slavonic and "Old Russian" (i.e., early East Slavic) to be completely identical, or that the *Pandectae* were translated into the Rus'/early East Slavic recension of Church Slavonic. What he actually means remains unclear. It would appear, however, that Maksimovich is in favor of the first alternative, since he occasionally refers to the text simply as "russkii perevod" (p. ix).

Third, this sentence gives the impression that someone has studied the reception of this translation of the *Pandectae* in the East Slavic area. In fact, as far as could be determined by this reviewer, no such study exists.

By including this sentence in his text, Maksimovich manages to circumvent the entire discussion about the provenance of the translation. However, this issue is far from solved and needs to be examined in a serious way. Since a review is hardly the appropriate place for such a serious scrutiny of the evidence, I will restrict myself to merely drawing the contours of the debate.

In essence, there exist three hypotheses:

(1) The *Pandectae* were translated by a team of South and East Slavs.

(2) The *Pandectae* were translated in the East Slavic area.

(3) The *Pandectae* were translated in the South Slavic area.

The first hypothesis is the oldest. It was presented by Sreznevskii as early as 1872.[26] The evidence presented in favor of this theory builds on two facts which were true at the time of Sreznevskii's publication: namely that all known manuscripts were of East Slavic origin and that they contained many East Slavisms in the vocabulary.[27]

The second hypothesis, pertaining to the East Slavic theory, is really a variation of the first, uses the same kind of evidence, but excludes the idea of a South Slavic translator working together with a colleague from the East Slavic area. This theory is found in articles by Franko[28] and Ivanova-Konstantinova.[29] It should be noted that neither Franko nor Ivanova-Konstantinova nor, indeed, Maksimovich, present any evidence in favor of the exclusively East Slavic hypothesis.

The third hypothesis, found, for example, in an article by Emil Kałużniacki,[30] characterizes the translation as "slaviano-bolgarskii." Kałużniacki's contribution fails, however, to offer evidence in support of this characterization. More recent proponents of this theory are Pavlova[31] and Thomson.[32] According to these scholars, the existence of a South Slavic manuscript, *Hilandar SMS 175* (1290s), containing chapters 2–32 of the *Pandectae*, speaks in favor of the idea that the translation was originally made in the South Slavonic area.

A preliminary study of *Hilandar SMS 175* by this reviewer, shows that the manuscript lacks many of the alleged East Slavisms. Before anything definite can be said about it, though, the manuscript needs to be studied in greater depth, and to be compared both with other Slavonic representatives of the tradition and with possible Greek candidates for the title of being the "original of the Slavonic translation."

As should be quite clear from the presentation of the problems surrounding the location of the earliest translation of the *Pandectae*, the whole matter is far from being insignificant. It is therefore puzzling not to find a single word about this issue in Maksimovich's book. One might conclude, given the circumstances, that Maksimovich did not have access to all the information needed to address these very important questions.

If Maksimovich had indeed read the articles by Pavlova and Thomson, he would have learned about the intriguing facts offered by the single known South Slavic copy of the oldest translation of the *Pandectae*. Surely he would have found it difficult to ignore this important witness.

The second concern with Maksimovich's edition touches on the question of which Greek version of the *Pandectae* should be considered to be the original of the Slavic translation. Maksimovich uses three Greek manuscripts: one from the twelfth century, "L," and two from the thirteenth, "C" and "P." In his preface (p. ix), he refers to these manuscripts collectively as "original" and goes on to say that those parts of this "original" that cannot be found in the Slavonic translation will be surrounded by brackets in the edition. In doing this, Maksimovich follows a venerable tradition in the research on the earliest Slavonic translation of the *Pandectae*: he considers the translation to be an abridged version of the Greek text. This idea goes back to the very beginning of research on the *Pandectae*.[33] Here, however, as in the question of the translation's provenance, there exists manuscript material that might prove otherwise. In 1088 Nikon himself prepared a shorter version of the *Pandectae*, known as the *Liber Parvus*. So far, only one copy of this text is known, *Codex Sinaiticus graecus 441* (ff. 264r–335v).[34] No investigation exists of this manuscript, but this reviewer intends to prepare such a study in conjunction with a more detailed analysis of the *Hilandar* manuscript.

A third concern, linked to the second, is that Maksimovich appears not to be familiar with the work done by Carlo de Clercq in the 1940s.[35] Similar to Maksimovich's *Index juridicus*, but much more detailed, de Clercq's book traces and analyzes the sources of the entries in the *Pandectae.*

Maksimovich's failure to deal with the difficult problems of location and his completely inadequate introduction to the problems concerning the history of the Slavonic translations of the *Pandectae* of Nikon of the Black Mount, are serious drawbacks in his otherwise tidy and well-organized edition. By thoroughly ignoring the views of those scholars who do not agree with him about the East Slavic provenance of the earliest translation, Maksimovich has perpetuated these problems rather than offered an acceptable solution to them.

To date, there exists no definitive treatment of the question of the origins and development of the Slavonic translations of the *Pandectae*. The interested reader will find useful information, however, in the articles by Pavlova and Thomson, which also give a brief introduction to the work done at the turn of the twentieth century.

NOTES

1. See F. J. Thomson, "'Made in Russia': A Survey of the Translations Allegedly Made in Kievan Russia," in G. Birkfellner, ed., *Millennium Russiae Christianae, Tausend Jahre Christliches Russland 988–1988* (Cologne, 1993), pp. 295–354, see especially p. 322n165.
2. Alexander Kazhdan, et. al., eds., *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium,* vol. 3 (New York and Oxford, 1991), pp. 1484–85.
3. See A. Gorskii and K. Nevostruev, *Opisanie slavianskikh rukopisei Moskovskoi sinodal'noi biblioteki,* vol. 2 (Moscow, 1862), especially pp. 38ff.
4. V. N. Beneshevich, ed., *Taktikon Nikona Chernogortsa. Grecheskii tekst po rukopisi No. 441 Sinaiskogo monastyria sv. Ekateriny* (Petrograd, 1917).
5. C. De Clercq, "Les Pandectes de Nikon de la Montagne Noire," *Archives d'histoire du droit oriental* 4 (1949): 187–203, especially p. 187; see also Gorskii and Nevostruev, *Opisanie*, p. 40.
6. See *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, vol. 3, p. 1485.
7. J-P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca,* 161 vols. (Paris, 1857–1866), vol. 86, pp. 69–74; vol. 106, pp. 1359–82; vol. 127, pp. 513–16, 527–32.
8. Maksimovich does not mention that the original fourteenth century translation was later revised, and that it is the revised version that accounts for the majority of the known Slavonic copies of the *Pandectae*; see F. J. Thomson, "The Problem of the Reception of the Works of John IV Ieiunator of Constantinople among the Slavs: Nikon of the Black Mount and Cirycus of Novgorod," *Palaeobulgarica* 11(1) 1987: 23–45, especially p. 28.
9. I. I. Sreznevskii, "'Pandekty' Nikona Chernogortsa," *Sbornik otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti* 12 (1875): 217–96.
10. A. Tikhvinksii, "Iaroslavskii spisok Pandekt Nikona Chernogortsa XII–XIII v.," *Russkii filologicheskii vestnik* 32 (1894): 261–69. See also the materials, under the same title and by the same author, in *Russkii filologicheskii vestnik* 28 (1892): 114–32; 30 (1893): 340–45; 31 (1894): 316–23; and 32 (1894): 113–22.
11. See also Tikhvinskii "Iaroslavskii spisok," pp. 263–67.
12. No reference is made to any relevant handbooks on the topic.
13. The reader is advised to consult Maksimovich's book for more precise data on the Slavonic manuscripts.

14. Athos, Great Lavra of St. Athanasius, *B 108*, twelfth century.

15. Manuscript Grec no. 37 (thirteenth century) in the Coislin collection and Manuscript Grec no. 876 (thirteenth century) of the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

16. The division of the sixty-three chapters of the *Pandectae* into two parts goes back to the Greek manuscript tradition (p. xi).

17. N. A. Zaozerskii and A. S. Khakhanov, "Nomokanon Ioanna Postnika v ego redaktsiakh: gruzinskoi, grecheskoi, slavianskoi," *Chteniia v Imperatorskom Obshchestve Istorii i Drevnostei Rossiiskikh* 205(2) 1903: 1–96. The reviewer has not had access to this publication.

18. De Clercq, "Les Pandectes de Nikon," p. 188.

19. N. P. Likhachev, "Rukopis′ prinadlezhavshaia patriarkhu Feodosiiu Tyrnovskomu," *Izvestiia otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk* 10(4) 1905: 312–19.

20. I. Franko, "Beiträge zur Quellenkritik einiger altrussischer Denkmäler," *Archiv für slavische Philologie* 29 (1907): 282–304.

21. A. H. Isakin, "Paleograficheskoe opisanie Pandektov Nikona Chernogortsa po Iaroslavskomu rukopisnomu spisku XIII v.," *Trudy kafedry russkogo iazyka vuzov Vostochnoi Sibiri i Dal'nego Vostoka*, vol. 1 (Irkutsk, 1960), pp. 77–89.

22. K. Ivanova-Konstantinova, "Ob odnoi rukopisi XIV v. Pogodinskogo sobraniia," *Trudy otdela Drevnerusskoi literatury* 25 (1970): 294–308.

23. R. Pavlova, "Neizvesten răkopis s podpisa na bălgarski patriarkh Teodosii Tărnovski," *Ezik i literatura* 1975(2): 25–38; idem, "Tri rukopisi chetyrnadtsatogo veka s podpis′iu bolgarskogo patriarkha Feodosiia," *Slavistichni izsledvaniia* 1978(4): 127–42 and "Oshte edin nepoznat srednobălgarski răkopis," *Ezik i kultura* 1983(5): 23–31.

24. Thomson, "The Problem of the Reception of the Works of John IV Ieiunator."

25. S. Bogdanova, "Pandekty Nikona Chernogortsa v spiske XVI v.," *Palaeobulgarica* 13(1) 1989: 81–95.

26. I. I. Sreznevskii, "Pandekty Nikona Chernogortsa po drevnemu perevodu," *Zapiski Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk* 21(1) 1872: 194–98, see especially p. 198.

27. The evidence presented by Sreznevskii in 1872 includes the following lexical items (Sreznevskii's spellings): *хорошъ*, here 'tidy,' *хорошавъ*, 'foppish,' and other derivations from *xorosh-*; *гривна*, 'grivna, a monetary unit'; *рѣзана*, 'rezana, a monetary unit'; *вѣкша*, 'věksha, a monetary unit'; *вѣверица*, 'věveritsa, a monetary unit'; *върстъ*, '*vъrstъ*, a

measure of distance', *сѣмья*, 'family, here: way of life'; *посадникъ* 'posadnik, an official'; *крьноути* 'to buy.' See Sreznevskii, "Pandekty' Nikona Chernogortsa," pp. 293–96, for additional evidence of a similar kind.

28. Franko," Beiträge zur Quellenkritik," p. 286.

29. Ivanova-Konstantinova, "Ob odnoi rukopisi," p. 303. Interestingly enough, Ivanova-Konstantinova, when referring to Sreznevskii, does not mention that his hypothesis included both a South Slav and an East Slav.

30. E. I. Kałużniacki, "Obzor slaviano-russkikh pamiatnikov iazyka i pis'ma, nakhoodiashchikhsia v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh L'vovskikh," *Trudy tret'ego arkheologicheskogo s"ezda v Rossii,* vol. 2 (Kyiv, 1878), pp. 213–321, especially p. 247.

31. Pavlova, "Oshte edin nepoznat," pp. 24ff.

32. Thomson, "The Problem of the Reception of the Works of John IV Ieiunator," p. 27.

33. Gorskii and Nevostruev, *Opisanie,* p. 21: "[. . .] my dolzhny dopustit', chto pri pervonachal'nom perevode, veroiatno, v sledstvie ogromnosti raboty, mnogoe bylo opuskaemo, ili izlozheno sokrashchennee."

34. Thomson, "The Problem of the Reception of the Works of John IV Ieiunator," p. 27n34; V. N. Beneshevich, *Opisanie grecheskikh rukopisei monastyria Sviatoi Ekateriny na Sinae* (Saint Petersburg, 1911), pp. 237–46; K. Clark, *Checklist of all Manuscripts in St. Catherines Monastery, Mount Sinai* (Washington, 1952), p. 7.

35. C. De Clercq, *Les textes juridiques dans le Pandectes de Nikon de la Montagne Noire* (Venice, 1942).

REVIEWS

RELIGION AND NATIONALITY IN WESTERN UKRAINE: THE GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE RUTHENIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN GALICIA, 1867–1900. By John-Paul Himka. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999. 236 pp. ISBN (cloth) 0-7735-1812-6 $70.00.

In 1867, the Habsburg monarchy was reorganized according to the constitutional arrangements of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Galicia found itself in the Austrian half of the monarchy, sometimes known as Cis-Leithania, and the conservative Polish nobles of Galicia, guided by Agenor Gołuchowski, found themselves well positioned to negotiate a secondary compromise with Vienna, permitting very significant Galician autonomy within Cis-Leithania. The consequent autonomy was structured to favor the prerogatives of Polish language, culture, and nationality, although Poles barely constituted a plurality of the population vis-à-vis the people who were called, and generally called themselves, Ruthenians (*rusyny*), sometimes Galician Ruthenians (*halyts'ki rusyny*), still on their way to becoming nationally Ukrainians. In 1867, the year of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, the Vatican approved the canonization of Iosafat Kuntsevych, the Uniate or Greek Catholic bishop who was martyred at the hands of Orthodox murderers in Vitsebsk in 1623. The Ruthenians of Galicia were overwhelmingly Greek Catholic in 1867, and so the canonization of St. Iosafat was of most immediate interest to them. John-Paul Himka takes this occasion as the paradoxical point of departure for his important new study of religion and nationality in eastern Galicia, or, as his title affirms, in western Ukraine.

"It would seem on the face of it that the Greek Catholic Ruthenians should have been elated to have one of their number solemnly declared a saint by Pope Pius IX," remarks Himka. "Yet the exact opposite was the case: Galician Ruthenian public opinion greeted the news of Iosafat's canonization with hostility" (p. 29). The reason for such antipathy to a saint who might well have been regarded as one of their own, to a canonization that could have been seen as an occasion of national pride, was that Iosafat's martyrdom was being rehashed, so to speak, at a moment of peculiar delicacy in the development of Greek Catholic religious identity and Ruthenian national identity. The intersection of those identity crises forms the central subject of Himka's study, as he attempts to sort out the interrelated impacts of religious and political forces in the making of modern Ukrainians in Galicia. Reticence toward the Greek Catholic saint was a function of ambivalence toward his Orthodox murderers at a moment, 250 years after his martyrdom, when Ruthenian Greek Catholics in

Galicia, faced with the political predomination of Roman Catholic Poles in the province, had to consider a favorable revaluation of the Orthodox component in their hybrid religious rite.

"The hostility to the canonization of Iosafat Kuntsevych in Greek Catholic Galicia," Himka explains, "makes sense within the context of the Russophile hegemony in Ruthenian public opinion" (p. 31). Exceptionally sensitive to the weight of national names in an age of evolving national consciousness, Himka describes a "Russophile" orientation, displacing an older "Ruthenian" identity, as part of a dialectical evolution that would eventually, though not inevitably, bring this population around to becoming Ukrainian. Russophilism plays a particularly important part in this study inasmuch as its manifestations were clearly both religious and political, reflecting Galician Ruthenian interest in the Orthodox religion and the Russian state, as well as a sense of common cultural destiny with the Orthodox population of Ukraine within the Russian Empire. Himka has worked in several major archives to produce this study, including Lviv, Vienna, and the Vatican, and the archival results are fascinating. Equally impressive, though, is the research that he has pursued in representing "public opinion" among Galician Ruthenians at a moment of maximal ambivalence and cultural controversy. Himka attends to the divergent journalistic perspectives of the province, with particular attention to Ruthenian publications in the provincial capital Lviv. He notices not only what was said, but what was passed over in silence, like the canonization of St. Iosafat which was most notable for being hardly mentioned in those publications. Himka's research permits us to witness in concrete detail the elusive process of the construction of nationality in the public sphere of Ruthenian Galicia.

Himka discusses the Russophile role of the Galician clergy who were also active outside Galicia, in the Greek Catholic diocese of Chełm (Kholm), the only remaining one within the Russian Empire; the irresistible combination of Russian imperial power and a Russophile clergy brought the Greek Catholics of Chełm over to Orthodoxy in 1875, envisioning a dual return "to the bosom of the Russian church and Russian nationality" (p. 59). The case of the intently Russophile Father Ioann Naumovych is treated in detail, including his role in the scandal surrounding the village of Hnylychky where 129 Greek Catholic Ruthenians wanted to convert to Orthodoxy in 1882. As well, Naumovych is discussed for his role in the making of Galician public opinion, his trial for treason by the Habsburg government, and his eventual embrace of Orthodoxy and emigration to the Russian Empire. Himka also addresses the efforts to shape Roman Catholic public opinion in the *Sion* circle in the 1870s, and the Roman-Polish perspective of the Jesuits who were supposed to reform the Greek Catholic Church in the 1880s, earning Russophile excoriation as "the most difficult historical enemy of the Ruthenians, responsible for rivers of blood and blazing fires" (p. 84). The variant details of religious practice are considered in their implications for ultimate allegiance, with organs and rosa-

ries pointing toward Rome, and three-barred crosses, Julian calendars, and priestly beards denoting Russophile Orthodox leanings. The bearded Naumovych was said to look just like an Orthodox priest even before he actually became one, while the journal *Sion* made the case for a clean-shaven Catholic clergy, suggesting, according to Himka, that nothing less than "the march of civilization" dictated smooth cheeks over shaggy beards (p. 50). Thus, even the cultural politics of bringing "civilization" to "Eastern Europe" entered into the public debate about Greek Catholic practice.

The fascination of ecclesiastical history is often in the details, and Himka clearly recognizes that no detail of ritual or prerogative seemed too small to provoke the passions of nineteenth-century churchmen. One of the most interesting sections of the book focuses on the exacerbating debates and numerous draft resolutions concerning the sensitive issue of clerical celibacy at the Lviv Provincial Synod of 1891. Uniates largely preserved clerical marriage at the time of the Union of Brest in 1596, and three hundred years later Greek Catholic priests faced Vatican pressure to recognize the spiritual priority of celibacy in the Catholic world. While a succession of resolutions sought to specify different degrees of recommendation on behalf of celibacy, the debate addressed the crucial national issue of the origins of the small Ruthenian intelligentsia, often the sons of married priests. One of the points that Himka emphasizes is the Vatican's general distrust of national sentiment, and reluctance to countenance the national deployment of religious issues, let alone encourage a national perspective that took priority over religious concerns. Himka sharply characterizes the Vatican delegate at the synod, Monsignor Agostino Ciasca, chosen as an Orientalist expert to go east to Lviv, though his expertise did not involve Slavic languages or culture. He appears in these pages petulantly throwing his snuffbox down on the floor, making tasteless jokes about the sexual impropriety of the Greek Catholic clergy, and finally altering the text of the accepted resolution after the synod ended. Perhaps from his perspective the Greek Catholics did indeed seem to practice an exotic Oriental rite, perceived by him according to the demi-Orientalism that helped to define the backwardness of Eastern Europe for so many foreign visitors to the region.

Starting the chronology of his study with the year 1867, Himka concludes it with the year 1900, which was not just the turn of the century, but also the year in which Andrei Sheptyts'kyi became the Greek Catholic metropolitan, inaugurating a new era of church leadership in the guidance of Ukrainian national development. Himka sketches the remaking of Sheptyts'kyi from a Polish noble to a Basilian monk to a Ruthenian leader, and points out his ancestral legacy of involvement in the Ruthenian sphere; at Sheptyts'kyi's ordination his father appeared in the costume of a Ruthenian boyar. This family history, like the account of the canonization of St. Iosafat, connects Himka's history of national issues in the modern Greek Catholic Church to the early modern emergence of the Union. Historiographically, this important study may be read alongside

such recent landmarks in early modern Uniate history as Boris Gudziak's *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (1998) and David Frick's *Meletij Smotryc'kyj* (1995).

Himka's work, profoundly engaged with the all-important modern issue of national identity, makes a brilliant contribution not just to the history of Ukrainian nationality, but also to the general theoretical understanding of modern nationalism. Taken together with his recent article on "The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus': Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions" (in *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*, eds. Michael Kennedy and Ronald Suny, 1999), Himka's research makes the case for a contingent and evolutionary perspective on nationality in which several different forms and inflections of national identity jostle one another in cultural competition, enhanced or diminished by various historical forces, including religion, without any predetermined outcome. In the case of Ukrainian national history, the ultimate outcome was, tautologically, Ukrainian national identity. Himka's study of the late nineteenth century in "Western Ukraine," however, demonstrates the range of competing alternative identity formations still seemingly viable at the turn of the century. The issue of nationality has drawn many stimulating theoretical treatments over the last generation, and one of Himka's achievements in this book is to offer an empirical study the subtlety, sophistication, and insight of which meet the intellectual challenges posed by this exceptionally important and profoundly complex historical problem.

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OLD BELIEVERS IN MODERN RUSSIA. By Roy R. Robson. DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995. XIII, 188 pp. + 18 illus., bibliography, index. ISBN (cloth) 0-87580-205-2 $30.00.

This book addresses the history of Old Belief, a topic that has been sorely neglected by English-language historians of the Russian Empire. While a plethora of studies exist in Russian and there are some relevant publications in Polish (Iwaniec), French (Pascal; Niqueux), and German (Hauptmann; Pleyer; Hildermeier), English-language scholarship has been almost exclusively devoted to the seventeenth-century genesis of Old Belief (Cherniavsky; Crummey; Michels). Robson's study makes an important contribution by focusing on Old Believers between the 1905 and 1917 Revolutions. The 1905 Revolution led to the legalization of Old Belief after more than two hundred

years of persecution, giving Old Believers the opportunity to discuss their internal affairs for the first time in a public forum. Robson organizes the five principal chapters of his book around the topics raised in these discussions: liturgy and prayer, church architecture, iconography, ritual prohibitions, and the notion of "community." These chapters are preceded by two rather general chapters providing the uninitiated reader with basic facts about Old Belief's religious history.

Robson draws the bulk of his information from post-1905 Old Believer publications, including liturgical books, prayer manuals, conference proceedings, and, in particular, articles published in eleven Old Believer journals and magazines. These sources provide some fascinating glimpses into the intellectual and moral dilemmas of faithful Old Believers facing modernity: Did Old Belief's religious ideals permit the use of kerosene lamps, iron plows, gramophones, or photographs? Should Old Believers have their children vaccinated or seek medical care in hospitals? Should Old Believers residing in cities eat together with non-Old Believers at one table? Should they be allowed to drink tea, or alcohol, and what about smoking tobacco? Clearly, the traditional boundaries of the Old Belief community were coming under attack and Old Believers were struggling with how to maintain their distinctiveness and inner cohesion.

Robson presents Old Believers' own views while downplaying critical commentary by outside observers as "problematic" and "hav[ing] their limitations." He rarely refers to archival sources such as reports by agents of the Holy Synod or by government officials, and seems to imply that Old Believers discussed their affairs openly without internal censorship or concerns about public reputation. This optimistic reading of Old Believer sources underscores Robson's desire to take Old Belief's own statements seriously.

Throughout his study Robson postulates that the religious ideals of Old Belief were stronger than the forces of modernization. "The way an Old Believer interacted with the world" was informed by "separatist traditions," developed during the seventeenth century and expressed in ritual,"prohibitions serv[ing] to set Old Believers apart from the rest of Russian society." Even those "liberal" Old Believers who made concessions to modernity—and the book illustrates that there were many such Old Believers—accepted traditional ideals and tried to give them new vitality by appropriating the tools of technology and scientific analysis (e.g., using photographs to disseminate old iconographic motives or describing the health hazards of smoking and drinking).

The common language of symbols (Robson speaks of an "iconic principle") also transcended inner divisive factors such as economic status, power hierarchy, social position, and geographic separation. According to Robson, all Old Believers participated in the same "system of communication" and were connected with each other by "shared sets of assumptions and [mutual] trust." Rank-and-file Old Believers had deeply internalized ancient religious tradition

("the piety of Old Rus") as the only viable "conduit of grace through which one could become deified," and thus, very much afraid of the Antichrist, did not even think of questioning the ritual proscriptions of their superiors.

However, Robson's book contains some data—mentioned only in passing and not fully analyzed—that contradict his basic premise and indicate that Old Believer peasants and merchants frequently disregarded the exhortations of their religious leaders: many drank alcohol and smoked tobacco (though "presumably no Old Believers . . . would ever smoke in church"); many used white sugar (a commodity that "had not been known in old Russia") and a growing number drank tea (denounced by "the most creative Old Believers" as "part of Chinese idolatry and therefore inappropriate for Christian consumption"); others visited the bathhouse (*bania*) together with their Orthodox neighbors ("with the heterodox" as Robson puts it); or they visited shrines of the Orthodox church, and bought cheap machine-made icons (not following injunctions to buy only expensive handmade icons); finally, Old Belief entrepreneurs had no qualms about selling Old Believer icons to the general public and mass producing icons of the Russian Orthodox Church in order to turn a profit (at least one Old Believer firm made icons for the imperial family). These developments suggest a community in conflict and crisis rather than an "ideological communitas" held together by shared beliefs.

Robson glosses over this internal crisis, creating an impression of unity and cohesion. Did the pronouncements of an educated Old Belief elite—writers, journalists, conference speakers, and community elders—really give expression to widely shared community values? One might note here that even Old Belief leaders of earlier periods had to overcome great obstacles when trying to impose their learned notions of religion and culture on community members (cf. studies on the Vyg Community). Was the chasm between post-1905 Old Belief leaders and their flock any less pronounced? We simply do not know. The archival records that would allow historians to reconstruct the aspirations and behavior of the vast majority of ordinary Old Believers have yet to be studied.

This book is of great interest to scholars of modern Russian religion, but readers should bear in mind the following two caveats: first, the author tends to idealize modern Old Believers' community spirit and to assume that ordinary and elite members lived in harmony; second, in the opinion of this reviewer Robson overestimates the power of religious tradition to immunize Old Believers against the rapid changes of the modern world.

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A LONG WALK TO CHURCH: A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY OF RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY. By Nathaniel Davis. Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995. 381 pp. ISBN (cloth) 0-8133-2276-6; ISBN (paper) 0-8133-2277-4 $32.00.

This book is the result of a project undertaken by Nathaniel Davis more than forty years ago. The project began in 1954 when he submitted a paper on "Religious Collaboration and Resistance in the Communist World" to Professor Philip E. Mosely of the Russian Institute at Columbia University. What followed was a dissertation on "Religion and Communist Government in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," completed at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1960, and a distinguished career as an American diplomat that lasted more than thirty years. The "delay" in completing the project certainly added to the value of the book, since it allowed Davis not only to enhance his understanding of the Soviet state apparatus and its policies as a result of his diplomatic missions in Moscow, but also to take advantage of the recently opened Soviet archives.

It is Davis' familiarity with the literature of the subject and his first-hand knowledge of the Soviet system that has enabled him to present a well-balanced history of Russian Orthodoxy since the end of World War II. But it is his access to the formerly closed Soviet archives that makes his contribution truly unique. Davis appears to be one of the first Western scholars to have gained access to the records of the USSR Council for Religious Affairs (now housed in GA RF, the State Archives of the Russian Federation). These documents shed new light not only on the history of Soviet policy toward Russian Orthodoxy during the last fifty years of the existence of the USSR, but also on the inner workings of the Russian Orthodox Church, including changes in its structure, finances, education, and parish life.

Although this documentary material comes from the archives of the highly centralized all-Union body, it has enabled Davis to depart from the traditional Moscow-centric point of view that prevailed for decades in the study of Russian Orthodoxy. As a result, his work is not limited to the analysis of events in Moscow, but also follows developments in those areas of the USSR where the majority of churches and Orthodox believers were located. Ukrainian Orthodoxy clearly emerges as one of the major beneficiaries of this approach. Davis notes that after World War II, "The Russian Orthodox Church had become a predominantly Ukrainian institution, as almost two-thirds of its parishes were in Ukraine" (p. 24).

It can be deduced from Davis' study that the predominance of Ukrainian parishes over Russian ones remained a salient feature of the Russian Orthodox Church throughout the post-war period. In 1958, for example, before the start of Nikita Khrushchev's antireligious campaign, the Kyiv eparchy had 582 active churches, compared with 212 in the Moscow eparchy, and the Lviv eparchy accounted for 2,071 churches, almost ten times as many as in the

Moscow eparchy. According to statistics compiled by Davis, even in 1994, after the Moscow Patriarchate had lost thousands of its former parishes to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox churches, it still had more parishes in Ukraine than in Russia (5,700 compared with 5,200).

Why did Russian Orthodoxy become an essentially Ukrainian phenomenon and remain so for many decades? Davis seeks the answers to this puzzle in the history of the Sovietization of the western borderlands of the USSR, acquired by Moscow in the course of World War II. He rightly states that it was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that "rescued the institution of the Russian Orthodox Church" (p. 16). As Davis shows in the book, Stalin used the church as an instrument of sovietization and russification of the Baltics, western Belarus, western Ukraine, and Bessarabia. In Ukraine, the Russian Orthodox Church was also an instrument to combat the Vatican and the Greek Catholic faithful, who were forcibly "converted" to Orthodoxy between 1946 and 1950.

Statistical data acquired by Davis from the Council for Religious Affairs support this conclusion, showing that the authorities in the western Ukrainian oblasts apparently kept in mind the main objectives of their anti-Vatican policy when they tried to spare Orthodox parishes from deregistration during the antireligion drives of the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, Galicia accounted for roughly 2 percent of the all-Union population and 25 percent of all the Orthodox churches in the USSR. Only half of those churches had an assigned Orthodox priest, but were kept open by the authorities, contrary to the usual practice in the rest of the country. It would appear that eastern Ukraine had to pay the price for the government's religious "tolerance" in the regions of western Ukraine so that the all-Ukrainian number of deregistered churches would meet all-Union "standards." In the late 1940s, Ukraine met that "standard" by closing approximately 7 percent of all active churches in the republic, but it was the oblasts of eastern Ukraine that suffered the most, with the closing of as many as 20 percent of the Orthodox churches in Poltava Oblast in eastern Ukraine.

In the 1950s, during the beginning of Khrushchev's antireligion campaign, western Ukraine lost 3.5 percent of its parishes, while eastern Ukraine lost 14 percent. By the end of Khrushchev's rule, the Lviv eparchy had lost 42 percent of its parishes—close to the USSR average of 40 percent, but the Dnipropetrovsk eparchy in eastern Ukraine lost 86 percent, the highest percentage in the USSR. The Mukachevo eparchy in Transcarpathia lost only 16 percent of its churches. Of 167 priests active in Dnipropetrovsk oblast at the start of the campaign, only 30 continued to serve their parishes at the end of the drive. In 1996, in neighboring Zaporizhzhia oblast, there remained only 9 of the 92 clerics who were registered there in 1958. As a result, by the mid-1980s there was a population of 170,000 for every Orthodox parish in the Dnipropetrovsk eparchy (including Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts) and 3,500 for every parish in Transcarpathia.

The closing of churches in individual oblasts often depended on the atheistic and bureaucratic zeal of local officials, the resistance of the population to

forceful closures, and especially on the general tendency of Party officials to "shelter" the Orthodox communities in the western regions of Ukraine, using them to combat the continuing loyalty of the local population to the suppressed Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. As Davis shows, that was the case not only with the closing of churches in the USSR, but also with the registration of new Orthodox communities. In 1988, after the dramatic change of religious policy under Mikhail Gorbachev, more than half of the 800 or so new Orthodox parishes registered in the Soviet Union were located in Ukraine, most of them in the former Greek Catholic eparchies in the western regions.

Davis is well acquainted not only with the sources and literature on the history of Russian and Ukrainian Orthodoxy, but also with recent developments in church politics in the former USSR. In fact, he offers one of the most accurate descriptions to date of the current confessional strife in Ukraine and of Ukrainian Orthodoxy's struggle for autocephaly. At the same time, the book's coverage of Ukrainian events is not completely free of occasional errors and omissions. Contrary to what Davis writes in the book, at the time of the Union of Brest (1596) it was not only western Ukraine (p. 132) but all of Ukraine that was under Polish rule. The leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Stepan Bandera, was never a Greek Catholic priest (p. 28). There are also some other omissions in Davis' account of Ukrainian topics, but they are not significant.

Davis adopts a "flexible" policy on transliteration, using Ukrainian forms of personal and geographic names when his sources are Ukrainian, and Russian forms when they are Russian. This creates some confusion. A case in point is the transliteration of the first name of Mariika Kazyn, a girl from Hrushiv who claimed to have witnessed the appearance of the Mother of God in April 1987: Davis identifies her as Marina Kazin (pp. 254–55). Nor does Davis make a clear distinction between the terms "Russia" and "Rus'," identifying the Nestor Chronicle as the "Russian Primary Chronicle," and Rus' lands as "Russian" (p. 237). Sometimes he uses the term "Orthodox" as an antonym of "Autocephalists" (p. 84), even though the latter designation refers to Orthodox believers seeking independence for their church.

In general, it should be noted that Davis' work is virtually free of errors concerning the history and current status of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, which gives him a rare distinction among scholars who specialize in the history of Russian Orthodoxy. For Davis, Ukraine is far from *terra incognita*, and that fact greatly enhances the quality of his book. Davis concludes with a number of reflections on the prospects for Russian Orthodoxy. According to his scenario, sooner or later the Russian Orthodox Church will be confined within the borders of the Russian Federation, and the Ukrainian and even the Belarusian Orthodox churches will follow their separate paths. Given the history of Orthodoxy in Eastern and Southern Europe, it is difficult not to agree with that prediction.

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THE UKRAINIAN GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE SOVIET STATE (1939–1950). By Bohdan R. Bociurkiw. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1996. 310 pp. ISBN (cloth) 1895-5711-2 $39.95.

This book is the product of a lifelong study of the history of the Ukrainian Catholic Church under Soviet rule by one of the most eminent scholars in the field. Its main focus is on the forcible suppression of the Greek Catholic Church by the Soviet authorities in 1945–1950, a topic that has generated an impressive literature, including both memoirs and research.

What are the new elements in the book's contribution to the subject? The list of archival sources includes an impressive amount of material from the formerly inaccessible Soviet depositories. Bociurkiw gained access to documents from the archives of the Greek Catholic Church that were confiscated by the Soviet authorities, the former KGB archive in Kyiv, and Communist Party and state archives in Moscow, Kyiv, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil, as well as materials pertaining to republican and oblast officials in charge of religious affairs. These and other materials, quoted abundantly in the book, have made it possible for Bociurkiw to produce the most authoritative study of the Soviet destruction of the Greek Catholic Church that has appeared to date.

The book provides an impressive amount of information on the preparation, logistics, and actual execution of the plan to destroy the church. It also documents the process of intimidation of the clergy, as well as the arrest and exile of Greek Catholic bishops, priests, monks, and nuns. Bociurkiw's archival findings present a unique opportunity to check the validity of studies of Soviet religious policy written in the West before 1991. The newly acquired KGB, party, and state documents prove "beyond reasonable doubt" what Bociurkiw and some of his colleagues claimed long ago: the "reunion" of the Greek Catholics with the Moscow Patriarchate was not voluntary, but was orchestrated by the state and conducted in a most brutal way by Stalin's secret police.

Bociurkiw's study persuasively links the actual process of the suppression of the Greek Catholic Church with two successive leaders of the USSR—Joseph Stalin, who signed the directive to suppress the church, and Nikita Khrushchev, then First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, who carried out the assignment. For the first time in the study of church-state relations in the USSR, Bociurkiw presents the reader with portraits of those Soviet secret police officials who were behind the scenes in the drama of the persecution and forcible suppression of organized religion in the USSR. One of them, whose career is detailed in the book, was Colonel Serhii Danylenko (Karin), mentioned in the memoirs of Metropolitan Vasyl' Lypkivs'kyi of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Danylenko was responsible for overseeing the destruction both of the Autocephalous Church in the 1920s and of the Greek Catholic Church in the 1940s.

Apart from this new and detailed information on the crucial role of the state in the suppression of the Greek Catholic Church, Bociurkiw's study sheds new light on a number of the most controversial aspects of the history of the suppression of the church. These include the church's relations with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the motives and role of the Initiative Group of the Greek Catholic Church for Reunion with the Orthodox Church led by Fr. Havryïl Kostel'nyk, and, finally, the role of the Moscow Patriarchate in the suppression of the Greek Catholic Church.

Bociurkiw shows that although the church was closely linked with the Ukrainian political and cultural movement through its episcopate, clergy, and faithful, Soviet claims that the church leadership had closely cooperated with the anti-Soviet underground were little more than a propaganda slogan put forward as a pretext to destroy it. The directive signed by Stalin in March 1945 makes it clear that the plan to suppress the Greek Catholic Church was part of a larger Soviet assault on the Vatican and on Catholicism in general on the territory of the USSR, and not a campaign aimed specifically against the Ukrainian underground. Quite symptomatically, that is also the way in which the assault was interpreted by the anonymous author of the 1946 letter to the leaders of the underground—a document that Bociurkiw attributes to Kostel'nyk.

Bociurkiw draws attention to the fact that after the Red Army took Lviv in the summer of 1944, the church leadership actively sought a modus vivendi with the Soviet authorities and did nothing to provoke its forcible suppression. He quotes a pastoral letter by the bishop of Stanyslaviv (Ivano-Frankivsk), Hryhorii Khomyshyn, and two pastoral letters of the head of the church, Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj, issued between October 1944 and March 1945. All three letters called on the underground to desist from "arbitrary killings," and Slipyj also helped to organize a secret meeting between the Soviet military command and the leadership of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. None of this helped the church's cause or prevented the Soviet propaganda machine from accusing the church leadership of collaboration with the anti-Soviet underground. Bociurkiw concludes that "there is *nothing* the Greek Catholic Church could have done to avert its suppression by the Kremlin" (p. 235).

The church's attempts to establish a working relationship with the state contributed, at least in part, to the fact that there was no immediate reaction on the part of the underground to the arrests of church hierarchs in April 1945. Only in mid-1946 did the underground take a clearly negative stand against the suppression of the church and the "reunification" of its faithful with the Moscow Patriarchate. Soviet secret police reports show that initially some leaders of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army even welcomed these developments, planning to install their men in positions of influence in the Orthodox Church in eastern Ukraine. Such reasoning was made possible by strained relations between the underground and the leadership of the church in early 1945, as well as by nationalist ideology, which was skeptical in its attitude toward religion and

postulated as its goal the creation of an independent "united" Ukrainian state (with an inevitable majority of Orthodox believers). That factor also enabled Kostel'nyk to claim at the "reunification" Sobor of March 1946 that the "forest men" were all in favor of Orthodoxy. Characteristically, the underground never retaliated against the organizers of the "reunion" and refused to take responsibility for the assassinations of Kostel'nyk in 1948 and the anti-Catholic publicist Iaroslav Halan in 1950.

What were the motives of Kostel'nyk and other members of the Initiative Group? Bociurkiw comes to the conclusion that all of them, including Kostel'nyk, who was the leader of the pro-eastern faction in the church, were intimidated by the secret police and forced to join the group. He also points out that the death in November 1944 of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, who was truly respected by Kostel'nyk, and his replacement as the head of the church by Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj, Kostel'nyk's old foe, may have contributed to the latter's decision to join the group. The rationale for the "reunion" that Kostel'nyk put forward in his private talks with priests and was presented in the anonymous letter to the underground, consisted of the following points: the Soviets had decided to suppress the church and would do so in any event; under such circumstances it was wrong for the clergy to abandon their flock, hence it was better to "reunite" with the Orthodox Church and thus prevent the influx of "Muscovite" priests into Galicia.

Bociurkiw's archival findings (Kostel'nyk's letters, as well as reports submitted by government and secret police officials) show that those were indeed among the true goals of Kostel'nyk's "conversion." To achieve them, Kostel'nyk insisted on the convocation of a special Sobor instead of oblast conferences, as had been suggested by the Moscow Patriarch, and on the consecration of new Orthodox bishops from among former Greek Catholics. Students of church-state relations in the USSR will be interested to learn that the Sobor of 8–10 March 1946, which concluded on the Sunday of Orthodoxy, was in fact arranged by government officials to take place between elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the start of spring sowing.

The Sobor was labelled an "operetta" by its participants and proclaimed uncanonical by the Ukrainian Catholic bishops in the West. But for Kostel'nyk it had a special meaning and was probably intended to set the seal on his "deal" with the authorities. That "deal" included the consecration of new bishops from among former Greek Catholics, the reduction of liturgical changes to a minimum, and the establishment of a theological seminary in Lviv. Kostel'nyk was also naïve enough to think that he and his supporters would be allowed to conduct a "modernization" of Orthodoxy in Ukraine. Little of this was ever realized, apparently contributing to Kostel'nyk's disillusionment with the "reunion" at the end of his life. It would appear that he was assassinated on orders of the Soviet secret police, which feared that the resistance movement would spirit Kostel'nyk to the West.

Bociurkiw analyzes the suppression of the Greek Catholic Church not only in relation to Soviet religious policy, but also in the broader context of Russian Orthodox attacks on Greek Catholics, starting with the partitions of Poland in the late eighteenth century. He also draws a parallel between the Lviv Sobor of 1946 and the 1839 Sobor in Vitsebsk, which suppressed the Greek Catholic (then Uniate) Church in central Ukraine and Belarus. At the same time, Bociurkiw rightly remarks that "in contrast to the tsarist 'reunion' campaigns, the Russian Orthodox Church played only a marginal role in the postwar assault on Greek Catholicism" (p. 237). One must agree with Bociurkiw that the Russian hierarchy generally had little choice but to follow Stalin's orders. However, the absence of any condemnation of the 1946 Lviv Sobor on the part of the Moscow Patriarchate after its liberation from the communist "yoke" is striking.

Bociurkiw quotes a document according to which the Orthodox archbishop of Lviv, Makarii (Oksiiuk), warned authorities back in 1945 that Kostel'nyk wanted only a formal union of the Greek Catholic parishes with the Orthodox church, and that if given a chance he would revive an autocephalist movement in Ukraine. This was a prescient statement, as it was indeed the former Greek Catholic parishes in Galicia that formed the core of the revived Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1989. The "time bomb" set by Kostel'nyk actually went off.

Bociurkiw concludes his book with a paragraph on sources to which he did not have access, remarking with irony that the Vatican archives remained largely closed to him when those of the former Soviet secret police in Ukraine were opened to researchers. There is little doubt that more revelations about the history of the suppression of the Greek Catholic Church, based both on Western and former Soviet archives, will come to light, but it is highly unlikely that those new documents will challenge the principal conclusions of Bociurkiw's study.

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NIHIL OBSTAT: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA. By Sabrina P. Ramet. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1998. xi, 425 pp. Index. ISBN (cloth) 0-8223-2056-8 $74.95; ISBN (paper) 0-8223-2070-3 $23.95.

Religion and politics are wisely banned from polite conversation, for separately they are dangerous enough, but together—potentially explosive. Even among scholars, disinterested discussion of religion in relation to politics and society—combined with the requisite empathy with the religious point of view—is

rare. Sabrina P. Ramet's *Nihil Obstat* exemplifies that combination of profound understanding and objective distance necessary for a scholarly treatment of this much neglected subject.

The book is divided into five sections, beginning with a cross-regional overview of communist religious policy and ending with a survey of postcommunist trends and some general theoretical conclusions. The three intermediate sections divide the subject geographically: the northern tier, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union. While the different countries are not all treated chapter by chapter (Poland and Czechoslovakia each appears in two chapters, while Bulgaria shares a chapter with Poland), all of communist East and Central Europe is covered, except for the Baltic states (more properly belonging to Northern Europe), Belarus, and Moldova (though the latter two are to some degree covered by the chapter on the Russian Orthodox Church).

Chapters two through six, and chapter eight, have all been published before (in some cases, in earlier versions) in journals, or in collections edited by the author. The eight remaining chapters are entirely new. Thus, the book combines the virtues of up-to-date scholarship with the convenience of collecting some of the author's previous research in a single volume.

The clever title—its tongue-in-cheek reference to Roman Catholic terminology is continued in such headings as "Imprimatur," "In Hoc Signo Vinces," and "Ego Te Absolvo," which the publishers have cutely set in a somber Gothic typeface—sounds a principal theme of the work. With the collapse of communism, "nothing stands in the way" of a proliferation of religions and religious groups throughout the former Soviet Union and its satellite states. This theme and its corollaries provide some conceptual unity to the tangled history and current problems of religion in East-Central Europe and Russia.

In her preface, the author questions the common view that the fall of communism has left a "spiritual vacuum" in its wake. As she points out, communism never quite succeeded in eradicating religion, nor was the influence of the institutional churches that survived through the communist period negligible. In fact, as Ramet remarks in her introductory chapter, "Communism in its own brutal way ultimately protected the religions of which it approved, crushing rival religious associations that failed to obtain its sanction" (p. 3). In countries such as Poland, it served as an unwilling foil to the Church's immense moral credibility. Thus, the new and revived religions now active in postcommunist space do have serious traditional competitors. On the other hand, there are sectors of society, particularly in such heavily Sovietized areas as Ukraine's Donbas, where something approaching a spiritual vacuum can be detected.

In a mostly historical study, chapter two stands out with its strictly political science approach. Here the author analyzes communist religious policy in Poland, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, as well as in two countries beyond the scope of the rest of this work: China and Cuba. Identifying several phases and subphases in the development of policy, she is able to draw illuminating

comparisons among these five regimes. She argues convincingly that religious policy is usually not isolated, but tends to track political, economic, and other government policy.

The next eight chapters examine religion, politics, and society in the former East European communist states, Russia and Ukraine. The concise historical summaries show, among other things, that close government supervision and control of religious groups was hardly a twentieth-century innovation. The reader is also reminded that the long-term deleterious effects of communist policies on religious life are far from spent. It is revealing that the East German *Jugendweihe*, long regarded as a lame government attempt to supplant religious confirmation of youth with state-imposed ceremonies, has experienced an evidently genuine revival since 1989 (p. 87). Particularly noteworthy is the chapter on Yugoslavia, with its lucid theoretical introduction, illuminating historical summary, and delicately balanced account of the intricacies of a most complex subject. The chapter on Romania concentrates on intolerance, defining and discussing it with a precision all too rare in treatments of this phenomenon. It is significant, incidentally, that the Romanian revolution of December 1989 was sparked by government removal of a Reformed parish priest in Timişoara. Albania, characterized by a religious complexity inversely proportional to its size, deserves its separate chapter. Ukrainianists may be struck by the parallels between the government-sponsored autocephaly of the Albanian Orthodox Church in 1922 and that of Ukraine in 1919–1920 (pp. 207–209).

Chapter nine, on "The Russian Orthodox Church in Transition," contains a most enlightening discussion of "system collapse, civil strife, and religious revival" (pp. 235–38), drawn in part from a 1992 article. Sounding a leading motif of her work, the author notes that because churches "are committed to systems of values that they ideally would like to become dominant is society," "religious organizations . . . are naturally political" (p. 238), and that "religion, concerned with the values of society, is intrinsically political" (p. 240). There is hope in Ramet's suggestions that "within the ideological corpus of Russian Orthodoxy may be found not merely 'reactionary-romantic authoritarianism,' but other proclivities, potentialities, and possibilities" (p. 245).

In a chapter aptly entitled "A House Divided," Ramet ably summarizes the complex church history of Ukraine since the 1596 Union of Brest, concentrating, however, on the emergence of the Greek Catholic Church and three rival Orthodox Churches since 1989. Even with reliance on the most trustworthy sources, however, a few errors or inconsistencies inevitably creep in. Thus, she states that Ukrainian Communist Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev attended Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi's funeral in November 1944 (p. 249). This is apparently inconsistent, however, with the statement by Bohdan Bociurkiw in his cited monograph that a letter to Pope Pius XII by Metropolitan Josef Slipyj describing the funeral "should lay to rest the still current rumours about Khrushchev's participation in the funeral bearing a wreath from Stalin" (Bociurkiw, *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State [1939–*

1950], p. 81n56). The statement that Greek Catholics "routinely said Mass in 'padlocked churches'" (page 250) would be better phrased "routinely celebrated the liturgy outside 'padlocked churches.'" On page 252 Ramet says that the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church "regained its legal registration in December 1989." More precisely, in December 1989 the Soviet government agreed to register individual Greek Catholic parishes; registration of the Church as a whole, however, was only accomplished in June 1991. Such details aside, this account is thorough and accurate, and the characterization of the overall situation rings true. Noteworthy is the author's concluding observation that the emergence of a single Ukrainian Orthodox Church, with perhaps 55 million faithful, would constitute the second-largest Orthodox Church in the world (p. 262).

The section on postcommunist trends begins with a survey of the "new evangelism" in postcommunist Europe, which includes some startling statistics. We learn, for example, that in 1994 Ukraine had approximately twice as many "nonindigenous protestant missionaries" as Russia (table 11.1, p. 266). When one corrects the misstatement of Ukraine's population in the table, one finds that Ukraine's ratio of missionaries to population was about six times that of Russia's. Ramet's analysis can be accordingly corrected to read that "Relative to population density, the most intense missionary activity has been centered in Estonia, [Ukraine] and Latvia, followed—at some distance—by Russia, Armenia and Georgia" (p. 266). Ukraine's more favorable religious legislation, and the absence of a single dominant church with the kind of political influence wielded by the Moscow Patriarchate in Russia, make it amenable to evangelization. At the same time, the evangelical challenge to the traditional Churches may prove a modernizing stimulus, much as in the sixteenth century, when competition from Protestantism and Counterreformation Catholicism spurred the Kyivan Orthodox Metropolitanate to reform.

In the next chapter, Ramet contrasts the fate of two churches in postcommunist societies: the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church in Poland. Using Bogdan Cywiński's concept of the "Julianic" and the "Constantian" church as an analytical model, she passes from the recent history of the weak, divided Bulgarian church to a detailed account of church-state relations in Poland. There, the Catholic Church has mostly found itself in "Julianic" opposition, first to the communist regime, then to postcommunist liberal constituencies. Warning that a Julianic church given access to power tends to turn theocratic, Ramet examines the controversies surrounding abortion, broadcasting, the constitution, and the concordat. Here, she seems to implicitly take current American notions of church-state relations as normative. While common enough, attaching political labels like "liberal," "progressive," and "conservative" to religious views (e.g., p. 306) is of questionable utility. With regard to the abortion controversy, for example, it is hardly self-evident that those who would extend legal protection to what is in their view an underrepresented class of persons should be termed "conservative," while

those who would deny it are called "progressive" (p. 305). Nonetheless, Ramet does illustrate how religious institutions sometimes seek to circumvent the democratic process; one is reminded that legislation is no substitute for evangelization.

The most colorful chapter is surely the thirteenth, from which this volume takes its title, and which is subtitled "The Rise of Nontraditional Religions." Here the author exhibits a laudable and all-too-rare respect for even the most bizarre religious notions that have appeared in postcommunist space. Regarding the extraordinary claims of White Brotherhood leader Maria Tsvigun, however, one can only concur (however reluctantly) with Ramet's question, "Why would Christ want to be reincarnated specifically as a *Ukrainian* . . . ?" (p. 315). Among the author's astute concluding observations are that nontraditional religious associations mirror tendencies in both mainline religions and in the West, that certain typically "American" features help evangelical groups gain converts (p. 333), and that the fundamentalist religious personality in some ways coincides with the authoritarian personality type (pp. 333–34). It is no revelation, however, that "the desire to proselytize . . . is common to most, if not all, Christian religions" (p. 334): one need only consult Matt. 28:19–20 to see why it could hardly be otherwise.

Ramet's final chapter, on "The Nature of Religio-Political Interaction," is the most interesting theoretically. Some of his assertions, to be sure, are problematic. The choice of "Ego te absolvo" for the chapter title leads to a discussion in which absolution seems to be confused with *a priori* approval: that "absolution is sometimes given in advance" (p. 335) is a contradiction in terms. Nor is the story of Abraham and Isaac (Genesis 22), cited on the same page, an example of absolution, for if to sacrifice one's son is to carry out God's will, there is nothing for God to absolve. Ramet's assumption of an antithesis between divine commands (e.g., that Abraham kill his son) and moral imperatives (e.g., against killing) (p. 337) is debatable: to the religious believer, God's commands are not distinguishable from the moral good, for God is good by definition, and the love of God is not distinguishable from the "love of the good and of Reason." That God stayed Abraham's hand is thus not incidental, but essential, to the point of the story. For the same reason the author's corollary, that because religious claims regarding positive law are registered "on behalf of obedience to divine authority" (as opposed to rationalistic notions of the good), they may be seen as "tending toward theocracy" and intolerance (pp. 337–38), is not convincing, except to the extent that all value systems tend to establish themselves to the detriment of competing ones. Any consistent Christian ethic must, in fact, tolerate "difference"; that its views on human conduct should play a role in a society's determination of what is harmful to public health, safety, or morals is natural, and far from theocracy.

Although Ramet's characterization of a morality based on divine command as "moral relativism" is even less convincing, one can only agree that moral relativism offers no sufficient basis for a secular state resistant to theocratic

pressures (p. 338). On what, then, can the state base its morality? Ramet suggests natural law or "right reason," but candidly points out that if positive law is to follow natural law, the problem remains of who should oversee and determine this correspondence—a legislative authority, an intellectual elite, or a religious body (p. 337). Conceding the inability of human reason to achieve a consensus in "gray areas" such as the abortion issue, she rightly points out that nevertheless, admitting such moral ambiguities "does not prevent one from asserting, at the same time, the absoluteness of moral dicta" (p. 338). The problem of finding an agreed-upon code for a diverse society in a secular sate thus remains unresolved. In any case, the author has amply demonstrated that "One does not need to be religious to apprehend the centrality of moral concerns in politics" (p. 339).

Although this book lacks a bibliography, the nearly sixty-seven pages of endnotes practically serve the purpose. There are a few minor gaffes of the editorial and typographic variety (e.g., information on Cuba on p. 30 is repeated on p. 43; the use of Polish diacritics is inconsistent and seems to have fallen victim to the vagaries of "find-and-replace"). They hardly detract from this volume's fitness as assigned reading in courses not only on East Europe or on religious groups, but on modern politics and society in general.

Sabrina Ramet's survey illustrates at least three important connections between religion and politics. First, religious policy often tracks other state policies. Second, religious issues are sometimes an important factor in political events (e.g., the 1989 Romanian revolution). Finally and most importantly, by offering alternative, competing visions of the social order, religious groups challenge political regimes, whether of an authoritarian or a liberal democratic stripe. Moreover, these social visions, linked as they are to the transcendent, may prove more compelling than mere political ideologies.

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THE UKRAINIAN RESURGENCE. By *Bohdan Nahaylo*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. xix, 608 pp. + 5 maps, 40 illus., index, bibliography. ISBN (cloth) 0-8020-4132-9 $55.00; ISBN (paper) 0-8020-7977-6 $24.95.

The emergence of independent Ukraine in 1991 has resulted in a steady stream of works that attempt to understand the history and political development of a nation that had previously been consigned to oblivion because of its subjugation to foreign powers. Independent Ukraine's importance as a key element of the so-called new "European security architecture" has also attracted the attention of non-Ukrainian political scientists and policy analysts. Given the long

ghettoization of Ukrainian studies, the broadening of interest is welcome. Formerly with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Munich and currently a senior adviser to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on the countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States, Bohdan Nahaylo initially sought to sketch a brief outline of how Ukraine achieved independence. He soon expanded his goals to produce "a surrogate concise political history of modern Ukraine and offer a tentative picture of the new independent Ukrainian state" (p. xvi). Of Ukrainian extraction, Nahaylo presents a moderate Ukrainian national viewpoint as he sketches chronologically the resurgence of Ukrainian nationalism, the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine's declaration of independence, and the political and foreign policy history of that new independent state between 1991 and 1996.

Nahaylo's study is political in the narrowest sense of the word. Readers will search in vain for an analytical framework as the author does not engage theories of nationbuilding, nationalism, and identity construction. Neither does he investigate the roles that Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians— below the level of the intelligentsia and politicians—played (beyond noting their participation in demonstrations and elections) in bringing about independence and sustaining thereafter a unified state. While including some of the newer scholarly studies of Ukraine's independence in his select bibliography, the author unfortunately does not engage those studies' conclusions, preferring to rely on his own interpretation of contemporary print and aural media accounts as well as interviews with some key political and cultural players. In the end, Nahaylo does not achieve his promise of "an acceptable balance between the descriptive and the analytical," erring as he does on the side of the descriptive (p. xvii). Indeed, at times the text is encyclopedic in nature.

The first chapter on the historical background of Ukraine is the weakest. Reducing over a thousand years of history to a mere nineteen pages, Nahaylo presents Ukraine solely as the victim of various powers, especially Russia. Nuances of historical complexity are absent, leaving the uninitiated reader to assume that everything that went wrong in Ukrainian history, including antisemitism, was imposed from the outside. The author might well have opened the book with a discussion limited to the immediate post-Stalin period in Ukraine. He is on much surer footing with his balanced examination of the Shelest years, although some readers may wince at his characterization of Khrushchev's ouster from power in 1964 as the result of "a palace coup" (p. 26).

In his nonthematic discussion of the developments that led to Ukrainian independence, Nahaylo does an excellent job in contextualizing. He keeps readers abreast of changing political directions in Gorbachev's Soviet Union as well as national resurgences in other non-Russian republics, especially the Baltic States. As a result, the lag in the Ukrainian national awakening of the period becomes fully apparent. Nahaylo also recognizes that Rukh, the national democratic movement, missed a valuable opportunity in 1989 to reach out to

mainly Russian workers in industrialized southeast Ukraine. Unfortunately, too many events on the road to independence become, for the author, turning points or watersheds, leaving the reader's head spinning.

Ultimately, Nahaylo believes that Ukrainian independence is "something of a miracle" (p. 549). He stresses the pragmatic nature of Ukraine's 1996 democratic constitution as recognizing a territorial rather than ethnic principle as the foundation for citizenship; the strides that both the governments of Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma made in foreign policy by reorienting Ukraine toward Europe, while maintaining restraint with regard to relations with the Russian Federation; and the peaceful transition of government in the aftermath of the 1994 elections. Consequently, in his conclusion he remains optimistic about Ukraine's future. His postscript, however, which briefly chronicles political and foreign policy events from the late spring of 1997 through the 1998 election, ends on a more pessimistic note. Here Nahaylo concedes that Ukraine may not be "adequately prepared to face the challenges of the twenty-first century" (p. 553). Obviously, predicting the future is very difficult and meeting the challenges of publishing deadlines and delays can be frustrating. But Nahaylo's change of mind in the postscript does underscore a fatal flaw in his book, and that is his reluctance to examine Ukraine's economic challenges. While mentioning miners' strikes, Kravchuk's exacerbation of Ukraine's internal problems, hyperinflation, Ukraine's continuing economic dependence on Russia, and other economic realities, he concentrates on political victories and progress in external affairs. Ironically—though with far less serious consequences—Nahaylo follows in the footsteps of Mikhail Gorbachev, who also concentrated on politics at the expense of economic reform. Other studies are beginning to appear, however, that address the more neglected topics of economic issues, regional differences, and the continuing legacy of a Soviet command economy, as well as the construction of new identities and a shared historical memory in independent Ukraine.

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THE LEGEND OF THE NOVGORODIAN WHITE COWL: THE STUDY OF ITS "PROLOGUE" AND "EPILOGUE." By Miroslav Labunka. Munich: Ukrainische Freie Universität, 1998. x, 339 pp. ISBN (paper) 3928-6873-1 $30.00.

The Tale of the White Cowl is a composition that purports to show the origin of the white mitre worn by the Novgorodian archbishops in the sixteenth century. A great deal of work on textual relations of the manuscript copies was done by N. N. Rozov, who identified five redactions of the *Tale*. He considered the

earliest of these to be the First Long Redaction, which contains mention of Rus′ as the Third Rome, but N. Subbotin had proposed that the Short Redaction, which does not mention Third Rome, was the earliest form of the text. Subbotin's suggestion seems more likely since the First Long Redaction corrects the chronology of the Short Redaction.

According to the *Tale*, Constantine the Great, in the early fourth century, presents Pope Sylvester with the white cowl as a gift for curing him of an illness. A subsequent pope (Formosus in the Short Redaction; unnamed in the First Long Redaction) sends the white cowl to a Byzantine patriarch (named Juvenal in the Short Redaction; Philotheus in the First Long Redaction), who then sends it to Archbishop Vasilii of Novgorod.

The problem with the chronology of the Short Redaction is that Formosus was pope in the late ninth century while Vasilii was archbishop in the early fourteenth century and there was no patriarch named Juvenal. The author of the First Long Redaction most likely realized the error of the Short Redactor in naming a person who was pope four-and-a-half centuries too soon. And, although Philotheus was not patriarch at the time Vasilii was archbishop, at least the century was right, since Philotheus was patriarch in the middle and late fourteenth century.

Attached to many copies of the *Tale* are two shorter works. The first is a letter or prologue self-attributed to Mitia the Small (generally thought to be a reference to Dmitrii Gerasimov) and addressed to Archbishop Gennadii of Novgorod in which the author explains how he found the *Tale*. The second is a "writing" or epilogue attributed to Gennadii Gonzov who was archbishop of Novgorod from 1484 to 1504 in which the author acknowledges receipt of the *Tale*. It is these two shorter works that Miroslav Labunka subjects to a thorough scholarly examination. Although a number of investigators (including this reviewer) question the self-declared attributions and corresponding early datings of these compositions, Labunka concludes that Gerasimov wrote the letter in the 1490s and that Archbishop Gennadii is indeed the author of the epilogue. As part of his argument for dating the epilogue early, Labunka compares its text to the "Short *Vita* of Maksim Grek," which has some similar passages. He convincingly shows that the author of the *Vita* borrowed from the epilogue of the *Tale*. Once we are able to establish the date of composition of the *Vita*, we will then, as a result of Labunka's analysis, be in a better position to establish a *terminus post quem non* for the writing of the epilogue.

Labunka's book is a work of the highest order of scholarship, not only because of its long, erudite, and informative footnotes, but also because of the nature of the questions Labunka raises about the texts at hand. He lays out with precise fairness the evidence and arguments both for and against early dating and traditional attribution. Then he provides his own reasoning for why he accepts one and not the other. A hallmark of sound scholarship is when the historian provides enough evidence for the reader to disagree. This means that

historians have as their primary goal the advancement of our understanding of the sources, and Labunka achieves that goal many times over.

The publication by the Ukrainische Freie Universität of Labunka's doctoral dissertation, completed by him at Columbia University in 1978 under the direction of Ihor Ševčenko, will make it far less likely that Labunka's important contribution to scholarship will be overlooked by other scholars writing on the subject. It also makes more accessible to students this model of genuine scholarly method.

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JEWISH-UKRAINIAN BIBLIOGRAPHY: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RESOURCES IN ENGLISH. Second revised edition. By Andrew Gregorovich. Toronto–Scranton, PA: Forum, 1999. 116 pp. $50.00. [Orders: A. Gregorovich, 620 Spadina Ave., Toronto, ON Canada M5S 2H4.]

Andrew Gregorovich, a retired librarian with a long history of distinguished service at the University of Toronto, has provided the scholarly world with the first significant bibliography of this nature, and as such his work belongs on the shelves of every serious collection of Ukrainian studies. This bibliography lists over one thousand entries, the majority of them scholarly volumes and articles, which deal directly or indirectly with the historical encounter of Jews and Ukrainians. One of the unique strengths of this work is Gregorovich's inclusion of many relevant works of fiction as well as several pamphlets, published in very small runs, which were circulated during the early years of post-Soviet independence. Also included are a number of more idiosyncratic items, such as an important newspaper advertisement (item 320) and a conference program (item 84).

The bibliography has several limitations, however. Gregorovich's intent in producing this work is clearly to aid Ukrainian apologetics, as he indicates in his introduction:

> The annotations in this bibliography are descriptive and also consist of criticism and evaluation as well as interesting quotes with a positive purpose. [T]he negative side [of Ukrainian-Jewish relations–HA] is so well represented in much of the literature that I did not feel compelled to dwell excessively on that tragic side of the history.

This caveat alone certainly does not disqualify the value of the bibliography, and Gregorovich does a reasonable job in listing all perspectives, whether hostile to Ukrainian interpretations or not. Nevertheless, this approach is especially unfortunate given that the bibliography is intended primarily for readers of English (despite the subtitle, a few Ukrainian-language works are also

included) and his rather loaded annotations limit its utility as a research tool for undergraduates. Gregorovich also includes an appendix of addresses and contacts for various Jewish and Ukrainian organizations—understandable in the context of providing material for engaging in contemporary political debate—as well as a list of "famous Jews who trace their ancestry to Ukraine," including "entertainment moguls" and others. The text is further marred by a small number of technical errors such as repetition of entries (e.g., items 13 and 16; 44 reprinted in 45) and the like, all of which could have been avoided with more careful editing.

Despite these reservations, Gregorovich's extensive revision of his first bibliography on this topic represents an almost ten-fold increase in size and constitutes an important contribution to the scholarship on the history of the Jews of Ukraine.

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CORRECTIONS

Pliguzov, Andrei I. "От флорентийской унии к автокефалии русской церкви," *HUS* XIX (1995): 513–530. The following was received from the author and represents a corrected conclusion to his article. This conclusion was not used at the time due to an oversight in the original volume:

В Троицк. 177 находим и еще один перевод с греческого, который примерно аналогичен тексту, опубликованному Ж. Минем в 160 томе «Patrologiae Corpus Completus» как «Апология» Марка Евгеника.[1] Сочинение, переписанное редактором-составителем Троицк. 177, не принадлежит Марку Евгенику (например, его нет в исчерпывающем каталоге Константина Н. Цирпанлиса).[2] Автором этого текста, по-видимому, являлся свидетель последних минут жизни Марка Евгеника иеромнемон на погребении Марка (в тексте: ἱερομνημονος, отсюда—испорченное славянское чтение «иероним») Федор Агалианос (Луи Пети предположил, что в создании текста принимал участие Георгий Схоларий.[3] Однако русскому читателю были важны не запутанные проблемы атрибуции, а резко антиуниатское настроение сочинения (в русском тексте оно похоже на устное завещание («словеса на кончине живота своего»): Марк Евгеник был единственным греческим иерархом, кто открыто не подчинился унии и до самой смерти (23 июня 1444 г. или 23 июня 1445 г.) яростно критиковал решения Ферраро-Флорентийского собора. Славянским переводчикам был доступен греческий список, близкий Vallicellanus Ф. 38, ф. 263–265 (издан Л. Пети, с разночтениями по восьми другим спискам). Дополнения славянского переводчика незначительны: прибавлена дата «м(е)*с*(я)ца априлѧ в лѣто 6951»[4] и заключительный раздел текста: «того же ѡстви*м* . . . аминь».

Теперь наш перечень московских списков документации, имеющей отношение к рецепции решений Ферраро-Флорентийского собора, можно считать исчерпывающим.

В приложении публикуем неизданные славянские тексты Послания 1443 года и сочинения Федора Агалианоса о последних днях жизни Марка Евгеника. При передаче текста я придерживался следующих принципов: все славянские буквы оригинала сохранены в публикации, надстрочные знаки не воспроизведены, сокращения под титлами раскрыты, необходимые для этого буквы поставлены в круглых скобках; титла всюду раскрыты по новейшей орфографии, выносные буквы внесены в строку и обозначены курсивом, опущенные перед ними или после них буквы также внесены в текст и помещены в круглых скобках; конъектуральные дополнения выделяются квадратными скобками (є); киноварные буквы переданы полужирным шрифтом (**bold**).

Harvard Ukrainian Studies XXI (3/4) 1997: 497–98.

1. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Seriae Graeca*, vol. 160 (Paris, 1866), cols. 536–37.
2. Tsirpanlis, *Mark Eugenicus and the Council of Florence*, pp.109–18.
3. См.: Louis Petit, ed., "Documents relatives au Concile de Florence. II Oeuvres anticonciliaries de Marc d'Éphese," in *Patrologia Orientalis*, vol. 17, f. 2 (Paris, 1923), p. 484, note a. Об Agalianus, см. C. J. G. Turner, "Notes on the Works of Theodore Agalianos Contained in the Codex Bodleianus Canonicus Graecus 49," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 61 (1968): 27–35.
4. На современное летосчисление эту дату можно перевести—если считать календарь мартовским—как апрель 1444 г.

Bilaniuk, Laada. "Speaking of 'Surzhyk,'" HUS XXI(1/2) June 1997: 100. The following phrase was erroneously inserted into the section "Semantics" from a reviewer's marks, and should have been removed before going to press. It was not the author's statement: "In standard Ukrainian it means 'to do,' and 'to work' is *pracjuvaty.* However, under influence of Russian *rabotat'* 'to work' there is a lexical shift among some *surzhyk* speakers for *robyty* to mean 'to work.'" Prof. Bilaniuk notes the possibility of nonstandard dialect influence on the semantic load of *robyty*, where Ukrainian dialects may utilize it as the unmarked lexeme meaning 'to work,' just as is the case in some forms of Polish, Slovak, and Czech.

HUS regrets these oversights.

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